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Wanaporn Techagaisiyavanit 
Good Governance in the Treaty-Making Process and Its Democratic Dilemma 
 
The emergence of Thailand’s treaty reform has not only brought change to its legal 
landscape, but also significant social, political and economic implications within the 
governing process. While it is political and social in the sense that the mechanisms 
introduced under Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution (treaty clause) are intended to secure 
greater accountability and transparency in the public administration through the increased 
involvements of the public and the institutional branches, the economic dimension derives 
from the fact that this provision directly deals with the scope of the executive’s authority in 
the conduct of international relations, trade and investment upon which domestic economy 
depends. This new approach makes perfect sense, especially from the liberal democracy 
perspective which believes in the restriction of government power. Nevertheless, these 
implications in which the effectiveness and responsiveness of government function have 
been substantially undermined come with a new dilemma and challenges which also pose 
threats toward the principle of democracy and its implementation.  
This dissertation hopes to provide a middle ground for Thailand’s treaty model 
through the exploration of the relationship between legal and political disciplines in the 
maintenance of the good governance principle and practice. In the derivation of the treaty 
model, the study draws out two important arguments to secure the government 
administration’s effectiveness, (i) the cultural component in which various democratic 
theories concerning the mechanism of public participation are examined to maximize the 
political role of the public, and (ii) the structural component in which the separation of 
vii 
 
powers principle is addressed in relation to creating the proper roles and functions of the 
legislature and judiciary in the foreign affairs context. The comparative study of the surveyed 
countries’ treaty practices, which reveals the executive’s central foreign affairs authority, the 
legislative manner of control and the application of judicial limits, is also used in order to 
help determine the scope of the public, legislature and judiciary involvements in the treaty 
process along with these two important components.  
The study opens up a new meaning of democracy in which practicality is the focus of 
its adoption. The proposed treaty model will not only carry out this important principle, but 
will also continue to operate as both the people’s safeguard against the encroachments of 
their interests and as the machinery that promotes a quality administration. Therefore, the 
research concludes that, while the current legal and institutional arrangements of the treaty 
clause are found inadequate to effectively respond to socio-political and economic 
challenges, the proposed treaty reform can become an important platform for a more 
ambitious model of the future. 
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Introduction 
Public participation and the principle of separation of powers have been known as 
ones of the most important democratic mechanisms that help legitimize a political process by 
enabling checks from the public and among the political organs whose functions and powers 
are prescribed by a constitution to ensure that their exercises of powers are in accordance 
with the objectives of democracy. Constituted as part of the civil and political rights, public 
participation is widely guaranteed by national constitutions and international law due to its 
ability to generate a quality political environment, namely accountability, responsiveness and 
transparency in the governing system. Along the line, the system of checks and balances 
under the principle of separation of powers is recognized for its significant role in 
maintaining the division of power and responsibilities among the institutional organs to 
prevent the domination of a particular branch over governmental activity. Because of their 
abilities to limit governmental authority through close public involvement and the 
supervision among these organs, it can also be said that the emphasis of these governing 
mechanisms’ function is particularly on the improvement of transparency and accountability 
in the public administration. Thus, in this traditional sense, public participation and the 
system of checks and balances are perceived as governing mechanisms that facilitate a better 
exercise of the people’s sovereign power by guaranteeing a type of political condition 
necessary for the maintenance of the system of self-governance.  
To this end, Thailand democratic reforms through the implementation of the 2007 
Constitution have strengthened these mechanisms by widely guaranteeing people’s right to 
direct political participation in several areas of public affairs while improving the ability of 
the legislature and judiciary in the scrutiny of the executive activity. This progressive move 
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made tremendous changes to the area of foreign affairs, particularly in the treaty-making 
process. Section 190 (the treaty provision) which came to replace Section 224 of the 1997 
Constitution requires direct public involvement in the making of a treaty, and has expanded 
the power of the legislature in the approval of a treaty negotiation and the function of the 
judiciary in deciding the constitutionality of the treaty. Section 190 is thus seen as a 
revolutionary treaty model which proves the Thai democracy to be simply more than a 
representative democracy. By adding a public participatory process and greater checks from 
the legislature and judiciary, Section 190 is intended to empower the people with additional 
tools for counter-balancing the government, and to improve the transparency and 
accountability of the process in accordance with the democratic principle. The executive’s 
extensive obligations, which involve a public hearing, legislative approvals (prior and after a 
treaty negotiation) and the policing power of the judiciary, therefore, have a drastic impact on 
the treaty-making process.  
Despite its democratic ideal that aims at increasing direct involvement of the people 
in governmental decision, the challenge that remains in the new phase of the Thai democracy 
is to ensure that these democratic mechanisms serve their purposes comprehensively and 
effectively in the sense that the improvement of transparency and accountability should not 
interfere with the responsiveness and effectiveness of governmental administration which are 
also vital to the management of domestic affairs and international relations. This question 
will therefore be addressed through the limits of the democratic mechanisms in the treaty-
making context. The reconstruction of Section 190 will require that the interest of the 
government in having an effective and responsive administration be taken into account 
through adjusting the scope of public participation, balancing the roles of the legislature in 
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the treaty approval and the judiciary in the enforcement of Section 190 for these mechanisms 
to best fulfill their functions. With this respect, my thesis statement asserts that while direct 
political participation and the system of checks and balances are essential to the 
establishment of democracy, maintaining proper balance between these limits (citizens’ 
participatory rights and checks from other institutional organs) and the government’s interest 
in having an effective administration are even more crucial to the success of the Section 190 
implementation and the procurement of the people’s interests in the realm of foreign affairs, 
which depend significantly upon the efficiency of government operation.  
In this dissertation, Chapter I will introduce the problems of Thailand’s current treaty-
making practice - the struggles we have had in order to affirm democracy and the principle of 
good governance by presenting internal and external weaknesses that have become the 
challenges in the maintenance of the two notions (accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness and efficiency) . Chapter II will briefly explain Thailand’s political evolution, 
and its current political structure to serve as background information and a clarification of the 
public role and the functions of each institutional branch under the 2007 Constitution. In 
Chapter III, the examination of the value of liberalism which focuses on individuals’ 
fundamental rights to be incorporated into the process of public participation will provide an 
argument for narrowing down the treaty categories to be subject to Section 190 process 
(discussed in Chapter V). The proposal of a liberalism method presented in Chapter III is a 
cultural approach which argues for fostering people’s democratic political culture through the 
adoption of liberalism in a participatory process. Chapter III by exploring the notion of direct 
public participation through assessing its value (reflected in different democratic theories), 
weaknesses and contribution to democracy will thus address the first area of concern, which 
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is the treaty scope. Then, in Chapter IV, I proceed to address the second and third areas of 
concern regarding the necessity of the executive competence and judicial limits in the realm 
of foreign affairs, which is a structural approach. The argument will go to support the 
readjustment of the treaty process in Chapter V by allowing the executive to prior determine 
its competence together with the other two branches (through the determination of whether 
the treaty in question must follow through with Section 190 process), and applying the 
concept of judicial deference under the circumstances where important government policy 
decisions may be involved. This is another important component which touches upon the 
question of political structure by suggesting how the principle of separation of powers can 
play its role in the maintenance of good governance, not only through the imposition of 
“checks” on the public administration, but also through preserving each institutional branch’s 
independence and autonomy (power and responsibility). The arguments for a properly 
designed public participation under the liberal approach (Chapter III) and the executive 
competence in the area of foreign affairs (Chapter IV) will then come into play in the 
reshaping of the Thai treaty-making model (a proposal to amend the treaty clause) in Chapter 
V which addresses i) the treaty scope (the readjustment of important treaty categories to be 
subject to public participation and legislative approval) and  ii) the treaty process (the 
suggestion of proper roles and manners of the legislature and judiciary’s involvements). 
Although we cannot deny the crucial roles of the legislature and judiciary in the 
establishment of democracy as they are the institutional instruments of ensuring 
accountability and transparency of a governing process, the operation of their functions must 
not exceed the necessary level required to sustain all other democratic elements (namely, 
government accountability, transparency, responsiveness and effectiveness) within the 
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machinery of the public administration. The study therefore neither aims at questioning 
whether we should advocate the use of public participation nor answering whether we must 
fully embrace the executive’s monopoly of foreign powers, but rather examining what type 
of issues should be subject to the participatory method, and what can be a proper treaty-
making process that will maintain balance between the people’s interests and the 
government’s responsibilities in order to secure the entire objectives of our democracy. The 
last Chapter (Chapter VI) will therefore provide the justifications why the proposed treaty 
model can fully serve these interests. 
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Chapter I: Good Governance in the Treaty Process and Problems in Democracy 
I. Introduction
This chapter will introduce the current democratic challenges faced under the 
implementation of the 2007 Constitution in the area of foreign affairs, which specifically 
requires special process in the making of treaties that are important to national interest. 
The chapter is intended to explain the dilemma of improving transparency and 
accountability in governmental administration without paying adequate attention to other 
democratic elements by showing how the reduction of the administration effectiveness as 
a result of these efforts has interfered with the goals of democracy and the principle of 
good governance. Section I presents two crucial political events which mark the periods 
of political changes for the better and for the worse – the birth of the so-called “People 
Constitution” (2007) and its aftermath. Riots and the unwelcoming gesture of the rural 
poor under the operation of the 2007 Constitution is the conundrum brought by these 
changes. These are problems that require us to dig deeper into its root causes rather than 
simply labeling them as the conflict of colors to answer why the mechanisms of the 
current Constitution could not address them. Section II will then explain one of the newly 
developed mechanisms under the Current Constitution in the area of foreign affairs which 
has embarked on the idea of “strong democracy” through the strenuous checks of 
institutional branches and direct public participation in the treaty-making process. This 
Section shows how the new treaty practice is adopted for the enhancement of democracy 
and the principle of good governance. In spite of the good faith effort toward advancing 
the democratic goals, Section III will present internal and external struggles concerning 
the preservation of administration effectiveness and responsiveness to the domestic and 
international demands that the country is facing in the maintenance of these ideologies, 
which in turn have weakened some of their underlying objectives. The challenges in 
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practice are also the obstructions to the democratic and good governance principles. Thus, 
Section IV will serve as a summary of the current issues of the treaty process and an 
introduction to a solution that build toward a proposed treaty model that would help 
maintain the balance of the democratic elements, the interests of the people, and the 
smooth function of government.   
II. Toward Political Changes 
The summer of 2010 brought one of the longest and deadliest protests in the Thai 
history. When the Red Shirts were formed in March of 2010, it was peacefully joined by 
nearly 140,000 people.1 However, the political movement which lasted nearly two months 
turned violent when the protesters’ demands had not been met. Numerous deaths and 
casualties were the results of the government’s attempt to disperse the demonstration. 
Grenades and gunfire were the primary means of communications between the two sides. 
A state of emergency was declared covering at least seventeen provinces nationwide.   
Back in September of 2006, another military action had previously been taken, but 
for the different objective - to overthrow the government of the former Prime Minister, 
Thaksin Shinawatra, who was at that time in New York City for a meeting of the United 
Nations General Assembly.2 The Royal Thai Army and the national police force roamed 
the streets of Bangkok. National television where the coup makers made their 
announcement ceased all scheduled programs. The Army declared martial law 
nationwide, ordered all soldiers to report to their barracks and banned unauthorized 
troops. Within a few hours, tanks and troops had successfully taken over the Parliament 
House and all other strategic points whereas 3,000 police forces were prepared to be 
deployed to ensure public order.3 Despite troops and tanks, the incidence turned out to be 
                                                 
1 Robert Horn, Thailand PM Gains Upper Hand in Protest Crisis, TIME, May 5, 2010, 
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1987118,00.html 
2 Coup D’Etat, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 20, 2006, at 1.  
3 Id.  
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the most peaceful, non-resisting military coup in the Thai history.4 There were no clashes 
and gunshots. The reason behind the non-resisting gesture of the public was believed to 
be “the alleged corruption and internal rifts that had reportedly plagued the Thaksin’s 
administration”.5 The previous national crises were blamed for its lack of transparency 
and public participation in the policy decisions, particularly in the pursuit of international 
trade negotiations. 
Despite the legitimacy claimed in the military intervention in 2006, it inevitably 
led to the bloody protest in 2010 whose proponents (primarily from the rural north and 
northeast) had benefited from the populist policies that Mr. Thaksin created during his 
five years in power - such as on health care, jobs and education. Unfortunately, the 
attempt of the opposite group to improve the country’s democratic condition (to fight 
against the corruption) was neither welcome nor supported by the rural poor. More sadly, 
the so called “People’s Constitution” of 2007, albeit equipped with several democratic 
mechanisms to ensure the system of good governance, has not seemed to solve the 
conundrum either. For one reason, establishing a democratic condition which requires 
people to be deeply involved, especially in the area that people may have little reason to 
care about, such as that of foreign policy, when they still struggle for their means is a leap 
of faith. And for another reason, subjecting the executive branch to the extensive check 
mechanisms in the areas which demand a speedy, responsive and effective administration 
when the branch barely has room to breath requires luck. Thus, this Constitution, 
although highly democratic, is still aspirational in its terms, and has posed critical 
problems in practice. But before we take a further look at what went wrong with our 
Constitution, we shall first appreciate the benefits it has to offer in the following section. 
 
                                                 
4 Anjira Assawanonda & Piyaporn Wongruang, Most Peaceful Military Coup in Thai History, BANGKOK 
POST, Sept. 21, 2006, at 6. 
5 Id. 
9 
 
III. Establishing “Strong Democracy” in Foreign Affairs 
The 2006 coup d’état led to the abrogation of the 1997 constitution with a promise 
to bring back a better democratic one. The plan was to “materialize” the 1997 
Constitution which “went a long way toward identifying basic rights of the people”, yet 
failed to achieve the objectives for the most part.6 Although the 1997 Constitution was 
praised for its several areas of improvements such as adding the provisions of the rights 
of locals over their natural resources, establishing additional checks and balances through 
independent governmental organizations, and providing the right of the people to petition 
for a bill, these initiatives have been deemed insufficient in terms of the areas they 
covered.7 The writers of the new Constitution were then charged with a challenging task 
in order to identify and incorporate the missing piece, “political will” of the people. The 
new phase of the Thai Constitution is thus intended to equip people with stronger civil 
and political rights, especially in the area of remote politics such as foreign affairs. The 
initiative, for the first time, requires people’s consultation and a more extensive 
legislative involvement in the making of important international commitments.  
Despite the claim of a failure to carry out people’s political will in the 
previous Constitution, the 2007 version yet faces another real challenge which is how to 
accommodate both citizens and government’s interests, and to put the mechanisms that 
guarantee people’s certain control over governmental activity into practice. The 2007 
Constitution was built upon a strong democratic principle that prioritizes people’s 
participatory rights in a wide range of national policy and legislations. The accountability 
thus takes place vertically (from people to government) and horizontally (among the 
branches). However, the downside of this heavily checked system is that it could place 
major obstructions in the executive administration if not properly balanced. The 
                                                 
6 Tunya Sukpanich, What Comes Next: A New Charter, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 24, 2006, at 1. 
7 Id.  
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administration ineffectiveness can pose challenges at two different levels. Domestically, it 
adversely affects a responsive characteristic of the government toward its people. And 
internationally, it causes disruption in the pursuit of the country’s diplomacy and foreign 
relations. These challenges faced by the government in fulfilling its constitutional 
obligations under the 2007 Constitution will be further elaborated in Section III. 
A. Good Governance and Democracy in the Thai Constitution 
i. Defining “Good Governance” 
The concept of good governance may be close to the notion of democracy in the 
sense that it is a type of governing method which describes how public institutions should 
conduct public affairs and manage public resources in order to guarantee certain 
outcomes that benefit constituents. According to United Nations Economic and Social 
Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), good governance refers to the process 
of decision-making which possesses eight major characteristics, namely “participatory, 
consensus oriented, accountable, transparent, responsive, effective and efficient, equitable 
and inclusive and following the rule of law”.8 These are the manners in which a public 
institution should exercise its power in order to secure this term. 
 The participatory-based model of the Thai Constitution which guarantees more 
extensive rights and opportunities for citizens to equally take part in the conduct of public 
affairs can easily fit into this term by possessing these characteristics such as public 
participation, inclusiveness and accountability. Party to the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Thailand affirmed its commitment to the Covenant in 
its Constitutional provisions, in particular Article 25 which guarantees citizens the right 
and the opportunity to take part in the conduct of public affairs.9 This commitment of 
                                                 
8 See http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/ProjectActivities/Ongoing/gg/governance.asp 
9 Accession on 29 Oct. 1996 with reservations to Article 1, 6, 9 and 20. International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 
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public participation is strongly reflected in several constitutional provisions, for instance, 
Chapter 3, Part 11 concerning liberties in connection with assembly and association and 
Chapter 7 concerning direct political participation by the people. In addition to the right 
of the people to vote, Chapter 7 also guarantees the right to petition the proposal of a bill 
to the National Assembly, the right to lodge a complaint to remove the persons from 
office, and the right to a referendum where the matter may affect “national” or “public 
interest” or is required by law.10 And more importantly, the Constitutional duty of the 
government to seek public consultation, for the first time, is extended to the conduct of 
foreign affairs under Chapter 9, Section 190. Thus, these numerous mechanisms reflected 
throughout the Constitution are strong evidences of the writers’ efforts to meet the 
definition of “good governance” in which people are truly engaged in the governing 
process, and, as a result, transparency, accountability and responsiveness in governmental 
administration can be improved. In particular, the problems of transparency and 
accountability are expected to be better addressed through Section 190 which involves 
substantial legislative close supervision and a public hearing in the making of important 
international agreements.  
ii. Defining Democracy  
The concept of democracy, which is to be further explored in detail in Chapter III, 
is also closely connected to the principle of good governance. This section will therefore 
briefly introduce this self-governing concept in order to provide a better understanding 
with regard to the important characteristics of the Thai Constitution. Democracy means a 
type of governing process in which the supreme power is vested in the people. The term 
                                                                                                                                                  
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec (last visited Sept. 5, 2011). 
10 In contrast to the 1997 version, the provision that grants the people the right to a referendum where the 
matter may affect “national” or “public interest” or is required by law has a strong democratic character to 
the extent that a referendum could serve as a final word for a policy decision, and not just an advisory 
opinion MANIT JUMPA, “kwamroo beungton kiewkab rathatumnoon hang ratcha anachak thai,” translated in 
BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE 2007 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 261 (2008). 
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thus suggests the power which is to be (whether directly or indirectly) exercised by the 
people in the political process to protect personal autonomy against arbitrary decisions 
made by a few.11 This notion of public participation provides a strong basis for self-
government by carrying out its very fundamental function, enhancing the abilities of the 
people to control the direction of their communities and to defend their interests 
accordingly.  
For Thailand, the efforts to strengthen the people’s participatory rights in the areas 
of national concerns are identifiable with Benjamin Barber’s term, “strong democracy”, 
which is defined by “politics in the participatory mode”.12 The framework of the 
Constitution opens up opportunities for the people to exercise their sovereign powers both 
through their representatives and through their own voices. The framework also allows 
broader checks from the legislature, judiciary and other constitutional independent 
organizations13 in the supervision of governmental activities. For instance, Section 190 
expands the legislature’s role in the approval of treaty negotiation for a wide variety of 
important treaties while specifically granting the constitutional court the power to decide 
the constitutionality of those treaties undertaken by the executive.14  Such provisions have 
a strong democratic implication in the sense that the exercise of governmental power will 
be limited and carefully watched by different organs and through political participation of 
the people to ensure that the government pursues its policy in accordance with its 
citizens’ interests. Thus, the public participation and strong check mechanisms have 
                                                 
11 Democracy is valuable because it expresses the will of the people, and supports individual autonomy 
under conditions of interdependence. Amy Gutmann, The Disharmony of Deocracy, in NEMOS: 
DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 128 (John W. Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds) (Vol. XXXV 1993). 
12 BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 151 (2nd ed. 2003). This type of democracy demands for a 
high degree of the state accountability which involves substantial direct participation on the part of people. 
GEORGE SORENSEN, DEMOCRACY AND DEMOCRATIZATION 10 (George A. Lopez et al., eds. 1993). 
13 These independent organs include the Election Commission, Ombusmen, National Counter Corruption 
Commission, State Audit Commission. See CONST. (2007), Ch. 11, §229-254 (Thail.). 
14 For details, see Section II, B (iii). 
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added more democratic elements to this representational system along the line with what 
is required under the notion of good governance.  
iii. Good Governance in Relations to Democracy 
Good governance and democracy therefore share a common political 
characteristic which can be described as a process by which power is exercised. Both 
concepts are about a quality of a governing procedure, one which is “good” and another 
which is “by the people”.15 Nevertheless, one may argue that governance by the people 
(democracy) is not necessarily “good governance” when it results in the alienation of the 
minority’s interest. This issue is something that the principle of good governance 
warrants within the element of equity and inclusion.16 However, rather than seeing both 
terms as conflicting, I would call good governance a subset of democracy as a concept 
that operates under the umbrella of self-governance. Whereas the term “good 
governance” is narrowly defined to signify a few prime elements, democracy confers a 
wider meaning of what it is to be “self-government”.17 The debates among different 
schools of thoughts are the evidence of a wide variety of qualities that each one regards to 
when defining the meaning of “democracy”. However, this section is only meant to show 
an overlapping concept between good governance and democracy which are believed to 
be enhanced under the new model of the Thai Constitution. 
                                                 
15 The term “good governance” is not only limited to the meaning of the process of decision making, but 
also refers to the quality which is to be distinguished from “bad governance”. These qualities are 
participation, the rule of law, transparency, responsiveness, consensus-oriented, equity and inclusiveness, 
effectiveness and efficiency, and accountability. Asiwaju Bola Tinubu, Good Governance, Democracy and 
Sustainable Development Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Dec. 15, 2008, P. 10 
16 Another distinctive aspect that departs the concept of good governance from democracy is basing a 
decision on consensus. Many models of democracy such as liberalism and agonism may reject this rationale 
by seeing it as suppression of differences and subordination of rights which could eventually lead to violent 
conflict. Carol C. Gould, Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCES 172-174 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). Bonnie Honig, Difference, Dilemma, and the Politics of 
Home, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCES 261(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (“[when] both oughts are 
compelling, and the situation that stages their conflict is inescapable. In such cases, I think if constructively 
at all, in terms of acting for the best and this is a frame of mind that acknowledges the presence of both the 
two oughts”). 
17 These interpretations reflect in the different models of democracy such as classicalism, developmental 
republicanism, liberalism, elitism, pluralism, agonism. 
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Several elements of good governance can be identified within the concept of 
democracy. Among other things, good governance emphasizes participation in the 
governing process (whether private or public) by stakeholders. By the same token, the 
system of self-government (democracy) which refers to a mode of decision-making over 
which the people exercise their control also suggests the significance of the people’s 
involvement in such a process to assure their ownership in a sovereign power. Political 
participation within the meaning of democracy may range from electoral process to direct 
public participation in important policy decision. In a slightly different aspect from good 
governance, democracy is also an end objective. Democratic means established under 
various models of democracy are themselves the goal of a governing system that the 
principle of good governance defined, namely accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness and effectiveness. Therefore, the questions of what is the purpose of good 
governance and how we come about it are where democracy comes into the equation.18 
The means that the principle of good governance warrants also serves as an objective of 
democracy. And, these qualities must be secure for a system to be democratic and good 
governing. For the purpose of this dissertation, these characteristics will be our focus in 
the development of a treaty-making model in Chapter V. How far the Thai Constitution 
has carried these concepts into practice, especially in the area of foreign affairs will be 
examined in the following section.  
B. A Move Forward: Democracy and Good governance in Foreign Affairs 
i. Thailand’s Treaty-Making in the Historical Context 
Thailand’s treaty-making experiences dated back to the Sukhothai period (AD. 
1257-1350) in which Siam (the previous name of Thailand) maintained foreign relations 
with China, followed by Ayudhya (AD. 1350-1767) and Ratanakosin periods (AD. 1767-
                                                 
18 Tinubu, supra note 15, at 11. 
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present).19 However, it was the Ratanakosin period that expanded and modernized the 
treaty practice of Thailand with western powers such as Great Britain and the United 
States.20 The vast majority of treaties concluded were commercial in nature. The Treaty 
of Amity and Commerce with the United Kingdom in 1826 became Thailand’s first 
recognition of Western power in the region. In 1833, the United States began diplomatic 
exchanges with Siam, as Thailand was called until 1938. However, it was during the later 
reigns of Rama IV (or King Mongkut, 1851-68), and his son Rama V (King 
Chulalongkorn (1868-1910), that Thailand established firm rapprochement with Western 
powers. The Thais believe that the diplomatic skills of these monarchs, combined with 
the modernizing reforms of the Thai Government, made Siam the only country in South 
and Southeast Asia to avoid European colonization.21  
The turning of the twentieth century marked a major change of the Thai’s treaty-
making history. By joining the peace treaty of 1919 and undertaking internal legal 
reforms, Thailand gained better recognition as becoming a modernized nation, which led 
to the abolition of unequal treaties with several western nations.22  
ii. The Tradition: Executive as the Authoritative Treaty-Maker 
The first Constitution of Thailand (June 24, 1932) formalized the practice of a 
treaty-making.23 Whereas the treaty-making process has been changed back and forth in 
later Constitutions, the tradition that remains unaltered is the plenary foreign affairs 
power of the executive with accountability toward the legislature whenever certain 
categories of treaties were to initiate. The common categories that are subject to 
                                                 
19 Sompong Sucharitkul, National Treaty Law and Practice: Thailand, in 27 NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE : FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM 173, 174 (Leigh 
Monroe et al., eds.1995). 
20 These are Treaty of Amity and Commerce with the United States in 1833, Treaty of Friendship, 
Commerce and Navigation with Great Britain in 1855, France, Denmark and the German Republic in 1858, 
and Portugal and the Netherlands in 1859 and 1860 respectively. Id. at 174-175. 
21 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2814.htm. 
22 This recognition is especially significant to the abolition of extraterritorial regimes that had previously 
been imposed upon Siam through the refusal of the application of Siam’s law upon foreigners. Id. at 177. 
23 Id.  
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parliamentary approval are peace treaties, treaties which provide for a change in the 
territories of Thailand or affecting its sovereign rights, and treaties which require 
legislative enactments for implementation.24 These types of treaties require the Executive 
to seek guidance and consultations from the National Assembly (the Parliament) which is 
composed of the Senate and the House of Representatives. This political structure will be 
elaborated in Chapter II. 
 The requirement of active participation of the public in the treaty-making process 
was never present in the Thai constitutional history. Public involvement rather took place 
in a form of treaties publication, also known as Government Gazette, which is tantamount 
to promulgating the treaty as the law of the land. Nevertheless, a collection of treaties 
compiled and published by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was generally “for official 
use” with “limited circulation”.25 The role of the public in the matter of foreign affairs 
was thus restricted. Treaty negotiations were undertaken without public 
acknowledgements and inputs. And thus, the executive’s conduct in the foreign affairs 
was primarily subject to legislative supervision, and not directly accountable to the 
people.  
iii. Against the Conventional Practice 
It was the conclusion of several Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and other treaties 
undertaken by Thaksin’s Administration that triggered the claims of the opposition party 
and others as non-transparent for aiming at favoring his affiliated business enterprises. 
Such claims brought major changes to the treaty-making process. 
                                                 
24 See, e.g., CONST. (1932), Ch. 4, § 54 (Thail.) (repealed 1946), CONST. (1946) , Ch. 4, § 75, § 76 (Thail.) 
(repealed 1947), CONST. (1949), Ch. 7, § 153, § 154 (Thail.) (repealed 1951), CONST. (1991), Ch 7, § 156, § 
177, § 178, (Thail.) (repealed 1997).  
25 Sucharitkul, National Treaty Law and Practice: Thailand, in 27 NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: 
FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 19, at 191. 
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Section 190 may be seen as a revolution of a treaty-making process that makes 
foreign affairs no longer simply the matter of a state.26 Traditionally, the power to 
negotiate and conclude international treaties is vested in the executive branch under the 
prerogative of the King.27 The Cabinet is deemed the vital decision-making body since its 
decisions can become the source of authority for government actions. A proposal of any 
treaty negotiation must be subject to the ratification of the Cabinet before it can proceed. 
The Cabinet is thus traditionally an independent authority that undertakes the initiation of 
the vast majority of treaty negotiations, whereas the role of the Parliament had always 
been “supplementary or complementary” as ones being called upon to approving treaties 
in limited cases as reflected in Section 224 of the 1997 Constitution.28   
A treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territories 
or the jurisdiction of the State or requires the enactment of 
an Act for its implementation must be approved by the 
National Assembly.29 
However, this authoritative tradition is being replaced by the increasing 
parliamentary, judicial and public roles in the treaty-making process under the 
Constitution of 2007. Not only does Section 190 require specific procedures which 
subject treaty-makings to public scrutiny and legislative approval, the provision also 
broadens the categories of treaties that must undergo such a process which is subject to 
the supervision of the Constitutional Court, the sole interpretative authority. These 
categories are as follows: 
A treaty which: 
                                                 
26 In the old days, a treaty-making is a matter reserved for the privileges. Very few selected officers were 
afforded opportunity to attend international treaty negotiations.  Id. at 193. 
27 Although the King is absent from any formal political role, he is often used as the legal representation of 
the executive government. This is due to its unique tradition dated back hundreds of years that regards the 
King as a divine figure and a guardian of his people.  
28 Jaturon Therawat, Roles of the Parliament in Treaty Making Process under the Thai Constitution 2 (Nov. 
21, 2008) (Working Paper, on file with the King Prajadhipok’s Institute), available at 
http://www.kpi.ac.th/kpith/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=264&Itemid=9.  
29 CONST. (1997), Ch. 7, § 224, (Thail.) (repealed 2006). 
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(1) Provides for change in the Thai territories or 
extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign 
rights or jurisdiction in accordance therewith or in 
accordance with international law 
(2) Requires the enactment of an Act for the implementation thereof 
(3) Has extensive impacts on national economic or social security, or 
(4) Generates material commitments in trade, investment or 
budget of the country must be approved by National 
Assembly.30 
 
The specific procedure is described in the following paragraph: 
 
Prior to undertaking a treaty negotiation of any treaty 
specified under paragraph two,  
(1) The Council of Ministers shall provide information and 
cause to be conducted public hearings, and shall give the 
National Assembly explanations on such treaty. 
(2) For this purpose, the Council of Ministers shall submit to 
the National Assembly a framework for negotiations for 
approval. 
(3) When the treaty under paragraph two has been signed, the 
Council of Minister shall, prior to the declaration of 
intention to be bound thereby, make details thereof 
publicly accessible… 
 
In the case where there arises a problematic issue under 
paragraph two, the power to make the determination 
thereon shall be vested in the Constitutional Court…31 
 
Aside from broadening the first treaty category to include “extraterritorial areas 
over which Thailand has sovereign rights or jurisdiction”, the 2007 Constitution, which 
came to replace the 1997 version, has encompassed two additional types of treaties 
(having economic and social impacts, or generating material commitments in trade, 
investment or budget of the country) that must be subject to its procedure.32 These efforts 
are in accordance with the preamble of the Constitution that clearly stated the 
commitment in adhering to “the protection of rights and liberties” and “of public role and 
participation” of the people in the government. Thus, to ensure the accountability, 
responsiveness and openness of government’s foreign affairs administration, the types of 
                                                 
30 CONST. (2007), Ch. 9, §190, (Thail.) (amended 2011). 
31 Id.  
32 Expanding the language from “the change in the jurisdiction of the state” to “the change in the 
extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign right or jurisdiction” may give rise to the 
Governmental constitutional mandate in the eventual future claim of territories that Thailand may have 
sovereign right to exercise upon. Therawat, supra note 28, at 9. 
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treaties that are subject to the public and legislative scrutiny have been expanded as well 
as the meaning of “treaty” which is intended to include any kind of international 
commitments.33 
Against this backdrop, given this broad language, nearly all treaties run the 
potential risk of being inadvertently interpreted by the Constitutional Court to be subject 
to Section 190 process. The addition of the third and fourth criteria basically serve as  
“catch all” categories that do not address the extent of “extensive impacts” and “material 
commitments” whereas the legislative intent is of little help since it only indicated the 
purpose of setting the principle of a treaty-making process.34 Although the recent 
amendment of Section 190 aims at addressing this issue by requiring legislation to 
determine the types of treaties to be subject to the special treaty process,35 the solution is 
deemed temporary, and can fall short of any anticipation on the emergence of the new 
kinds of treaties. Section 190 has therefore shrunken the executive’s primary role in the 
treaty conduct through expanding the meaning of important treaties. The making of 
treaties, which had traditionally been shielded from the public eye, is now the public 
subject with close supervision of the legislative and judicial bodies. The executive branch 
is now deemed more accountable than ever. What could go wrong with this highly 
democratic mechanism might have been beyond the anticipation of the writers as 
problems became materialized under the implementation of the 2007 Constitution.  
 
 
                                                 
33 CONSTITUTION DRAFTING ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE THAI CONSTITUTION (2007), 
available at http://www.nesac.go.th/library/Main_highlight/pdf/cons_book2550.pdf.  
34 “The terms economic security and social security are also too vast and subjective, hence, a potential cause 
of controversy and an open door to abusive interpretation that restrain the Government’s freedom of actions 
and to a large extent compromise its stability by the constant risks of being accused of the 
unconstitutionality of its actions”. Therawat, supra note 28, at 7. 
35 “There shall be the law on the determination of the treaty types, negotiation framework, procedures and 
methods for the conclusion of treaties having extensive impacts on national economic or social security or 
generating material commitments in trade or investment…” CONST. (2007), Ch. 9, §190, ¶ 5 (Thail.) 
(amended 2011) (emphasis added). 
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IV. Problems in the Democratic Treaty-Making Process  
Thailand has taken a progressive step to enhance the legitimacy of the 
international treaty-making process. As introduced in Section II(A), the notion of “strong 
democracy” and good governance have been incorporated into the Thai Constitution of 
2007 by ensuring the direct involvement of the public and close supervision of other 
branches in the treaty-making process.36 Under these principles, the executive treaty 
power is directly held accountable to the people. Nevertheless, the implementation of the 
specific treaty-making procedures under the current Constitutional mandate has posed 
challenges to the government administration as well as the balance of powers among the 
institutional branches. The following section will put these issues into perspective by 
examining (i) internal weaknesses which concern the obstruction of effective and 
responsive governmental administration to domestic needs, (ii) external weaknesses 
relating to the country’s economy and credentials in the international realm as a result of 
the new constitutional requirement, and the role of the courts which have aggressively 
policed this constitutional commitment. Both internal and external weaknesses can 
eventually lead to the undermining of certain elements of democracy and good 
governance that we originally intended to secure.  
A. Challenges in Practice: Obstruction to Internal and External Affairs 
i. Internal Weaknesses: Ineffective and Unresponsive Administration 
 
The primary objectives of having both horizontal (parliamentary approvals) and 
vertical checks (direct public participation) are to generate a responsive, transparent and 
accountable government in the sense that treaties are to be undertaken in accordance with 
the will of the people and the interests of the country, and not in any particular 
                                                 
36 Benjamin Barber described the concept of strong democracy as a modern form of participatory 
democracy which rests on the idea of a self-governing community of citizens who are united to express the 
common goals and in the interest of the community. It is this method that gives rise to the legitimacy of 
politics. BARBER, supra note 12, at 117. 
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individuals’ favor. However, the newly designed constitutional requirements for the 
treaty-making process have frustrated certain democratic goals that the process also 
intends to secure. Far from improving the quality of responsiveness, these mechanisms 
can result in the reduction of the administration effectiveness in taking care of the issue at 
hand or other pressing matters, and in pursuing other valuable treaties that are 
unquestionable beneficial to the country’s economy and foreign relations.  
The new treaty-making process that allows an open-ended list of treaties to be 
subject to its substantial procedure can divert government’s attention, time, energy and 
resources away from other critical issues. Although the effort to tackle the vagueness of 
Section 190 treaties has been made through the requirement of enacting the law that 
restricts these important categories, the approach does not necessarily provide a safe 
haven for any new international commitments (which tend to evolve with changing 
conditions and the demands of the international environment)37 as long as the 
Constitutional Court acts as the primary guardian of the treaty determination. Thus, 
international agreements that bear different titles, but share the nature of the treaties listed 
in the legislation would still be subject to interpretation. And whether the executive will 
also retain this interpretive discretion is questionable. These Section 190 treaties are out 
of the question subject to the detailed treaty-making process which can be divided into 
two primary stages, prior to entering into negotiations and prior to being bound by the 
treaties. Both phases require public involvement and parliamentary approvals. With this 
respect, according to the constitutional requirements, it is not sufficient to make the 
framework of a treaty available to the public. The government must provide information 
and conduct public hearings to respond to and to receive public comments. This 
requirement certainly demands more than merely a passive role of citizens in receiving 
                                                 
37 Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 IOWA L.REV. 941, 977 (2004). 
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information. Pursuant to this understanding, first of all, the government has a positive 
duty to arrange and facilitate public forums to meet the constitutional obligations. 
Secondly, the mandate for the parliament approvals of the treaty frameworks make 
legislature responsible for keeping an eye on a wide variety of treaties (which will not 
necessary be restricted by the legislation), which could either result in their paying too 
much attention while piling up other issues or passing through the contents swiftly and 
allowing those treaty frameworks to go unattended.38 
The reduction of the effectiveness of the Thai government administration is 
posing two phases of challenges; the current situation in which the government’s 
resources, time and energy have been heavily invested into the constitutional 
requirements of the treaty-making process in order to avoid any sort of political backlash, 
and the future challenge in which the government will become further unresponsive by 
being tempted to fast-forward their obligations only to satisfy the rules while ignoring the 
true meaning of the procedure. A wide range of treaties could be potential candidates that 
mandate the government to provide resources for the public hearings.39 There is then a 
question of the effectiveness of the public participation mechanism. The quality of this 
democratic mechanism will be affected as a result of the government’s unmanageable 
workloads. While government resources will be drained down into the demanding treaty 
                                                 
38 By way of comparison in the U.S., despite the conviction in the predominant role of Congress in the 
treaty-making process, most senators agree that every international agreements should not be required to 
submit for advice and consent since it would be literally impossible to give all of them thoughtful 
consideration. And because of the large number, many would be of a routine nature which would result in 
Senate’s lack of attention.  John C. Stennis & J. William Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in 
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, 1971, at 5. See also LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, 
DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 58 (1990) (casting doubts on the serious scrutiny by the Senate of the 
executive agreements that were required to report to Congress under the Case Act). The failure of the 
legislative supremacy model in the early days brought a change of perception of executive power in 
America. The overriding problem was known for Congress’ inability to get anything done. MICHAEL 
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 118 (2007).  
39Report from the Standing Committee on the Problem of the Enforcement of the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Thailand BE 2550 (Mar. 24, 2009), in PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES IN THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
SECTION 190 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND BE 2550, at 4-8 (2009) (reporting 
comments and concerns expressed by government officers from the Ministries of Commerce, Foreign 
Affairs and Defense).  
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process due to the possible open-ended interpretations of the important treaties, public 
comments and concerns from the hearing which are formed as part of the people’s wills 
and intellects will run the risk of failing to take part in the final decision. Within this 
treaty-making framework, there is no guarantee that public hearing will play much role in 
shaping the treaty content.  The deficiency of the existing public participation 
mechanisms that encompass broad public issues (such as those affecting national budgets, 
having substantial social, economic impacts or national security) is that these issues do 
not provide the government enough reason and purpose to be responsive to the public 
views due to the fact that there are no urgent individual needs to attend to. Thus, the 
democratic dilemma here does not only include the government’s focus on satisfying its 
constitutional obligation in one area which causes unresponsiveness or results in delayed 
responses to other pressing issues, but also its insensitivity to the public comments in that 
particular area itself.40  
ii. External Weakness: The Impact on the Economy and Foreign Relations 
 
Section 190 has been subject to criticism for its substantial burdens that must be 
borne by the government which has not only caused major disruption in its 
administration, but also in the pursuit of the country’s foreign diplomacy.41 The increased 
                                                 
40 Another drawback presented by “direct democracy” is the inducement of the citizens’ excessive role in 
directing how to manage political and economic affairs, which sometimes render the administration 
impossible to handle the demands and expenses. The situation oftentimes inadvertently results in the 
staleness (indifference) of the administration due to the State’s budget issue. Direct Democracy, The 
Tyranny of the Majority, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/world/united-states/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15127600. 
41 The Constitution grants the executive branch the power to conclude treaties under the prerogative of the 
King. The additional treaty-making procedures which require public hearings and a presentment of a treaty 
framework to the parliament prior to a negotiation may cause major disruption in the government 
administration. Particularly, given a rapid change in the matter of international relations, several treaties are 
cooperative and friendly in nature. It tends to rather benefit than hurt the nation. The government should be 
entrusted with full discretion when concluding such treaty is in accordance with the power originally 
granted by the Constitution. Rujikej Chumkasorakit, Praden wikrao rang rathatumnoon hang ratcha 
anachak thai: bot bunyad kiewkub sonthisanya nai rathatumnoon [Analysis on a referendum: Treaty Clause 
in the Constitution], 24 (Working Paper, 2007). See also, supra note 39, at 4. (“Section 190 has presented 
the biggest challenge to the function of the department of negotiation due to the nature of the international 
transactions within the treaty-making process which requires expediency, secrecy and efficiency of the 
negotiating authority. The delay caused by the complexity of the current treaty process is also seen as a 
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uncertainty of whether a treaty in question is subject to the constitutional process has 
substantially stalled the administration in the conduct of foreign affairs. Given its broad 
scope of international agreements and the vague time frame of public participation, 
Section 190 has slowed down the administrative process of various government agencies 
as they hesitated to pursue international negotiations without several prior consultations 
for fearing of the violation of the constitutional process had the agreement been cast into 
Section 190.42 In fact, not only did these efforts to consult upset the country’s partners to 
the agreements due to the delay, they also turned out to provide no greater comfort than 
the government acting on its own when the office of the Juridical Council, which had 
previously acted as a primary legal counsel of the executive branch by giving advice 
regarding whether a particular agreement is subject to Section 190 treaty-making process, 
later declined its role.43 The deference of its opinion was due to the role of the 
Constitutional Court as the sole authoritative interpreter under the 2007 Constitution.44 
Thus, despite the amendment of Section 190, paragraph 5 concerning the law on the 
treaty category determination, there is little doubt that the legislation will solve the main 
issue which is the control of the Constitutional Court’s interpretation.  
This reaction clearly also has a detrimental effect on several beneficial agreements 
such as Bilateral Air Service Agreements, Bilateral Investment Treaties or the Convention 
for the Avoidance of Double Taxation which are primarily deemed to promote the 
national economy, and do not normally have negative consequences.45 The process of 
                                                                                                                                                  
contradiction to the condition of the World Trade Organization membership which requires that the party 
country make good faith efforts in facilitating free trade…”). 
42 JUMPA, supra note 10, at 295.  
43 Id (providing examples of the occasions that the Office of Juridical Council has declined its role in giving 
its opinion concerning treaties that may be subject to Section 190 procedure). 
44 Id.  
45 Bilateral Air Service is an agreement which two nations sign to allow civil aviation between their 
territories. The agreement normally commits the parties to open their routes, ports and deregulate the size of 
an airline which tend to benefit the tourism and airlines industries of the countries. Bilateral Investment 
Treaty (BIT) is a treaty that obligates the parties to guarantee certain rights of foreign investors in a host 
country. This treaty is deemed to draw and create incentives for foreign capitals and investment. The 
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these treaties, as well as others that are cooperative in nature, has been inevitably delayed. 
The country thus faces losing economic opportunities that are contingent upon the entry 
into force of those treaties. At the same time, many international agreements whose terms 
are subject to automatic renewal at the end of their enforceable period are made 
impossible under this new constitutional requirement. This does not only have certain 
negative economic consequences, but also the impact on the country’s international 
relations and its credibility. The example is reflected in the constitutional challenge of 
Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) that had set Japan off after 
their nearly three years of negotiations.46 Whereas the constitutional safeguard in the area 
of the treaty-making is meant to preserve the common goods, the national interests are 
also at stake on the other end. 
The roles of the courts in vigorously enforcing the constitutional provision are 
proven to present major obstructions in government administration, and a threat to the 
country’s established international relations. The erosion of the executive zone took place 
through their expansive interpretation of treaties that require public hearing and 
parliamentary approvals (demonstrated in the case of Joint Communiqué between 
Thailand and Cambodia dated June 18, 2008) as well as approving the public hearing 
standard (the Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement-JTEPA).47  The Japan-
                                                                                                                                                  
Convention for the Avoidance of Double Taxation relieves an entity or an individual from paying two 
separate taxes on the same property for the same purposes during the same period of time which again 
provides economic incentives for foreign investments. See also, Charter Change Goes Before Parliament, 
BANGKOK POST, Nov. 22, 2010, http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/207499/charter-change-goes-
before-parliament (“A foreign affairs official who is an expert on legal affairs supported the amendment of 
Section 190 as a means to move forward stalled negotiations”). 
46 Academics and Activists to Turn to Constitutional Court on the Unconstitutional JTEPA. PRACHATHAI 
NEWS, Feb. 24, 2010, http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/300. 
47 Bangkok Pundit, Yellow Shirt Turns on Abhisit, ASIAN CORRESPONDENT, Nov.24, 2010, 
http://asiancorrespondent.com/42930/yellow-shirts-turn-on-abhisit/ (“finally, someone willing to 
admit [that] the source of the problem is the court decision in 2008 which applied such a broad 
interpretation to Section 190”). Cf., Another criticism of the Ultra Vires of the Constitutional Court also 
came from the case concerning the accession of Thailand to the Bio-Diversity Convention under Section 
224 of the Constitution B.E. 2540 in which the Court had decided unconstitutional for lacking 
parliamentary approvals. The interpretation of the Constitutional Court was felt erroneous by inadvertently 
expanding the parliamentary role in the treaty making process. Therawat, supra note 28, at 3.  
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Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) is the case example that involves the 
demand on an Administrative Court to determine government’s standard of conduct in the 
treaty-making process, specifically the holding of a public hearing. Although the 
Administrative Court declined its jurisdiction, it had done so due to its lack of power on 
the constitutional matter, and not on the ground that it cannot impose a public hearing 
standard in the treaty-making process. 48 JTEPA, nevertheless, became the first case that 
sounded the alarm of our foreign relations. The constitutional challenge of the Thai-
Japanese trade agreement created tension and resentment among the Japanese negotiators 
and investors as they felt deceived and dishonored.49 The outcome of the court’s decision 
to withhold Joint Communiqué between Thailand and Cambodia also resulted in the 
severance of Thailand-Cambodia diplomatic relations.50  
The types of treaties in which public participation and legislative involvement 
must at least be warranted are thus dependent upon the judiciary interpretation of Section 
                                                 
48 In this case, the plaintiffs representing people from various sectors alleged that their lives had been or 
would be adversely affected from the conclusion of JTEPA which had not completed the public hearing 
process. Despite the defendant (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)’s contention that it had assigned the 
Chulalongkorn University research centre to conduct public hearings 3 days following the cabinet 
decisions, the plaintiffs claimed that people were not given sufficient opportunities to participate because 
the hearing was not widely announced and took place for a short period of time. Such conduct shows bad 
faith of the government when it tries to exclude people from meaningful participation and discussions 
which, in effect, prevent people from effectively checking the government’s exercise of power. This 
constitutes “an unlawful act by an administrative agency or State official” within the meaning of Article 9 
of the Act on Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure B.E. 2542 (1999) 
which gives rise to the Administrative Court jurisdiction. The Administrative Court of First Instance 
rejected the claims and its decision was affirmed by the Supreme Administrative Court on the ground that 
the conduct of foreign affairs is conferred by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, not by any 
legislation. Whereas Article 9(1) only grants the Administrative Court its jurisdiction over disputes in 
which government officials act “in a manner inconsistent with the law or the form, process or procedure”, 
the government’s failure to act in accordance with the constitutional requirements is out of the question falls 
outside the Administrative Court’s discretion. Affirming that it had no jurisdiction according to Article 9, 
the Administrative Court did not get to determine whether the public hearing claimed by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs to be meaningfully held meets the “standard” of public participation. Saan Pokklong [The 
Administrative Court], Mar. 30, 2007, Ruling No. 178/2550 (Thail.), available at 
http://www.admincourt.go.th/50/s50-0178-o01.pdf.   
49 Supra note 46.  See also Petchanet Pratruangkrai, Japanese Worried about Delay of Pact, THE NATION, 
Oct. 18, 2006, http://www.mfa.go.th/jtepa/en/archives/news_2857.html 
50 Shortly after Cambodia’s appointment of Mr.Thaksin Shinawatra as economic advisor to Cambodia’s 
prime minister, each side then recalled its ambassador from each other to signal the official end of their tie. 
Thomas Fuller, Thailand Recalls its Ambassador to Cambodia, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/06/world/asia/06thai.html.  
27 
 
190. Section 190 of the Thai Constitution has identified categories of the shared “vital 
interests” (which should be seen as the interest of the country) in the form of different 
types of international agreements, namely those affecting the Thai territories, its 
sovereign rights, the laws, national economic or social securities, or generate material 
commitments in trade and investments of the country. To this effect, it is up to the 
Constitutional Court to decide what constitutes a treaty, and which one that must undergo 
the Section 190 treaty-making process. The provision did create a big loophole providing 
no clear answer to such a question, and “to interpret whether a treaty will have negative 
effects on the economy and society is subject to each interpreter”.51 Thus, the process will 
depend on whether the court will apply an expansive or limited interpretation. The 
requirement of the legislation enactment to determine Section 190 treaty types may 
provide a certain restriction on the Court’s interpretation. But the approach will only 
serve as a temporary remedy as the new meanings of international terms and 
commitments are meant to expand with an ever changing international environment, and 
the demands of the international community. 
Under the implementation of former Section 190, the case of the Joint 
Communiqué between Thailand and Cambodia dated June 18, 2008 (concerning the Thai 
government’s acknowledgment of Cambodia’s enlistment of the Temple of Preah Vihear 
as a World Heritage site) had been interpreted by the Constitutional Court as a treaty that 
affects Thailand’s “sovereign rights”, “territories” and has “extensive impacts on national 
economic or social security”.52 According to the Constitutional Court’s rationale, the 
                                                 
51 Supra note 47.  
52 Located near the border of Thailand and Cambodia, the Temple of Preah Vihear has long been the subject 
of dispute concerning its ownership. This is due to complicated history in which the French colonial map 
mismatched that of the Thai, showing the line deviating from the watershed in the Preah Vihear area while 
placing the entire temple on the Cambodian side. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled in favour of 
Cambodia, holding that Cambodia has sovereign right over the Temple of Preah Vihear. Thailand has then 
made a reservation objecting such decision, but had never made an appeal. In addition, the ICJ’s failure to 
specify territory borderlines over which Cambodia has sovereign right left the dispute unresolved. Temple 
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content of the Joint Communiqué was a formal recognition by the Thai government of 
Cambodia’s full sovereign right over the Temple and its surrounding area, which could 
affect the Thai entitlement to the claim over the Temple territory which has not yet been 
settled, and to its persistent objection to the International Court of Justice’s ruling in 
1962, in the future.53 The possible loss of the country’s sovereignty over a territory is 
sufficient to trigger the Section 190 procedural mandate. Such interpretation is of course 
no longer restricted to “[a] treaty which provides for a change in the Thai territory”, but 
to include those that may create the “possible loss of sovereignty on a parcel of land”.54 
Although this change is meant to clarify the old term, “in jurisdiction”, it is yet a subject 
of a battle between the executive who prefers a narrow interpretation and the judiciary 
who is more willing to apply a broad interpretation to encompass the areas over which the 
country may have possible sovereign rights.55 And as a result, under the aggressive role of 
the judiciary, the new term of Section 190 (“extraterritorial areas over which Thailand 
has sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance therewith or in accordance with 
international law”) could invite an expansive judiciary interpretation to include any type 
of treaty that may lead to such effect.  
 The same issue may also arise by the vague term “extensive social and economic 
impacts” when there is no standard for the extensiveness. The process of qualifying 
treaties of course involves the speculation of the impacts. Another core decision rendered 
by the Constitutional Court was that the Joint Communiqué could create social impacts 
                                                                                                                                                  
of Preah Vihear (Cambodia v. Thail.), 1962 I.C.J. 45 (June 15), available at http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/45/4873.pdf. 
53 Saan Rathatumnoon [The Constitutional Court], Jul. 8, 2008, Ruling No. 6-7/2551 (Thail), available at 
http://61.19.241.65/DATA/PDF/2551/A/108/1.PDF 
54 Therawat, supra note 28, at 9. 
55 Kanitta Topothai, The Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on the Matter of Being the International 
Agreement under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 Section 190 with Regard to the 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 28 (Dec. 12, 2008) (an academic document submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the program of senior executives on criminal justice administration, National Academy 
of Criminal Justice)(on file with the Library of Courts of Justice), 
http://elib.coj.go.th/managecourt/data/c12_4.pdf 
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by affecting social and economic rights of citizens living in the disputed area as well as 
the relations among citizens of both countries living side by side.56 Remarked by a 
foreign affairs official, “the Thai-Cambodian Joint Statement signed by then foreign 
minister Noppadon Pattama and Cambodian Deputy Prime Minister Sok An on June 8, 
2008, in support of Phnom Penh’s plan to list Preah Vihear temple as a World Heritage 
site was a victim of this differing interpretation. The Constitutional Court on July 7 in the 
same year ruled the statement affected national security and society in general, even 
though this was not the case”.57 Such broad criteria will eventually create all kinds of 
claims upon treaties “when it does not matter whether the changes under Section 190 are 
for the worse or for the better and also when many changes can affect the economic or 
social lives of the people” 58 in some ways. 
The amendment of Section 190 in 2011 was the evidence of these impractical 
aspects of the treaty process that became obstacles to the implementation of fuller 
democracy.59 Nevertheless, it is questionable whether this minor change can make a 
whole difference in addressing the underlying problem, which requires balancing the 
roles of the institutional branches and the public in the treaty process rather than simply 
making a list of important treaties. The ruling of the Constitutional Court on the Joint 
Communiqué between Thailand and Cambodia may signify the judiciary role in 
upholding the participatory rights of the people and constitutional commitments of the 
                                                 
56 Saan Rathatumnoon [The Constitutional Court], Jul. 8, 2008, Ruling No. 6-7/2551 p. 24 (Thail), 
available at http://61.19.241.65/DATA/PDF/2551/A/108/1.PDF. But see, Thugs Templar, THE ECONOMIST, 
Sept. 24, 2009, available at http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displayStory.cfm?story_id=14506572 
(The ruling of the Constitutional Court together with the mob under the People’s Alliance for Democracy 
(PAD) in fact created great tension among the Thais and between the Thais and the Cambodians which led 
to the clashes between the Thai and the Cambodian troops causing several lives and the tourist industry. 
Villagers living in the area were rather disturbed by the arrival of the PAD who “wrongly” claimed the loss 
of the Thai territory).  
57 Supra note 47. 
58 Therawat, supra note 28, at 7.  
59 See rationales and principle in H.R. REP. No. (omitted) , at 32 (2011) (Report of the Committee on the 
Draft Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand Amendment (No. 2) B.E. 2554 (Section 190)), available at 
http://web.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa_db/adhoc-upload/5-20110128105022_190.pdf. 
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political branches in the treaty-making context. Unfortunately, the approach had 
inadvertently encouraged the phenomenon of ineffective administration by the judiciary’s 
vigorous role which has put many government’s treaty activities on hold.60 At the same 
time, the fear of political backlash which forces the government into holding a public 
hearing and securing legislature’s approval only to satisfy the requirements is not going to 
improve its responsiveness to social needs and concerns. At the international level, 
although the judiciary can invalidate a treaty under the constitutional authority, the 
country can still face international liability, and will be required to provide some sorts of 
compensation, pursuant to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties which also 
operates as customary international law.61 Thus, even though the new legislation specifies 
a list of special treaties for the purpose of Section 190 process, I personally have little 
doubt that this solution will run into the same problem, which will essentially involve the 
Court in the final treaty determination. And this can potentially be extended to any new 
kinds of treaties that emerge after the list has been completed, as the Court remains the 
sole interpretive authority. To my conclusion, because the mechanism of Section 190 is 
deemed vital to the maintenance of democracy and good governance, there are thus the 
issues of the treaty scope, process and the proper roles of the institutional organs and the 
public that must be addressed and re-evaluated.    
Overemphasizing the transparency and accountability of the treaty process may 
not get us very far down the path of democracy and good governance when the 
mechanism interferes with other democratic objective. Efforts to uphold certain 
democratic values can be made at the expense of another. Thus, these challenges do not 
                                                 
60 Ministry of Foreign Affairs showed a strong support in the amendment of Section 190 as a means to 
move stalled on-going negotiation forward. Supra note 47. 
61 See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 60, 61, 62, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 
I.L.M. 679 (1969); 63 A.J.I.L. 875, 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf (stating that a repudiation of a 
treaty which is amount to a breach of obligations does not provide a ground for treaty termination). 
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only present themselves in terms of practicality, but most importantly also in a form of a 
threat to the democratic principle. 
B. Challenge in Principle: Obstacles to Good Governance and Democracy 
It must be acknowledged that democracy is committed not only to the process that 
reflects people’s will, but also the outcomes that secure the people’s will.62 Democracy 
therefore is not merely about ensuring accountability and transparency through the 
process of self-government. It is also about listening, responding to and carrying out 
people’s voices to serve its purposes. These are also some of the primary characteristics 
under the principle of good governance, that is, to be responsive and effective in 
managing public affairs. Assuming that the current means (Section 190) is sufficient to 
guarantee these qualities in our government is out of the question. Effectiveness in 
governmental administration which refers to “processes and institutions [that] produce 
results that meet the needs of society…”63 has been undermined under the implementation 
of Section 190 mechanism. Both internal and external challenges have clearly shown how 
these missing components (responsiveness and effectiveness of the government 
administration) affect the interest of the people and the country.  
There are reasons why responsiveness and effectiveness must form part of our 
self-governance. Democratic theory such as classicalism, republicanism or liberalism 
strongly believes in the people’s involvement in the political process based not only on 
political, but also social values the system of self-governance can secure, protecting 
communal interest, promoting social harmony or developing individual’s moral 
                                                 
62 Gutmann, The Disharmony of Democracy, in NEMOS: DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY, supra note 11, at 135. 
63 Id. Other than forming as part of “good governance” principle, the effectiveness in the administration has 
other significance that must not be underestimated or mistaken for a “mere convenience” of the 
government. This political characteristic provides a foundation for a government to be responsive at 
national and international levels.  
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capacity.64 However, the procurement of these values is highly dependent upon the 
effective engagement and faith of the people in the governing process which requires a 
responsive and effective administration to accomplish this task. These are the qualities 
that keep our democratic ideology moving by making sure that people by feeling a sense 
of belonging want to exercise their sovereign power and count on the system.  
Section 190 may arguably satisfy certain elements of democracy and good 
governance, specifically transparency. However, the current means seems to decrease the 
odds of affecting the outcome of a policy decision by the public in the area of foreign 
affairs due to the extensive obligations that have continued to disrupt governmental 
function. Ironically, the improvement of our democracy has impeded the objectives in 
itself. For now, the people may enjoy the expansive participatory rights, but in the long 
run this safety valve can only take effects when a responsive and effective characteristic 
of the state are present to ensure that the people’s feedback and intentions will form parts 
of the political decisions, and that state’s policies will be guided by public opinions. Thus, 
the promotion of democracy and good governance depends on this importation question 
which is how to secure not just transparency and accountability of a government, but a 
political environment that builds upon trust and understandings in the community, rather 
than how to constantly overwhelm the administration with a variety of check mechanisms 
that will only lead to the impediment of the primary objectives of our Constitution.   
V. Conclusion 
From the day military and tanks occupied the center of Bangkok in 2006 to the 
day people roamed the streets and destroyed their home country, Thailand’s efforts to 
enhance its democracy has been proven to fall short. Deeper than it appears on the surface 
as a battle between political alliances, the riot has a more significant implication on the 
                                                 
64 For classicalism, public participation in the decision-making allows individual to be educated, to 
distinguish his own impulses and desires and to pursue general interests. CAROLE PATEMAN, 
PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 25 (1970). 
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question of administration effectiveness and responsiveness to the demands of the rural 
poor. Poverty, income disparity, poor education and health care cannot be alleviated 
through simply having a transparent, but responsive and effective administration for 
attention and resources to be allocated and redistributed to the areas that mostly are in 
need. Internal weaknesses will continue to be the reason why people do not have faith in 
the current Constitution and would rather use violence than the Constitution in the 
exercise of their power. At the same time, effective external responses are as crucial as 
the domestic ones in the sense that their absence could mean a loss of the country’s 
credibility, diplomacy and interest upon which the country’s economy has increasingly 
depended.    
There is no question that Thailand through improving the level of public 
participation and the involvement of the institutional branches in the area of the most 
affected national interests reflect its vision in the value of democracy and good 
governance. Section 190 treaty provision is an attempt to embark on the idea of making 
state affairs a true public one in which the content of the future treaty is accessible to the 
people and their representatives. Nevertheless, the provision has continued to pose major 
obstacles to government performance.  To this end, this dissertation will propose a treaty 
model which focuses on the adjustment of the three primary areas within Section 190, 
namely i) the treaty scope – concerning the types of treaties that must be subject to this 
special process, ii) the treaty process – concerning the level of public participation and 
legislative approval in the process, and iii) the proper role of the institutional branches – 
concerning the competence of the executive in the determination of the special treaties, 
and the manners of the legislature and judiciary involvements throughout the treaty-
making process. The proposal to amend Section 190 therefore requires the re-evaluation 
of the public participation scope and the consideration of the executive’s flexibility in the 
34 
 
exercise of its foreign affairs power in order to maintain proper government function and 
a guarantee of fuller democracy.  
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Chapter II: The Political Character of Thailand 
I. Introduction 
It has been said that Thailand is one of a few countries in the world that has the 
honor of being the country with the largest number of Constitutions, which unfortunately 
provides little contribution to the quality of the country’s socio-political life. Since its 
first creation in 1932, the Thai Constitution had been seen as a lifeless instrument 
representing the symbol of democracy rather than an enforceable principle. A series of 
these written Constitutions had been manipulated and shaped by the socio-political 
interests of various factions of the ruling elites to fit their personal agenda. Constitutions 
merely served as instruments written to legitimize, yet to preserve the status of the ruling 
elites rather than the people’s fundamental interests. Thus, transparency and 
accountability remained “rare commodities” in the public administration. 
During the periods of the political struggles, the efforts to overcome these anti-
democratic elements that rampaged among the ruling elites gave rise to the promulgation 
of the 1997, and eventually to the 2007 Constitutions, which brought substantial changes 
to the political and legal landscapes of Thailand. The 1997 Constitution has provided a 
key bench mark in a reform process. The notion of the separation of powers was seriously 
adopted to promote the ability of other political branches to check on the executive’s 
activities. Several mechanisms were established to restrict bureaucratic powers, to better 
protect individual liberties, and most important of all to improve the people’s ability to 
directly scrutinize government conduct. The focus of the modern Thai Constitution is 
thus centered on enhancing government’s accountability and transparency, which are also 
the means of protecting civil liberties against a tyrannical form of government. The 
principle of the separation of powers has never been better followed since the adoption of 
the 1997 Constitution, especially when this legal instrument has officially established a 
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truly independent judiciary body, known as the Constitutional Court, to rule on the 
constitutionality of the other political departments’ activities. This practice has been 
further emphasized in the 2007 Constitution, which does not only enjoin substantial 
scrutiny of the legislature and the judiciary upon the executive, but also empowers the 
people to keep an eye on their government.  
With this respect, this chapter will briefly introduce the development of 
Thailand’s political character since its official adoption of the first Constitution, its 
struggles to fit Western ideology into the traditional Thai governing system that has long 
embraced the monarchial institution, its readjustment throughout the reform periods 
(Section II), followed by a summary of its institutional functions and powers under the 
current Constitution (Section III). This chapter is therefore designed to provide the basic 
understandings of the Thai political culture and the current political structure, which are 
indispensable components in the analysis to seek a reform that can be a better suit for its 
social and political environment.  
II. The Evolution of the Thai Politics: From the Struggle for Power to the Struggle 
for the People 
 
Since 1932, a series of Thai Constitutions had been known to promote the steady 
expansion of the Thai ruling class as well as to preserve their status. The primary 
functions of the early versions of the Thai Constitutions were to legitimize the ruling 
class’ power, to earn recognition from western nations, and to serve as political 
machinery against their main rivalry in politics.1 Thus during this transitional period, 
                                                 
1 For instance, during the transitional period, an alliance between the National Assembly and the executive 
was created. The composition of members of the National Assembly which came from both electoral 
process and appointments had facilitated a political party to easily manipulate, manage and control the 
Assembly. KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, KINGS, COUNTRY AND CONSTITUTIONS: THAILAND POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 1932-2000 31-38 (2003). FRED W. RIGG, THAILAND: THE MODERNIZATION OF A 
BUREAUCRATIC POLITY 152-153 (1966).  
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although it is true that political powers were retrieved from the monarch, they were rather 
passed onto members of bureaucracy both civilian and military, and not onto the people.2  
Under the interim Constitution of 1932, all powers once exercised by the monarch 
under the traditional system of absolutism then had to be returned to the people, and 
exercised through the Assembly of the People Representatives (legislature), the State 
Council (executive) and the courts (judiciary).3 Nevertheless, in practice, these powers 
were instead put in the hand of the new ruling elites. Rights and duties of the people 
specified in the permanent 1932 Constitution were limitedly exercised solely through the 
elections of representatives.4 Technically speaking, the sovereign rights of the people 
were bestowed upon those who were in control of the Assembly. The power to carry out 
policies rested within the political ruling party and not with the elected representative 
body while media censorship was prevalent.5  
The 1946 Constitution brought another major change to the political structure by 
introducing bicameral Parliament consisting of the House of Representatives and the 
Senate of which members are to be elected.6 Nevertheless, the government assured its 
majority control in Parliament through the interim method of election which not only did 
it allow the candidates to vote themselves into the Senate, but also laid down the 
                                                 
2 This political culture was attributed from the fact that the 1932 movement was primarily led by a group of 
the few educated who had the privilege to learn and import the ideology from western countries, rather than 
those of the middle class, industrial workers or publicly supported organizations which is distinguishable 
from western experiences.  RIGG, supra note 1, at 148-149.  
3 CONST. (1932), §2 (Thail.) (repealed 1946). It has been acknowledged that the very first version 
(provisional Constitution of 1932) was a mixture between western parliamentary system and Soviet 
Doctrines in which political authority was to rest with a national assembly, and a People’s Committee was 
to be elected by the assembly as its executive while this central executive committee had responsibility for 
appointing and supervising the People’s Commissars who carried administrative responsibilities. Id. at 56. 
4 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 1, at 36. It was also clear that the promoters of the 1932 Constitution 
hoped to maintain their control over the government by means of their majority in the Council. Id. at 91 
(explaining the transformation of monarchy during  the modernization period which basically transferred 
powers from the absolute monarchy to office-holding, new ruling elites). 
5 Benjamin Batson, Siam’s political future Documents from the End of the Absolute Monarchy 101-102 
Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, Data Paper no. 26, 1974 (citing King’s Prajadhipok’s 
abdication statement expressing his concern on the incompatibility of the government administration with 
individual freedoms and principles of justice).  
6 See CONST. (1946), §17 (Thail.) (repealed 1947). 
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qualifications of voters and candidates in such a manner to provide wider participation of 
its supporters.7 As history repeated itself, the power struggles among the ruling elites 
continued. As a result, this Constitution was short-lived, and within a year later was 
abrogated and replaced by the 1947 Provisional Constitution under the new military 
leadership.8 
The efforts to improve the democratic aspect of the Constitution were, however, 
at least seen in the 1949 Constitution which created a control mechanism of the 
legislature by way of voting no confidence in the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, as well 
as expanding more rights and duties of the Thai people than any other previous versions.9 
The Constitution was easily passed by majority votes in the Parliament.10 But again, the 
1949 Constitution was not so welcome among those “who saw the Charter as an obstacle 
to their effective participation in national affairs”11 and who felt that their interests were 
being taken away. The opposition from the factions of the ruling class, therefore, became 
a strong force that sealed the fate of the 1949 Constitution.   
The promulgation of the 1952 Constitution was then understood to provide a solid 
political ground for the military junta government who was able to nominate and select 
most of the appointed members of the Assembly.12 Through this controlling method, the 
position of the government became invincible, and nearly authoritarian with weak 
opposition in Parliament. Under the cloak of constitutionality, the justification of the then 
government was further supported by the belief that common people were not sufficiently 
knowledgeable, and thus incapable of making any direct political decisions without their 
                                                 
7 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 1, at 45. 
8 Id. at 48. See also http://www.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa_db/cons.php (listing a series of the Thai 
constitutions). 
9 Memorandum Conversation between Prime Minister Phibun and Ambassador Edwin Stanton (Mar. 1, 
1949) RG 59 892.011/3-149. 
10 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 1, at 50. 
11 Id. at 51. 
12 Id. at 46. 
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representatives. These political responsibilities thus fell upon the so-called educated and 
well-informed, in other words, the ruling elites, to exercise such political power on behalf 
of the people. 
The tradition of the monopolization of power by the government continued from 
1950s-1970s under the “Paw Khun” style of democracy (despotic paternalism) which 
bequeathed the supreme power in the executive who supposedly acted as the guardian of 
the people as well as their interests. Under this patriarchal system, there certainly is a 
presumption that the leader must adhere to the virtue and the Buddhist principles reigning 
with kindness and justice in the best interest of the people.13 The system of the separation 
of powers was not only seen as unnecessary, but also antagonistic to the sacred teachings 
of Buddhism of unity and affection. Since the existence of opposition parties was 
perceived as a threat toward national harmonization, there was a complete absence of 
“checks and balance” mechanism in the political process. The 1968 Constitution was also 
described as the document of military leadership. As easily predicted, the system, 
although inspired by strict moral principles in the hope to provide the nation with social 
and political stability, did not make very far when such system only tempted the leader to 
exploit their monopolistic position.14 This traditional Thai style democracy eventually got 
brought down by widespread resentment among the intellectuals, followed by a student 
                                                 
13 The “Paw Khun” style democracy was also named as the Thai Buddhist democracy which at the time 
was seen as a more preferable system to the western idea of the separation of powers, and suitable to the 
Thai culture in the sense that the ruling from the top of the social hierarchy would allow an enlightened and 
most capable leader to serve others (his subjects) in the service of the common good. The ruler himself 
must therefore act in accordance with the Buddhist principles. The patriarchal administration was inherited 
from the thirteenth century or the Sukhothai period. SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 1, at 10-11. In 
accordance with the principle of “Dharmasastra”, the king’s function is to protect his people, and preserve 
the sacred law. Under this theory, the monarch possesses the characteristics of a bodhisattva and a devaraja 
(the goddess of mercy), and must adhere to the kingly virtue as a self-restraint mechanism in the exercise of 
his power. WILLIAM J. SIFFIN, THE THAI BUREAUCRACY: INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 15 
(1966).  
14 It was, in fact, popular and effective during the marshal Sarit ’s tenure but gradually lost its legitimacy as 
people became intolerant with his unscrupulous successors. SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 13. 
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uprising in 1973, which led Thailand into the next phase known as the period of “limited 
democracy”. 
Between 1970s and 1990s, Thai democracy was still far from perfect with heavy 
influence of military-style administration. The emergence of the new generation together 
with the growth of a politically aware community made it harder for the extremist regime 
to survive. As a result, a compromise of the ruling class to adopt western-based 
democracy through the re-establishment of parliamentary system, elections and political 
parties was deemed necessary. Nevertheless, such system still allowed the bureaucrats, 
technocrats and military to actively participate, and pursue their wealth and interests 
under the disguise of democracy.15 The senate body that was entirely appointed by a 
“ruling clique” neither in anyway would represent the interests of the people nor served 
as a counter force to the power exercised by the executive. 
Despite the existence of the Constitution, it was quite clear that its function was to 
legitimize the political system, and to facilitate the exploitation of power by a certain 
group of people. The term “limited democracy”, thus, basically suggested a less 
accountable system in the decision-making process in which the role of the 
representatives is secondary to the appointed in running the country.16 In sum, this 
version of Thai democracy was proven to be no different than the previous “Paw Khun” 
style as the legislature and the executive were working nearly as the same body. The only 
differences were the power that changed hands and the governing style that was 
transformed on its face. The power was simply transferred to the new emerging elites 
“who literally bought their way into Parliament”17 continuing the cycle of corruption. The 
                                                 
15 The Constitution of 1978, for instance, was written to allow the entire senate body to be appointed while 
government officials and military officers could simultaneously held their senator position. CONST. (1978), 
Ch. 6, §84 (Thail.) (repealed 1991). 
16 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 1, at 17. 
17 Id. at 16. 
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1991 Coup of course did not end this vicious cycle, but only to begin another round of 
abuse to be pursued by a different group, yet again under the military leadership. 
The arrival of the 1997 Constitution was meant to overcome past political 
misconduct and to advance the country’s democratic development by focusing primarily 
on improving the people’s rights and freedoms and the qualities of the political 
institutions. The Constitution was designed as the “People Constitution” by incorporating 
stronger checks directly from the people in addition to that of the conventional 
parliamentary system, requiring a fully elected Senate body, establishing a party list 
system, creating independent “watchdog” organizations, and better securing the people’s 
political and civil rights.18 For instance, Section 121 required the entire two hundred 
senate members to be elected by the people from seventy-six provinces. Section 214 gave 
the people the right to a referendum on any issues that may affect national or public 
interests. The Constitutional Court, the National Counter Corruption Commission 
(NCCC), and the Election Commission (EC) were created by the Constitution as 
additional control mechanisms.19 These independent agencies are empowered to conduct 
an investigation, dissolve the political party or remove the person from his office. These 
far-reaching efforts were also seen as novel to Thailand’s judicial reform since Thailand 
had not had a legal tradition that completely separated the judiciary from the executive 
branch, prior to the 1997 Constitution.  
The 2007 Constitution therefore built upon the 1997 constitutional framework and 
its fundamental principle that had sought to correct its weakness by securing the 
institutional foundations for a more stable polity which ironically resulted in “electoral 
                                                 
18 The 1997 Constitution was regarded as the People’s Constitution for the fact that it was the first time in 
history that the drafters directly engaged with the public. Regional seminars and questionnaires were used 
extensively to gauge public opinion on political reform seeking to address the civil society’s interest. Erik 
Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 People’s Constitution, XLVIII ASIAN SURVEY 373, 
374-378 (2008). 
19 See CONST. (1997), Ch. 10, (Thail.) (repealed 2006) (providing independent organizations for the 
scrutiny of state powers). 
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authoritarianism”.20 Thus, one of the key reforms undertaken under the 1997 Constitution 
to ensure greater governmental stability became the target at which the 2007 version 
aimed to break in order to improve the ability of the opposition to censure executive 
power. Several aspects concerning the reconstruction of political institutions include, for 
instance, the reduction of the number of the parliamentary members’ votes to launch 
censure motions against a prime minister and his cabinet, the composition of appointed 
senators from a special ad hoc panel, 21 the selection of the Constitutional judges entirely 
by the judiciary, and making the public as the forth branch of government by providing 
ample opportunities for their political participation. These mechanisms are clearly 
designed to provide the people a better control over the executive’s activities, including 
its authority in the realm of foreign affairs. The arrangement of the current political 
structure will be elaborated in the following section. 
It is indisputable that the primary objective of the 2007 Constitution is to address 
the past mistakes that had allowed corruption and the absence of the true protective 
mechanism of the people’s life and liberties to shape our democracy. Groups of the 
privilege had been fed, empowered and expanded through the exploitation of “their 
constitutions”. It is quite clear that the current Constitution is fully aware of this bitter 
history. But the new challenge is yet to come. Although countering the executive power 
                                                 
20 The system of strong executive was created through the creation of a party list coupled with a five 
percent threshold level of single-member districts, and the ninety-day rule were all meant to strengthen 
institutions and government stability. The effect of the five percent threshold had effectively increased the 
proportion of the dominant party’s seats while keeping out small parties that could potentially provide the 
opposition making it harder to launch censure debate which requires at least two-fifths of the members of 
both Houses. See Kuhonta, supra note 18, at 375 n.4 (“A five percent threshold means that a party must 
receive at least five percent of total votes in order to be allotted seats in Parliament. A single-member 
district is one where only one seat is contested per district, as opposed to a multi-member district where 
several seats may be contested. The ninety-day rule is a rule that stipulates that a member of Parliament 
(MP) has to be part of a political party for at least 90 days before registration for the next election.”). 
21 The strategy was intended to correct the failure in the 1997 version, although entailing the entire Senate 
body to be fully elected, that could not escape the influence of the executive, and inevitably became 
political machinery for the dominant political party at that time. It has been reported that most senators that 
were up for running the election and won the election had close tie with Thai Rak Thai, the leading party, 
which as a result failed miserably in acting as an impartial body to check on the lower House. Id. at 384. 
Charter’s Ideals Fine, but System of Senate Election Must Change, THE NATION, Apr. 23, 2006, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2006/04/23/opinion/opinion_30002294.php.  
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is the rule of thumb to keep democracy alive, we still have to keep in mind that this rule 
cannot be overly followed in such a way that it would hamper the government’s effective 
administration, and eventually turn democracy against us. Seeking balance in the system 
is always a challenge. However, the continuing efforts in search for a better answer are a 
crucial part of the legal and political evolution, and the key to the new development of 
“democracy”.  
III. Political Structure under the 2007 Constitution 
Thailand had officially adopted the system of constitutional monarchy on June 24, 
1932 (B.E. 2475) after its long tradition of absolutism by declaring the Constitution as the 
supreme law of the land while the King remains the symbol and the national identity of 
the country.22 Prior to this period, Thailand possessed neither a legislature nor an 
executive, as all political powers were vested within the monarch. This tradition had been 
the heritage of the Sukhothai Kingdom in the 12th century. Thus, the draft Constitution of 
1932 signed by King Prajadhipok, created Thailand’s first system of separation of 
powers, a single House legislature (People’s Assembly) with seventy appointed members. 
Since the period of the first Constitution that brought Thailand the new political 
character, there are a total of eighteen Constitutions partaking in the democratization 
process for the past eighty years.23  
Under the governance of constitutional monarchy, Thailand has followed the 
principle of the separation of powers by having the Constitution prescribe functions and 
powers to three institutional organs, namely the legislature, the executive and the 
                                                 
22 MANIT JUMPA, “Kwamroo beungton kiewkab rathatumnoon hang ratcha anachak thai,” translated in 
BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE 2007 CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 4 (2008). See AMARA 
RAKSASATAYA & JAMES R. KLEIN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THAILAND: THE PROVISIONS AND THE 
WORKING OF THE COURT 2 (Amara Raksasataya & James R. Klein eds., 2003). Under absolutism, the king 
was the center of the socio-political system, and was regarded as the “Lord of Life” whose primary 
function was to protect his people and preserve the law. Nevertheless, his order is absolute, and his position 
is beyond challenge. SIFFIN, supra note 13, at 14-15. 
23 This is the number of the Thai Constitutions that are originally drafted and passed either as provisional or 
permanent Constitutions. 
44 
 
judiciary. The Legislature is bicameral, with a fully-elected House of Representatives and 
a partially-elected Senate. The Executive has the King as the chief of state and the prime 
minister as the head of government. The Judiciary is composed of the Constitutional 
Court, the Courts of Justice, the Administrative Courts and the Military Courts. The 
primary responsibilities of these three departments were roughly prescribed under the 
first Constitution, 24 which had slowly evolved into a more sophisticated and accountable 
model as citizens’ participatory roles have been increased in the political process making 
them a potential “fourth branch” of government. Such a progressive movement is 
reflected in the differences between the very first version in which the legislature is 
consisted of only the House of Representatives with limited functions25 and the later ones 
that have guaranteed greater citizens’ rights and freedoms as well as their abilities to 
scrutinize government’s conducts.26 The establishment of the Constitutional Court in 
1998 also affirmed the effort of the political reforms to enhance the basic rights and 
freedom of the Thai people.  
A. The Public (Direct Participatory Roles) 
Since the promulgation of the “People Constitution” (the 1997 Constitution), 
there has been a drastic change in principle that embraces the sovereign right of the 
people. The 1997 and 2007 Constitutions both replaced “the sovereign power comes from 
the Thai people” of the 1991 version with “the sovereign power belongs to the Thai 
people” to further emphasize the inviolability of the people’s fundamental rights and 
                                                 
24 The turning point of the Thai Constitution was said to be after World War II, where a new Constitution 
(1946) was promulgated. The Constitution was considered the most democratic at that time since it had 
created for the first time a bicameral legislature consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. 
Also for the first and last time the constitution called for a fully elected Senate. JUMPA, supra note 22, at 5. 
25 Id. at 6-7. 
26 CONST. (2007), Ch. 5, §87 (Thail.) (providing that state policies, in principle, shall be pursued in a 
manner that promotes and lends support to public participation by taking into consideration public 
discussion in the determination of state policies and plans for economic and social development at both 
national and local levels). 
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liberties by the state,27 which is also dedicated by the entire section under Chapter III of 
the 2007 Constitution.  
To ensure the implementation of this fundamental principle in the primary stage, 
rights and liberties in connection with information and complaints, and in connection 
with assembly and association specified in Part 10 and 11 within Chapter III guarantee at 
least basic civic roles in political participation.28 These are, for instance, the rights to 
acquire and to have access to information in possession of government agencies, the right 
to receive explanations of the on-going activities, the right to express his or her opinions 
in the concerned project, or the right to peacefully form an association to convey their 
political will. These freedoms are valuable in the sense that they can be exercised simply 
through the people’s initiation without support by the state in the first place.   
The notion of “rule by the people” has been advanced by the incorporation of 
direct public participation (in the political process) into the directive principles of state 
policies stipulated under Part 10, Chapter V of the current Constitution. The section 
expressly required the state to promote direct participation by the people in several areas 
of state affairs such as policies and plans for economic and social development at both 
national and local levels, the provision of public services, and most importantly the 
scrutiny of the exercise of state powers at all levels.29 New government control 
mechanisms have been added to improve the ability of the people to keep an eye on their 
                                                 
27 CONSTITUTION DRAFTING ASSEMBLY, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE THAI CONSTITUTION 2 (2007), 
available at http://www.nesac.go.th/library/Main_highlight/pdf/cons_book2550.pdf. See also CONST. 
(2007), Ch. 3 (Thail.) (guaranteeing equality, personal rights and liberties, rights in the administration of 
justice, rights in property, rights and liberties in occupation, liberties in expression of persons and mass 
media, rights and liberties in education, rights to public health services and welfare from the state, rights in 
connection with information and complaints, liberties in assembly and association, community rights and 
right to protect the Constitution). 
28 These rights and liberties are subject to limitations where the disclosure of the information will affect the 
security of State, public safety or other individuals’ interests or unless there is a law enacted for securing 
public order “during the time when the country is in state of war, or when a state of emergency or martial 
law is declared”.  CONST. (2007), Ch. 3 §56, 63 (Thail.). It should also be noted that the limitation of the 
disclosure of public information is narrow in the sense that only those that “shall” affect the state security, 
public order or individual interests can be protected. Thus, the possibility that certain information might 
have such consequences will rule out the privacy of the information. 
29 JUMPA, supra note 22, at 180. 
46 
 
government, and to intervene in its conduct when it fails to act in accordance with the 
rule of law. Governmental decisions are also required to seek public consultation under 
certain circumstance.30  
To ensure the exercise of state powers in accordance with this principle, the 
Constitution provides direct channels for the public to actively engage in political 
decisions. Pursuant to Chapter VII (Direct Political Participation by the People), Thai 
people are guaranteed the right to petition the proposal of a bill to the National Assembly, 
the right to lodge a complaint to remove the persons from office, and the right to a 
referendum where the matter may affect “national” or “public interest” or is required by 
law.31 The Constitution requires only 10,000 eligible voters to propose a bill in 
Parliament whereas only 20,000 eligible voters can launch an impeachment motion 
against a political officeholder.32 The required small number of participants is to facilitate 
the participatory process, and to overcome the common issue of lacking sufficient 
supporters which can disqualify the public initiative. The right of the people to a 
referendum in national policy decisions, on the other hand, is not guaranteed by the 
number of voters’ participation, but rather can be exercised through either the discretion 
of the executive or legislation. Such a provision also has a strong democratic implication 
in the sense that a referendum could serve as a final word for a policy decision, and not 
just an advisory opinion.33 
The power of the mandatory public consultation can also render certain acts of the 
executive unconstitutional. A clear example is demonstrated in the treaty-making clause 
(Section 190) that explicitly requires a public hearing prior to the executive’s entering 
                                                 
30 See CONST. (2007), Ch. 3 §66, Ch. 7 §165, Ch. 9 §190 (Thail.). 
31 See Chapter I, Section III, A (i). 
32 CONST. (2007), Ch. 7 §163-164 (Thail.). JUMPA, supra note 22, at 251.  
33 Unlike the 1997 version which limits the status of the referendum to advisory opinion, this is another 
distinctive feature carried under the 2007 Constitution that allows the result of the referendum to determine 
the policy decision. It nevertheless depends entirely on the executive whether to adopt the recommendation 
of the people. JUMPA, supra note 22, at 260-261. 
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into a negotiation of “special treaties” (mentioned in Chapter I). A failure to conduct a 
public hearing in such a circumstance provides a legal basis for the executive to be 
challenged in the Constitutional Court rendering the particular treaty void, and the 
government liable. However, the requirement of public consultation in the treaty-making 
context does not always gives the public the control over treaty contents since the 
executive still retains its discretion in adopting the people’s suggestions. But it can still 
be an effective means to limit governmental authority through this power sharing 
procedure which is to remind us that the “sovereign power belongs to the people”.  
The effectiveness of the extensive public involvement in political affairs to ensure 
transparency in governmental administration is unquestionable. However, its 
effectiveness to ensure government’s accountability and responsiveness may not be 
entirely clear. As mentioned, the constitutional duty of government generally does not go 
beyond providing resources for public participation. And for the government to give 
serious thoughts to the public inputs is outside the constitutional mandate. The 
government’s careful consideration of public opinion is another question that requires us 
to examine further to ensure the effective implementation of this democratic mechanism, 
and is to be addressed in Chapter III.   
B. The Legislature 
Under the Constitution of 2007, the legislature is known as the National 
Assembly consisting of two chambers; namely the Senate (the Upper House) and the 
House of Representatives (the Lower House) whose members cannot simultaneously 
assume both positions.34 The House of Representatives has 480 members, 400 of whom 
are directly elected from constituent districts and the remainder drawn proportionally 
                                                 
34 CONST. (2007), Ch. 6 §88(Thail.).   
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from party lists.35 The Senate is a non-partisan body with 150 members, 76 of whom are 
directly elected (one per province).36 The remaining 74 are appointed by a panel 
comprised of judges and senior independent officials from a list of candidates compiled 
by the Election Commission by taking into consideration equality and fairness of persons 
represented from various sectors as well as those from the socially underprivileged.37 The 
candidates must also demonstrate the knowledge, expertise or experience suitable to the 
duty of senators. 
i. Accountability 
 In addition to the power of the judiciary in the appointment of the Senate body, 
the legislature can face accountability through the power of the prime minister 
(executive) to dissolve the House of Representatives for a new election under Section 108 
and the power of the Constitutional Court (judiciary) to remove a person’s membership 
of the House of Representatives under Section 106 and the Senate under Section 119 
respectively. In addition, pursuant to Section 91, either the members themselves of both 
Houses or an independent constitutional agency such as the Election Commission of not 
less than one-tenth of the entire number may lodge a complaint with the House President 
in the removal of the other member, which is to be deferred to the final decision of the 
Constitutional Court.  
ii. Roles and Functions 
The Parliament or the National Assembly is the law-making arm of the 
government with the primary responsibility to enact organic laws and legislation of the 
country. The legislative branch of government (National Assembly) consists of the two 
                                                 
35 The Constitution of 2007 has reduced the number of the members of the House from 500 to 480. In 
addition, in the event that results in members of the House of Representatives 
being less than four hundred and eighty in number but being not less than ninety five percent of the total 
number of members of the House of Representatives, it shall be deemed that members in such number duly 
form the House of Representatives.  Id., Ch. 6 §93. 
36 Id., Ch. 6 §111. 
37 Id., Ch. 6 §113. 
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legislative bodies (the House of Representatives and the Senate), each of which has its 
own responsibilities. Their primary law-making duty is enumerated in Chapter VI, Part 7 
of the 2007 Constitution.38 The National Assembly is also charged with functions to 
scrutinize and control the government administration, to approve matters of major 
concerns, and to appoint or remove government officials of the Constitution.39 These 
responsibilities go along with the principle of “checks and balances” to ensure that 
government acts transparently and accountably in accordance with the national policy 
and the people’s interest.  
The increased parliamentary role in the political decision-making process has 
become a key element to improving the democratic character of the Thai Constitution. 
Typically, the parliament’s common duties are to provide approvals for matters of 
national interests, namely the country’s budget and spending, the government’s decision 
to declare war and to make treaties. Within the current Constitution, the scope of some of 
these common duties have been broadened through redefining what it means to be 
“matters of major importance”, particularly in the treaty-making area. The addition of the 
special categories of treaties that must be subject to the new treaty-making mechanism 
pursuant to Section 190 was the product of this meaning expansion.  
The traditional role of the parliament in the treaty-making process had been 
deemed supplementary as ones being called upon to approve treaties in limited cases.40 
The structure of the executive’s treaty power can be viewed as a negative list approach in 
                                                 
38 Id., Ch. 6 §142-150. The procedure of the enactment of legislation can be initiated by the Council of 
Ministers, the members of the House of Representatives, the Court, or the public (not less than 10,000 of 
the eligible voters). The proposed bill must first be submitted to the House of Representatives for debate, 
amendment and vote. After it has been approved by the House of Representatives, the bill is then forwarded 
to the Senate. If the bill is disapproved, the amended bill will be withheld and returned to the House of 
Representatives for further consideration. The bill proceeds to the next stage once the Senate approves it.  
After the bill has been approved by both houses, the prime minister then presents it to the King for his 
assent (signature) which shall come into force upon its publication in Government Gazette.  
39 For detailed roles and functions of the Parliament, see http://www.parliament.go.th/main01.php 
40 Jaturon Therawat, Roles of the Parliament in Treaty Making Process under the Thai Constitution 2 (Nov. 
21, 2008) (Working Paper, on file with the King Prajadhipok’s Institute), available at 
http://www.kpi.ac.th/kpith/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=264&Itemid=9. 
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which plenary power in the making of treaties is vested in the executive unless stipulated 
in the exceptions under the Constitution. This tradition has continued since the very first 
Constitution of 1932 (B.E. 2475) of which Section 54 required that any treaty providing 
for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation 
must be approved by the House of Representatives. A series of the Thai Constitutions have 
demonstrated this traditional approach as follows.41 
Constitution of 1946 (B.E. 2489), Section 76 provides that “any treaty providing 
for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation 
must be approved by the National Assembly”. 
Constitution of 1949 (B.E. 2492), Section 154 provides that “any treaty providing 
for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation 
must be approved by the National Assembly” 
Constitution of 1968 (B.E. 2511), Section 150 provides that “any treaty providing 
for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation 
must be approved by the National Assembly” 
Constitution of 1974 (B.E. 2517), Section 195 provides that “any treaty providing 
for changes in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign 
rights, or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation, or treaty of military alliance 
must be approved by the National Assembly” 
Constitution of 1978 (B.E. 2521), Section 162 provides that “any treaty providing 
for changes in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign 
                                                 
41 Kanitta Topothai, The Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on the Matter of Being the International 
Agreement under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 Section 190 with Regard to the 
Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 14 (Dec. 12, 2008) (an academic document submitted in partial fulfillment of 
the requirements for the program of senior executives on criminal justice administration, National 
Academy of Criminal Justice) (on file with the Library of Courts of Justice),  
http://elib.coj.go.th/managecourt/data/c12_4.pdf (providing a source of a series of the constitutional 
provisions on treaty power).  
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rights , or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation must be approved by the 
National Assembly” 
Constitution of 1991 (B.E. 2534), Section 178 provides that “any treaty providing 
for changes in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign 
rights , or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation must be approved by the 
National Assembly” 
Constitution of 1997 (B.E. 2540), Section 224 provides that “any treaty providing 
for changes in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign 
rights, or requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation must be approved by the 
National Assembly” 
Not until the Constitution of 2007 (B.E. 2550) had substantial changes been made 
to the participatory role of the parliament and the public in the treaty process. As 
presented in Chapter I, the new requirement of the participation from both Houses before 
and after a treaty negotiation process, although aiming at strengthening the legislative 
function (as a scrutinizer who represents the people’s interests), poses a new set of 
democratic challenges. The balance of the legislative involvement in the treaty-making 
process must be sought and maintained without compromising other democratic values to 
ensure the practicality and the effectiveness in the administration of the executive and the 
function of the legislature itself.  
C. The Executive  
The Executive is composed of the King serving as the chief of state, the Prime 
Minister as the head of government, and the Council of Ministers as the cabinet. Pursuant 
to Chapter 9 of the 2007 Constitution, the prime minister is elected from among the 
members of the House of Representatives following national elections for the House of 
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Representatives.42 The leader of the party positioned to organize a majority coalition 
generally becomes the prime minister by the King’s appointment (for formality), who 
also appoints no more than thirty-five other ministers to constitute the Council of 
Ministers.43 The prime minister term is also limited to two four-year.44 
i. Accountability 
The executive is directly accountable to the Parliament. Pursuant to Section 176, 
upon coming into power, the Cabinet must state its policies and explain its operations to 
the National Assembly within fifteen days following the date it takes office in accordance 
with the directive principles of fundamental State policies under Section 75.45 Despite the 
restriction on passing the no confidence vote by the National Assembly during this early 
process, the Constitution did state that the prime minister and each minister must be 
individually and collectively responsible to the National Assembly for the policies they 
had delivered, which can subject them to a later challenge. Thus, the “ministership” may 
be terminated under the circumstances in which members of the House of 
Representatives pass a vote of no confidence pursuant to Section 158 and 159 by a simple 
majority vote or three-fifth of the members of the Senate passing a resolution for the 
removal of the minister in question.46  
During the periods of the massive political reforms, whether or not members of 
the executive body can continue to hold their offices can also be subject to public 
                                                 
42 CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §171 (Thail.) (“The Prime Minister must be a member of the House of 
Representatives appointed under section 172. The President of the House of Representatives shall 
countersign the Royal Command appointing the Prime Minister”). 
43 Id., See also JUMPA, supra note 22, at 273. 
44 The Constitution of 2007 added the new rule which limits the term of the prime minister to two 
consecutive terms or eight years designed to eliminate the concentration of power. Constitution Drafting 
Committee, “Sarasamkan kong rangrathatumnoon chabab mai B.E. 2540,” translated in THE SUBSTANCE 
OF THE DRAFT OF THE NEW CONSTITUTION 128 (2007).  
45 Nevertheless, no vote of confidence can be passed since this process is intended for government to 
prepare plans for the administration of the State affairs for the purpose of determining guidance on the 
discharge of official duties for each year in accordance with section 76. CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §176 (Thail.). 
46 There are, in fact, other causes for the termination of the ministership such as death, resignation or 
criminal conviction. What is mentioned here is the termination primarily caused by the direct accountability 
of the executive to the legislature. 
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approval since the people is endowed with the right to lodge a complaint to remove the 
persons from office. Under the 2007 Constitution, only 20,000 eligible voters are 
required in order to launch an impeachment motion against a political officeholder.47 
ii. Roles and Functions 
Within the executive body, the Monarch serves as the symbol of the country, and 
has no actual role in politics. The primary roles of the King is to approve or disapprove 
bills adopted by the Parliament (the National Assembly),48 and to appoint the prime 
minister and the cabinet as a matter of formality. Bills passed by both Houses of 
Representatives and the Senate can only become law upon approval of the bill by the 
King. Bills do not become effective as laws without the approval of the King, unless later 
re-affirmed, and ratified by the Parliament.49 
The Prime Minister is the Head of Government whose primary responsibilities are 
to administer all government agencies except the courts and the legislative bodies. The 
Council of Ministers or the Cabinet is in charge of all the day-to-day government 
activities, except those of the Parliament and the Courts. The Cabinet sets governmental 
policy and goals. The individual ministers and deputy ministers will carry out those 
policies and goals within their own designated ministries. The individual ministers head 
up their respective departments by providing policy direction to the permanent officials 
who, in turn, give direction to the various supervisors and other leaders within their 
department. In addition, all ministers and deputy ministers sit as members of the Council 
of Ministries, which normally meets once a week to establish government policy on any 
                                                 
47 CONST. (2007), Ch. 7 §163-164 (Thail.). 
48 Id., Ch. 6 §150. 
49 The bill must be presented to the King for his approval. If the King disapproves a bill as a proposed law, 
the bill is returned to the Parliament to consider the King's objections. If the parliament nonetheless 
approves the law again, by at least a two-third vote of both houses of the parliament, the bill is returned to 
the King for reconsideration. If the King still declines to sign the bill into a law, the Prime Minister is 
authorized to promulgate the bill as a law by publishing it in the Government Gazette, the official 
newspaper of the Government equivalent to the King’s assent.  Id., §151. 
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issues requiring government attention. The Council of Ministries has the power to submit 
urgent legislation (Emergency Decree) to the King for immediate implementation by 
Royal Decree, to be followed by the submission for the consideration of the Parliament 
within three days.50 Once such a proposal has been adopted by Royal Decree, it is the law 
of Thailand unless overturned by an action of the Parliament. The Council of Ministers 
also prepares and proposes the country’s budget spending to the Parliament.51 
Being the constitutional monarchy, the executive powers are, in theory, the 
prerogative of the King. These rights include the power to issue an Emergency Decree 
(Section 187), to declare the martial law (Section 188), to declare war (Section 189), and 
to conclude treaties with other nations and international organizations (Section 190). 
These functions, in practice, are within the primary responsibility of the Cabinet, some of 
which are directly accountable to the Parliament such as the power to declare war 
requiring two-thirds votes of the members of both Houses to give the approval, and the 
power to conclude treaties involving both substantial parliamentary and public 
consultations in the process. 
The 2007 Constitution brought a drastic change to the relationship between the 
political branches and the public, especially in the treaty-making realm. Pursuant to 
Section 190, the power to make certain treaties is no longer exclusive to the executive. 
The greater participation of the legislature and the public are deemed necessary, and 
required for the important treaties to take effects.52 The requirements of an initial public 
hearing as well as parliamentary approvals prior and after the treaty negotiation, albeit 
                                                 
50 JUMPA, supra note 22, at 176. 
51 Id. at 264. 
52 Prior to undertaking a treaty negotiation of any treaty specified under paragraph two, 
(1) The Council of Ministers shall provide information and cause to be conducted public hearings, and 
shall give the National Assembly explanations on such treaty. 
(2) For this purpose, the Council of Ministers shall submit to the National Assembly a framework for 
negotiations for approval. 
When the treaty under paragraph two has been signed, the Council of Minister shall, prior to the declaration 
of intention to be bound thereby, make details thereof publicly accessible… CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190, 
(Thail.) (amended 2011). 
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improving the transparency of government administration in the treaty-making process, 
have been cast doubts in terms of its practicality and the effectiveness in the 
implementation of democracy and good governance. Controlling executive activity does 
not necessarily mean reducing its capability to carry out an effective administration. This 
rationale is something that the new mechanism must take into consideration since the 
quality of the executive function also plays a vital role in supporting the democratic 
characteristic of the public administration.  
D.  The Judiciary 
Blending the principles of traditional Thai and Western laws, Thailand's judicial 
system is composed of the Constitutional Court, the Courts of Justice, the Administrative 
Courts and the Military Courts. The new court system which guarantees greater 
independence from political influence by transferring powers to administer all courts 
away from the executive branch to the judiciary has been established under the 2007 
Constitution.53 Nevertheless, all judges are appointed by the King. And the King's 
appointments to the Constitutional Court are made upon the advice of the Senate in which 
the nine Constitutional Court judges are drawn from the Supreme Court of Justice and 
Supreme Administrative Court as well as from among substantive experts in law and 
social sciences outside the judiciary.54  
Under the 2007 Constitution, the Constitutional Court is the highest court of 
appeals, although its jurisdiction is limited to clearly-defined constitutional issues. Its 
members are nominated by a committee of judges, leaders in parliament, and senior 
                                                 
53 The executive branch had had a traditional role in administering all courts. However, under the new court 
system, the Ministry of Justice (Judiciary) is now the sole organ overseeing agencies within the judicial 
process such as the National Police, the Attorney-General’s office, the Correction Department. 
RAKSASATAYA & KLEIN, supra note 22, at 25. 
54 Pursuant to Section 204, the Constitutional Court shall consists of the President and eight other judges of 
which three judges shall come from the Supreme Court of Justice, two judges from the Supreme 
Administrative Court, two quailed persons from a legal field, and two others from the field of political 
science, public administration or other social science. CONST. (2007), Ch. 10 §204 (Thail.). 
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independent officials, whose nominees are confirmed by the Senate and appointed by the 
King. The Courts of Justice have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases (consisting of 
general courts, juvenile and family courts and specialized courts) and are organized, 
pursuant to Section 219, in three tiers: Courts of First Instance, the Court of Appeals, and 
the Supreme Court of Justice.55 Administrative courts have jurisdiction over suits 
between private parties and the government, and cases in which one government entity is 
suing another.56 In several southern provinces where Muslims constitute the majority of 
the population, Islamic law and custom were applicable to matrimonial and inheritance 
matters among the Muslims. Provincial Islamic Committees therefore have jurisdiction, 
but limited to that over probate, family, marriage, and divorce cases.  
The primary role of the judiciary is adjudication. Due to its nature that directly 
affects rights and liberty of the people, the branch must be guaranteed of its 
independence, and free from any political interference.57 Thus, to assure the 
independence of this organ in the adjudication, three principles have been established; 
first prohibiting the legislature and the executive from interfering with judges and the 
judiciary either directly or indirectly by precluding the ability of the executive to remove 
judges such as other government officials, secondly prohibiting internal interference 
(within the organ) by preserving the autonomy of each judge in their respective case, and 
thirdly prohibiting the withdrawal or transfer of the pending case by a higher-ranking 
                                                 
55 Id., §219. 
56 See Article 9 of the Act on Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure 
B.E. 2542 (1999), http://www.admincourt.go.th/amc_eng/02-LAW/laws/Act-01-04-47.pdf.  
(“Administrative Court ha[s] the competence to try and adjudicate or give orders over… (1) the case 
involving a dispute in relation to an unlawful act by an administrative agency or State official, whether in 
connection with the issuance of a by-law or order or in connection with other act…”). 
57 Pursuant to this principle, the Office of the Judiciary under the Ministry of Justice which is an 
organization and a juristic person has become the sole organ responsible for the administration works of all 
the Courts of Justice. http://www.coj.go.th/eng/thejudiciary.htm#t5.2. 
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official’s order to another judge. The case that is being considered must be concluded and 
complete by the same judge.58 
To improve the independence of the branch, the Constitutional Court was 
formally established under the 1997 Constitution, and came to replace a traditional 
constitutional body known as “Constitutional Council” which was claimed to lack 
complete independence for having persons of other political branches in the body.59 The 
1978 Constitution, for instance, provided the composition of the Constitutional Council 
to include the President of the National Assembly and other appointments by the National 
Assembly.60 With the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution, the Constitutional Court 
was elected as an independent organization responsible for scrutinizing government 
conduct as well as upholding the democratic principles laid down under the Constitution. 
The 2007 Constitution has since continued this readjustment by prohibiting the selection 
of the President and judges of the Constitutional Court from any government officials or 
state agencies to maintain the independence of the Constitutional Court.61 
i. Accountability: Constitutional Court 
Under the Constitution, the King’s assent is required in the appointment and the 
removal of judges, except in the case of the Constitutional Court judges where advice of 
the Senate must also be required (Section 204). In practice, the selection committee for 
judges of the Constitutional Court is consisted of the judiciary (the President of the 
Supreme Court of Justice and the President of the Supreme Administrative Court), the 
executive (the President of the House of Representatives and the Leader of the 
Opposition in the House of Representatives) and the President of a constitutional 
                                                 
58 JUMPA, supra note 22, at 299. 
59 Id., at 303. 
60 CONST. (1978), Ch. 10 §184, (Thail.) (repealed 1991). 
61 CONST. (2007), Ch. 10 §207, (Thail.). 
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independent organ while the Senate is required for a sitting to pass a resolution approving 
the selected persons (Section 206). 
One of the grounds for vacation of the members of the Constitutional Court is 
through the Senate passing a resolution pursuant to Section 274. The resolution of the 
Senate under this section is deemed final and no request for the removal of such a person 
from office can be made on the same ground. Thus, it can be said that the power to 
appoint and remove the constitutional court judges rest in the legislative body whereas 
the role of the executive has substantially decreased in such a process to ensure that the 
decision to be rendered against the executive body is made impartially and 
independently. 
ii. Roles and Functions: Constitutional Court 
The Constitutional Court generally has jurisdiction over the constitutionality of 
parliamentary acts, royal decrees, draft legislation made by political parties and members 
of the National Assembly, disputes concerning violations of individual rights guaranteed 
under the Constitution as a result of the legislation in contrary to the supreme law of land 
(Section 212),  as well as the conflict of powers and duties between at least two political 
organs being the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers or non-judicial 
constitutional organs (Section 214).62 With this respect, the jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court is set forth in four areas; firstly determining the constitutionality of 
statutes and the organic law bill, secondly considering the qualifications of a member of 
the National Assembly, a minister and any person holding public offices, thirdly deciding 
on issues concerning the powers and duties of political organizations under the 
                                                 
62 RAKSASATAYA & KLEIN, supra note 53 (“the Constitutional Court shall substantively pursue the 
following duties; (1) consideration and adjudication of any provision of law, rule and regulation as being 
contrary or inconsistent with the Constitution; (2) consideration of disputes among constitutional 
organizations as to their powers and duties”). Other functions include making recommendations to the 
National Assembly and the government in the amendment of the present Constitution. 
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Constitution, and fourthly having other jurisdictions as stipulated by the Constitution and 
organic laws.63 
Since the Constitution prescribes powers and duties to the constitutional 
organizations, it is deemed important that there must be an organ to decide on the issue in 
relations to the performance and powers of these organizations. Section 214, then 
becomes the key provision that explicitly assigns this role to the Constitutional Court. To 
the significance of Section 214, the power granted to the Constitutional Court to resolve 
“political questions” pertaining to the allocation of powers and competence between the 
legislature and the executive has also been read along with Section 190 that explicitly 
grants the Constitutional Court, for the first time, the power to resolve disputes 
concerning the types of treaties that must undergo the special treaty process, which in a 
way determines the executive’s authority in the treaty-making process.64 Pursuant to this 
Section, the Constitutional Court has the final word to decide whether the treaty in 
question and the act of the executive are constitutional by circumventing such a process 
or in other words, whether the executive is competent to solely execute the treaty without 
parliamentary and public involvements.  
It is indisputable that resolving the issues of political powers is one of the primary 
functions of the Constitutional Court as reflected in Section 190 and specifically in 214. 
Nevertheless, these assigned duties may not be as simple as they may appear in the 
constitutional text. Judicial intervention in the political branch’s administration and 
decisions to ensure their transparency and accountability also brought other challenges 
                                                 
63 Id. at 6. 
64 “In the case where there arises a problematic issue under paragraph two, the power to make the 
determination thereon shall be vested in the Constitutional Court…” CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190, ¶ 6 
(Thail.). 
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that bear the cost of other democratic values.65 Entrusting the power entirely to interpret 
duties and functions of government in one independent organ seems to be a 
democratically-sound solution to curtail the government’s ability in determining its own 
competence. However, in practice, this judicial function which allows the court to have a 
final word on who gets to do what may also put many activities of the political 
departments on hold as a lack of the other political branch’s participation in such an 
activity may provide a ground for a constitutional challenge. As presented in Chapter I, 
the extensive judicial interference may become a major impediment to the effectiveness 
of government administration which is also a required component for the administration 
to be responsive to the social needs. At the same time, the missing component in its 
jurisdiction to address a substantive guarantee violation by a treaty raises a serious 
concern about the proper role of the Constitutional Court and balance of the judiciary 
function. Thus, the removal of the judicial role from the political process will not provide 
us a better answer either since such an argument will only bring down the democratic 
character of our governing system. Rather the degree of its involvement must be 
elaborated. 
Therefore, the issues of judicial intervention and the executive autonomy must be 
addressed, especially when they have significant implications upon the people’s interests. 
As part of this dissertation analysis, the level and manner in which the judiciary should be 
involved (the appropriateness of the Constitutional Court’s roles and functions), to at best 
safeguard the people’s constitutional rights, to assure the executive autonomy and to 
maintain the balance of powers among the institutional branches in this realm will be 
examined and suggested in Chapter IV (the Separation of Powers) and V (the Treaty-
Making Model) respectively. 
                                                 
65 While being in its infantry, many have feared that decisions rested only in the hand of 15 justices are also 
running the risk of subverting the supremacy of the constitution by resorting to subservient law rather than 
the intent of the constitutional text. Cf., RAKSASATAYA & KLEIN, supra note 22, at 35. 
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IV. Conclusion 
Since the drastic change in the 1930s up until the adoption of the 1997 
Constitution, Thailand’s political reforms had been accused of hypocrisy in which an 
emphasis was placed on the appearance of a process (a constitution, Parliament, political 
parties and an election), rather than a principle. Despite the incorporation of the 
separation of powers doctrine, “the charter actually gave the Assembly no more real 
power than it gave to the king”.66 Independent organizations to represent public interests 
remained weak politically while the acclaimed “free press” was typically controlled by 
influential officers to promote their personal agenda. The principle and the true objectives 
of democracy (life and liberties of the people) were lost in the process. These were the 
early challenges that the Thai had struggled to overcome over a sixty year period. 
However, through the arrival of the modern reforms that attempted to seal these 
loopholes (political exploitation) and to uphold the basic socio-political rights and 
privileges of the people, a new form of challenge that has another democratic implication 
has emerged.  
Although the focus has now shifted to the enforcement of the very fundamental 
principle of democracy under the current Constitution by incorporating direct democracy 
(public consultation) in several areas of political affairs, facilitating strenuous checks 
from the legislature and other independent agencies, curtailing the executive decision-
making authority, and reinforcing judicial policing power, there is yet the question of 
practicality, and how the new approach can achieve its objectives realistically, 
particularly in the treaty-making process. As part of the efforts to undertake serious 
political reforms, Section 190 has proven to be the most advanced, yet daunting treaty 
provision. On an international scale, the obstruction of the administration effectiveness 
                                                 
66 RIGG, supra note 1, at 161. 
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has adverse implications for the country’s political and economic opportunities in the 
pursuit of foreign relations and the maintenance of its foreign diplomacy, whereas on a 
domestic scale, this outcome threatens the government’s responsiveness to social 
concerns. Maintaining the executive’s primary role and authority in the area of foreign 
affairs is still arguably crucial, but cannot be overly emphasized to prevent the repetition 
of our past mistakes. Balance in the exercise of the executive’s foreign affairs power 
must be sought and established. The legislative and judicial controls over the executive’s 
conduct must be effectively implemented. At the same time, the role of the public in the 
political process which is instrumental to the cultivation of the self-governing process 
must therefore be emphasized in a tactful way through an effective public participation 
mechanism. How to sustain and nurture the democratic principle in the treaty-making 
process will require us to look back at the process or the means itself to bring about the 
constitutional ultimate goals. The rest of the chapters will therefore dedicate to the 
analysis of our means.  
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Chapter III: On Thailand’s Democracy (The Public Role) 
 
I. Introduction 
 
With the implementation of the improved check mechanisms as laid down in 
Chapter II, the Thai Constitution is believed to enhance political equality by expanding 
people’s rights to political participation in various areas of public affairs. Thailand’s 
efforts to advance its democracy through improving the level of public participation in 
the most affected areas of national interests reflect its vision in the value of participatory 
democracy. Increasing the role of public participation is not only believed to serve the 
social purposes (individual capacity-building and social understanding development), but 
also the legitimacy of politics.  
Unfortunately, inserting mechanisms into the Constitution may not be a sufficient 
guarantee of procuring civil rights and liberties, given that several factors cannot be 
corrected simply through a change in a political structure. A mixture of issues which have 
arisen in modern Thai politics range from political passivity of those who have little to 
care about less immediate concerns to deep social fragmentation driven by those who are 
gravely affected, but inadequately accommodated. The people’s feeling of being 
disregarded and disenfranchised also has much to do with the effectiveness of the 
administration. In light of these weaknesses, the concept of liberalism must be 
strengthened in the context of Thai political participation. To meet these challenges will 
require us to look at the root causes in order to understand human psychology and to 
secure an effectual vehicle (governmental function) in the delivery of our objectives. 
Despite various criticisms, I see the advantages of the liberal ideology as a way of 
generating an approach to better enforce people’s participatory rights, which has become 
one of the primary challenges of our time.  
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With this respect, this chapter seeks to raise practical aspects of liberalism (to be 
advanced in the application of a treaty-making model in Chapter V) in response to the 
weaknesses posed by public participation in the context of Thai democracy through the 
examination of various political theories and the root causes of the modern challenges. 
The following section briefly introduces the issues of public participation under the 
current Constitution. Section III will walk us through the idea of direct participation 
portrayed by each school of thought, namely republican, liberal, elitist and participatory 
models which present certain elements that can provide positive changes to the Thai 
democracy. While these democratic models attempt to explain the extent of civic roles in 
political arenas in the most effective fashion, each by itself may not provide an adequate 
respond to Thailand’s current political issues. Following along the path, Section IV will 
then present the condition of Thailand’s democracy in correspondence with Chapter II 
and its evolution from the early elitist to a participatory-based form, which has yet 
continued to pose the same set of problems concerning citizens’ certain attitudes toward 
politics (whether apathy or aggression) caused by a mistrust in their government and the 
absence of certain qualities in the administration. These questions must be addressed 
through an understanding of our cultural traits and the development of the social 
discipline, and by balancing government functions to generate the type of governing 
process that, in turn, fosters the “citizenship” character of the people. In connection with 
such arguments, Section V elaborates justifications for the employment of a liberal 
element and a set of participatory mechanisms to enhance the function of public 
participation which I believe the Constitution is lacking in this participatory mode. And 
last but not least, Section VI will serve as a conclusion – a summary of a better solution.  
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II. Modern Challenges 
Since the arrival of the 1997 Constitution, Thailand has taken an aggressive move 
to advance the country’s democratic development by focusing primarily on improving the 
people’s rights, government accountability and the integrity of political institutions 
through the incorporation of a strong check and balance system directly from the people 
in addition to that of the conventional parliamentary system.1 Thailand clearly perceived 
direct political participation by the people to be a supplemental mechanism of ensuring 
the quality of “self-government”. Public participation has, therefore, dramatically gained 
a major role in several areas of public affairs, and as a matter of a State’s fundamental 
principle. The public participation mechanisms will be further elaborated in Section IV, B 
(ii).  
Despite the benefits that public participation has to offer, there are several general 
claims against this concept.2 This section will focus on some of the primary claims that 
are directly applicable to Thailand’s current democracy condition as partially laid out in 
Chapter I. These are the issue of citizens’ passivity in the area of “remote politics”, deep 
social division aggravated by the discontentment of personally affected, but inadequately 
accommodated individuals and the ineffectiveness of the administration. 
A. Passivity, Low Level of Energy and Thoughts, Weak Sense of Social 
Responsibility  
 
The apathetic, less-informed and non-energized characters of the average citizens 
in the realm of politics is a typical claim asserted by elitism and pluralism which perceive 
                                                 
1 Pursuant to the Constitution of 1997, important democratic mechanisms such as the system of a fully 
elected Senate, the establishment of a party list system, the creation of independent “watchdog” 
organizations, and the better procurement of the people’s political and civil rights were put in place. 
2 These claims are, for instance, permission to allow a small percentage of citizens to pass legislation 
through initiatives (Gilbert Hahn & Stephen C. Morton, Initiative and Referendum, Do They Encourage or 
Impair Better State Government? 5(4) FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 937(1977)), the incompatibility with the ideal of 
consensus government (MADS QVORTRUP, A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF REFERENDUM 9 (2002)), the rigidity 
of its outcome by providing no opportunity for amending a measure or arriving at a compromised solution 
(JAMES BRYCE, MODERN DEMOCRACIES 159 (1921)), and exacerbation of conflicts (DAVID B. MAGLEBY, 
DIRECT LEGISLATION, VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 181 (1984). 
66 
 
public affairs as a business of bureaucrats and experts. According to their views, the 
complexity of modern society, economy and social issues result in a pattern of citizens’ 
disengagement, which justifies the comprehensive roles of the wisest and the most 
experienced in directing those of lesser knowledge and skills. Schumpeter especially cast 
doubts on the level of political commitment among the average citizens as national issues 
tend to be so remote that most people “hardly have a sense of reality”, in contrary to a 
business world that their lives directly depend upon.  
As much as I would like to deny this claim, I must admit that Thailand’s political 
climate, from a certain angle, does not depart from this understanding. From the 
beginning of the 1932 peaceful revolution led by the educated few and army officers, the 
practice of “self-governance” was ruled by a facade of parliamentary system in which 
“few bothered to vote, electoral competition was at a minimum, and the government 
appointed half the members of parliament”3. For a long time, fierce political battles 
among the ruling class had effectively excluded the people’s political participation. This 
is not to blame the elites, but also the low civic spirit within the Thai people themselves 
that had fueled these vicious cycles. The evolution of the Thai political system was 
remarked as the system of “passivity of the overwhelming majority of the people”4. It is a 
remarkable phenomenon to those who witnessed a series of dramatic events in the early 
days in which the Thai people served as no more than the spectators of heated political 
scenes.  
 Today, one may easily argue that the level of energy and a democratic mindset 
among the people have been increased with the implementation of a new set of check 
mechanisms. Nevertheless, the political energy has been unleashed into the wrong 
channel, and in a rather destructive manner while leaving a formal public forum of 
                                                 
3 Donald Hindley, Thailand: The Politics of Passivity, 41(3) PAC. AFF. 355, 356 (1968).  
4 Id. at 359. 
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discussion empty and unattended. The outbreak of the bloody protest is just a form of 
aggression and violence, and not rationality found in a democratic activity. Despite the 
(detrimental) activism, citizens’ passivity still reigns in areas of national concern which is 
where their understandings and intellectual minds could have been at their best use. In the 
end, the question as to why people would rather use violence in search for a better answer 
to their livelihood than delivering their opinions on the “national issue” ought to be clear 
by now. This answer should alarm us about the type of issues that immediately demand 
public participation to redirect the people’s energy in a constructive manner, and the type 
of democratic mechanisms that can effectively accommodate the people’s concerns to 
relieve this tension.   
B. A Source of Deepening Social Divisions  
According to pluralism, public participation can bring conflict to the surface, 
deepening social divisions rather than uniting them. The cause for concern is especially 
that of a polarized society which is easily fueled rather by rage than rationality. 
According to David Magleby’s study, direct democracy (referendums on legislation) 
“intensifies conflict and leads to a politics of confrontation.”5 Along this line, elitism 
described the unfit character of average citizens for state affairs by referring to “the 
emotionality of the masses” that tends to impair their judgment in politics, and 
consequently weakens its stability. Extensive participation may radically transform 
politics into a battlefield causing undue disruption and, in an extreme case, fanaticism.6 
For pluralism, a certain degree of citizens’ passivity is actually preferable in order to 
secure a stable political environment. 
                                                 
5 MAGLEBY, supra note 2, at 181. 
6 DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 204 (2nd ed., 1996), See also Berelson B, Democratic Theory and 
Public Opinion 16(3) PUB. OPINION Q. 313-330 (1952). QVORTRUP, supra note 2, at 87 (“The prejudice of 
the people is far stronger than those of the privileged classes; they are far more vulgar; and they are far 
mote dangerous because they are apt to run counter scientific conclusion”).  
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The issue of social fragmentation in Thailand is at its peak since the bloodless 
coup of 2006. The country has been broken into two. Violence that led to the military 
crackdown in the summer of 2010 was a failure of reconciliation attempts. At the deepest 
level of the social disharmony, freedom of speech and assembly were mobilized by the 
people to channel their anger, resentment and hatred as opposed to reason and 
understanding. People’s political judgments and decisions are based on their political 
alliance and loyalty. On the surface of this fragmentation, the colors that each side 
attaches itself to may symbolize their political alliance. However, the root causes of the 
divergence are rather driven by economic and social inequalities that have rampaged 
among the lower class.7 The side that the rural people take merely suggests whom they 
perceived to have better responses to their demands.8 Politics of the rich in the past has 
worsened the economic and social conditions of the poor.9 The country’s harmony had 
continued to crack until it was finally broken in the summer of 2010. The seriousness of 
the situation raises questions on scholars’ minds whether public participation will serve 
as a tool of compromise or a sword, and whether people will turn a public forum into 
another battlefield. There is a dilemma. However, to completely deny a “public space” 
will only suppress this tension, and eventually encourage violent political participation 
outside regulated forums and institutions.  
There is of course a pressing need to respond to this challenge. To my 
understanding, public participation is not exactly the cause of violence, but only a 
                                                 
7 Sanitsuda Ekachai, Thailand’s Shocking Inequity Statistics, BANGKOK POST, Nov. 30, 2009, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/blogs/index.php/2009/11/30/thailand-s-shocking-inequity-statistics?blog=64 
. (A shocking statistic revealed that “the top 20% own 69% of the country's assets while the bottom 20% 
own only 1%. Among the farming families, nearly 20% of them are landless, or about 811,871 families, 
while 1-1.5 million farming families are tenants or struggling with insufficient land. On income 
distribution, the top 20% enjoy more than 50% of the gross domestic product while the bottom 20% only 
4%”) 
8 Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 People’s Constitution, XLVIII ASIAN SURVEY 373, 
374 (2008) (“…the rural poor finally felt enfranchised under the Thaksin regime’s populist programs….”) 
9 See The Implications of Colored Movements, BANGKOK POST, Sept. 23, 2010, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/opinion/opinion/197731/the-implications-of-coloured-movements. 
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channel for people to express their senses of exclusion and under-accommodation. The 
root cause is rather the unresponsiveness of the government to their (primarily) economic 
and social problems that they felt had received better responses by the previous 
administration. Nevertheless, to open up a wide variety for the cause of public 
participation to be conducted without specificity is not going to address these personal 
high demands either. Thus, how to design a forum of public deliberation that can create a 
positive atmosphere in the society and foster the community is a question for a 
constitutional designer to contemplate.    
C. A Source of the Ineffectiveness of Government Function  
In the challenge of a democratic practice, we constantly face the question of 
whether it is feasible to extend citizens’ rights to public participation in all areas of state 
affairs, especially when societies are densely populated, complex and heterogeneous. 
Besides the problems of factions (differences of interests) as foreseen by Madison, the 
issue then boils down to the institution that takes charge. Elitism has been the strongest 
proponent for the argument concerning the ineffective operation of an administration 
under direct democracy (public participation). From Max Weber’s position, elitism 
advocated that direct democracy is unfavorable, let alone impossible, because, in a 
heterogeneous society, it would only lead to ineffective administration and political 
instability.10  
In the context of the Thai democracy, this challenge has presented itself in a form 
of the opposition party’s extensive demands of public participation on all kinds of issues 
(under the broad criteria provided by the Constitution) that the government finds 
impossible to catch up with, as a way to discredit and destabilize the administration. The 
consequence is that the Constitution can subject the government to many methods and 
                                                 
10 HELD, supra note 6, at 163. 
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levels of public participation while the government, nevertheless, can neglect as many 
citizens’ comments as it wishes while managing to satisfy the constitutional 
requirements. The challenge of the opposition, however, has not necessarily guaranteed 
the responsiveness of the government, and even disrupted the smooth operation, 
particularly in the treaty-making process. The scenario has stalled the government’s 
function by either their paying too much attention to holding all types of public 
participation to avoid the opposition’s claim while piling up other issues, or doing it 
frivolously and allowing the important concerns of citizens to go unattended.  
Maintaining an effective and efficient government is a pre-requisite for the 
function of democracy. In my view, these qualities form part of a “responsive” 
administration (as a primary character of effective representation) because for a 
government to be receptive to people’s needs and critiques, it does require a well-
functioned, ready-to-handle type of government. 
III. Political Theory: Governing Principles from Different Schools of Thoughts 
(Ideas Concerning Political Participation addressed by each school)  
 
Political theorists came up with several approaches to define “democracy” 
whether by political conditions or principles. However, by looking at its Greek roots, 
democracy does not only serve as an end objective, but also as a means of a governing 
procedure11, in which power is to be exercised by the people to form the state and decide 
on policy decisions.12 Thus from an understanding of the meaning of “democracy”, it at 
least suggests the rights of the people to take part in the political process to ensure that 
                                                 
11 “Demos” simply means people and “kratia” is to rule, which gives a general meaning of “rule by the 
people”. MICHAEL SAWARD, THE TERMS OF DEMOCRACY 8 (1998). 
12 GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3 (1962), See also, Id., at 15 (suggesting that democracy is 
generally understood as “a political system in which the citizens themselves have an equal effective input 
into the making of binding collective decisions. [W]hereas a non-democratic system gives power to the 
hands of certain individuals to make binding decisions without any accountability to citizens”).  
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their voices be heard and their views be taken into account.13 And to secure these rights, a 
government must be established by “deriving their just powers from the consent of the 
governed”.14 Thus, ultimate authority and sovereignty lie in the people who gave their 
consent through political participation upon which legitimate government rests.15  
This method of self-rule on which democracy is based upon seems to entail public 
participation by reminding us that representation can be improved by citizen deliberation 
and reciprocal communications between a government and people. This section, I have 
selected four different models of democracy, namely republican, liberal, elitist and 
participatory which portrayed, and in some cases, delimited the ideas concerning public 
participation. And how this self-rule principle is carried out by each school also extends 
to the role of public participation that each of them regards in relations to the function of 
democracy. From a minimalist perspective in a civic role advanced by elitism to the 
extended notion of civic virtue in developmental republicanism, these models have 
presented their elements throughout the evolution of Thai politics. My mission is to 
analyze the weaknesses, and to seek an equation among these models for the right fit for 
the Thai democracy in response to the challenges of my generation.      
A. Republican  
Republicanism believed in the freedom of a political community based on self-
government in which citizens are endowed with the right to directly participate in 
government. Similar to the classical model, republicanism approves of public spirit - the 
willingness of a person to set aside his personal interests in the pursuit of the public ones. 
The fundamental principle of this developmental model is to secure a form of association 
                                                 
13 Nevertheless, another way of interpreting effective democracy argued by Ross Harrison is to look at the 
people’s wishes being represented and effective as long as people get what they want even though it was 
not brought by their direct expression. ROSS HARRISON, DEMOCRACY 8 (1995). 
14 LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 4 (1990). 
15 Id.  
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that will defend “the good” of all members by a collective force and unity.16 It holds the 
ideal of strong and collective identifications of the people by the principle and communal 
values they share. This is a crucial role that Republicanism believes public participation 
can play in the development of individuality by placing the community’s interest ahead 
of anything else, and by relinquishing personal desires and preferences. 
Advanced by Jean Jacque Rousseau, public participation is believed to contribute 
to the formation of capable citizenry in the governance of state affairs by enhancing an 
individual’s sense of social responsibility and creating concerns for public issues. He 
placed a wider role of public participation by perceiving it as “central to the 
establishment and maintenance of a democratic polity”.17 With this respect, there is the 
need for “psychological connections” among the people within the system they live in 
order to form a community, and to gain the full potential and benefits of democracy.18 
According to this view, citizens’ deliberations on public issues can help creating people’s 
sense of belonging, which in turn will provide long-term incentives for them to protect 
communal interests. Public participation, hence, serves more than simply a protective tool 
against tyranny, but also a constructive mechanism that unites individuals’ goals.19  
The presumption about the qualities of individuals required for effective self-
governance may be challenged given the current condition of Thai politics, in which 
members lack sufficient incentive to deliver a collective decision. Although Rousseau 
acknowledged that “this was democracy for small states”, arguing that a small scale 
politics is more manageable in terms of the amount of public issues that also immediately 
                                                 
16 HELD, supra note 6, at 57 (quoting JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 60 (1762)). 
17 CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 20 (1970). 
18 Rousseau’s theory goes beyond the protective function of participation as an assurance of the 
institutional arrangements. He believed that there must be a continuing interrelationship between the 
working of institutions and the psychological qualities and attitudes of individuals interacting within them. 
Id. at 22. 
19 Public participation in the decision-making allows individual to be educated, to distinguish his own 
impulses and desires and to pursue general interests. Id. at 25. 
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touch upon people’s lives, with a smaller group of people to reconcile,20 it does not mean 
that this model should not be applied in the case of a deeply divided society. Its 
motivational assumptions (public virtue and the common good notions) are essential to 
reduce controversies and relieve social tension. It is of course a matter of providing a 
participatory framework guided by the idea of Republicanism that would motivate people 
to contribute to matters that they are sure can make changes to their lives and to resolve 
their differences. Nevertheless, providing public forums for broad national issues may not 
necessarily create a “republican” environment. Careful consideration to reshape the 
issues for public participation is required to help develop the right mindset toward this 
Republican orientation.  
B. Liberal 
Liberalism perceives human beings as free and equal individuals. Although a state 
must retain a monopoly power to provide a basis for private transaction, its capability to 
regulate must be constrained to minimize the negative effects of their policy decisions 
upon personal rights and freedoms of individuals, the primary interests to be safeguarded 
under the notion of liberalism. The authority bestowed by individuals on government is 
thus for the pursuit of the essential purposes of the governed, namely the preservation of 
“life, liberty and estate”.21 It is a protective model which seeks both to restrict the power 
of state, and define a private sphere by using democratic mechanisms primarily to protect 
and promote individual interests. 22 Liberalism’s aim is, therefore, to secure the political 
conditions that are necessary for the exercise of personal freedom.  
                                                 
20 HELD, supra note 6, at 56. 
21 Montesquieu, in the same manner, devoted his life on the question of institutional limits on state action 
believing that “individuals’ capacities and energies would be unleashed in the knowledge that privately 
initiated interests would be protected”. Id. at 83. 
22 Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in DEMOCRACY AND 
DIFFERENCE 67, 75 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (suggesting the exercise of public reason from John Rawl’s 
standpoint, although open to all citizens to partake, has been limited by a political conception of 
liberalism). Judith N. Shklar, The Liberalism of Fear, in LIBERALISM AND THE MORAL LIFE 21 (Nancy L. 
Rosenblum ed., 1989). CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 4 (2000) (“Above all, liberalism 
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According to John Locke, “the institution of government can and should be 
conceived as an instrument for the defense of the life, liberty and estate of its citizens”.23 
The boundary of each individual is respected through the principle of morality that 
encouraged individuals to preserve each other’s liberty.24 Thus, liberalism under Locke’s 
philosophy is not entirely self-indulging that is merely centered on personal rights, 
interests and concerns. His idea demanded that people take into consideration other’s 
fundamental rights and justice when weighing against one’s own. With this respect, the 
liberal concept does not only focus on the pursuit of individual satisfaction, but also the 
moral development of individuals. This is also the way John Stuart Mill defined “liberty” 
that one is free to pursue so long as it does not cause harm to others, deprive others of 
theirs or impede their ability to obtain it.25  
 Liberalism may perceive citizens’ involvement in political affairs as necessary to 
guard their human dignity, social justice, and to guide their own destiny as people are the 
best defenders of their own rights. But the emphasis on the pursuit of individual interests 
is the weakness of liberalism that needs to be carefully addressed in order to provide a 
possible answer to our current challenges (citizens’ apathy, social division, unresponsive 
administration). The focus of the liberal approach can induce public activism by 
encouraging the expression of personal needs and desires, which must be subject to 
limitation (delineate the scope) to create compromise among the community members 
and an administration which is capable of handling all the important issues. Thus, the 
strength of liberalism is reflected in the value it places on collectively protecting 
individuals’ fundamental justice (rights to life, liberty and security) that everyone equally 
shares. This is especially the case, as Mill argued, “when people are engaged in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
imposes limits by providing the very framework for the respect of “human rights” which are regarded as 
being non-negotiable assets”). 
23 HELD, supra note 6, at 78.  
24 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 311 (2nd ed., 1988).  
25 HELD, supra note 6, at 102 . 
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resolution or problems affecting themselves or the whole collectively, energies [will be] 
unleashed which enhance the likelihood of the creation of imaginative solutions and 
successful strategies”.26 Liberty, by itself, may not be sufficient to guarantee “human 
excellence”. However, liberty pursued and facilitated through a proper means can bring 
about the development of independent, autonomous and rational minds necessary for a 
formation of a strong community. These means will be discussed later in the chapter.  
C. Elitist 
Elitism is on the other end of the spectrum, which sees the limitation of political 
participation by the people as necessary. A very low level of civic involvement in 
political activities has been suggested by its governing term which limitedly defines 
democracy as an “institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote”27. Elitism sees the impracticability of direct democracy and the necessity 
of effective and centralized organization in order to handle the issues of mass society. 
The growth of technical experts, skillful bureaucrats and a hierarchical political structure 
then render the exclusion of most citizens’ political roles inescapable. Thus, with a low 
estimation of individuals’ intellectual capacities and enthusiasm, political participation is 
a function of the upper class. Citizens’ right to political participation has been limited to 
an electoral process where competitive parties and strong leadership take the lead in 
shaping people’s interests and public policy. The development of commerce, social 
structure and human conditions render elitism justifications for making the ability of 
                                                 
26 Under Mill’s philosophy, vigorous protection of individual liberty enables a person to “flourish” and to 
fully pursue his political and economic freedom which, in return, can benefit all in the long run. HELD, 
supra note 6, at 104 (emphasis added). 
27 Amy Gutmann, The Disharmony of Democracy, in NEMOS: DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY 129 (John W. 
Chapman and Ian Shapiro, eds) (Vol. XXXV 1993) (quoting JOSEPH SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, 
SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY 269 (1943). 
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citizens to replace one government by another the sole channel of restraining 
governmental power.  
David Held may agree with the conditions of modern societies that demand quite 
a level of experts, but not with those of humans that it should circumscribe citizens’ role 
in partaking in political decisions. Held suggested that citizens’ passivity, apathy and 
ignorance do not create the pattern of the upper class politics, but are rather the product 
of this exclusivity. To many people who have little interest in political activities, they 
“simply do so precisely because they experience politics as remote, and because they feel 
[that] it does not directly touch their lives or that they are powerless to affect its 
course”28. He further emphasized that the more the issues immediately affect people’s 
lives, and the more those affected are assured that their inputs will be taken into account, 
the more successfully direct public participation will serve its purposes. From this 
perspective, citizens’ activism may require an involvement of personal interests, and a 
responsive administration to create trust within the system in order to foster involved 
citizens in the long run which is crucial to the success of direct democracy.  
In sum, elitism may provide one easy solution to the politics of a mass, complex 
society by putting issues in the hand of a capable few who make decisions on behalf of 
their constituents. The model was, in fact, reflected in the early pattern of Thai politics. 
The system of the “capable” may guarantee convenience in government administration, 
but not necessarily responsiveness as the Thai ruling elites continued to exploit people’s 
indifferent political attitudes. A stable political environment is not to be expected either. 
With the current political condition, social fragmentation will only be worsened when 
people’s interests, especially the rural poor continue to be inadequately addressed. 
Similarly to the issue of passivity raised by Held, emotionality of the mass may not be the 
                                                 
28 Joseph Schumpeter himself saw this similar problem that as long as people view domestic and foreign 
affairs as remote issues, they will continue to disengage, and “without a sense of responsibility that comes 
from immediate involvement, ignorance persists” HELD, supra note 6, at 175-181. 
77 
 
cause for elitism’s justification, but the consequence of its “remote democracy”. Elitism 
does not provide us enough reasons why we should keep the majority of the people 
uninformed, passive and socially irresponsible when there is neither a guarantee of a 
responsive government nor peaceful politics. Elitism merely exploits the electorate’s 
weaknesses that are susceptible to strong influence of their leaders without seeking to 
improve human conditions to become more capable simply because this is what the 
system thrives on. As reflected in the Thailand’s political evolution, this model is out of 
the question a major failure for the Thai-style bureaucracy.  
Elitism, nonetheless, at least pointed out human flaws that we can seek to 
overcome through the design of an appropriate mechanism, and the understanding of a 
human nature. Preparing social conditions, besides providing resources and opportunities, 
is arguably as crucial for effective public participation since it takes a democratic 
political structure (opportunity and resources), effective governmental function 
(immediate response) and mentally active citizens altogether to form fuller democracy.  
D. Participatory 
Participatory democracy offers a broader range of civic engagement by enhancing 
the role of citizens in managing public affairs. The model shares certain ideology with 
classicalism in terms of equality and respect among citizens by their ability to directly 
participate in all areas of public affairs. Participatory democracy reinforces the idea of 
direct “self-governance” which replaces the roles of political ruling class by those of the 
people. It recognizes certain political conditions of modern politics that can be resolved 
through civic education, attitudes and actions under the mode of direct participation.29 
Only the transformation and the expansion of understandings among citizens that takes 
                                                 
29 Barber described the conditions of modern politics as conflicting, pluralist and exclusive (the separation 
of public and private actions). And only by civic education will citizens become capable of making 
common purpose rather than their altruism. BENJAMIN R. BARBER, STRONG DEMOCRACY 117 (2nd ed. 
2003). 
78 
 
place during the process can make them discover the commonality of their purposes. And 
therefore, in contrast to republicanism, community grows out of this process, and not the 
other way around.  
Participatory democracy provides a full spectrum of public participation. This 
type of direct democracy extends and, in fact, encourages people’s participation beyond 
the public realm. The development of “citizenship” and the formation of a community 
can take place in a private sphere such as workplaces or local organizations. The practical 
aspect of this model is its emphasis on the transformative process at the local scale by 
creating a training ground for individuals to take advantage of the available participatory 
mechanism in the exercise of their control and judgment over decisions that may affect 
their personal lives and community. 30 This practice also helps lifting a restrictive role of 
citizens due to their lack of interest in national politics in the long run. A certain 
limitation is also suggested, under this model, in correspondence with the exercise of a 
local autonomy in a sense that the action of public participation is not necessarily 
required at every level and in every instance, but rather frequently enough when 
significant decisions are being made ,31 (which, in this case, are those affecting us 
personally and our community).  
In sum, whether participatory mode of democracy supports public participation in 
a public or private sphere, one of its primary objectives is to cultivate civic ideals, and 
develop an individual’s judgment in the direction of the community. However, the 
dangers of adopting the model in a full range to apply to all kinds of public issues (as 
Thailand is currently facing) are the citizens’ apathy in complex matters, the inability of a 
government to follow through its obligations and the citizens’ discontentment in 
personally affected areas that have not received adequate attention. The transformation 
                                                 
30 Id. at 209-211.  
31 Id. at 151. 
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process toward a civic community thus depends heavily upon people’s taking appropriate 
actions, a government’s good response and not merely the implementation of an 
institutional framework. The real challenge here is how to induce people to deliberate, 
and to eventually speak for the interest of the community. As Held suggested, by giving 
people good enough reasons to care about politics (through personal incentives and a 
responsive government), you may be halfway to creating a community (as public 
participation becomes more successful in serving its purposes). Thailand’s current 
political and social conditions can benefit from the model through the idea of embarking 
on small-scale concerns such as the issues of personal justice and community livelihood 
which may make it easier on us to grasp common action amidst the social conflict. This 
can serve as a foundation for civic action and responsibility at the national level “where 
participation is harder, but the stakes are much higher”.32 
IV. Thailand’s Democracy Condition: From Elitism to Participatory Model 
 
A. Political Development: Sources of Political inequality  
 
The year 1932 marked an important change in the political system of Thailand 
both for the better and for the worse. The introduction of the principle of separation of 
powers under the sovereign rights of the people has also invited the system of elite 
favoritism in which politics is the business of the upper class. The Constitution, although 
emphasized in the preamble that the “sovereign power comes from the Thai people”,33 
helped institutionalize a hierarchical political structure in which only knowledgeable 
bureaucrats took charge in the administration. There was no direct public participation in 
political affairs in the early constitutions. Rights and duties of the people specified in the 
permanent 1932 Constitution were limitedly exercised solely through the elections of 
                                                 
32 Id. at 211. 
33 CONST. (1932), Preamble §2 (Thail.) (repealed 1946).  
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representatives.34 Later constitutions were drawn in such a way that would allow the 
government to take control of the Parliament one way or another. The 1946 Constitution, 
for instance, allowed the candidates to vote themselves into the Senate, and provided the 
qualifications of voters and candidates that facilitated a wider participation of its 
supporters.35 In the same manner, the Constitution of 1952 gave ways to the military 
government to nominate and select most of the appointed members of the Assembly.36 A 
lack of education and understanding in the new form of governance were the primary 
justifications for the common people to be excluded that unfortunately made elitism a 
perfect fit for the early model of Thailand’s democracy. These factors became major 
causes that led to the pattern of political exploitation.  
It can be said that political inequality and political exploitation are causes and 
consequences in themselves. The development of Thailand’s democracy has shown that 
political inequality causes political exploitation, which in turn aggravates the condition of 
political inequality. Despite a series of Constitutions, it was clear that running the country 
was a matter of the upper class. Each constitution was primarily designed by a particular 
group either to fit their personal agenda or to prevent the surge of its rivalry without 
paying adequate attention to the fundamental principle, e.g. people’s life and liberty. Thai 
Constitutions were not taken seriously as binding documents in the sense that whenever 
there is a shift in power among the ruling elites, the Constitution was suspended to permit 
new rules in favor of those in power. The purpose of its Constitution rather served as a 
                                                 
34 KOBKUA SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, KINGS, COUNTRY AND CONSTITUTIONS: THAILAND POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT 1932-2000 36 (2003). It was also clear that the promoters of the 1932 Constitution hoped to 
maintain their control over the government by means of their majority in the Council. FRED W. RIGG, 
THAILAND: THE MODERNIZATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITY 91 (1966) (explaining the transformation of 
monarchy during the modernization period which basically transferred powers from the absolute monarchy 
to office-holding, new ruling elites). 
35 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 34. at 45.  
36 Id. at 46. 
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tool to institutionalize elitism by supporting an ongoing power struggle among various 
factions of the ruling elites in order to legitimize the politics of their time.37  
Nonetheless, despite the improvement of the Constitutional mechanisms that 
renders the government’s exercise of power directly accountable to the people in the vast 
areas of national interests, the outcome falls short. Not only do the mechanisms provide 
no guarantee for better responsiveness of government’s administration, but also worsen 
its efficiency. Social unrest, violence and hatred among the people which had been 
previously fueled by cycles of political and social inequalities are not resolved by the new 
mechanisms. It is, on the contrary, seen as a legitimate source of the people’s power to 
roam the streets. Passive political culture has obviously taken its toll on us by widening 
the gap between “the haves” and “the have-nots” while perpetuating a pattern of 
unresponsive administration. Consequently, when people decided to speak up, they used 
violence rather than words to communicate their troubles.  
i. Elitism and Cultural Discipline: Deferential Mindset 
The idea of elitist governing style in the early days was reflected in a form of 
monarchy, the system in which the ruling class gave directions and made decisions for 
the people. Thailand’s long tradition of absolutism under which the king was a patriarchal 
figure, who subsumed all the powers within him, had shaped Thailand’s social structure 
in a form of class divisions. The instant change of its governing form in 1932 was 
substantial to a formation of the political structure, but was not quite at the social level. 
The deferential mindset of the people in public affairs, especially in the early period, 
cannot be blamed on anything else but the patriarchal role of the benevolent monarch and 
the social status of individuals that had designated their roles within a hierarchical 
structure.  
                                                 
37 RIGG, supra note 34, at 152-153. 
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Elitism suggested that the absence of substantial civic engagement in the 
governing process was crucial for the stability of the system. In comparison to the system 
of absolute monarchy, the relationship between the king and his subjects which was more 
of a family-oriented form based on unity and affection literally reduced the role of Thai 
people in public affairs to “the governed” who were subject to the governor’s decisions.38 
Neither political mechanisms nor people acted as internal checks.39 This was due to the 
fact that the Buddhist moral rules operated as constraints upon the exercise of his 
absolute power. The deferential posture of the people was made stronger, especially when 
the king’s absolute power was perceived less as a threat, and more of a mental shelter and 
protection of their livelihood. In addition, Thailand’s old feudal system which allowed 
individuals’ status to be marked by their entitlements to the pieces of property also played 
a significant role in designating social responsibilities of each individual and the scope of 
their roles in public affairs.40 Thus, class divisions were seen as an effective way for 
nobility to assert their power and control over resources and manpower. Civic roles were 
essentially limited to no more than carrying out decisions that had already been made for 
them. 
The product of passivity and apathy were the results of the old style elitism. 
Although this was what Held suggested in the elitist democracy model, both governing 
                                                 
38 The concept of the “Lord of Life” pertains to nothing (about absolute or arbitrary power of life and death 
over his subjects) more than his moral obligations to perform certain social tasks to satisfy his people’s 
needs. DAVID M. ENGEL, LAW AND KINGSHIP IN THAILAND DURING THE REIGN OF KING CHULALONGKORN 
2 (Alton L. Becker et. al., 1975). 
39 The king himself is obliged to act in accordance with the ten kingly virtues and the Buddhist principles 
for the interest of his people. The tradition is also Hindu-derived believing in the righteous role of the king 
by adhering to justice and the tenth kingly virtues, namely giving, morality, liberty, rectitude, gentleness, 
self-restriction, non-anger, non-violence, forbearance and non-obstruction. Id. at  4-5.  See also DAVID K. 
WYATT, THE POLITICS OF REFORMS IN THAILAND 8 (New Heaven, 1969) (suggesting the effect of the 
transformation which embodied Buddhist moral principles in the reign of kingship helped strengthen the 
checks against despotic excesses of absolute rule). 
40 Among these are princely group, nobles, common and bondsmen whose legal rights and public duties 
were varied depending on their membership of the group. HOOKER, M. B., A CONCISE LEGAL HISTORY OF 
SOUTH-EAST ASIA 27-28 (1978). The abolition of the class of bondsman which was instituted in the late 
1800 during the reign of King Chulalongkorn suggested the significance of having lower class control in 
the early period. ENGEL, supra note 38, at 18. 
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styles share the common character which focus on excluding people from forming their 
thoughts and taking part in political decision. A long range of a hierarchical system had 
forged certain political culture in the Thai people’s blood. Under the benevolent monarch, 
powers exercised by the king were justifiable to the people whereas citizens’ roles were 
best played (as understood among the people) by rules within their designated realms of 
responsibilities. Under such a circumstance, their needs to stand up and speak for their 
interests seemed unnecessary as decisions were to be made for them accordingly. Their 
limited freedoms were directions and decisions to be followed (obligations) in exchange 
for a protection of the communal interests. Despite this positive interaction between the 
ruler and the ruled, the hierarchical structure did not disappear without leaving certain 
conditions in a cultural trait. Not only did the system strip away the people’s roles in 
politics, but also their political mentality. The absence of political equality in the early 
Thai democracy further contributed to a passive nature among the average citizens when 
it came to deliberating policy decisions. People would still do it, not because they 
realized the importance of the rights they currently possessed, but simply because they 
were asked to do so. Political inequality is easily aggravated under such conditions. It is 
not surprising why politics easily fell into the hands of those who understood the culture 
too well, and decided to act on it. Thailand’s democratization in 1932 may be known as 
one of the shortest and bloodless revolutions. New political institutions were set up 
overnight. However, as Sartori suggested for a democratic culture to take root, it could 
take up to a generation. And it is up to us to ensure that the process takes place.  
ii. “Transform-Placements Process” 
 
In his essay, Ian Shapiro described Huntington’s theory of democratic transitions 
under four different accounts; two of which are “transformations” and “replacements”. 
The former refers to the scenario in which democracy is endowed by the elites in power, 
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whereas the latter requires the opposition to take the lead.41 In either case, the scenarios 
suggested that the adoption of democracy is possible in the exclusion of the lower class.  
Thai democracy is a complex situation. It did involve a mixture of the efforts of a 
new wave (the educated few) and the understanding Monarch to come to terms with the 
necessity of the country’s new political system.42 Thus, on one hand, the process is 
transformative in the sense that the Monarch willingly gave up his absolute power, and 
allowed it to be returned to the people, while he still served as their mental shelter and the 
symbol of national unity. And on the others, this substantial political reform was led and 
proposed by a group of high ranking colonels and the educated upper middle class. 
Although it is true that the movement was also driven by resentment among government 
officials who had been laid off due to worldwide economic recession at that time,43 the 
fact that the opposition group pursued an immediate action by using the military instead 
of public mobilization is evidence that they acknowledged that a royalist mindset still 
reigned in the general public (a lack of popular will towards the reform), especially in the 
lower class and the underprivileged.44  
The resolution of the country by employing legal means (drafting the 
Constitution) without taking into account social factors was a risky business as the 
absence of strong political will of the people has later contributed to the vicious cycle of 
political exploitation by a ruling class. The fact that the 1932 movement was primarily 
led by a group of the educated few who had the privilege to learn and import the ideology 
from Western countries, rather than those of the lower class, industrial workers or 
                                                 
41 IAN SHAPIRO, DEMOCRACY’S PLACES 93 (1996). 
42 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 34, at 4 (“In spite of his own belief that a real democracy is very 
unlikely to succeed in Siam…[and] even be harmful to the interest of the people, the King was truly of the 
opinion that it was a necessity that Siam must adopt democracy…”). 
43 ENGEL, supra note 38, at 123. Hindley, supra note 3, at 356.  
44 The promoters of the 1932 revolution was consisted of few civilians with radical minds and a lack of 
mass support and conservative army officers wishing to inherit and gain access to power and privileges 
after the relinquishment of the monarchy. Hindley, supra note 43.  
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publicly supported organizations suggested the absence of a democratic mindset of the 
general public, which significantly forged a form of elitism.45  
iii. Direct Adoption of Western Democracy: the Establishment of Forms 
rather than Principle 
 
The adoption of Western-based democracy which took shape only in the forms 
(parties, elections and parliament) rather than principle brought negative consequences.46 
As Giovanni Sartori suggested, imitation of a political form that has been invented 
somewhere is not hard to do, but it never guaranteed a survival of democracy. Thus, 
despite the establishment of a parliamentary system, elections and political parties, the 
elitist system has allowed bureaucrats to actively participate and pursue their interests 
under the cloak of democracy. This is obviously the advantage that elitist democracy 
offered to the ruling class by limiting the people’s political participation.  
While weak political will of the common people was more prevalent at that time, 
there was a question of the fitness of the newly adopted Western ideology to the Thai 
political culture and the social structure. In his Majesty’s remark (King Prajadhipok), his 
deepest concern was that the Government might not employ proper methods of 
administration compatible with “individual freedom and the principle of justice” for the 
people.47 As a result, the powers that must be returned to the people who had little idea 
what to do with it were simply changed hands to the new ruling elites under the disguise 
of democracy. The sovereign rights of the people were bestowed upon those who were in 
control of the Assembly. Whereas rights and duties of the people specified in the 
                                                 
45 This phenomenon made Thailand distinguishable from Western experiences. RIGG, supra note 34, at 
148-149. See also Ulrich K. Preuss, The Exercise of Constituent Power in Central and Eastern Europe, in 
THE PARADOX OF CONSTITUTIONALISM 213-216 (Martin Loughlin & Neil Walker, eds., 2007). 
46 Supra note 41 at 92 (1996) (suggesting how instant adoption of democratic practices does not necessarily 
form a democratic culture). Giovanni Sartori, How Far Can Free Gov. Travel? in DEMOCRACY: A READER 
50-51(Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner eds., 2009) (describing preconditions of democracy, and that 
copying democratic forms are not sufficient to procure democracy). 
47 Department of Asian Studies, Cornell University, Data Paper no. 26, 1974 (citing King’s Prajadhipok’s 
abdication statement expressing his concern on the incompatibility of the government administration with 
individual freedoms and principles of justice).  
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permanent 1932 Constitution were limitedly exercised solely through the elections of 
representatives, the National Assembly was heavily controlled by the government to 
maintain its position.48 A lack of the people’s political will and participation was a 
contributing factor to the abuse of power of the ruling class to enrich their wealth, and 
preserve their status. The cycles of military intervention were the evidence of this fact 
that it did not end the country’s ill fate, but rather opened up another opportunity for the 
new ruling class to step in. 
iv. Unresponsive and Ineffective Administration 
 
The failure of Thailand’s democracy which heavily relied on the elitist democracy 
led to a weak enforcement of the democratic principle while overemphasizing the process 
(having various mechanisms and political institutions) that had been put in place only to 
benefit a particular group.49 The weak enforcement also had much to do with the Thai 
people’s mindset that allowed the practice of political exploitations to persist whereas the 
establishment of a formal process such as a constitution, Parliament, political parties, and 
election served nothing more than to verify the position of those in power. 
These are the sources of unresponsive administration in which the government’s 
high-handed method had primarily been made against its opponent with little regard to 
people’s interests and their well-being. Decisions were made and resources were 
allocated in favor of those in power which further aggravated political and social 
inequalities. Transparency and honesty remained rare qualities in government 
administration. Corruption had thus rampaged among ruling elites.50 Thus, the claim of a 
responsive administration, if any to be made, is for the rich.   
                                                 
48 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 34, at 36. RIGG, supra note 34, at 156 (Despite the parliamentary 
system, it was clear that the promoters of the 1932 Constitution hoped to maintain their control over the 
government by means of their majority in the Council). 
49 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 34, at 4. 
50 Corruption is defined as abuse of public power for private benefit. Examples of corruption include the 
sale of government property by public officials, bribery, and embezzlement of public funds, patronage and 
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Arguably, the early challenges that the Thais had struggled to overcome over 
decades may have been alleviated. Nevertheless, a new form of bureaucratic inefficiency 
has also emerged by the arrival of the modern reforms that attempt to seal these 
loopholes, and to uphold the basic socio-political rights and freedoms of the people. The 
recent version of the Thai Constitution may have been devoted to promoting 
accountability and transparency in government administration by incorporating direct 
democracy (public consultation) in vast areas of political affairs as well as facilitating 
strenuous checks from the legislature and other independent agencies. There is yet the 
question of practicality, and whether the drastic approach will, in turn, further undercut 
the effectiveness of an administration, which is already lacking. The requirement of 
extensive public participations in all kinds of national issues may satisfy a core 
democratic element (self-governance), but is deemed inadequate if its effect causes 
failure in government’s policy decisions to reflect any of citizens’ opinions and concerns. 
The emergence of the new rights in political participation is a sharp contrast to the 
traditional constitutions that solely emphasized an electoral process as a means to control 
the government’s exercise of power. The new rights affirm the principle of political 
equality and justice. It is then left to the people to exercise and enforce these rights with 
appreciation and responsibility. And it is up to us to redesign the participatory 
mechanisms to keep the people within this line. These are cultural, political and social 
issues that cannot be addressed merely through a change of a political structure, but 
through a new creation of cultural and social disciplines.  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
nepotism. Boris Podobnik et al., Influence of Corruption on Economic Growth Rate and Foreign 
Investment, 63 THE EUR. PHYS. J. B 547 (2008), available at http://polymer.bu.edu/hes/articles/psnis08.pdf. 
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B. Emergence of Participatory Model under the Emphasis of “Civic Virtue” 
i. Constitutional Reforms (1997 and 2007 models) and the Public Spirit 
 
The arrivals of the 1997 and 2007 Constitutions brought about periods of major 
political reforms51 that had incorporated the concept of participatory democracy with an 
emphasis on the people’s deliberation in the interests of the nation. Thus, the 
Constitutions are not only meant to combat the country’s past failure by focusing 
primarily on improving the people’s participatory rights in the political decision-making 
process (in addition to the checks under a conventional parliamentary system) to induce 
government accountability and transparency, but also to create a stronger sense of public 
spirit.52 Although previous Constitutions spelled out a certain degree of civic duties, no 
constitution can make it clearer than that of the 2007 version in the requirement of a 
person’s duty to defend the country and “to safeguard national interests.” Thus, the new 
Constitution may generously provide people with participatory rights in the political 
process (to be described in the following section), but it does also require a higher form 
of participation in which Rousseau believed through “stressing the centrality of 
obligations and duties [of the people] to the public realm.”53 These collective obligations 
are fundamentally reflected, for instance, in Section 67 in the national conservation and 
protection of the environment, Section 71 in defense of the country’s national interests, 
Section 87 in the participation concerning the determination of policies and plans for 
national economic and social development, and Section 190 in the involvement of treaties 
affecting national sovereign rights and jurisdiction, economic, social security, trade and 
budget of the country. By shaping the issues that are nationally-centered to be subject to 
                                                 
51 Pursuant to the Constitution of 1997, important democratic mechanisms such as the system of a fully 
elected Senate, the establishment of a party list system, the creation of independent “watchdog” 
organizations, and the better procurement of the people’s political and civil rights were put in place. Based 
on this foundation, the promulgation of the 2007 Constitution took a further step in strengthening the Thai 
democracy, especially in the improvement of people’s participatory rights in the decision-making process.  
52 See CONST. (2007), Ch. 4 §70-71 (Thail.) (Duties of the Thai people “to protect and uphold the Nation, 
religions and the King…to defend the country and safeguard national interests…”).  
53 HELD, supra note 6, at 56 
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public deliberation, the Constitution does not only seek to foster an active and involved 
citizenry, but also implies its faith in the people’s public spirit to come forward with a 
united goal to make their decisions based upon “the common good”. 
ii. What do the Participatory Rights Cover?  
A broad framework to promote public participation in political decision-making, 
state plan and policy and in the scrutiny of the exercise of the government powers has 
been laid down in the 2007 Constitution as a matter of principle. Chapter V, Part 10 (the 
directive principles of state policies in relation to public participation) established the 
purposes and general areas of public participation that the state must accommodate. The 
provision also requires the state to provide resources and education in the promotion of 
this political right. This broad framework, therefore, laid a strong foundation for several 
other sections in the implementation of public participation for national interests. 
The guarantee of public engagement in political realm is certainly not limited to 
liberties in connection with assembly and association (Chapter III, Part 11). Chapter VII 
provides substantial rights to the people for their direct political participation (in addition 
to petition for the proposal of a bill to the National Assembly, to lodge a complaint to 
remove the persons from office) in a referendum where the matter may affect “national” 
or “public interest” or is required by law. This general term has become a rule of thumb 
which can trigger the people’s right to political participation as long as issues affecting 
national interests or the common good are implicated. The new public rights are, 
therefore, included in several policy decision-makings such as in the areas of foreign 
affairs and environmental protection. The following sections are operated in accordance 
with the directive principles of state policies in relation to public participation. 
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Section 165 (Chapter VII) specifies circumstances under which a referendum 
may be conducted, in the case where the Council of Ministers is of the opinion that any 
issue may affect national or public interests.54 
Section 190 (Chapter IX) requires public hearing in a treaty-making process for 
any treaty which “provides for a change in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas 
over which Thailand has sovereign rights…or has extensive impacts on national 
economic or social security or generates material commitments in trade, investment or 
budgets of the country.”55 
Section 66 (Chapter III) endows the right of a community to participate in the 
conservation, preservation and exploitation of natural resources, and in the protection, 
promotion and preservation of the quality of the environment. According to this 
provision, public consultation must be made prior to undertaking any project or activity 
which may seriously affect the community with respect to the quality of the environment, 
natural resources and health.56  
iii. “Developmental” Element under Participatory Democracy 
From its framework to specific provisions, the Thai Constitution can be described 
as aspiring toward participatory democracy by focusing on the people’s rights to self-
governing through a means of direct political participation other than an electoral 
process. Nevertheless, the Constitution’s specific reference to civic duties (Chapter IV) 
and to specific provisions (Chapter VII, Section 66, 165 and 190) concerning political 
participation in the issues of national concerns as described (e.g. to petition to remove 
officers, to deliberate on a treaty that has extensive impacts on national economic or 
social security) presents a certain element of republicanism by demanding a collective 
role of the people to address, strictly speaking, non-private issues. Thus, matters affecting 
                                                 
54 CONST. (2007), Ch. 7 §165 (Thail.). 
55 Id. Ch. 9 §190 (amended 2011).    
56 Id. Ch. 3 §66.    
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national or public interests which require individuals’ decisions to be based on what is 
best for the country (rather than personal preference) establish a system of cooperation. 
And it is this system that republicanism strives for. Thus, the current Thai Constitution 
does not only adopt the idea of participatory democracy (forms of direct democracy in 
several areas of political decision-making), but also place an emphasis on the 
developmental element stressed in the republican model by subjecting concerned national 
issues ranging from environmental conservation to foreign policy to public deliberation 
in the creation of “concerned citizens”.  
The adoption of participatory democracy is clearly established in the 
Constitution’s principle which seeks to promote civic roles in the governing process and 
to emphasize that “the sovereign power belongs to the Thai people”. The directive 
principles of state policies fully embrace the notion of strong democracy by specifically 
requiring the state’s roles not only in promoting public participation at all decision-
making levels, but also in providing civic education for political development. Civic 
education and well-informed citizens remain ones of the most important ingredients 
stressed by participatory democracy that made citizens capable of transforming one’s 
interest into a community’s.57 The extent of this type of direct democracy goes beyond an 
electoral process, and is not only limited to a “consultative”, but is also an “initiative 
process”. The entire constitutional chapter on direct political participation by the people 
has dedicated to empowering people to propose a bill and to remove misbehaving officers 
from the office. Thus, through these different types of processes, the participatory model 
is clearly adopted under the Constitution to generate people’s stronger political will 
power in directing the fate of their community.  
                                                 
57 BARBER, supra note 29, at 117. 
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Beneath the participatory model, an element of republicanism is arguably present 
in terms of the types of issues to be subject to public participation, which in a way 
demands a community mindset of participants to solve problems that may be remotely 
out of their concerns. These issues are those affecting public interests: territorial 
demarcation and sovereignty, national budgets, economic and social security and so on. 
The presumption is there in the qualities of individuals required for effective self-
governance, and that people aspire to “think community” to begin with. Opportunities for 
public participation (public issue formulation) then become the formation of “a society in 
which the affairs of the state are integrated into the affairs of ordinary citizens”.58 In my 
view, the aspect of the participatory process that stresses a collective decision-making of 
the people in the issues that concern the nation as a whole (civic virtue) rather than 
individuals requires a high degree of a citizen’s communal mindset. Individuals’ aims 
and wishes are cast away by issues framed toward social responsibility and the pursuit of 
public wellness. This specific aspect of the Thai’s participatory democracy can be seen as 
inspired by republicanism.  
iv. Weaknesses: Potential Tensions between the Two Models and Rethinking 
Constitutional Provisions 
 
Despite the mixed elements of the Thai Constitution, republicanism and 
participatory democracy operate on different presumptions and principles. Whereas the 
former is based on politics of homogeneity, the latter recognizes one of the most 
important conditions of modern politics; competing interests, conflicts and pluralism. The 
function of public participation under participatory democracy is rather employed to 
reconcile these differences than to forge consensus based upon previous norms.59 Both 
models are clearly different in terms of their means in the pursuit of their social ends. The 
                                                 
58 HELD, supra note 6, at 57. 
59 BARBER, supra note 29, at 128-131 (describing political conditions that impose “a necessity for public 
action…for reasonable public choice, in the presence of conflict and in the absence of private or 
independent grounds for judgment”) (emphasis added). 
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version of direct democracy by Benjamin Barber, thus, rejects a republican approach 
based on its collectivist, unitary aspects and the idea of civic virtue community through a 
believe that individuals’ interests must be first recognized and transformed, only then a 
community can later be created. This is, however, what might be missing from the idea 
that the current Constitution embraces as it requires people to deliberate with a public 
mind, and to think collectively in the interest of the country. Its focus of public 
consultation at a national level, without paying adequate attention to small scale issues, 
may increase the degree of this ideological tension, and jeopardize participatory principle 
itself. What we might be implementing here is pushing this deeply divided society to 
address highly collective and extremely political issues. Whereas there is an absence of 
public participation in the areas of economic and social concerns at individuals’ level, 
these are inadequately provided at a local scale.60 The path to fully appreciate the benefits 
of participatory democracy requires us to rethink and redesign the scope of public 
participation.  
The problems of the Thai democracy that encompasses various dimensions, 
citizens’ apathy in politics, serious social fragmentation or administration inefficiency are 
legitimate reasons to undertake another round of constitutional adjustment by shifting 
public participation’s focus more on the issues that affect individuals’ fundamental rights 
and local communities’ rights. This is the area where the idea of liberalism can help 
bridging the gap between participatory and republican models by raising the issue 
concerning fundamental justice (life, liberty and security interest) that each individual 
                                                 
60 Section 66 (Chapter III) may provide a community right in the management and preservation of their 
local resources. These rights are still limited to environmental protection, natural resources preservation 
and the public health. Similarly, although section 287 (Chapter 14) states that local residents have the right 
to public participation “in the case where any act to be performed by a local government organization may 
have material impacts on the livelihood of local residents”, this right is of course limited to a local 
government’s conduct or activity, and does not apply to an act of the central government such a treaty 
making or border settlement.  
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shares to develop into a common understanding. Barber may reject liberalism based on 
the argument of self-consummation. However, there is a tactful element that lies in this 
individualistic character which can have positive impacts on Thai democracy. The 
importance of shifting the scope of public participation to focus on individual 
fundamental interests, and the role that liberalism can play in order to reconcile these 
differences will be further elaborated in the following section. 
The current approach may seem generous in its terms for inviting political 
participation by the people to address all kinds of complex national issues. It is, however, 
inadequate to overcome specific weaknesses posed in the modern Thai society. In the 
path toward building citizens’ strong commitment to make a public choice and creating a 
community, individual needs and differences must be first recognized, shared and 
understood by others. The following section seeks to resolve the tension between the two 
ideologies by suggesting how the incorporation of liberalism can come into play to help 
bridging the gap, and to overcome these specific challenges.   
V. Toward Cultural Reform and Creation of a New Social Discipline through 
Strengthening Political Participation Instrument 
 
Because of the weaknesses of public participation set forth in the first section, this 
republican-mixed participatory form is deemed inadequate in response to these modern 
challenges. Adopting a liberal component in participatory democracy is required, and 
does not necessarily replace the republican values. On the contrary, my arguments in the 
following section will show how this approach can enhance the quality of a “citizenship” 
(informed, socially responsible and rational) by breaking a certain aspect of cultural 
barriers and a negative social discipline.  
Liberalism underlines the importance of an individual’s fundamental rights to 
make us realize the values of the rights we hold to begin with. It is the notion that will 
make us understand that our rights are as important and as uninfringeable as others. Thus, 
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in the exercise of one’s personal freedom, one cannot do so without disregarding his or 
her community. Liberalism, to my understanding, does not go so far that it legitimizes the 
supremacy of one’s interest over another’s. Liberalism requires us to recognize each 
individual’s interest and prioritize it in accordance with its necessity on the basis of 
mutual understandings and compromises. Through this mode of participation, democracy 
will turn into a project that forges ordinary citizens’ potentiality through self-discovery of 
their personal needs, and eventually the realization of the common concerns.    
A. The Need to Break Cultural and Social Barriers to Fully Embrace Democratic 
Principles  
 
A series of constitutional reforms have been undertaken primarily aiming at 
deconstructing and reconstructing Thailand’s political structure (the establishment of 
various democratic forms). Despite the transformations of its legal and political 
landscape, the conduct and political will of the people in the pursuit of this path may only 
be enhanced if facilitated by effective mechanisms. An emphasis on a liberal component 
within participatory democracy is a way to create active citizenship and a new social 
discipline that teaches them to deliberate on the basis of rationality, and to give faith in 
the governing system. It is, therefore, my understanding that the improvement of 
Thailand’s democracy condition does not solely depend upon a change in the political 
structure, but also the cultural and social aspects to be addressed in the context of 
liberalism.  
B. Justification for Incorporating Liberalism into Participatory Democracy: the 
Affirmation of Fundamental Rights  
 
The attack on liberalism oftentimes relies on the assumption of the pursuit of pure 
self-interest, rather than of the community as a whole. The typical claim lies in the heart 
of human nature which is based on self-satisfaction, self-fulfillment and a desire for 
personal gains. For better or worse, this is the reality we must acknowledge. My take on 
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the incorporation of the liberal approach into public participation, of course, does not 
approve of all sorts of unlimited personal freedoms and individuals’ rights, but rather of 
those that need to be protected. Here, we are talking about the protection of negative 
freedom, freedom from interference of one’s fundamental rights and liberties. When it 
comes to the issues surrounding individuals’ fundamental justice (human rights, life, 
liberty and security interests), no matter how diversified the community is, we cannot 
deny that all equally share the same type of legitimate interest and the desire to secure a 
livelihood.  
The deficiency of the existing public participation mechanisms that encompass 
broad public issues (such as those affecting national budgets, having substantial social, 
economic impacts or national security) is that they sometimes do not give people enough 
reasons to be active and to become concerned citizens, while at worst failing to 
accommodate those who might be personally affected. With the dramatic increase in 
numbers of the “qualified issues” for public participation, there is also a question of how 
well numerous public hearings will respect and reflect people’s opinions, if at all. Can the 
government meaningfully follow through with this constitutional obligation, especially 
given that there is no follow-up process? In contrast to the matter of individuals’ 
fundamental rights, high-profile national issues arguably tend to produce less responsive 
administration with regard to public opinion due to the fact that there are no individual 
needs to serve, no specific misery to attend to, and no one to contest this government’s 
failure. Benjamin Barber referred to this scenario as political hypocrisy in which political 
elites throw referenda at the people, and overwhelm them with all kinds of complex mass 
society problems.61 The process therefore leads to further passivity through self-
                                                 
61 Barber’s claim, however, rather pointed out to the problem of a lack of information, full debate and 
insulation from money and media that prevent people from fuller and effective participation. Because the 
active, engaged and civic-minded characters of citizens have been presumed, the argument for strong 
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perpetuating ignorance in the areas of “remote politics” while building up tensions for 
better responses in the areas of “daily politics”.  
To get people to come forward and deliberate in accordance with our democratic 
purposes, the process must create a system that fosters civic activity and trust among the 
constituents (among the people, and between the people and the government). The 
justifications for adopting the specific aspect of liberal ideology (in the protection of 
individuals’ life, fundamental liberty and security) is, therefore, to form this meaningful 
decision-making process by the people through (i) breaking the pattern of passivity, (ii) 
keeping the executive truly accountable and responsive to its constituents, (iii) generating 
compromise within the society, and (iv) developing the “will power” as opposed to the 
“want” as part of the social harmony process. The approach seeks to break the barrier 
between liberalism and democracy by using liberal elements to recover its moral 
dimension. When the system is designed to cultivate individuals’ motivations and 
intellects, only then the maintenance of liberty and individual development “can be fully 
achieved with the direct and continuous involvement of citizens in the regulation of 
society and state”62. 
i. Breaking the Pattern of Passivity  
It has been said that for democracy to be meaningfully implemented, there needs 
to be more than simply political rights and public space. People themselves must exercise 
these powers actively and caringly.63 In the absence of the energy and the civic spirit, the 
function of democracy is deemed to diminish. Citizens’ attitude toward politics can be a 
barrier to its development when citizens fail to act upon which the circumstances so 
require.  
                                                                                                                                                 
democracy fails to address another crucial issue that deals with individuals’ incentives. BARBER, supra note 
29, at 154. 
62 HELD, supra note 6, at 267. 
63 ALAN KEENAN, DEMOCRACY IN QUESTION 7 (2003).  
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In light of this difficulty, the theory of a “civic reserve” developed by Gabriel 
Almond and Sidney Verba suggested that citizens, while generally uninterested in public 
affairs, will be able to “mobilize resources if…their interests are threatened.”64 By the 
same token, Carol Pateman supported that the pattern of citizens’ apathy and ignorance 
can be broken by “making democracy count in people’s everyday life”65. She 
acknowledged the weaknesses of the human nature that any decision would not be made 
as effectively as “in those nearer home”, and that people will learn to participate from 
issues that they are most interested in and likely to have a better grasp of which are those 
“immediately touch their lives”.66 According to this logic, strong motivations and passion 
of the people to play their parts in public realm are simply generated from policy 
decisions or governmental actions that directly affect or threaten their personal justice. 
Thus, one of the simplest ways to overcome people’s passivity and indifference in 
politics is to let them address and manage their affairs through issues that are individually 
or community related. Following the “civic reserve” theory, citizens’ activism and 
interests in politics are generally heightened when they personally feel that there is a need 
to take action. 
In response to the question of a constitutional mechanism, these rationales require 
that we readjust the scope of public participation by prioritizing those who are to be 
personally affected by government’s undertakings to get their words out in a formal 
hearing process prior to the project. The strategy is thus to extend the method of 
democratic control to the areas upon which people’s livelihood depend. Although this 
view sounds somewhat self-indulgent in a sense that people’s active and effective 
                                                 
64 QVORTRUP, supra note 2, at 28-29. See Gabriel Almond, Civic Culture, in THE BLACKWELL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL SCIENCE 91 (Vernon Bogdanor ed. 1991). Montesquieu also defended the 
idea that “individuals’ capacities and energies would be unleashed in the knowledge that privately initiated 
interests would be protected”. HELD, supra note 6, at 83. 
65 PATEMAN, supra note 17, at 104. 
66 HELD, supra note 6, at 269. 
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participation requires a subject of discussion that they personally care about or have a 
reason to be interested in, it is by no means that an end result will always be self-
satisfactory, especially when the surrounding issues concern an individual’s fundamental 
rights. No matter how self-interest driven one can be, the matter that requires immediate 
attention justifies individuals’ articulation of their personal needs and concerns. It is one 
of the easiest starts to prepare people to articulate their personal needs in a way of a 
public spirit. My intention is to propose a basic solution that can serve as a stepping stone 
toward a more ambitious goal such as national politics. Before then, the character of an 
active, concerned and informed citizen must be nurtured. And we can leave the elitism’ 
claim behind that because of the passive and apathetic characters that citizens in general 
possess, people should be kept in their private realm. Besides, legitimacy in policy 
decisions will be automatically improved as those personally affected can exercise the 
right to express their problems and propose solutions of their own.67 
ii. Keeping the Executive Fit 
The primary arguments for limiting the scope of public participation to issues that 
immediately concern individuals’ fundamental rights go directly to support the function 
of democracy in two ways. One is necessary for securing effective and responsive 
administration, and the other is for inducing and maintaining active roles of citizens in 
the political realm. The latter effect is also contingent upon the former. Public 
participation can serve as a safety valve to secure people’s interests only when a 
responsive character of the state is present to guarantee that people’s feedback will form 
parts of the political decisions, and that state’s policies will be guided by public opinions. 
The same holds true for the maintenance of effective public participation that can protect 
individuals’ justice and the quality of one’s citizenship as “engaged citizens”. Thus, 
                                                 
67 Shapiro criticized Gutmann and Thompson’s false presumption on the legitimacy of deliberative process 
concerning the health care issue that involved less than twenty percent of affected population. IAN 
SHAPIRO, THE STATE OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY 29 (3rd ed. 2006).  
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framing issues to enable public participation to serve specific purposes, to have real 
impacts on people, and to be practically feasible are crucial to what type of effects we 
wish public participation to have upon the people. This certainly requires us to refrain 
from generating all kinds of high-profile, complex and random issues for public 
consultation. Even Benjamin Barber in his book, Strong Democracy, suggested its own 
version of limitation by pointing out that direct self-governance of citizens does not 
necessarily take place “at every level and in every instance, but frequently enough and in 
particular when basic policies are being decided and when significant power is being 
deployed”.68 And with my own interpretation, the “basic policies” and “significant 
power” here refer to fundamental issues surrounding individuals’ life, liberty and 
security.  
The concern of the effectiveness of government administration addresses the issue 
of public participation process on two grounds: first, the areas of public participation and 
secondly, the manner in which to institute. The issues of fundamental individual rights 
are increasingly important in the treaty-making context and especially crucial in the 
health and environment related legislation enactment that demands a highly responsive 
administration. By cutting down the potential issues to be subject to participation process 
may not be sufficient to secure the type of administration that we want, a formal hearing 
which allows an appeal process is necessary to make sure that people were listened and 
the government’s decision is carefully observed. It is true that the issue of individuals’ 
fundamental interest already provides government a specific purpose to be attentive. This 
follow-up process will serve as a formal safeguard in addition to such rationality.   
The process of public participation requires people to come forward and 
deliberate. But it takes a responsive and effective administration for public participation 
                                                 
68 BARBER, supra note 29, at 151 (“Government by the people directly…was of course impractical if not 
impossible for any society of substantial population”).  Supra note 13, at 9.  
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to fully serve its function - effective in the sense that a government can manage its 
resources and handle the mandatory requirements, and responsive in a way that it can 
truly incorporate public feedback into policy decisions.69 Keeping the scope of the issues 
broad thus runs the risk of producing dysfunctional administration through the 
cumulative consequences of all sorts of initiatives that a state finds impossible to catch up 
with.70 The reduction in the effectiveness of the Thai government is posing challenges 
such as unmanageable workloads and irresponsible administration (temptation to fast-
forward their obligations only to satisfy the rules while ignoring the true meaning of the 
procedure), especially in the absence of any formal follow-up process.71  
Centering issues on individuals’ fundamental rights and guaranteeing a responsive 
formal process help create people’s trust in government and faith in democracy by 
showing them that democracy is not simply an abstract notion, but a process in which 
their actions can make a difference. Public participation oftentimes fails to transform 
conflicts into a solution primarily because the citizens’ compromised position fails to 
form part of the political decisions. It then becomes simply a meaningless tool that draws 
people together just so they can find out later on that their share of concerns have been 
given up for something else that they did not negotiate for.72 Using public participation to 
                                                 
69 HELD, supra note 6, at 154 (2nd ed. 1996) (citing HABERMAS J., STRUKTURWANDEL DER 
OFFENTLICHKEIT (1962) (“ It has been said that the realms of social life where matters of general interests 
can be discussed and where different opinions can be reconciled by allowing arguments to be sustained are 
fundamental to the health of politics”). 
70 The example of the direct democracy dilemma was given in the domestic legislature context. Since the 
1970s voters have tended to like initiatives that promise better schools, new hospitals or tougher prison 
terms, but they are oblivious to the costs involved. At the same time, they loathe taxes and in many states 
they have insisted, by voter initiative, that two-thirds majorities are needed to raise them. Direct 
Democracy, The Tyranny of the Majority, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 17, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/world/united-states/displaystory.cfm?story_id=15127600. 
71 Although freedom of speech (under civil and political rights) is traditionally regarded as a negative right 
in nature, for these rights to be fully respected, “one must entrench rights to resources that help the exercise 
of those rights…” Thus, this type of negative rights which arguably does not enjoy unlimited exercises 
because it could have both budgetary and certain political consequences. CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 40, 42 (2000). 
72 Diversity of viewpoint in foreign-policy decision making is useful primarily because it, as an end in 
itself, gives the public a sense that its viewpoint has been heard and considered. MICHAEL J. GLENNON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 32 (1990) (emphasis added). 
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address broad political issues such as matters affecting a national budget, social security 
and so on can give rise to such problems, especially when the reflection of citizens’ input 
in the national issues is commonly minimal. 
David Held emphasized the significance of maintaining the effectiveness of 
public participation by pointing out that if people have reasons to believe that their inputs 
are unlikely to be taken seriously, incorporated or weighed equally as those of public 
authorities, it is less likely of course that people will count on the system or find the 
government trustworthy.73 The result will further undermine the participation mechanism 
itself making it more difficult, if not impossible, to maintain an engaged role of citizens. 
iii. A Path Toward Compromise, not Consensus 
The path to generate consensus among people’s political views on the issues of 
national concerns or the “common good” can be impractical. Besides posing a challenge 
to public participation in terms of citizens’ apathy, broad political, social or economic 
issues also run a greater risk of creating diversion and aversion among the people, 
especially in a highly polarized society. Tocqueville, in fact, asserted the reason why 
high-profile or broad issues will not produce effective public participation due to its 
tendency to intensify social conflicts driven by participants’ biases, political alliance and 
emotion.74 Its danger lies in the unlimited scope and imprudent application of public 
participation. Overload of information and extreme publicity concerning a national issue 
often cause citizens to be “exposed to so many opinions and so many facts that they are 
reduced to choosing at random”75 as opposed to their sense of rationality. This is the 
scenario that wide open national issues tend to produce: confrontation and hostility. 
                                                 
73 HELD, supra note 6, at 268. 
74 Stephan Holmes, Tocqueville and Democracy, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 28 (David Copp, John 
Hampton & John E. Roemer eds., 1993) (“In the heat of the struggle each partisan is driven beyond the 
natural limits of his own views by the views and excesses of his adversaries, loses sight of the very aim he 
was pursuing …”) 
75 Id. 
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Many are sensitive matters which somehow, to great amount of people, serve as an 
implication for their political alliance that will only exacerbate their inability to accept 
their internal differences (ideas or political views). The current approach may presume 
that participants will enter into a forum with an impartial, open mind concerning their 
solutions, but it is hardly the case, given Thailand’s recent political situation.  
How can a specific, individual-related issue open up people’s minds? The 
argument is drawn from a distinctive characteristic that the concept of individuals’ life, 
liberty and security possessed. Unlike general political issues, its dramatic impact on 
people’s lives can more easily call upon communal sympathy and understandings. A 
hearing process which invites and responds to affected individuals is crucial to a path to 
reconciliation. A guarantee of a responsive process to individuals’ fundamental justice is 
a way of recognizing the differences and diversity of needs that are so crucial that they 
cannot simply be denied of their existence. The approach does not try to accommodate 
every single interest, but to ensure that the interests affected are acknowledged and 
articulated in search of compromise and understandings among equal citizens.76 This 
follows: “[a] richer understanding of process of democratic discussion results if we 
assume that differences…function as a resource for public reason rather than as divisions 
that public reason transcends”.77 The pressure for consensus, particularly required for 
issues of national concerns, is generally a suppression rather than a transformation of a 
conflict between individual interests and civic virtue. As previously asserted, the liberal 
mode of participation which narrows down the issue of public consultation will seek to 
generate compromise, rather than consensus based on mutual respect and understandings 
                                                 
76 Carol C. Gould, Diversity and Democracy: Representing Differences, in DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCES 
172-174 (Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996). Bonnie Honig, Difference, Dilemma, and the Politics of Home, in 
DEMOCRACY AND DIFFERENCES 261(Seyla Benhabib ed., 1996) (“[when] Both oughts are compelling, and 
the situation that stages their conflict is inescapable. In such cases, I think if constructively at all, in terms 
of acting for the best and this is a frame of mind that acknowledges the presence of both the two oughts”). 
77 IRIS MARION YOUNG, DILEMMAS OF GENDER, POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLICY 67 (1997). 
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under the principle that one’s individual rights cannot prevail when such an assertion 
infringes upon another’s. The decision one makes will require him to be grounded upon a 
moral principle (which can sometimes even be one’s personal preference). It can help 
generate community awareness through developing citizens’ compassion and mutual 
understandings. This process forms a basis for harmony which allows people to fully 
participate in their daily politics, and to relate to each other in positive ways. With the 
right mechanism, the country can be led away from internal diversion and toward the rule 
of law. Argued by Richard Arneson, in Liberal Democratic Community, liberalism may 
present individual conflicts in the short run, but it protects all citizens’ stake “in the 
maintenance of an open society for goal formation”78 as a building block for tolerance 
and wide individual liberty.  
iv. Developmental Driven  
Both John Rawls and Jürgen Habermas believed that the priority of basic liberal 
principle must be given since its protection provides the framework for the exercise of 
free public reason, the framework in which citizens’ reasonableness and rationality thrive 
on. This concept of political justice, by giving people a sense of security in their affected 
rights through a guarantee of a responsive public hearing, enables them to express and 
transform their understanding of the good through political interactions in the long run.79 
Public participation may oftentimes be seen as a conflicting principle of individualism 
that primarily seeks to protect individual’s preferences and freedoms rather than to 
promote consensus on public issues.80 Nonetheless, the process of public participation 
that is based on the concept of fundamental rights to life, liberty and security will 
encourage individuals “to view one another as being entitled to universal moral respect 
                                                 
78 Richard Arneson, Liberal Democratic Community, in NEMOS: DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY, supra note 27, 
at 209.   
79 John Rawls, The Domain of the Political and Overlapping consensus, in THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY 245, 
262 (David Copp, John Hampton & John E. Roemer eds., 1993). 
80 Benhabib, supra note 22, at 77. 
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and egalitarian reciprocity”81 enabling the protection of fundamental justice for all. The 
issue oftentimes brings the scenario in which a person comes to realize how his personal 
interest encompasses others with whom he is associated with. What I view as my 
livelihood may also be others’, and together is the community’s. This type of self-interest 
can generate a share understanding among those who bear the same fate. A collective 
goal need not be “common”, but can be an interest all can share.82 The process, therefore, 
does not only induce the desire of an individual to speak up, but also brings about the 
recognition of moral rights among the affected citizens in that particular community. 
Dialogues in the liberal mode, I must argue, helps humans understand each other’s 
circumstances, prioritize pains felt by him and the members of his community, and 
develop sympathy toward one another. The liberal mode of participation that focuses on 
the very fundamental issues thus encourages the deliberation of one’s personal needs; a 
process that allows individuals to discuss, to share, to be informed, and to form a rational 
choice capable of making a joint decision.83  
Participation in politics “called upon citizens to weigh interests not his own; to be 
guided…by another rule than his private partialities; to apply, at every turn, principles 
and maxims which have for their reason of existence the common good”.84 I can only 
validate the argument that political participation is believed to hold this intrinsic value for 
the development of individuality when the type of political participation can truly unleash 
individual energies, and render a meaningful process. It is, therefore, a matter of 
                                                 
81 Id. at 78. 
82 Supra note 77, at 68. 
83 Along this line, Richard Arneson even argued for the necessity of the deliberation of an individual’s 
basic preference to discover one’s desire (which can sometimes be based on his moral ground) and to form 
a rational choice. Arneson, Liberal Democratic Community, in NEMOS: DEMOCRATIC COMMUNITY, supra 
note 27, at 203-204. 
84 AMY GUTMANN & DENNIS THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY DISAGREEMENT 42  (1996) (quoting John Stuart 
Mill). 
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designing a process that will induce and draw the people to come together in the first 
place to make such transformation happen.  
VI. Patching Up Pieces 
Social issues that have rampaged in the Thai society are not novel problems of 
democracy. In fact, Thailand seems to pick up all the possibilities (unfavorable 
conditions) that could leave public participation the least feasible alternative - citizens’ 
passivity in national issues, serious social tension and ineffective administration. Despite 
its sharp teeth, the Thai Constitution, to my understanding, is only half-way operational, 
and has not yet effectively enforced these mechanisms. Instead of fostering the quality of 
citizenship and democracy, public participation has widened the gap between the most 
experienced and the less capable by further encouraging a sense of apathy while 
disconnecting the affected constituents from the system. In addition, the broad realm of 
public consultation has presented threats to the effectiveness of governmental functions 
in such a way that the means of direct participation does not serve its original purpose, 
but is merely a shield in a battlefield of politics.  
To this end, if the existing machinery (public participation) cannot serve its 
function, and may in fact worsen the social conditions, it is time not for the abandonment, 
but the readjustment. Different models of democracy as mentioned each have great 
features to offer. It is unnecessary to be critical of one, and not another, and to solely rely 
upon a single model. Participatory democracy has laid a strong foundation under the 
current Constitution, but to make it work may require a seed of liberalism and a balance 
in elitism’s claim (effective administration) to finally achieve the ideology of 
republicanism (a sense of community and citizenship). As much as narrowing down the 
sphere of public participation to a very fundamental issue must be undertaken, a 
responsive mechanism must be guaranteed. Greater emphasis should be placed on the 
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necessity to define and delimit the sphere of politics to unleash, direct and foster 
individual energies in the civil society into the right channel.85 Cutting down issues does 
not only mean allowing the government to focus on, and respond to a very fundamental 
one, but also creating greater trust among the people and of the people in the political 
process. John Stuart Mill also pointed out that there is a way to incorporate and transform 
individual liberty into a building block for utilitarianism, the greatest good of all. 
In sum, this is not simply a proposal to a legal reform, but also a cultural one. 
When a Constitution gets ahead of the people, it is our task to slow the process down to 
allow them to move along. To leave it up to the people to catch up with the system, to my 
belief, is a major flaw since this can be another cycle of political development in the 
absence of the “necessary will” of the people (that is, the will to undertake the right 
political action) to entail a proper function of democracy, which may lead us back to 
where we started. Promotion of political equality cannot be made simply by adopting a 
new political structure, but also cultural reform through creating a new social discipline.86 
We surely do not wish that this instrument to be just an empty process only to fulfill the 
definition of a democratic nation.  
                                                 
85 A triumph liberal way of thinking, “a sense that limiting excesses of government and protecting 
individual rights are of greater concern than translating immediate popular sentiment into public policy”. 
Marc F. Platter, From Liberalism to liberal Democracy, in DEMOCRACY: A READER 68 (Larry Diamond & 
Marc F. Platter, eds. 2009). 
86 SUWANNATHAT-PIAN, supra note 34, at 4 (“Democracy is alive if and when its principle and process are 
truly put into practice”). 
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Chapter IV: On the Separation of Powers (The State’s Organs) 
 
I. Introduction 
The common understanding of executive efficiency which can sometimes be 
narrowly interpreted as administrative “convenience”1 led to the emergence of various 
forms of democratic mechanisms to ensure greater diligence on the part of the 
government, and to prevent the abuse of power as a result of the branch having all the 
powers and accessible resources at hand. The emphasis of the people’s broad 
participatory rights in the political decision-making process as introduced in Chapter III 
was one of the examples that affected the priority of the administrative efficiency of the 
executive in the governing process. The concern is nevertheless conceivable because the 
term “convenience” can result in the disregard of the public views and representation (the 
involvement of legislature) simply to get things done, and the tendency toward power 
monopolization by that particular branch in the absence of political barriers. The notion 
of checks and balances introduced under the separation of powers doctrine has therefore 
been argued to counter such effects, and to create accountable and responsible 
governance rather than to facilitate the political process, in other words, the function of 
administration.  
Against this backdrop, this chapter will present another perspective in regard to 
the relationship between the separation of powers doctrine and the administration 
efficiency that should be in a positive manner by promoting both efficiency and 
accountability qualities in the governing process. And it is not necessary that we must 
give up one quality for another. In fact, the emphasis on the central role of the executive 
in the realm of foreign affairs is to respect the division of powers under the principle of 
checks and balances. The interference by other branches (checks), although legitimized 
                                                 
1 LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 35 n. (1990) (citing Myers v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)). 
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under the separation of powers principle, cannot exceed the necessary level because 
efficiency requires a sufficient level of the executive autonomy in the foreign affairs 
conduct along with the consideration of judicial deference under particular 
circumstances. My argument by no means suggests that check mechanisms must be 
deprived for the benefit of the executive branch’s political independence. These roles, 
functions and responsibilities of each branch are carefully divided and prescribed under a 
constitution. My position here is only to point out that it is crucial for this instrumental 
framework to ensure both political autonomy and accountability of the public institutions. 
Because when the constitutional structure allows too much boundary crossing among 
branches, it can undermine the autonomy and undercuts the effective function of the 
political departments, which constitutes an element of our democracy. 
This chapter will introduce the concept of the separation of powers doctrine and 
its relevance to the preservation of the executive’s foreign affairs authority (Section I) by 
examining the structure of the Thai and the U.S. Constitutions and the operation of the 
two systems under this principle which demonstrate the predominant roles of the 
executive in foreign relations (Section II). Arguably, although the structure of the Thai 
Constitution allows a broader exercise of the executive’s foreign power, the U.S 
Presidential role in the realm of foreign affairs is nonetheless rather prominent in practice 
than textually stipulated.2 However, there is a certain aspect of the Thai Constitution that 
may have made its implementation a challenge to this tradition. These are the increasing 
                                                 
2 Although the President exercises a broad foreign affairs power derived from Article II, his power is not 
exclusive as the Senate’s coordinate power of “advice and consent” is required in treaty policymaking, 
either by participating in negotiations, by providing advice on foreign policy, or by using its veto power to 
force the President senatorial policy. John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-
Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM.L. REV. 1955, 1963 (1999). See also, Arthur 
Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties-The Original 
Intent of the Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L.REV. 1, 117-20 (1979). The 
Thai Constitution, on the other hand, vests the executive with a broad treaty power with a few exceptions. 
Jaturon Therawat, Roles of the Parliament in Treaty Making Process under the Thai Constitution 2 (Nov. 
21, 2008) (Working Paper, on file with the King Prajadhipok’s Institute), available at 
http://www.kpi.ac.th/kpith/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=264&Itemid=9 
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roles of the legislative and judiciary interventions that have threatened the effective 
function of the executive in the treaty-making process. Against this unconventional 
practice, there are good rationales behind the proposition of centralized executive foreign 
affairs authority. The institutional structure, expertise, efficiency and credibility are the 
leading qualities that make the branch a good fit for the foreign affairs administrator 
(Section III). At the same time, in the absence of sufficiently strong domestic 
implications, these justifications also suggest limited responsibility of the legislature in 
the realm of foreign relations. And last but not least, the consideration of limited judicial 
review to support the primary authority of the executive in this area will be examined 
(Section IV). Although the judiciary is considered an appropriate body to enforce our 
constitutional process, there are certain factors like decisions that involve foreign policy 
determination, the allocation of state organ powers, and important individual rights 
concerns that can come into play in determining an appropriate level of judicial 
involvement. These are thus key elements to the improvement of a balanced interaction 
among the institutional branches in the area of foreign affairs. 
II. The Separation of Powers Principle 
Advanced by Montesquieu, the separation of powers doctrine is also known as the 
system of “checks and balances” among the three branches of government, namely the 
legislature, the executive and the judiciary, which is designed to divide government 
functions, and eliminate the concentration of power.3 The framers’ constitutionalism was 
                                                 
3 Elliot L. Richardson, Checks and Balances in Foreign Relations, 83 AM. J. INT.’L L. 736 (1989). The 
term  "trias politica" or "separation of powers" was coined by Charles-Louis de Secondat, baron de La 
Brède et de Montesquieu, an 18th century French social and political philosopher. Under his model, the 
political authority of the state is divided into legislative, executive and judicial powers.  He asserted that, to 
most effectively promote liberty, these three powers must be separate and acting independently. An 
Overview on the Separation of Powers, National Conference of State Legislature, 
http://www.ncsl.org/LegislaturesElections/OrganizationProcedureFacilities/SeparationofPowersOverview/t
abid/13543/Default.aspx. The search to divide government by function was also undertaken by the work of 
John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government to distinguish between the legislative and executive 
powers. Montesquieu also adopted Locke’s understanding of the executive power as “composed of a 
foreign affairs power”. Yoo, supra note 2, at 1993. 
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committed to limited government through this governing method to ensure that such 
powers only come to exist through the prescription of a constitution which assigns 
functions and allocates powers to each branch. The legislature holds the power to regulate 
through making, amending and abrogating laws. The executive branch has the duties to 
execute the laws, take care of the daily administration, and also serve as the guardian of 
the economy and internal security. And the judiciary has the primary function to enforce 
the laws, and resolve disputes. These governmental powers and responsibilities are to be 
set apart, and exercised independently to allow effective checks among these institutions 
to occur.4 As Montesquieu observed, the executive and the legislative powers, when 
falling into the same hand, can lead to a tyrannical form of government.5 Thus, the basic 
idea of the doctrine is to ensure the independence of the branches and the decentralization 
of powers.   
The interaction among these branches is deemed crucial not only to the 
effectiveness of the check system, but also “the practical working of government”.6 The 
term “practical working” was, however, argued as operational and feasibly functional 
rather than a “mere convenience” of a particular branch.7 Although Justice Brandeis’ 
opinion in Myers v. United States suggested the preclusion of the efficiency argument as 
the primary objective of the separation of powers doctrine which should aim at protecting 
against the abuse of power,8 the efficiency of governmental functions may at least be 
perceived through the independence of the three institutions in the deliberation of their 
own judgments and decisions. The argument for administrative efficiency and 
effectiveness as I advocated in the previous chapter is necessary, and does not fall to the 
                                                 
4 Richardson, supra note 3. See also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 7. 
5 Richardson, supra note 3, at 737.  
6 Id. at 736  
7 Id. (citing O’donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516, 530 (1933).  
8 Justice Brandeis wrote “the doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not 
to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power”. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 35 n. 
(citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926)). 
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same level as the claim of “convenience”. These terms (effectiveness and efficiency) 
have been defined by United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the 
Pacific (UNESCAP) as ones of the eight primary characteristics of good governance and 
the principle of democracy.9 Efficiency thus bears a much greater quality than mere 
convenience by fostering a political condition that could yield a responsible and 
responsive administration. 10   
Along with the principle of separation of powers, governmental functionality 
should therefore be taken into consideration, and balanced against the need for 
governmental checks. Although, the primary objective of institutional independence is to 
enable each branch to effectively police one another rather than to facilitate the 
interaction among the branches,11 the checks system however cannot be so overbearing 
that it impedes with the government’s necessary functions or its primary authority. In 
fact, a practical approach as opposed to a rigid one was adopted to enable the realistic 
operation of government administration throughout the American history.12 In the 
maintenance of balance and appropriate checks, a flexible approach which refers to 
sufficient discretionary power to be exercised by a particular branch without interference 
of another as a matter of decision-making is adopted.13 Thus, the powers properly 
belonging to one branch should not constantly be directed and disrupted by other 
                                                 
9 See Chapter I, Section III, A 
10 According to dictionary definitions, “efficiency” means “performing or functioning in the best possible 
manner with the least waste of time and effort” by “having and using requisite knowledge, skill, and 
industry”. The term also connotes being competent and capable. “Convenience”, on the other hand, bears 
merely the character of being “at hand, favorable, easy, and comfortable for use”. Thus efficient 
administration refers to the condition in which the political branch can exercise its power in its best capable 
manner to serve public needs with little consumption of time, energy and resources. The convenience of 
administration may only require government works to get done with not much of an effort as well as the 
quality of work.  
11 Yoo, supra note 2, at 1992 (“By establishing a separation of powers, Locke sought to subject the power to 
regulate individual conduct to rules that would ensure accountability and fair process”). 
12 MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 36-37 (1990).  
13 “Functions have been allowed to courts as to which Congress itself might have legislated; matters have 
been withdrawn from courts and vested in the executive; laws have been sustained which are contingent 
upon executive judgment on highly complicated facts…Enforcement of a rigid conception of separation of 
powers would make modern government impossible”. Id (citing The Federalist No. 37 (J. Madison)). See 
also Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165-166, 170 (1803). 
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departments.14 This flexibility reduces the potential collision among these institutions and 
the restraint of the executive’s power. In light of the modern treaty practice, the current 
arrangement may have gone too far to the extent that the curtailing of the executive’s 
authority in the realm of foreign affairs gave rise to several political and social issues as 
laid down in Chapter I and III. Thus, for Thailand, which has long maintained the 
tradition of having the executive as the leading organ in the conduct of foreign policy, its 
new constitutional framework that has diverted the treaty-making practice from a 
practical approach (in the procurement of administrative effectiveness) is becoming a 
subject of controversy.  
In my view, this functional consideration is needed in order to preserve the quality 
of the executive administration. Strenuous checks from the legislature and the judiciary 
can pose a potential threat to the effectiveness in the formulation of foreign policy and 
the conduct of foreign relations. There is also the danger of the legislature’s failure in 
giving careful consideration to several different issues, which will undermine the 
underlying function of the branch itself.15 And because the purpose of the separation of 
powers doctrine is to create the system in which three branches can effectively police one 
another’s usage of power, restoring the constitutional balance among the branches may 
also deem necessary to preserve this objective. 
The consequences of the principles of separation of powers can be frictions and 
result in inefficiencies. And it is the price that people have to pay to ensure that 
government is acting in the best interest of the people, as one may argue. But the question 
is whether it is necessary that national interests and democratic values in the conduct of 
foreign affairs can only be attained and maintained through the adoption of excessive 
                                                 
14 As Madison suggested, the most crucial task, in his view, is “to provide practical security for each 
against the invasion of the others” THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 250 (J. Madison) (emphasis added).  
15 John C. Stennis & J. William Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in The Role of Congress in Foreign 
Policy, 1971, at 5. See also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 58. 
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legislative and judiciary interventions to control the exercise of the executive’s foreign 
power. These interests, I must argue, will rather be best preserved when the executive, 
legislature and judiciary operate as partners within the framework of the constitution. The 
interaction must not simply be an attempt by each branch to assert its own power. The 
resolution is rather to secure legislature consultation and judicial reviews in a proper 
balance, and to maintain mutual respect among the branches.16 Under the constitution, the 
executive is vested with certain political powers enabling it to have broad discretion on 
matters concerning diplomacy and foreign relations. The central roles of the executive 
and the consideration of judicial limits in foreign affairs are crucial to the effectiveness of 
these executive functions. Constant interference of other branches, in the name of 
national interests, can yield the opposite outcomes like embarrassment, indecisive foreign 
policy, loss of political supports and economic benefits or even severance of foreign 
relations. Thus, the argument against administration efficiency cannot be sustained when 
efficiency does not simply mean “convenience” for a particular branch, but has 
significant implications for vital national interest and the maintenance of our democratic 
values.  
As a matter of principle, democracy should be invoked to guide the construction 
of our Constitution by establishing the institutions and procedures that will “promote 
maximum attention to the will of the people…”17 Along this line, for the operation of the 
separation of powers doctrine to promote this democratic objective by providing a 
support for a constitutional foundation, a respect of the division of powers must be 
observed. This goes back to my original argument reasoning why effective administration 
is crucial for the government to be more responsive to its people and to act in the best 
                                                 
16 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 28. See also Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF 
CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 39. 
17 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 37.  
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interest of the country. This underlying rationale should be taken into consideration as a 
guiding principle to our constitutional procedures, and to our treaty-making process.18 
III. Constitutions under the Separation of Powers Doctrine (Roles and 
Responsibilities of the Political Organs in the Realm of Foreign Affairs) 
 
A. Thailand’s Experience: The Executive’s Foreign Power in the Historical Context 
As partially introduced in Chapter I, Thailand’s treaty-making experience was 
overwhelmingly executive authoritative. Throughout the Thai history, Thailand had 
maintained a long tradition of Kingship under which the Kings took their leads in the 
country’s, which was not limited to the conduct of diplomacy and foreign relations, but 
the overall public affairs. Under the absolute monarchy system, foreign affairs power was 
vested entirely in the monarch who was the sole authority in the pursuit of foreign 
relations and treaty-makings.19 They, themselves, were rulers, ambassadors and 
diplomats. They made decisions whom to establish and cultivate friendly relations with.20 
Trade and exchange of diplomacy, especially under the reign of King Narai (1656-1688), 
made Ayudhya exceptionally one of the most powerful and prosperous kingdoms in the 
seventeenth century.21 It was so astounding that the royalist French remarked as “there is 
no state that is more monarchial than Siam.”22 
                                                 
18 HENKIN, Supra note 1, at 38 (“For the large twilight zone where text is silent, where original intent is 
uncertain, where history is ambiguous, the principles and the values of democracy may be determinative”). 
19 Diplomatic History of Thailand, http://www.mfa.go.th/web/2680.php. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
20 “King Ramkhamhaeng of Sukhothai (1279-1300) was proficient in the art of cultivating friendly 
relations. He has been often described as a brilliant diplomat”. The period was proclaimed the golden era of 
the Sino-Thai trade relations. Id. For records of Thailand’s past foreign relations, see LEIGH MONROE, 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE : FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED 
KINGDOM 173-181 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995). See also Borwornsak Uwanno & Wayne D. Burns, The 
Thai Constitution of 1997 Sources and Process, http://www.thailawforum.com/articles/constburns1.html. 
21 The age of commerce and prosperity first arrived in the early seventeenth century. The kings welcomed 
new knowledge, exchanged embassies with the Netherlands, France and Persia as well as borrowing 
western custom, culture, architecture and lifestyle. CHRIS BAKER & PASUK PHONGPAICHIT, A HISTORY OF 
THAILAND 14 (2005).  
22 Id. at 15 (citing FRANCOIS CARON & JOOST SCHOUTEN, A TRUE DESCRIPTION OF THE MIGHTY KINGDOMS 
OF JAPAN AND SIAM 128 (John Villiers ed., 1986) (1671)). See also, Sompong Sucharitkul, National Treaty 
Law and Practice: Thailand, in National Treaty Law and Practice 687, 703 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 
2005). 
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 Although, through administrative reforms in the early Ayudhya period, the 
governing system was divided into four separate departments having the department of 
treasury (also known as “Krom Phra Khlang”) oversee foreign affairs and policy, the 
final determination of foreign policy and the treaty negotiations, including the reception 
of foreign envoys were still rested with the King. A centralized and functionally 
specialized administrative organization was created. 23 This tradition had been carried 
over to the Bangkok period (Ratanakosin, 1782).24 The responsibilities for the conduct of 
foreign affairs, especially the initiations and the conclusions of treaties, were solely 
administered by the department of treasury and its sub-division (Krom Tha), which later 
became an independent body assuming the status equivalent to that of a Ministry.25  
In sum, the powers to conduct foreign policy, relations and the overall affairs had 
predominantly been exercised by the executive under the prerogative of the King. The 
long tradition of having the focal role of the divine monarch in the administration 
certainly has a certain degree of influence upon Thailand’s current political culture and 
social structure.26 Despite the declining political role of the monarchy, administering 
foreign power through one primary organ remains the core of the Thai bureaucracy. After 
all, the power to conclude a peace treaty, armistice or other treaties with other countries 
or international organizations is the prerogative of the King who exercises his executive 
                                                 
23 See Chapter III, Section IV, A. Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute 
for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF 
CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15. WILLIAM J. SIFFIN, THE THAI BUREAUCRACY: 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND DEVELOPMENT 20 (1966). The centralized administration was formulated by 
King Trailok who tried to transform the political structure by drawing from Khmer practice. FRED W. 
RIGGS, THAILAND: THE MODERNIZATION OF A BUREAUCRATIC POLITY 70 (1966). 
24 Despite the efforts of modernization, the centralized power of monarchy was displaced by office-holding 
elites as the core of bureaucracy while the monarch continued its role in legitimizing politics. RIGGS, supra 
note 23, at 92.   
25 Krom Tha (meaning “port” in Thai used to deal with port activities) has ever since gained its new status 
as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand. Supra note 19. SIFFIN, supra note 23. 
26 See Chapter III, Section IV, A (describing social structure and political culture as sources of political 
inequality). 
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power through the Council of Ministers pursuant to Section 190.27 Thus, the historical 
context may establish the tradition and practices, but in the continuation of political 
modernization, it is the Constitution that prescribes the power structure, and designates 
the division of labor for the public institutions.  
B. Foreign Powers Vested under the Thai Constitution 
Not until the first Constitution of Thailand (June 24, 1932) had the treaty-making 
practice been formalized while the role of the monarch become more or less than a 
symbol of the supreme authority.28 Although the treaty-making process has been changed 
back and forth throughout a series of Constitutions, the tradition that remains unaltered is 
the predominant role of the executive that takes up the primary responsibilities in the 
realm of foreign affairs.29 The plenary power of the executive in the conduct of foreign 
relations may be implied under the Chapter of Council of Ministers (IX), but its plenary 
treaty power has been clearly worded pursuant to Section 190.  
It may be true that the parliament still enjoys a certain amount of control over the 
areas that involve international relations such as through its budgetary appropriation or 
war declaration authorities. There was, however, little evidence that the parliament 
sought to exercise its control or exert its influence through these channels. While the 
legislative authorization concerning budget spending can be overridden by the executive 
under certain circumstance, the war declaration which had barely been issued by the 
parliament was secretly nullified by the executive during the Second World War.30 Thus, 
                                                 
27 CONST. (2007), Ch. 1 §3, (Thail.) (“The sovereign power belongs to the Thai people. The King as Head 
of the State shall exercise such power through the National Assembly, the Council of Ministers and the 
Courts in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.”) 
28 MONROE, supra note 20, at 177.  
29 Therawat, supra note 2, at 2. Kanitta Topothai, The Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on the Matter 
of Being the International Agreement under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 
Section 190 with Regard to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 26 (Dec. 12, 2008) (an academic document 
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the program of senior executives on criminal justice 
administration, National Academy of Criminal Justice) (on file with the Library of Courts of Justice),  
http://elib.coj.go.th/managecourt/data/c12_4.pdf. See Chapter II, Section III, B (ii). 
30 BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 21, at 135-139. Sucharitkul, supra note 22, at 695. 
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arguably the participation of the legislature in the shaping of a national foreign policy 
remains limited. This discretionary power is still well preserved within the sphere of the 
executive.  
Under the power granted by the Constitution, the legislature’s primary duties are 
to legislate and enact organic laws as well as annual appropriation bills which make it the 
central authorities in the authorization of the country’s budgets, spending and finance.31 
This specific power may also imply its ability to allocate and control governmental 
budgets concerning foreign affairs. Matters such as the budget allocation for treaty 
negotiations or the amount of foreign aids and international organization membership 
fees to be incurred must be eventually considered and approved by both Houses. 
Nonetheless, the legislative control of foreign affairs in terms of national spending does 
not go beyond the time of normalcy such as the “state of war” or “arm conflicts”. Section 
169 clearly provides certain flexibilities by granting special powers to the Council of 
Ministers in the exercise of its foreign affairs power “to transfer or relocate the 
expenditure determined for any Government agency or State enterprise for use in a 
different item from that previously determined in the Annual Appropriations Act”32 In 
such event, the only obligation that the executive has towards the legislature is its report 
to the National Assembly without any authorization required.  
 Other areas of the legislature’s foreign affairs participation come from Section 
189 and 190 of Chapter IX which provide for the powers to declare war and to make 
treaties respectively. The war declaration provision requires that the prerogative to 
declare war be subject to the approval of the national Assembly with “votes of not less 
than two-thirds of the total number of the existing number of both Houses”.33 However, 
the war declaration clause has rarely been invoked, and did not come up since the Second 
                                                 
31 CONST. (2007), Ch. 8 § 168, 169 (Thail.). 
32 Id. § 169. 
33 Id. § 189. 
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World War during which formal approval was granted. During the war period, although a 
declaration was issued, it was never officially delivered or even secretly refused to 
deliver to the U.S. government by the Thai ambassador, Seni Pramoj and the senior 
statesman, Pridi Panomyoung.34 The decision taken up by H.E. Pramoj rendered the war 
declaration null and void, which had saved the country from being the defeated nation 
and being treated as the U.S.’ enemy. H.E. Pramoj was later invited to return to become a 
Prime Minister in Thailand who fronted the peace negotiations.35 And again the incidence 
carries significant implications for the executive role in the shaping of foreign policy and 
the control of foreign affairs.   
Other significant diplomatic functions that are silent under the Thai Constitution 
are normally assumed to be the sole responsibility of the executive. The absence of the 
textual stipulation does not impair the executive’s exercise of its foreign affairs power or 
deprive it from these essential functions. The period during the 1930s marked another 
crucial diplomatic mission of the government to resolve a dispute concerning territories 
lost to other states by the treaty of 1900s during the colonial period.36 Led by the military 
wing in the People’s Party, the Thai delegates travelled to Paris to present their map and 
to reclaim the territories.37 The attempts to unify the country and strengthen its image 
while making other nations recognize Thailand as an independent nation were undertaken 
as part of the government campaign. How the government wanted foreign nations to 
                                                 
34 The decision of the Thai ambassador in Washington, Seni Pramoj, to withhold the declaration of war 
from delivering to the U.S. government led the U.S. to refrain declaring war on Thailand. The group called 
the Free Thai Movement (Seri Thai) comprising of Thai students in the U.S. was formed with the assistance 
of Seni to resist the Japanese. At the end of the war period, the Japanese surrendered. It was the dramatic, 
righteous decision of the ambassador that saved the country. The declaration of war was deemed illegal, 
null, and void. It also repudiated all agreements made with Japan by the formal government. Barbara Leitch 
LePoer, Thailand: A Country Study, Library of Congress (1987), http://countrystudies.us/thailand/. See also 
BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT, supra note 21, at 135-139.  
35 H.E. Pramoj invitation to become the Prime Minister of Thailand at the time was due to the fear of the 
British retaliation and the threat of its domination aftermath, especially when Thailand was seen as a 
valuable rice supplier for the devastated colonial territories. His return was thus to strengthen the Thai 
position and U.S support in the opposition of any return of colonial influence. BAKER & PHONGPAICHIT, 
supra note 21, at 137. 
36 Id. at 131-133.  
37 Id. at 131.  
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perceive Thailand is arguably our foreign policy. The executive by assuming this strong 
role throughout the Thai history has become the forefront of a foreign policy shaper, and 
has continued to do so in the realm of foreign affairs through diplomatic consultations 
and treaty making.         
Despite the understanding that the executive is not the sole organ that undertakes 
responsibilities concerning the making of treaties, it has nevertheless been the primary 
branch that undertakes all of the treaty negotiations. This treaty power is clearly granted 
to the Council of Ministers under Section 190. 38 Although, the treaty clause accompanied 
certain conditions that would subject specific treaties to the supervision of the legislature 
and a public hearing, these are rather treated as exceptions to the executive plenary 
power.39 In addition, a series of the Thai Constitutions suggested the preliminary role of 
the Parliament in the treaty-making process.40 It can also be deduced from the fact that 
the provisions on such prerogative of the King to conclude the treaties have always been 
stipulated under the Chapter dealing with the Council of Ministers, and that the treaty-
making-power is vested in the Executive Power, while the Legislative Power intervenes 
only in a form of an approval or disapproval to the conclusion of the treaties under 
limited circumstances. And apparently, these cases were rather seen as exceptional, and 
did not arise as often to trigger the requirement of the parliamentary approval.41 All in all, 
                                                 
38 Treaty-making power is vested under the Chapter dealing with the Council of Ministers as stipulated in 
the following text; “[t]he King has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice and other treaties 
with other countries or international organizations”. CONST. (2007), Ch 9, § 190 (Thail.) (amended 2011). 
39 Rujikej Chumkasorakit, Praden wikrao rang rathatumnoon hang ratcha anachak thai: bot bunyad 
kiewkub sonthisanya nai rathatumnoon [Analysis on a referendum: Treaty Clause in the Constitution], 24 
(Working Paper, 2007). See also Therawat, supra note 2, at 2 (The Constitution grants the executive branch 
substantial powers to undertake and conclude treaties whereas the role of the parliament in the participation 
of such process was rather seen as “supplementary”).  
40 Specifically, a treaty that requires the enactment of an implementing Act for its implementation must be 
approved by the National Assembly. See, e.g., CONST. (1932), Ch. 4 § 54 (Thail.) (repealed 1946), CONST. 
(1946), Ch. 4 § 75-76 (Thail.) (repealed 1947), CONST. (1949), Ch. 7 § 153-154 (Thail.) (repealed 1951), 
CONST. (1991), Ch 7 § 156, 177-178 (Thail.) (repealed 1997). 
41 Although many treaties and international agreements were not subject to prior approval of the Parliament 
at the beginning of the negotiation, they might still be required to go through the ratification and 
implementation process after they had been concluded. These are such as Agreement on the Promotion and 
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the executive retained the authorities and the primary responsibilities in initiating 
negotiations, concluding and even terminating treaties and international agreements.  
Up until recently, this tradition has been altered by the increased participation of 
the parliamentary and judiciary roles in the treaty-making process. Such change took 
place through constitutional reforms by broadening the scope of the legislature’s 
supervision on treaties and the judiciary policing power on the government’s observation 
of the constitutional process. Treaties that will create certain conditions in addition to 
those providing for a change in the Thai territories or the jurisdiction of the State or 
requiring the enactment of an Act for its implementation must follow a specific treaty-making 
procedure. Thus, the authority to make treaties which was primarily and originally vested 
in the executive must now be shared with the Parliament under additional specified 
circumstances whereas the Constitutional Court can exercise its jurisdiction over the 
question of the validity of the treaty in question. 42 
These substantial changes have affected the traditional role of the executive in the 
treaty-making process. 43 The broad language under the new treaty-making provision 
                                                                                                                                                 
Protection of Investment. Ministry of Foreign Affairs - Economic Agreement, 
http://www.mfa.go.th/web/2693.php. 
42 Although it may be true that, in the absence of the new provision, the Constitutional Court may still hold 
a judicial power to decide on the issue concerning the allocation of powers between political branches in 
accordance with its general jurisdiction under Section 266 of the 1997 Constitution, but the introduction of 
the additional types of treaty will also mean expanding the judiciary policing power to assure the 
conformity of the executive branch to the Constitution. Topothai, supra note 29, at 14. See also CONST. 
(1997), Ch. 8 §266 (Thail.) (repealed 2006). 
43 These obligations are reflected under Section 190 of the 2007 Constitution as follows;  
A treaty which: 
(1) Provides for change in the Thai territories or extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance therewith or in accordance with international law 
(2) Requires the enactment of an Act for the implementation thereof 
(3) Has extensive impacts on national economic or social security, or 
(4) Generates material commitments in trade, investment or budget of the country.43 
Prior to undertaking a treaty negotiation of any treaty specified under paragraph two, 
(1) The Council of Ministers shall provide information and cause to be conducted public hearings, 
and shall give the National Assembly explanations on such treaty. 
(2) For this purpose, the Council of Ministers shall submit to the National Assembly a framework for 
 negotiations for approval. 
(3) When the treaty under paragraph two has been signed, the Council of Minister shall, prior to the 
declaration of intention to be bound thereby, make details thereof publicly accessible… 
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referring to treaties that are subject to legislature and judiciary checks seems to wither 
away the executive powers in the making of international commitments,44 in particular 
Article 216, paragraph 5 which binds the decision of the Constitutional Court upon the 
National Assembly, Council of Ministers and other State organs.45  
Nevertheless, those special categories of treaties should still be treated as an 
exception rather than a rule (a general application to all types of treaties) considering our 
history and practices in the treaty-making process. Under the current constitutional 
structure, the executive still retains plenary powers in the conduct of foreign affairs, 
whereas only under certain circumstances where its role can only be limited and 
intercepted by other branches. Clearly, the original intent of the constitutional text was 
not meant to alter the executive’s primary role in the conduct of foreign relations, and 
was expected only to increase accountability and transparency of the administration in the 
area where vital national interests could be at stake. However, the general and vague 
language referring to special categories of treaties is rather problematic as it has created 
potential shifts in the balance of powers between the executive and the legislature 
through advancing legislature’s roles in the uncommon area of treaties that have 
inadvertently been interpreted by the Constitutional Court to fall under the special 
categories.46 The problem of this potential shift of balance of power that the Thai 
Constitution might create has a strong implication on the principle of separation of 
powers, which will require us to address through the adoption of the centralized executive 
                                                                                                                                                 
In the case where there arises a problematic issue under paragraph two, the power to make the 
determination thereon shall be vested in the Constitutional Court. CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190 (Thail.) 
(amended 2011). 
44 The language of Section 190 has been widely criticized for its imprecision and vagueness which create 
substantial obligations on the executive’s side altering its traditional role in the realm of foreign affairs. It 
was also seen as an erosion of the executive’s treaty-making power which was not intended, but inevitably 
consequential. Therawat, supra note 2. 
45 “The decision of the Constitutional Court shall be deemed final and binding on the National Assembly, 
Council of Ministers, Courts and other State organs”. CONST. (2007), Ch. 10 §216 (Thail.). 
46 Bangkok Pundit, Yellow Shirt Turns on Abhisit, Asian Correspondent, Nov.24, 2010, 
http://asiancorrespondent.com/42930/yellow-shirts-turn-on-abhisit/ 
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foreign power (CEFP) and the consideration of judicial limits to restore the efficient and 
practical function of the executive branch.   
C. The U.S. Experience: Foreign Powers Vested under the U.S. Constitution 
Although there is a sharp contrast between the U.S. and the Thai constitutions 
structurally and traditionally, it can be said that the two countries share common treaty 
experiences and practices in terms of the presence of the executive’s prominent role in 
the realm of foreign affairs.47 The active role of the President in the conduct of foreign 
relations in the past has created both criticism and recognition. There certainly are good 
reasons, despite the structural limitation of the U.S. Constitution48, why the executive has 
successfully maintained its primary role in the conduct of foreign affairs. Unlike the Thai 
Constitution which explicitly grants plenary power to the executive while providing 
specific exceptions for the involvement of the legislature, the division of labor among 
branches under the U.S. Constitution is subject to greater controversy,49 especially 
concerning the legislature and the executive roles in the formulation of foreign policy. 
It has been argued that the U.S. Constitution grants Congress substantial powers 
in the area of foreign affairs.50 The sources of Congressional powers in this realm 
principally came from, for instance, the commerce clause (duty to collect taxes and to 
                                                 
47 For claims of the unrestrained executive power in foreign affairs, see Phillip R. Trimble, The President’s 
Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 39 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 
1990), Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: 
The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra 
note 15, at 11-15, 49-72. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in 
THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 158-173 (David Gray Adler & 
Larry N. George eds.,1996). GLENNON, supra note 12, at 164-191. 
48 Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 47, at 40 (arguing the President prerogative in the realm of foreign affairs is mostly about 
influence rather than law since legally Congress has virtual plenary authority over all aspects of foreign 
affairs). 
49 Justice Jackson refers the area of foreign affairs as “the twilight zone” in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer where there is a large uncertainty concerning the distribution of authorities between the President 
and Congress. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 18. GLENNON, supra note 12, at 10-11 (quoting Youngstown Sheet 
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“[P]residential powers are not fixed, 
but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress”). 
50 Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The 
Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra 
note 15 (Arguing the usurpations of the powers of congress in foreign affairs).   
124 
 
regulate foreign commerce), the declaration of war clause and the treaty clause (advice 
and consent of Senate).51 There are also other expressed Congressional powers that imply 
its involvement in the realm of foreign affairs.52 The President, although acting as a 
Commander-in-chief under the Constitution, is not the only sole organ in the conduct of 
foreign relations. His decisions are contingent upon Congress authorization of military 
and foreign aid spending. Congress may prohibit or limit the President’s directly by 
legislation or denying of funds through appropriation clause.53 The ability of the 
President to direct and control foreign affairs matters seems to have been limited by 
conditions imposed under these clauses, which subject him to the scrutiny of the 
legislature. 
Despite several restrictions on the foreign affairs powers of the President imposed 
by the Constitution, this understanding does not necessarily reduce the executive’s 
essential role in the foreign administration. Under Article II, section 2 of the U.S. 
Constitution, the President can make treaties (with the advice and consent of two-thirds 
the Senate). He is the Commander-in Chief of the armed forces. He also appoints 
ambassadors (with Senate advice and consent), receives ambassadors and other officers 
including those in the conduct of foreign affairs.54 These functions were, however, argued 
by Professor Henkin, as “duties” or assignments rather than “powers”. Even if they were 
powers, these are only good for conducting foreign relations, and not to formulate foreign 
                                                 
51 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 3 and 11, art. II. § 2, cl. 2 (respectively). GLENNON, supra note 12, at16. 
52 The implied foreign affairs powers include the power to tax and spend for the common defense and the 
general welfare, to coin and regulate foreign coins, to raise and support army, and to make laws necessary 
and proper to carry out their powers. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 1, 5, 12 and 18. See also HENKIN, supra 
note 1, at 18-19. 
53 Congress can pass legislation directly affecting foreign policy upon its own initiatives or upon the 
recommendation of the executive.  Each year, Congress authorizes and funds programs that directly affect 
the relations of the U.S. with other nations. Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise 
Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF 
CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 2-3, 8-10.  See also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 32. 
54 U.S. CONST. art. II § 2, cl. 1, 2. See also HENKIN, supra note 1, at 19.  
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policy. 55 Yet, it seems that the line between conducting foreign relations and shaping 
foreign policy is rather thin. How one can conduct foreign relations without having 
abilities to direct or influence foreign policy is questionable. After all, the authority to 
recognize or disestablish foreign relations with another nation is part of a national foreign 
policy. In addition, although the treaties clause requires the advice and consent of the 
Senate, it is the President who makes treaties, and the power to make treaties is the power 
to negotiate, to communicate and to articulate policy intentions.56 Furthermore, whether 
the treaty will be undertaken is entirely within the President’s discretion.57 Therefore, the 
argument that the conduct of foreign relations bares no relations to shaping foreign policy 
does not carry much weight. At the very least, it should be acknowledged that the powers 
vested under Article II have strong implications for the President’s role in the shaping of 
foreign policy. 
Although the Constitution enumerates and allocates some foreign affairs powers 
(commerce, war and treaties) to the political branches, many powers that are indisputably 
foreign affairs in nature are not stipulated,58 these include the making of foreign policy. 
In such a case, these powers may also be implicitly inherent in the President from the fact 
that Article II, section 1 of the Constitution vested all the executive power in the 
President whereas Article I, section 1 conferred upon Congress legislative powers “herein 
granted” under the Constitution. Thus, under this argument, the Presidential power is not 
only limited to those expressly enumerated, but will also include independent and 
                                                 
55 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 37-38.  
56 GLENNON, supra note 12, at 165. 
57 “It is the President who makes treaties, if the Senate consents; the Senate cannot make a treaty. The 
President need not make a treaty even if the Senate or Congress demands it”. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 37-38 (Clarendon Press 1996)(1990). 
58 GLENNON, supra note 12, at 148 (quoting United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 310 
(1936)) (“The President’s power as ‘sole organ of the federal government in the field of international 
relations…would seem to include the authority to decide on behalf of the United States to terminate a treaty 
that no longer serves the national interest…”). 
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substantive powers to determine the condition of the nation in its foreign relations.59 The 
Court in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. in fact supported the presidential plenary 
power by claiming that President is “the sole organ of the nation in its external 
relations”60 Such reading that entrusts with the President all executive authorities with a 
few explicit exceptions 61 that give Congress direct controls over his decisions may 
coincide with the understanding of the Thai constitutional structure, which confers a large 
amount of foreign affairs power to the executive. 
Whichever reading may be, it is undisputable that presidential powers in the 
conduct of diplomacy are extensive.62 This is also because “[d]iplomacy requires a long 
term perspective, and Congress tends to be influenced by short-term interests”.63 
Diplomatic matters are thus usually deferred to presidential leadership. The President’s 
sole and exclusive authority over diplomacy ranges from recognizing states and 
governments, maintaining diplomatic relations, conducting negotiations to initiating 
                                                 
59 HENKIN, supra note 57, at 39. See also, A. HAMILTON, WORKS 76, 81 (Hamilton ed. 1851). Ariel N. 
Lavinbuk, Rethinking Early Judicial Involvement in Foreign Affairs: An Empirical Study of the Supreme 
Court's Docket, 114(4) Yale L.J. 855, 865 (2005) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 165-66 
(1803)) (“ By the constitution of the United States, the president is invested with certain important political 
powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in 
his political character and to his own conscience....”). 
60 Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after I.N.S v. Chadha, 
18 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1191, 1193 (1986)). Plenary presidential power means “one that is not 
susceptible of congressional limitation”. GLENNON, supra note 12, at 20 n.98 (The maintenance of the 
executive exclusive authority in the international field is to accord the branch “a degree of discretion and 
freedom from statutory restriction…”). 
61 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 37. See also THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 5: 162 (P. L. Ford ed.,1892).  
62 Alexander Hamilton believed that the responsibilities and powers lay with the President, except as 
expressed in the Constitution. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 22. See also Theodore Roosevelt’s stewardship 
theory. THEODORE ROOSEVELT, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY 271-272 (1913). Despite the President’s broad range 
of foreign affairs power, this by no means suggests that his power is unrestrained and without limit. Only in 
a few cases had any court invalidated an act of Congress on the ground that it violated general presidential 
foreign affairs power. As Justice Jackson stated in his concurrent opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer, the President may never act to the contrary of an Act of Congress. GLENNON, supra note 12, at 
13. The scope of the executive power is also limited when it comes to treaty interpretation. “The 
President’s semantic denomination of his act cannot by itself control the procedure constitutionally 
required”. GLENNON, supra note 12, at 134. 
63 Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 47, at 42 (arguing on the executive usurpation of congressional prerogatives). . 
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informal decisions or actions in the construction of foreign policy and so on.64 These are 
presidential realms which are not subject to congressional interference. Congress may, 
however, influence the executive by requiring it to take certain values into account in 
formulating foreign policy position.65 The President’s concurrent power with Congress 
must of course still be acknowledged.66 But to deny the significant role of the executive 
in this realm is to deny reality. It should rather be understood that the President makes 
foreign policy by conducting foreign relations, negotiating international agreements and 
treaties, whereas Congress executes the policy by giving effects to the concluded treaties 
(enacting legislations and implementing treaties), and by appropriating funds to support 
the executive decisions.67  
The negotiation function and the ability to control official communication with 
foreign governments become additional key elements to presidential leadership in the 
realm of foreign affairs.68 Although treaties are subject to advice and consent of the 
Senate, the Senate was originally expected to act in an executive capacity whose body is 
smaller and less representative than the entire Congress.69 Furthermore, treaties are 
                                                 
64 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 32. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (recalling President Franklin 
Roosevelt’s recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933). 
65 Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 47, at 45. 
66 Michael J. Glennon, Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 98, 112 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990). When the President acts pursuant to an 
express or implied authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he 
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. When the President acts in absence of either 
a congressional grant or denial or authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers. This is the 
zone of twilight “in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority”. But the President may act in 
external affairs based upon his independent authority without congressional authorization, but not to the 
contrary of an Act of Congress. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-638 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring). However, the presidential foreign relations power may extend to action 
inconsistent with the act of Congress when there is a presence of emergency. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 
453 U.S. 654 (1981). 
67 HENKIN, supra note 57, at 83. 
68 Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 47, at 44. See also, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
69 Not until Amendment XVII had the Senate been elected by popular votes, the framers’ intent by having 
not specified the entire congressional role suggested that the treaty-making process would be undertaken by 
the President and a small Congressional body which is less accountable and less democratic in character. 
HENKIN, supra note 1, at 49. For amendments history, see 
http://www.senate.gov/civics/constitution_item/constitution.htm#amdt_17_%281913%29. 
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certainly not the only means taken by the President to generate the U.S. international 
obligations and foreign policy deliberations. An executive agreement has served as 
another channel of communication which can presumably be drawn from plenary 
executive diplomatic powers which was left out from the U.S. Constitutional process.70 
This power to relying on his sole authority to make certain executive agreements has 
been argued to derive from the “Executive powers”. Whether this power is legitimate is a 
subject of controversy, but what is certainly the case is that executive agreements have 
ever since taken substantial roles in the U.S. foreign relations, and almost replaced a 
formal treaty-making process.71 Despite a substantive distinction that has been drawn 
between a treaty and an executive agreement to restrict the making of executive 
agreements,72 over the past sixty years, the decline of a formal treaty making process 
which requires a great deal of Congressional roles suggested the expansion of presidential 
authority in the conduct of foreign affairs. 
Looking beyond the constitutional text and into the historical context, Alexander 
Hamilton early set forth on the view of the executive power in the conduct of foreign 
relations by referring to “the grand design of the Constitution” which presumably vests 
all the responsibilities of foreign relations in the President under the “Executive power” 
                                                 
70 Although presidential agreements are not mentioned in the Constitution, “the framers clearly understood 
that nations make some agreements that are not treaties, and they could not help but anticipate tacit, 
informal understandings by the President…” HENKIN, supra note 1, at 55. The Restatement states that the 
President “may make an international agreement dealing with any matter that falls within his independent 
powers under the Constitution”. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 303(4)). Constitution 
only refers to “treaties” that require the advice and consent of the Senate, and not international agreements. 
GLENNON, supra note 12, at 178-180 (“The Supreme Court has upheld the use of executive agreements to 
carry out what appears to be plenary presidential power…”). 
71 These include military commitment in 1953 that was made in the form of an executive agreement, peace 
treaties that have been altered by subsequent executive agreements, and other formal treaties such as the 
North Atlantic Treaty Status of Forces Agreement whose supplementary agreements were simply approved 
without ratification by the U.S. Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS 
IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 49-60. See also HENKIN, supra note 57, at 219. 
72 A treaty is referred as “the proper instrument for contracting important, substantive agreements” whereas 
an executive agreement is generally understood as “an instrument for the conduct of routine and essentially 
nonpolitical business with foreign countries”. Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American 
Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in 
THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 49.  
129 
 
whereas Congress only possesses specific foreign affairs powers granted by the 
Constitution.73 The Constitution may confer certain foreign powers to both executive 
and legislative. But making treaties, declaring war and peace, approving expenditures 
are certainly not the only matters concerning foreign affairs. In the absence of the textual 
authority, the executive’s role has arguably continued to fill in the gap.  
Despite the uncertainties of textual interpretations and the framers’ intent 
concerning the allocation of foreign affairs powers, experiences have provided us with 
some answers. Throughout the American history, we have witnessed the President’s 
foreign affairs power “took root and grew” while “Congress contributed to the steady 
growth...” 74 There certainly are factors that gave rise to the centralized executive foreign 
power phenomenon, which remind us why the executive should be the primary body that 
articulates our foreign policy and conducts our foreign relations. This question will be 
examined in the following section as to why this is the case, and should be the case for a 
successful implementation of foreign policy. President Roosevelt recognized this 
important function of the executive as he once asserted that the President himself can 
determine foreign policy…, can communicate that policy as ‘sole organ’, can implement 
it as ‘the executive’, and can enforce it as Commander in Chief”.75 This rationale also has 
a significant implication for the respect of the division of labor among the institutional 
branches which is deemed crucial to support the important functions of the executive, the 
maintenance of foreign diplomacy, and the procurement of national interest.  
 
                                                 
73 Hamilton’s broad interpretation of the presidential foreign relations power was nevertheless opposed by 
James Madison who favored presidential enumerated foreign powers. Hamilton made the argument in 
support of President Washington’s authority to declare neutrality of the United States in the war between 
England and France. Hamilton read the executive power clause in Article II of the Constitution as a grant 
to the President of all executive power and insisted that executive power included the control of foreign 
relations. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 21-22 (emphasis added). 
74 It has been said that the growth was due to Congress’ acknowledgement of the President’s diplomatic 
expertise and its own sense of inadequacy in terms of information and experiences. Id. at 28. 
75 Id. at 29. 
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IV. The Centralized Executive Foreign Powers (CEFP) 
Despite the fact that certain constitutions such as the Thai Constitution allocates 
substantial and considerable amount of foreign affairs power to the executive, there is a 
conviction that the legislature should still maintain a significant role in the conduct of 
foreign relations to preserve the system of checks and balances that would protect 
“against undue concentration of power and unwise decision”,76 which basically is what 
the principle of separation of powers is intended to guard against. That being said does 
not suggest that legislature can and should penetrate in every foreign policy decisions that 
the executive undertakes because what the principle of separation of powers aims at 
preserving is also the essential function and autonomy of each branch. The power 
properly belonging to one branch ought not to be administered or interfered by the 
other.77 The excessive control of the legislature can certainly impede an effective 
administration as well as generating powerful influence of the legislative branch in area 
of foreign affairs. By the same token, the absolute independence of the executive in the 
exercise of foreign affairs power, in the absence of any control or check from other 
institutions, will create an issue of accountability and transparency within the political 
system. Therefore, the solution, suggested by Senator Stennis, is rather to secure 
legislature consultation in a proper balance, and maintain mutual respect between the two 
branches for the successful implementation of foreign policy.78 Legislature’s participation 
will be required under important circumstances, but cannot exceed the necessity that its 
role overrides the executive’s function. Imbalanced interference is a lack of proper 
interaction which weakens the principle of separation of powers. What is “proper” and 
                                                 
76 Stennis, Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN 
POLICY, supra note 15, at 3. 
77 Supra note 14.  
78 Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The 
Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra 
note 15, at 21. 
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how much is “balance” certainly deals with the question of where these constitutional 
boundary lines should be drawn among the three institutional branches.  
A. Limited Legislative Functions in Foreign Affairs  
Constitution normally grants powers to the legislature to primarily deal with 
domestic issues rather than foreign policy.79 And, in the realm of foreign affairs, how 
much the executive should defer the matter or seek advice from the legislature often 
depends on the degree of impact felt by the domestic. Certain circumstances prescribed 
by the Constitutions such as military spending abroad or war declaration for instance, 
may arguably demand legislative controls primarily because these activities require 
substantial extraction of people’ taxes which affect local spending. Thus, the legislature 
as a representative body of the people’s interests should at least be able to address how 
those taxes may be spent in the area where little return is expected to the people and the 
country’s economy.80 This interpretation, however, may be a broad application of the 
legislature’s role in foreign policy decision-making by stretching the link of domestic 
impacts. There is a difficulty for such a broad justification as any minimal connection to 
be made with domestic matters is an excuse for the legislature to step in, and take control 
over the decision. A stronger connection may be required to warrant the necessity of the 
                                                 
79 GLENNON, supra note 12, at 30. Yoo, supra note 2, at 1994 (pointing out William Blackstone’s analysis 
on the executive’s federative power that foreign affairs “was the quintessential executive function”). The 
executive authority is the “federative power” necessary to govern “the power of war and peace, leagues and 
alliances, and all the transactions with all persons and communities without the commonwealth”. JOHN 
LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT §143-146 (Regnery ed., 1956). 
80 The same is true with the Presidential role in domestic affairs. The mere fact that the act is connected to 
foreign affairs does not necessarily make it an “executive power”. Cf., MICHAEL RAMSEY, THE 
CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 107 (2007). Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at 
American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 
1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 39 (citing THE PAPER OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON, vol. 15, 397 (Jelian P. Boyd ed., 1995)) (“We have already given in example one effectual 
check to the Dog of war by transferring the power of letting him loose from the Executive to the Legislative 
body, from those who are to spend to those who are to pay”). In 1969, the Senate adopted the non-binding 
“National Commitments Resolution” declaring that the President could not commit the armed forces or 
financial resources of the United States without Senate consent or congressional approval. However, the 
attempt to regulate the executive agreement committing of arm forces only went as far as requiring 
periodical reports from the President. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 58. See also S. Res. 85, 91st Cong., 1st 
sess., Cong. Rec. (1969). 
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legislature’s involvement.81 At a closer case, certain international commitments that have 
direct impact upon individuals’ fundamental interest or the livelihood of local 
communities, which will be further discussed in Chapter V (concerning the treaty-making 
standard), should provide a stronger justification for the legislature’s involvement in the 
process. Nevertheless, such authorization does not suggest the legislature’s absolute 
control over the conduct of foreign relations. The legislative role in foreign affairs has 
limitation. Without significant domestic implications, the role of legislature in the 
formulation of foreign policy and the conduct of foreign relations can diminish.82 The 
ability to direct and control external affairs may fall outside the legislature’s realm of 
responsibility. And, this is also due to the view that it is not in the legislature position “to 
conduct a ‘day-to-day’ diplomacy and foreign policy business of the nation”.83  
In my view, the issue of the legislature’s constitutional boundary in the realm of 
foreign affairs ultimately will require us to weigh internal impact, especially when it 
involves individuals’ fundamental interest against the needs of the executive to maintain 
its efficient function in the conduct of foreign relations. Drawing a definite boundary 
among the branches in a fuzzy area like foreign affairs is a challenging, if not impossible 
task. But again, to confirm my previous point, when a clearer line has been drawn, the 
executive administration will not be constantly disrupted, and will only be subject to 
                                                 
81 It must also be acknowledged that domestic connection is not the primary rationale for legislature’s 
participation in important foreign policy such as war declaration or military spending. It is rather the power 
granted under a constitution which involves budgetary appropriation authority of legislature that, in fact, 
dictates its role. Thus, my argument is not intended to prove that the constitution is wrong in granting such 
authority to the legislature since this is an appropriate branch, as being a representative body of the people, 
to possess the authority. My point was rather if the “domestic impact” rationale is to be made as a sole 
justification for the involvement of the legislature in the conduct of foreign affairs, a strong sufficient 
connection must be shown to prevent excessive interference of the executive’s function. 
82 Pursuant to Locke, Montesquieu and Blackstone’s thinking, it is especially the case that the line between 
the executive’s treaty-making power and the legislative control over domestic regulation is to be drawn. 
Yoo, supra note 2, at 1997. 
83 Id. at 1991 (quoting JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 147 (Regnery ed., 1955)) 
(“Foreign affairs, by contrast, ‘are much less capable to be directed by antecedent, standing, positive laws’ 
because ‘what is to be done in reference to foreigners’, since it was dependent on their actions, ‘must be left 
in great part to the prudence of those who have this power committed to them’”). Stennis & Fulbright, 
Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of Congress in 
Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 15, at 23. 
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scrutiny under the situation in which there is a real demand for it. Legislature 
consultation can certainly play an important role in such circumstance.   
The participation of the legislature may be crucial in the conduct of foreign affairs 
to help protect citizens’ interests against adverse impacts that may have resulted from the 
country’s commitment abroad. Such a condition gives a strong, legitimate reason for the 
involvement of this body in which citizens’ interests are collectively represented. 
Arguably, in the treaty context, the legislative role in the making of a treaty should still 
be limited, if not entirely abstained, in the absence of a strong direct domestic impact, 
because this check mechanism (extensive participation of the legislature), while 
attempting to shield the domestic from these potential harms, would also prevent political 
and economic opportunities that could have gained through the country’s pursuit of 
international treaties. Thus, the arguments for broad foreign affairs power for the 
executive are still understood as necessary to expedite treaty relations in the fast-moving 
global environment, to maintain the integrity of the national foreign policy and to avoid 
serious international embarrassment.  
B. Why Foreign Affairs Should Be the Matter of the Executive?  
Justice Sutherland rendered his opinion in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 
that “[h]e, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which 
prevail in foreign countries. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his 
agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials…”84 These are the quality 
and characteristics that the executive possesses, which gives the branch the advantage in 
the pursuit of foreign relations. The Court in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp was 
aware of presidential plenary power in external affairs through the recognitions of this 
quality. The primary arguments that had been made for the centralized executive foreign 
                                                 
84 GLENNON, supra note 12, at 27 (citing U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). 
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policymaking (CEFP) took into account the executive’s important characteristics. These 
include its institutional structure (which is known for its “unitary political entity with 
indivisible national interest” and also designed to insulate from external interference), its 
leadership character, its capacities and expertise (by possessing experience, resources and 
secret information), its policy evaluation capabilities (that the legislative may lack due to 
other overwhelming tasks), and its efficiency.85  
i. Institutional Structure  
Foreign policy issues, in general, are considered national problems which are 
more efficient to be tackled by “one voice”. The approach also requires compromises of 
competing interests to promote the overall national one.86 In terms of structural 
efficiency, the internal organization of the executive institutions fosters this condition by 
allowing it to function independently, and thus gives it the ability to articulate and deliver 
foreign policy in one voice. The legislature, on the other hand, representing various 
interests ranged from individuals to corporate entities, accounting for various initiatives, 
can find itself caught up with responsibilities to respond to various demands, thus make it 
more difficult to generate a coherent position.87 For instance during the post-Vietnam 
War period, congressional reforms driven by congressional interest and activism in 
foreign policy ironically left Congress “too decentralized and democratized to generate 
its own coherent program”.88 The structural reforms inside Congress also accompanied 
                                                 
85 Larry N. George, Democratic Theory and Foreign Policy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 59-63 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,1996). 
86 Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 47, at 41. 
87 George, Democratic Theory and Foreign Policy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 85, at 59-63. Suggested by Professor Koh, the growing domestic 
pressure to enact protectionist legislations has driven Congress to take a more active role in the control of 
U.S. trade policy, and thus making it more difficult for the President to respond to the requests of the U.S. 
trade partners concerning the liberalization of its markets.  Koh, supra note 60, at 1228. 
88 Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 47, at 161. GLENNON, supra note 12, at 30 (1990) 
(citing J. SUNDQUIST, THE DECLINE AND RESURGENCE OF CONGRESS 306 (1981) (“Congress can act 
negatively to disrupt the policy the President pursues, but it cannot act affirmatively to carry out a 
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other issues such as overlapping functions and a lack of coordination among the 
committees from both houses.89 The internal hierarchy of the executive has continued to 
benefit foreign policy formation and execution. The ability of the branch to easily form a 
consensus allowing its decision to be easily solidified and quickly dispatched is a crucial 
factor for the executive to act responsively and efficiently in the field of international 
affairs, whereas the legislature may find it difficult to arrive at a decision in a timely 
manner, especially in times of crisis.90  
The structural efficiency argument, however, can be countered by the fact that 
such a system will only promote unaccountable executive foreign policy making, 
especially in a treaty process. To the critics, the legislature serves as the body of public 
expression and interests. The approach of the multi-branched participation in the process 
can therefore help lessen the likelihood of unpopular policies which can incur costs in 
credibility.91 Although it is important that various domestic interests represented by the 
legislature should reflect in foreign policy and the treaty texts, the accommodation of all 
the constituents would be unrealistic. This expectation can generate internal conflicts, 
weaken foreign policy, and hamper the efficiency of the administration.92 As mentioned, 
the parameter of foreign affairs is larger than what people normally assume.93 Even in the 
realm of a treaty-making, what is considered as a “treaty” to be subject to the scrutiny of 
the legislature and the public domain can be broad 94 and can prolong the entire process 
                                                                                                                                                 
comprehensive substitute policy of its own, even if through structural reform it could develop the capacity 
to create it”). 
89 GLENNON, supra note 12, at 30. 
90 Id. at 28. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 27 (“Unlike Congress which can act only informally, by statute or 
resolution, the President can act quickly and informally, often discreetly or secretly”) (emphasis added).  
91 GLENNON, supra note 12, at 123. 
92 Congressional reforms led to the creation of various committees opening for hearings, votes and intense 
lobbying by ethnic groups, foreign governments and commercial organizations, which in the end weaken 
the “majority-building efforts” of the President. Id. at 31. 
93 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 27 ( “Foreign policy, then as now, consisted of much more than making treaties 
or legislating tariffs…the conduct of foreign relations was a day-to-day process, continuous and 
informal…”).  
94 For a variety of treaty definitions, see Chapter V, Section II, A. 
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when involving the legislative control and public participation in every one of them. 
Seeking consultations in the treaty process must, therefore, be maintained in moderation 
and in a reasonable manner by taking into account the level of domestic impacts and the 
internal structure of the legislature to prevent conflicts and fracture in the foreign policy 
interests. The argument for strenuous checks after all undermines the ability of the 
executive to come up with a concrete position that represents the overall public interest 
while overlooking the significance of what really is the nation’s long-term interest. 
ii. Appealing Characters  
The qualities that make the executive the best suited in the conduct of foreign 
affairs have long been widely recognized. A belief in the executive leadership in foreign 
affairs was held firmly by Alexander Hamilton as he stated that the “energy in the 
executive is a leading character in the definition of good government”.95 There are other 
characters praised by scholars who feel that foreign affairs should be the matter of the 
executive. Professor Arthus Maass, for instance, referred the character of the President to 
be “a powerful magnet, constantly attracting proposals…” which makes him as equally 
good as a primary initiator of legislation.96 These are the qualities that can appeal to 
foreign governments of a particular negotiation position. Such a character also facilitates 
the executive’s capacity to centralize and coordinate the foreign policy decision-making 
process, and can energize and direct policy through speed and efficiency.97 Thus, in an 
international crisis, this is the organ that has the leadership quality (energy, expertise and 
the capacity) and credibility that the legislature may not have to handle the problem.98 
                                                 
95 Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 47, at 159. 
96 GLENNON, supra note 12, at 28-29. Cf., SIFFIN, supra note 23, at 27 (suggesting charisma as an important 
source of royal authority in the context of monarchal absolutism which had been asserted in many forms of 
rituals). 
97 Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism after the New Deal, 101 HARV.L. REV. 421, 452-453 (1987). 
98 The role of the executive was even more prominent during the 1930s depression as it held the power to 
negotiate trade agreements and re evaluate trade policy to help relieve the country’s economic conditions 
when Congress itself failed to deliver effective trade regime carried through the infamous Smoot-Hawley 
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This is an important character that contributes to establishing a country’s international 
credibility and good foreign relations. 
iii. Expertise 
Both Thailand’s and the U.S.’ foreign affairs experiences have demonstrated the 
leading roles of the executive branches in the undertaking of significant international 
events.99 The experiences gained by the branch make their expertise undeniable. The 
expertise that has uniquely been developed during both in time of peace and crisis is also 
viewed as a necessary key element to the success of the conduct of foreign policy.100 This 
massive professional bureaucracy has been claimed to derive from its ability to access to 
vast information and resources. Senator Stennis once commented in his lecture 
concerning the President competence in the war affairs that he found it “very difficult to 
believe that it is really wise or proper for us to convert the Senate of the United States 
into a war room and try to direct battles, prescribe tactics, control strategies, draw 
boundaries, dictated fixed withdrawal dates, and otherwise usurp the responsibilities and 
prerogatives of the President and our military leaders”.101 Along this line, Justice 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tariff Act of 1930. Koh, supra note 60, at 1194. Despite the fact that Congress has power to collect taxes 
and duties and to regulate foreign commerce, the President still holds the key function, which is power to 
negotiate tariffs as Congress itself does not possess such authority. Under the “New Deal” doctrine, 
institutional changes that would allow certain freedoms for government to deal with multiple social and 
economic issues were necessary. In their view, the existing system prevented government from reacting 
flexibly and rapidly “to stabilize the economy and to protect the disadvantaged from fluctuations in the 
unmanaged market”.  Sunstein, supra note 97, at 423-424. 
99 Presidential leadership in foreign affairs has continued, especially throughout the warfare period, which 
marked America as the world’s hegemonic power. At the end of Vietnam war, the role of the President in 
the establishment of multilateral political and economic order is arguably expansive. Koh, Why the 
President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 47, at158. Article 46 of Vienna Convention by seeking to uphold the stability 
of international treaty structure also implies the executive authority that can obligate the nation to be bound 
by an international instrument. It stated that “although a treaty obligation may be invalid within a state 
because of its failure to comply with constitutional requirements, the international agreement is 
unimpaired”. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969), art. 46.  
100 George, Democratic Theory and Foreign Policy, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 85, at 60.  
101 Despite his belief in the Congress and the President co-determination roles in the war-making powers, 
Congress usually did defer the authorities to the President to take all necessary measures in time of crisis. 
Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The 
Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra 
note 15, at 21. 
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Sutherland stated in U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. believing in the President’s 
foreign policy discretion. In his opinion, “[t]he President…manages our concern with 
foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine when, how, and 
upon what subjects negotiation may be urged…”102  
For Thailand, at the turn of the twentieth century, the growing of the global 
market economy and free trade led the executive branch to continue to manifest its 
expertise through various types of international commitments ranged from regional to 
multilateral levels.103 These international initiatives had primarily been undertaken by the 
executive leading agencies such as Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of 
Commerce. “As the breadth of our treaty obligations has broadened, their depth has 
increased as well”.104 Recent developments in the world trading system also brought 
technical issues and unanticipated problems, for instance, rules of origin (ROO), non-
tariff barrier to trade (NTB), Sanitary and Phytosanitary measure (SPS) that are far from 
common to domestic problems. These are new sets of rules which now comprise more 
than one-third of a nation’s economic activity.105 Thus, the executive’s superior capacity, 
knowledge and skills because of its issue orientation, accessibility to resources and time 
are determinative factors that make it a better branch to generate effective responses to 
external challenges.106 The legislature, on the other hand, cannot be expected to develop 
                                                 
102 Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 47, at 159-160 (quoting U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright 
Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936)). 
103 Founded in 1967, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was formed through the 
initiatives of the five foreign ministers – Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore. The 
discussion took place in such a casual manner as it was referred as “sports-shirt diplomacy”. “It was by no 
means an easy process: each man brought into the deliberations a historical and political perspective that 
had no resemblance to that of any of the others”. See ASEAN History, http://www.aseansec.org/20024.htm. 
At the multilateral level, Thailand joined the World Trade Organization in 1995 followed by a series of 
bilateral free trade agreements. For more information, see http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx. 
104 Yoo, supra note 2, at 1957. 
105 See Economic Report of the President, February 1998, H.R. doc. No. 105-176, at 216 (2d Sess. 1998). 
106 New challenges are no longer limited to domestic issues and are not subject to the control of a nation 
state. These international issues such as global debt crisis and terrorism forced the U.S. into a reactive 
global posture, and giving the president superior institutional capacity to initiate government action. Koh, 
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the same level of expertise since the domestic duties at hand do not typically leave them 
sufficient time to do so.107 The emergence of new international issues has arguably put 
the executive branch into the leadership position, and will continue to do so through the 
demand of the nation’s competency, speed and diplomacy.    
But of course democracy cannot consistently demand levels of expertise that is 
out of reach of citizen participation or legislature supervision. As I stressed in Section IV, 
A concerning the legislative function in the area of foreign affairs, the legislative role will 
become more important as domestic issues are increasingly touched upon. The difficulty 
remains when the line between internal and external affairs becomes more blurry, since 
“globalization has made even disparate parts of the world more tightly knit”.108 Almost 
every international contact, if involving some sort of obligations, can arguably have 
domestic impacts, except at different levels. But at what level is sufficient to require the 
executive to seek a second opinion must be determined. Thus, the issue concerning the 
standard of public participation and legislative involvement in the treaty-making process 
will be dealt in the next chapter to address the boundaries. My assertion regarding the 
quality of the executive branch in terms of its expertise neither seeks to embrace the idea 
of granting absolute power to the branch nor opposes public involvements in the matter 
of foreign affairs. My argument rather focuses on the rationale of why the executive 
should be trusted and should serve as the leading organ in the promotion of our national 
interest. For one thing, this department is equipped to cope with global challenges. And 
for another, with sufficient deference from other branches, this political branch will be 
allowed to respond to social needs more effectively when demanded. Citizens’ and 
                                                                                                                                                 
Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 47, at 161. 
107 George, supra note 85, at 61. 
108 Rachael Bade, Globalization Increasingly Blurs Line between Domestic, Foreign Affairs, WASH. DIPL., 
Nov. 22, 2010, 
http://washdiplomat.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=6904:globalization-
increasingly-blurs-line-between-domestic-foreign-affairs&catid=212:november-2010&Itemid=232 
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legislature expertise are still required, but not at every level, and definitely not in the 
manner that should obstruct government performance or decrease the level of 
administration efficiency to the point where it can no longer serve its own function and 
democracy.   
iv. Effectiveness and Efficiency  
Although the significance of administration “efficiency” seems to be overlooked 
in the justification of the centralized executive in the realm of foreign affairs, especially 
when driven by the concern of governmental accountability, the issue of efficiency is 
going to be my central argument in the proposition of the executive centralized authority 
in the exercise of foreign affairs power since this is the factor that can, in fact, improve 
the democratic condition of the governing system.  
As mentioned, the executive branch has the institutional advantage which allows 
the body to effectively respond to all kinds of international issues. In fact, foreign policy 
should not entirely be a matter of the executive simply because it is convenient for the 
branch. But foreign affairs must be the matter of the executive because it is effective and 
efficient to be addressed through this organ.109 In his concurring opinion in Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, Justice Douglas acknowledged efficiency as a distinctive 
quality possessed by the executive branch. He stated that “[a]ll executive power – from 
the reign of ancient king to the rule of modern dictators – has the outward appearance of 
efficiency. Legislative power, by contrast, is slower to exercise…the ponderous 
                                                 
109 It must be noted that administration convenience does not deliver the same quality as efficiency.  
Efficiency means “performing or functioning in the best possible manner with the least waste of time and 
effort; having and using requisite knowledge, skill, and industry; competent; capable…” Convenience, on 
the other hand, refers to an act that is favorable, easy, or comfortable and barely requires efforts or skills. 
http://dictionary.reference.com. Although, a method maybe convenient to generate a decision, it does not 
necessarily make it efficient if it does not provide the qualities such as skill, knowledge and competence, 
but speed.   
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machinery of committees, hearings, and debates are…cumbersome, time-consuming, and 
apparently inefficient”.110  
How executive efficiency is compared to that of the legislature is quite clear. 
However, such quality can be easily underrated, especially when countered by other 
values such as accountability and transparency in the conduct of foreign affairs. But the 
concern of efficiency should not be taken lightly as the lack of it could cause a stall in the 
country’s administration, especially when handling by an inefficient body such as the 
Senate which was once described as “the graveyard of treaties”.111 Taking an instance of 
the Genocide Convention which took the U.S. forty years to ratify, instead of acting upon 
a treaty, the Senate simply stockpiled it.112 In fact, most senators agreed that their role in 
the treaty-making process should be limited.113 Every international agreements should not 
be required to submit for advice and consent since “it would be literally impossible to 
give all of them thoughtful consideration”.114 And because many would be a routine 
nature of which the large number would result in Senate’s lack of attention to details.115 
Such involvement certainly would neither make the government more accountable nor 
make the system any more efficient. Even in the case of executive agreements which 
required the executive branch to submit reports periodically to Congress, it was doubtful 
whether the agreements were seriously scrutinized at all making the mechanism simply a 
hollow threat which basically served no purposes.116  
                                                 
110 Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 47, at 159 n.4 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 629, 629 (1952)). GLENNON, supra note 12, at 30 (“Congressional committee 
debates are not always useful in creating foreign policy”). 
111 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 50-51. 
112 Id. 
113 Stennis & Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The 
Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra 
note 15, at 5.  
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
116 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 58. 
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The administration quality such as efficiency is not a light matter, and should be 
considered along the line with maintaining the accountability and openness of a 
government. As introduced in Chapter I (internal challenge), this element will matter in 
the long run since its shortage can affect the capacity of the government to be responsive 
to the people’s needs. Efficiency remains one of the leading characters that the executive 
possesses in conducting foreign relations, and is required to have in administering 
domestic affairs. Besides improving the democratic condition, efficiency is the quality 
that brings about external gains economically, politically and diplomatically. In the age of 
globalization, protecting domestic interests is as important as ensuring the potential 
benefits that the country could secure from the cultivation of external relations.  
v. Credibility and International Embarrassment  
The issue of “efficiency” is not only a matter of domestic concerns. This quality 
of the executive is a key factor that helps establishing the credibility of a nation and 
diplomatic courtesy, and is what makes the executive predominant in the field of foreign 
policy.117 The nature of the executive is therefore crucial to the maintenance of 
international relations. The process of the foreign relations conduct must be driven by 
both domestic and international considerations. In the conduct of a country’s foreign 
diplomacy, jeopardizing its international relations should be avoided. This is because the 
country’s good international relations are also what the country’s economy and political 
stability depends upon.118 That being said, by no means, suggests that foreign policy 
                                                 
117 The uncertainty of the “advice and consent” condition in the treaty-making process in terms of its 
timeline has complicated the negotiation stages. A sharp bifurcation of a treaty making process between the 
presidential stage and the Senate stage frustrated Presidents, annoyed foreign governments, and troubled 
U.S. foreign relations. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 50. 
118 Good international relations of course is not the sole determinative factor that guarantees a country’s 
political stability, but can be one of the conditions. Taking the example of several regional agreements such 
as the European Union (EU) and Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), both have forged and 
taken the benefits of good international relations to promote political stability and security of the regions. 
Whereas this regional arrangement’s benefit was recognized by the U.S. as a strategy to unite and stabilize 
Western Europe after World War II, the ASEAN comprehensive objectives to include economic, cultural 
and social cooperation among members were viewed as long-term solutions to establish political stability 
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should only generate positive interactions. Countries oftentimes employ economic 
sanctions, trade retaliations and even the use of military force to gain their positions. 
However, foreign policy should be conducted in the manner that would allow the country 
to achieve its objectives at most. And if the goal of the country is to promote its economic 
prosperity and stability through pursuing international agreements, then we should agree 
that upsetting a partner to the agreement is to be avoided. This process clearly requires a 
competent body to ensure that the country’s foreign affairs are being handled effectively 
and professionally to avoid the issue of credibility and international embarrassment. In a 
diffuse global economy, the country must constantly manage relations with foreign 
governments. This responsibility demands special qualities that the legislature finds it 
hard to meet due to its internal structure. Most importantly, developments in the global 
communication and interconnection have increasingly made countries lean toward 
bilateral and multilateral agreements as a way of delivering its foreign policy message 
and asserting its position in the world stage. Any disorganization, delay or incoherence in 
a position is a reflection of the country’s incompetency, and can definitely affect its 
credibility and reputation.  
Credibility remains one of the major issues in the multilateral trade forum that the 
executive must constantly manage to maintain under excessive participation of the 
legislature. For instance, the Kennedy Round of the General Agreements on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) negotiation gave the U.S. an uneasy position and humiliation through the 
attempted control of Congress on the non-tariff concessions.119 The string attached 
(subsequent approvals) effectively diverted the U.S. negotiation positions from what its 
trading partners understood it would honor. This reaction of course produced “an 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the region. Sungjoon Cho, Breaking the Barrier between regionalism and multilateralism, 42 HARV. 
INT’L  L.J. 419, 436 (2001). See, The ASEAN Declaration, Aug. 8, 1967, 6 ILM 1233 (1967), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/1212.htm. 
 
119 Koh, supra 60, at 1998-1999. 
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international fall out”. The U.S. trading partners then “grew increasingly reluctant to 
negotiate nontariff barrier agreements with U.S. officials, whom in their eyes, lacked 
negotiating credibility because of their accountability to an unpredictable Congress.”120 
The control mechanism created by the 1984 Act which permitted a veto from a single 
Committee of Congress in a negotiated agreement also sabotaged most agreements 
politically by denying a potential trading partner the assurance of the other party’s 
prompt positive response (guaranteed legislative approval).121 The mechanism was seen 
as a negotiation killer that rendered other nations hesitate to enter into further deals. 
Sharing the same fate, the required procedure (public participation and legislature 
approval) under Section 190 of the Thai Constitution was triggered, and almost killed the 
nearly complete Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) that took up 
to three years of negotiations.122 The claim of the constitutional process violation, had it 
been successfully challenged, would have required the agreement to be renegotiated, 
which would in turn undermine the Thai government’s credibility while inevitably 
shaking its international relations with Japan.  
Justice Sutherland emphasized that the central role of the executive branch in the 
conduct of foreign affairs is necessary to avoid any serious international 
embarrassment.123 The common “embarrassment” scenario have been described by the 
fact that the executive might begin an international initiative “only to have Congress 
change its mind after that policy had been undertaken”.124 The participation of the 
legislature might be viewed as needed to legitimize the process, but its extensive role, in 
                                                 
120 Id. at 1200.  
121 Id. at 1217-1218. 
122 Academics and Activists to Turn to Constitutional Court on the Unconstitutional JTEPA. PRACHATHAI 
NEWS, Feb. 24, 2010, available at http://www.prachatai.com/english/node/300. 
123 Serious embarrassment is to be avoided by according the President “a degree of discretion and freedom 
from statutory restriction which would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved”. GLENNON, 
supra note 12, at 23 (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)). 
124 The example of this “rug pulling” reflected in the Iran Contras and the Vietnam War during which 
Congress had initially authorized the Presidential acts, then later unauthorized them (lethal aid prohibition 
and the termination of war). Id. at 24-25. 
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many cases, has been proven to be rather disruptive than constructive to the system.125 As 
commonly known, the Senate role is to advice the President as to the kind of treaty 
should look like to be acceptable. Oftentimes there are conditions attached such as 
reservations, amendments, understandings that would require further renegotiation. The 
result was “a sharp bifurcation of the treaty process between the presidential stage and the 
Senate stage, which frustrated governments, annoyed foreign governments and troubled 
United States foreign relations”.126 The U.S. treaty process has also been criticized by 
foreign governments as making it impossible to do diplomatic business, and that it gave 
no chance of any predictability on the treaty approval.127 The uncertainty of the country’s 
position may appear to the eye of the world community as “irresolute, divided, [and] 
undependable”128.  
Thus, ensuring a positive interaction between the political branches is deemed 
crucial to the efficiency of the internal administration and the country’s external relations 
(credibility, reliability and reputation abroad). The relationship should be in a 
collaborative and respectable manner while keeping in mind that the central role of the 
executive branch is sometimes required in the preservation of foreign relations. An 
attempt to secure internal accountability by placing heavy controls over the executive 
may come at the expense of the country’s accountability abroad.  
It is therefore important that the executive maintain the quality of its 
administration. And to do so, it must possess a certain level of autonomy to ensure 
                                                 
125 Often times, the condition was used as a political tool to attack the integrity or credibility of the 
government. As the case of the Committee veto reflected, the Committee members do not need to give any 
reason why a particular agreement is rejected. They may even vote “to disapprove out of a desire to hold a 
particular agreement hostage…” Koh, supra note 60, at 1217.  See Farnsworth, 12 Senators Opposing 
Reagan on Canada Trade, N.Y. TIMES, April 16, 1986, at D5, col. 4 (“The irony is that the Committee is 
not angry at the Canadians, but rather at the Administration, which refuses to enforce trade laws”). See also 
Shribman & Pine, Reagan Gains Canada Trade Victory as Senate Effort to Impede Talks Fails, Wall St. J., 
Apr. 26, 1986, at 5, col. 3. 
126 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 50. 
127 Id.  
128 GLENNON, supra note 12, at 25. 
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flexibility, specialization as well as the consistency of the policy in the administration.129 
Surely one could argue why a country should give priority to external courtesy, and pay 
less attention to its own. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits the legislature from acting 
disruptive or from making changes of its considerations back and forth. And indeed, 
sometimes the country’s foreign relations must be sacrificed for the sake of (as a critic 
may call) a good policy.130 But one should keep in mind that we do not live in isolation. 
We are part of the global system. Our internal well-being is contingent upon our external 
relations. After the Cold War period, economic diplomacy has increasingly gained its 
prominent role by drawing countries together to channel their energy toward building 
global peace and economic prosperity.131 Foreign policy, especially trade, is claimed as a 
strategic approach that has connected “policies on domestic economic growth to 
international relations with foreign nations”.132 Diplomacy is not thus simply being 
considerate to foreign governments, but also to our people who benefit from these 
political and economic ties. International embarrassment and credibility therefore are not 
simply matters of the country’s image, but its economic opportunities, social connection 
and political gains in the world stage. To avoid these losses, flexibility in the 
administration is needed for the executive branch to assure the partners of its competence, 
and to increase its ability to employ trade negotiation in conjunction to other foreign 
policy mechanisms.  
In any case, the autonomy of the executive in the conduct of foreign affairs does 
not suggest that the legislative role should be completely excluded as argued in the 
                                                 
129 John Linarelli, International Trade Relations and the Separation of Powers under the United States 
Constitution, 13 DICK. J. INT’L L. 203, 205 (1995). 
130 GLENNON, supra note 12, at 26 (quoting A. Schlesinger, “Why Not Question the Presidency?” 
N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 2, 1987, at 25)) (“When an Administration of foreign policy is incoherent, duplicitous and 
dedicated to rash and mindless policies, what indeed is so awful about a crippled Presidency? Surely a 
crippled Presidency is far better for the nation and for the world than an unchasten and unrepentant one”).  
131 Linarelli, supra note 129, at 203. 
132 Id. at 204. See also Michael Kantor, Trade Central to America’s Future in the World, Address before the 
National Press Club, Washington D.C. (May 5, 1993), in 4 DEP’T. ST. BULL., May 17, 1993.  
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previous section, especially when substantial domestic impacts are involved. My 
argument for the central role of the executive branch in the realm of foreign relations 
only requires that the role of the legislature be reasonable and consultative rather than 
prohibitive, while respecting the executive’s policy determination when needed. The 
relationship between the branches should be in a mutual respect to promote the efficiency 
of the administration, which is the approach that would foster the overall interests of the 
country.    
V. Judicial Review in Foreign Affairs 
Balancing the interaction among the branches is the key to the maintenance of the 
administration effectiveness and to the success of foreign policy implementation. 
Limitation of a judicial role under certain circumstances is also one of the factors that 
would promote the central role of the executive branch in the undertaking of foreign 
policy. With this respect, this section will address the relationship between the executive 
and the judiciary branch to examine how the restraint of judicial review can enhance this 
quality of administration while reducing the potential shift in the balance of powers.  
A. Judicial Roles and Limits in Foreign Affairs 
The concepts of judicial abstention and deference, although distinguishable, share 
the implication of limitation in judicial review.133 Whereas judicial abstention refers to a 
circumstance in which a court can exercise its discretion and equitable powers pursuant 
to the Constitution and statutes, but declines to decide a legal action over which it has 
jurisdiction, judicial deference, on the other hand, refers to a willingness of a court to 
reach the merit of a case, but only defers certain political issues to the competent 
branches in respect of their authorities. Furthermore, judicial abstention often involves 
the issue of allocation of powers where a laundry list of factors is to be considered, while 
                                                 
133 Judicial review refers to the power of the courts of a country to examine the actions of the legislative, 
executive, and administrative arms of the government and to determine whether such actions are consistent 
with the constitution.  
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these factors are not mentioned in the context of judicial deference.134 Despite the fact 
that these concepts are two different animals, there is yet “the explicit interaction between 
abstention and deference when courts adjudicate on constitutional foreign affairs 
controversies”.135 The two concepts at least suggest that the court should be limitedly 
involved in certain areas such as those concerning policy considerations such as national 
security, economics or national expenditure.136 And, it was rather the degree of the 
court’s involvement that should differentiate the two concepts; one in which deference is 
absolute (abstention), and another in which deference is partial (deference). This section, 
however, is not meant to focus on the analyses of the judicial deference and abstention 
applications per se, but only to look at the justifications for limited judicial roles in the 
realm of foreign affairs through an understanding of the relationship between the two 
concepts. 
Under the U.S. jurisdiction, the concepts of judicial abstention and deference have 
been developed, and are commonly applied in the realm of foreign affairs.137 Despite the 
fact that Article III, section 2 of the U.S. Constitution vests the judicial power in Article 
III courts to decide all cases arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties,138 the courts 
                                                 
134 Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs, 89 Iowa L.Rev. 941, 1000 (2004). In the context of 
judicial abstention, a political question became the primary factor that rendered the case unreviewable by 
the court. Under this circumstance, the court, compelled by the question of competence and the allocation 
of powers among political branches, would defer its judgment without making further inquiry into the 
decision of a political branch. See Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).  
135 Nzelibe, supra note 134 (arguing that these two doctrinal products are interrelated in a way that reflects 
differences in degree and not in kind). 
136 Id. T. Jeremy Gunn, Deconstructing Proportionality in Limitations Analysis, 19 EMORY INT’L L.REV. 
465, 486 (2005). The rationale that courts often used for judicial abstention has also been employed in 
judicial deference cases in which individual rights are involved. See also, Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 
242 (1984) (stating that that foreign affairs matters  “are ... largely immune from judicial inquiry or 
interference.”) 
137 Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 943. Lavinbuk, supra note 59, at 862-863 (providing a criticism on the 
mainstream’s arguments concerning “the broad judicial power of the United States ... [to] a large class of 
international cases-those affecting Ambassadors, public Ministers and consuls, admiralty and maritime 
cases, and cases involving foreign parties”). An emergence of a revisionist position arguing for the role of 
"the political branches, rather than the courts,…to decide how the nation should meet its international 
obligations”. Yoo, supra note 2, at 1962. 
138 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. (“The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under 
this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their 
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have sometimes removed themselves to a backseat and have not played a major part in 
the governance of the matter of foreign affairs.139 This is the area that oftentimes involves 
a minimal role of the judiciary.140 These concepts thus implicates the courtesy of the 
Court to accord the government a certain policy space for believing that the governmental 
act may be in pursuant to the national security concerns or national interest in relation to 
other nations.141 
B. The Absence of Judicial Restraint and its Problems in the Thai Context 
Judicial restraint, particularly “judicial abstention” may be an unfamiliar concept 
under the Thai Constitution as the Constitutional Court has been able to exercise its 
power to decide on the question of the distribution of powers among governmental 
organs pursuant to the power granted under the Constitution (its general jurisdiction).142 
Through the general provision, the Court was able to determine whether the international 
document (presumably a treaty) undertaken by the executive branch can bypass the 
legislature approval as appeared in its Ruling No. 11/2542 (1999).143 The Thai 
                                                                                                                                                 
authority;--to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;--to all cases of admiralty 
and maritime jurisdiction;--to controversies to which the United States shall be a party;--to controversies 
between two or more states…”). But see RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 324 (explaining how the issue of 
standing in foreign affairs can limit a judicial challenge under this jurisdictional grant Article).  
139 The courts have responded to the cases that involved U.S. foreign policy in various ways. Under some 
situations, courts have accorded complete deference to the position expressed by the executive. In others, 
courts give that position great weight from persuasive to relevant evidence. And there are circumstances 
that court have abstained from deciding such issues at all. Jonathan Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign 
Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 98 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990). In 
Goldwater v. Carter, the Court declined its role in determining whether the action of one branch exceeds its 
authority to commit. DAVID GRAY ADLER & LARRY N. GEORGE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF 
AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 38 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,1996). During the war period, 
the political question doctrine has routinely been invoked by the U.S. Courts in response to the challenges 
to the constitutionality of the war (the Vietnam, Korean, Grenada and Panama wars) which were initiated 
without congressional authorization. Nevertheless, the political question doctrine traditionally generates 
more activity in the lower courts, where it has recently been applied to a wider range of foreign affairs 
disputes, such as: controversies over the allocation of foreign affairs powers. Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 
948. 
140 HENKIN, supra note 1, at 69.  
141 Id. at 70-71. 
142 See CONST. (1997), Ch. 10 §266 (Thail.) (repealed 2006). CONST. (1991), Ch. 10 §207 (Thail.) (repealed 
1997). 
143 Summary of the Constitutional Court, May 25, 1999, Ruling No. 11/2542 (Thail.), 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.or.th/download/Summary_desic/42/Summary_desic_eng/e11_2542.pdf  
(requested the Constitutional Court to rule on whether or not a letter of intent to seek technical and 
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Constitution of 2007, however, is known as the first Constitution that specifically grants 
the Constitutional Court the power to resolve disputes concerning the types of treaty that 
must be subject to the special process under Section 190.144 In addition, Section 214 
grants the Constitutional Court general jurisdiction to resolve “the case where occurs a 
conflict as to the powers and duties between at least two organs being the National 
Assembly, the Council of Ministers or constitutional organs that are not Courts…”145 
Most importantly, what these provisions confer upon the Court is the power to address 
the conflicting claims of competence between the political departments. The difficulty 
arises when this grant of power involves the determination by the Court as to how the 
foreign affairs powers should be allocated, even in the departure of the original intent of 
the Constitution which grants the executive a broad range of foreign affairs power. The 
shift in the balance of powers can occur when the authorities of the executive in the 
foreign affairs conduct can be limited or expanded according to the Court’s interpretation 
of the treaty in question.  
The ability of the government to undertake its full autonomy in the pursuit of any 
international agreement depends heavily upon the determination by the Court on the type 
of the document involved. A sharp contrast in the Court decisions with regards to the 
executive’s obligation to submit an international agreement to the legislature for prior 
approval is demonstrated in the two cases; one concerning the letter of the recognition of 
Preah Vihear Temple enlisted by Cambodia as a World Heritage Site (hereafter “Preah 
Vihear Temple”) and the other concerning the letter of intent to seek technical and 
financial assistance from the International Monetary Fund (hereafter “IMF”).  
                                                                                                                                                 
financial assistance sent by the government to the International Monetary Fund was a treaty that had to be 
approved by the National Assembly under section 224 paragraph two of the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand, B.E. 2540 (1997)).  
144 “In the case where there arises a problematic issue under paragraph two, the power to make the 
determination thereon shall be vested in the Constitutional Court…” CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190, ¶ 6 
(Thail.). 
145 Id., Ch. 10 § 214.  
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In the IMF, the Constitutional Court held that the letter of intent was simply “an 
explanation of the policies and operations of the government” required as part of the 
application process in order to exercise its rights to withdraw sums from the IMF. 146 It 
also bore no character as a “treaty” for its being only a unilateral act of the Thai 
government since the IMF did not treat such letter of intent as a binding obligation 
between the two parties. Although there was an obligation to obtain Parliamentary 
approval on the modification of its solvency law within a specific timeframe, the failure 
to meet such dateline constituted no breach of contract, according to the Court.147 The 
underlying decision of this case suggested that unless the document is not treated as a 
“treaty” by the Court in the first place, there is no need to look into other elements. This 
narrow interpretation certainly accords the government a large space in the exercise of its 
foreign affairs powers. 
On the contrary, the Court in Preah Viherah Temple ruled that the joint 
communiqué signed between the Thai and the Cambodian governments in the recognition 
of Preah Viherah Temple enlistment as a World Heritage Site by Cambodia was a type of 
treaty, which rendered it unconstitutional for failure to go through the process required 
under Section 190.148 Despite the fact that the declaration would not “affect each 
country's rights on surveying and demarcating the common border”149and only serve as a 
friendly support of the enlistment to strengthen the diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, 150 the Court nevertheless held that the document was intended for legally 
                                                 
146 Supra note 143. 
147 Id. 
148 Saan Rattatumnoon [The Constitutional Court], Jul. 8, 2008, Ruling No. 6-7/2551 (Thail), available at 
http://61.19.241.65/DATA/PDF/2551/A/108/1.PDF.  
149 Thailand, Cambodia Signed Document on Preah Viherah Temple, MCOT News, June 18, 2008, 
http://enews.mcot.net/view.php?id=4812 (quoting the former Thai Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama at a 
press conference). 
150 In summary, the Joint Communiqué contains six provisions as follows; 1. Thailand is in full support of 
the government of Cambodia in its enlisting Preah Viherah Temple as a World Heritage Site in accordance 
with the map arranged by Cambodia. 2. Cambodia acknowledged that the enlistment will not include the 
buffer zone located in the northern and eastern side of the temple. 3. The enclosed map under the first 
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binding effects since it contained the obligations of the Thai side, specifically the forth 
provision which specified the joint planning management to preserve the character and 
cultural aspects of the Temple and the surrounding areas. The Court went further to treat 
reservations under the fifth provision as evidence of a binding agreement where both 
parties mutually agreed that nothing in the joint communiqué shall affect each country’s 
rights on its border claims (as opposed to evidence of a simple understanding that 
intended no whatsoever legal effects concerning borders’ delimitation and settlement).151  
The inconsistency in the Court’s rationale can, in fact, makes it hard for the 
executive to predict whether it has an independent authority to undertake and conclude a 
certain international agreement. At one time, the executive acted as a primary guardian. 
And at another time, its role was inadvertently switched to an assistant to a treaty making 
process. The problem here is the Court’s rationales in differentiating Thailand’s 
obligations under both international documents. Although both cases contain certain 
obligations that Thailand must undertake, the Court basically treated the supposedly 
collaboration of the two nations in the protection of the ancient Temple to maintain its 
culturally distinctive aspects as a “breachable” obligation while, in the IMF, rejecting that 
there could be any breach of Thailand’s obligation to amend its solvency law within the 
specific timeframe stated in the letter of intent.152 And due to this mistaken recognition of 
                                                                                                                                                 
paragraph shall be the original map including the “Schema Directeur pour la Zonage de Preah Vihear” and 
other core zones. 4. While awaiting for the decision of the joint committee in the demarcation of the 
common border, the two countries will collaborate to preserve the value and the unique character of the 
temple in accordance with the international standard. Such joint management plan shall be submitted along 
with the Temple enlistment which is designated for the consideration on February 1, 2010. 5. The 
enlistment shall not affect each country's rights on surveying and demarcating the common border. 6. 
Thailand and Cambodia are deeply thankful to the Director-General of UNESCO, Mr. Koichiro Matsuura, 
for his kind facilitation in the enlistment process. Supra note 148, para. 1.4. 
151  Id. para. 1.5(3). 
152 The Constitutional Court decision concerning the Joint Declaration between Thailand and Cambodia 
does not practically reverse the effectiveness of the Signatory of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Topothai, 
supra note 29. However, the fact that the Court in Preah Viherah Temple demanded that the communiqué 
undertaken by the Thai government be withdrawn yet could not prevent Cambodia from enlisting the 
temple since the Cambodian government was going to proceed regardless strongly showed that there was 
really no contractual obligation on the Thai side or any breach that would have resulted in any sort of 
reparation to be furnished by Thailand to Cambodia.  
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the legal obligation, the joint communiqué was considered an international “treaty”153 
making the Court look into other elements of the treaty such as the territorial or 
jurisdictional impacts potentially made by the treaty to determine the executive’s 
authority in the treaty-making process.  
It is, in fact, understood that once an international undertaking is considered as a 
“treaty”, other elements that would require a treaty to be subject to a complicated 
constitutional process can easily fall into it.154 Such a broad treaty characterization of the 
Court certainly will affect the executive discretionary power in the conduct of foreign 
relations. A treaty that is meant to support diplomatic relations is no exception to the 
scrutiny of the legislature. Not only did the decision of the Court to demand that the Thai 
government withdraw the communiqué imply the diminished authority of the executive 
in the conduct of diplomacy, it also jeopardized Thailand-Cambodia foreign relations by 
putting the Thai government in an awkward position with Cambodia.  
Although, under the Thai Constitution, the obligation of judicial restraint is out of 
the question, it yet seems that its consideration could be a way out of this frustration. The 
power to resolve the issues regarding the competence and constitutional functions of 
political branches now rests with the Constitutional Court. Aside from its general 
jurisdiction pursuant to Article 214, the power of the Constitutional Court to require 
treaties to be subject to Parliamentary approvals and a public hearing is also an 
implication for the ability of the judiciary to manage the distribution of powers among the 
political organs. And the foreign affairs power is no exception. The expressed language 
in the Constitution led some critics to invoke the traditional analysis of the separation of 
                                                 
153 The Constitutional Court employed an analytical method on the meaning of “treaty” pursuant to the 
Vienna Convention. Supra note 148, para. 1.5. 
154 Remarked by Professor Jaturon, the vagueness of Section 190 will create all kinds of claims since “it 
does not matter whether the changes under Section 190 are for the worse or for the better and also when 
many changes can affect the economic or social lives of the people”. And thus, there is no doubt that many 
treaties will likely be subject to parliamentary approvals and public hearings. Therawat, supra note 2, at 2. 
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powers doctrine to justify the current position of the Constitutional Court, through strict 
adherence to the constitutional text, in the determination of foreign affairs authorities.155 
Nonetheless, the language of Section 190, paragraph 6 only confers the power rather than 
requiring the Court to resolve disputes that may arise thereof 156 which could also suggest 
its ability to either entirely abstain from rendering a decision or defer the issue to the 
competent body where it sees fits.  
Thus, although it must be acknowledged that one of the crucial functions of the 
Court is to police these constitutional boundaries by ensuring that the constitutional 
process is observed, we must not forget that such a process also runs the risk of entrusting 
the branch that may lack the resources, expertise and understandings to decide on the 
question that is purely political in nature while concerning the stability of our foreign 
relations.157 The question of what would be the appropriate role for the Court in the realm 
of foreign affairs must be addressed. And the extent of the Court to scrutinize 
governmental actions to assure their conformity with the Constitution will be examined in 
the following sections. 
 C. Justifications for Judicial Limits 
As we have seen, the concepts of judicial deference and abstention are not 
unusual practices in the U.S. when the courts’ decisions might involve the determination 
of certain foreign policy or affect the allocation of powers of the political organs. But the 
                                                 
155 Fritz Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L. JOURNAL 
517, 520 (1966) (“An avoidance on such prudential grounds would, of course, also conflict with the basic 
assumptions of the classical theory, that the exercise of judicial review should be the necessary 
consequence of the Court's postulated duty to decide all cases properly within its jurisdiction, and to decide 
constitutional questions whenever the outcome of the case should depend upon such a question”). Topothai, 
supra note 29, at 15 (suggesting that the adoption of Section 190 which grants the judiciary the power to 
render a decision concerning the type of treaty that must secure legislative approval was in accordance with 
the principle of the checks and balances).  
156 Supra note 43.  
157 Recalling Justice William Rehnquist’s opinion in Goldwater v. Carter, he stated that when “basic 
question presented…is political”, it would be “nonjusticiable because it involves the authority of the 
President in the conduct of our country’s foreign relations…” RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 321 (quoting 
Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979)).  
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next important questions to be addressed are the justifications for their applications, and 
their significances to the executive function through the argument for institutional 
competency.  
Effectiveness and efficiency of the administration remained the key elements that 
encouraged the court to view its function as a proponent for governmental policy that 
has already been established.158 These are pragmatic concerns about the effective 
execution of U.S. foreign policy that demand that a salient role of the executive branch 
be accorded. Both democratic elements (effectiveness and efficiency) are the primary 
concerns that led courts to defer its judgment for the respect of the executive’s 
positions.159 The consideration of the effective administration in the conduct of foreign 
affairs can, in fact, be traced back to the framers intent. Through the replacement of the 
Article of Confederation with the Constitution, the framers had intended to empower the 
executive through the assignment of various foreign affairs responsibilities for the more 
effective implementation of foreign policy.160  
The belief of the courts in the presidential plenary powers in the area of foreign 
affairs that, in effect, made the courts defer its decision to the President by giving him “a 
broad discretionary authority to identify and define national interests and national 
security”161 may be explained by its lack of competence, expertise, resources and 
                                                 
158 David Gray Adler, Court, Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT 
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 44 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,1996). 
159 Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
supra note 139, at 99. Lavinbuk, supra note 59, at 864-865 (addressing the revisionist position believing in 
a limited role of the judiciary in the realm of foreign affairs) (“Whatever judges may believe U.S. foreign 
affairs obligations to be, ‘[t]he propriety of... interposition by the court may be well questioned,’ 
particularly because ‘the judiciary is not that department of the government to which the assertion of its 
interests against foreign powers is confided.”). 
160 Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
supra note 139, at 100. 
161 Adler, Court, Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 158, at 44-45 (emphasis added). RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 321-322 (2007) 
(quoting Justice Jackson in Chicago &Southern Air Lines Inc. v. Wterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 
111(1948)) (“[B]ut even if courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decision as to 
foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confined by our Constitution to the 
political departments of the government, executive and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and 
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guidelines for resolution of foreign affairs matters, the fear of embarrassment that may 
attend the judicial review against a presidential act as well as the view that the president 
possesses superior diplomatic skills, information and better understanding of national 
interest. Furthermore, the constant evolution in international norms may make it difficult 
for the courts to properly define the scope of foreign affairs powers. These are, for 
instance, the emergence of new kinds of international commitments or international 
norms that may be of a non-legal character, but simply a share understanding among 
international community.162 These factors can, in fact, diminish the capacity of the courts 
to resolve disputes concerning foreign relations.163  
As argued in Section III (B), there are reasons that render judicial reviews in 
every government act or decision inappropriate in the context of foreign affairs.164 And 
there are circumstances that demand the applications of judicial abstention and deference, 
especially when the court decides on the constitutional question concerning foreign 
affairs that could go far beyond a mere determination of the rights and duties of the 
litigants in the case.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
involve large elements of prophecy…and have long been held to belong in the domain of political power 
not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry”). Lavinbuk, supra note 59, at, 865.  
162 Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 981. 
163 Other factors suggested by Charney were questions concerning international law, independent judiciary 
(reflection of the biases of their culture and foreign policy), expertise in the law of the executive, access to 
the facts, international law is alien, important and uncertain effects, sole voice and flexibility. Charney, 
Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION supra note 
139, at 101-106. 
164 RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 321(“Judicial involvement in foreign affairs controversies nonetheless carries 
a hint of inappropriateness, driven by an intuition that it is inexpedient and indeed dangerous for courts to 
undermine or second guess foreign policy decisions of the President and Congress”). Baker v. Carr set 
forth alternative tests for the application of judicial abstention which is partially reflected in this analysis 
“when it is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political 
department, a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it, or the impossibility 
of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect due coordinate branches 
of government, or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made, or the 
potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question”.  
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218 (1962).  
157 
 
i. Judicial Abstention 
Judicial abstention has traditionally been applied to the situation in which the 
“Constitution has committed the determination of the issue to another agency of 
government than the courts”.165 This is a classical concern of the separation of powers 
principle that where there is “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of an 
issue to a coordinate political department”,166 the court will entirely decline to rule on 
that particular issue. This concept has also been expanded to preclude the court’s 
determination of authorities among the political branches.167 A political question became 
the primary factor that rendered the case unreviewable by the court. Under this 
circumstance, the court, compelled by the question of competence and the allocation of 
powers among political branches, would abstain from rendering a decision without 
making further inquiry into the decision of a political branch. 
The concept of judicial abstention should be considered in the Thai treaty context 
when involving the determination of the executive treaty-making authority. Despite the 
power granted by the Constitution, this does not mean that the concept is inapplicable as 
previously argued. Many of the factors that the court considered for judicial abstention in 
the case Baker v. Carr are framed in terms of institutional competence to conserve the 
judicial credibility and to promote the decision-making of the competent authority.168 
Although critics of the judicial restraints may have pointed out the courts competence in 
judging the matters of foreign affairs can derive from their abilities to analyze highly 
                                                 
165 Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 949 (citing Herbert Weschler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional 
Law, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1, 9 (1959)). 
166 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 217. 
167 The President was claimed acting unconstitutionally by depriving the Senate constitutional role in the 
treaty termination with Taiwan. The question of whether the Constitution allowed the President to 
terminate a treaty in connection with recognition in the absence of the Senate was then presented to the 
court. Although the court recognized that the question will only require the interpretation of the 
constitutional provision which is within the judicial function and competence, the court was not willing to 
decide whether one branch of the government has impinged upon the power of another. Goldwater v. 
Carter, 444 U.S. at 999.  
168 Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 949. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 218. 
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vague and complex domestic legal issues,169 the problems presented in the Thai context 
which involved an aggressive role of the judiciary in foreign affairs may have less to do 
with the court’s “undiscoverable standard”,170 but more to do with the impact of its 
decision upon the stability of the country’s foreign relations. It concerns the nation’s 
established foreign policy and the conduct of international relations. The Preah Vihear 
Temple involves an important decision of the Constitutional Court to withdraw the 
executive’s foreign affairs authority, which has destabilized Thailand-Cambodia foreign 
relations. The Court’s decision by rendering a judgment against the validity of the Joint 
Communiqué has disregarded the government’s policy determination, and undermined 
the principle of mutual respects among the institutional branches while delimiting the 
foreign affairs powers that were originally vested in the executive.  
ii. Judicial Deference 
The concept of judicial deference could suggest a lesser degree of abstention in 
the sense that the court will at least reach the merits of the dispute, but deferring certain 
issues to the discretion of the concerned authorities.171 The concept again calls for 
institutional competencies or raises the question whether the court is more competent to 
use its own judgment than is another institution.172 Sharing judicial abstention’s 
justifications, courts typically are seen as more competent to evaluate the merits of facts 
                                                 
169
Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 983. See also HAROLD H. KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: 
SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS 221-22 (1990).  
170 The term “judicially discoverable and manageable standards” was one of the factors set forth in Baker v. 
Carr for the application of judicial abstention, which refers to the concern of judiciary competence in the 
realm of foreign affairs due to its lack of institutional capacity to evaluate the relevance of evidence when 
their understanding of the applicable norms governing such evidence is incomplete. 
171 Judicial deference derives from the famous case, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) concerning the court’s deferral decision to an administrative agency on 
the statute’s interpretation. Although judicial deference is understood to be outside of foreign affairs 
context, “at least one commentator has argued that much of the judicial role in foreign affairs can be 
viewed through the prism of Chevron-type deference derived from administrative law”. Nzelibe, supra note 
134, at 1000. 
172 Gunn, supra note 136, at 484. There are other circumstances that courts would defer their decisions that 
this paper will not address since they are not the center of this chapter’s analysis. These are such as 
jurisdictional disputes within the federal system (the reluctance of federal courts to challenge the 
constitutionality of a federal law) or jurisdictional disputes in the international system. Id. at 485. 
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where “popular interests and political power ignore human and constitutional rights”,173 
than making a judgment concerning political and economic decisions. It is thus 
sometimes less of the capability concern than appropriateness.  
  The judicial deference approach can play an important role in a situation where 
the court must address a substantive violation of an individual’s constitutional rights, but 
its review must be limited in terms of the extent those rights must be accorded due to the 
concern of government’s limited resources and important policy decision. This is 
especially important in the upholding of the people’s participatory rights that affirmative 
governmental action is required. This kind of right imposes duties on the government to 
resources for the right to be fully respected.174 Thus, the determination of the right to 
public participation (substantive requirements) can have a policy implication as to how a 
branch of government should manage its budget and resources. And it is questionable 
whether the judiciary should be able to judge, especially in the absence of a specific 
regulation or statute concerning the manner of a public hearing. And even if there is one, 
should the interpretation be deferred to the concerned bodies will require further analysis 
that is beyond the length of this dissertation. But in any case, matters involving political 
judgments, especially those concerning an assessment of the validity of claims on 
national resources may fall outside the judicial function, and can be ones of the factors 
that justify judicial deference. 
 For Thailand, the case of Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement 
(JTEPA) raised a very important issue concerning the ability of the court to define a 
                                                 
173 Id.  
174 CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 40, 42 (2000).  Ran Hirschi, Negative Rights vs. 
Positive Entitlements: A Comparative Study of Judicial Interpretations of Rights in an Emerging Neo-
Liberal Economic Order, 22.4 HUM. RTS. Q. 1060, 1084 (2000) (“…all matters involving political 
judgments on the allocation of economic resources, the management of a valuable public asset…in which 
complex economic and social considerations and trade-offs were involved…the Courts should be less 
inclined to intervene…). 
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public hearing standard in the treaty context.175 The validity of an international agreement 
does not only depend on following a proper process, but also observing the substantive 
requirements of a public hearing imposed by the judiciary. These factors can drive up the 
costs of judicial intervention on the administration of foreign policy.176 The burden that 
the government must bear to defend the means of participation it accorded to the public 
will be considerably high. And it is not necessary that the substantial requirements of the 
public consultation procedure will guarantee its effectiveness, if the public administration 
itself lacks such a quality. For these reasons, it will be necessary for the Thai courts to 
avoid prescribing absolute rules of conduct for a political branch under certain 
circumstances for the executive to maintain sufficient autonomy in the foreign policy 
decision.  
Despite the fact that the Thai Constitution assigns the court a function to decide 
on cases regarding foreign affairs matters, there are yet factors to be considered in terms 
of the diminished degree of judicial involvement, especially when its decision concerns 
the determination of the political departments’ authorities, the judgment of policy 
considerations (having political or budget consequences), and in the absence of individual 
justice interest (fundamental rights). These factors are what I feel compelling and 
consistent to the principle of our constitutionality, which our judicial system should take 
into consideration in the area that concerns our international relations.177 The concerned 
                                                 
175 The primary challenge was the unconstitutionality of the agreement that did not afford the public 
sufficient means and time to participate in the making of the agreement. Saan Pokklong [The 
Administrative Court], Mar. 30, 2007, Ruling No. 178/2550 (Thail.), available at 
http://www.admincourt.go.th/50/s50-0178-o01.pdf.   
176 One of the compelling justifications for a limited judicial review suggested by Chamey is the fear that 
the court decisions might have important and indeterminate effects. The argument calls into the question of 
the court’s effectiveness when applying the rule of laws that also involve foreign policy determinations and 
other factual considerations. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND 
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION supra note 139, at 104. 
177 What I referred to as “our principle of constitutionality” is by maintaining the balance of powers among 
the political branches, and by keeping the legislature and the judiciary from excessively intruding into the 
executive’s sphere, especially in the realm of foreign affairs where the Constitution vested plenary power to 
the executive. For the U.S., the Supreme Court’s docket in fact showed the manner of the judiciary 
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factors will help enhancing the effectiveness of the executive administration by 
discouraging unnecessary judicial interference while reducing the potential shift in the 
balance of powers among the institutional branches. This functional consideration, while 
according the executive a certain level of autonomy to undertake its foreign policy 
decisions, will allow each branch to effectively perform a function in the area of its 
competence and in a manner that would foster our national interests.  
D. Balancing Approach: Justifications for Judicial Involvement  
The mere involvement of foreign policy or the allocation of powers cannot simply 
exclude the judiciary role from a legal dispute concerning foreign affairs since any slight 
connection to those considerations would justify the absence of the court’s role entirely in 
this realm.178 In the case of Thailand, there will be a question of where this line can be 
drawn since the making of treaty could all involve or at least affect foreign policy 
determinations in some ways. If this was the case, then the court would be completely 
excluded from the entire process. And there would be no room for the court to act as a 
guardian of constitutional rights in foreign affairs. 
Thus, although it may be true that foreign policy determination in general is 
within the executive’s discretionary power, but the policy that substantially affects 
fundamental individual justice can trigger a better, justifiable role of the court. And it is, 
in fact, an important question to be addressed by the court rather than any other political 
organs which must serve as a guardian of the people’s constitutional rights.179 
Furthermore, stability, as one of its institutional qualities, may very well prove to be 
                                                                                                                                                 
involvement in foreign affairs, although prevalent in the early days, is limited when affecting the function 
of the necessary political branches. Lavinbuk, supra note 59, at 895. 
178 “But it is erroneous to suppose that every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies 
beyond judicial cognizance” Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. at 999 (citing Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 
(1962)). 
179 RAMSEY, supra note 80, at 107 (casting doubts on the executive power amounting to altering 
individuals’ legal rights and duties in the domestic legal system). 
162 
 
important in a context where individual rights are at stake.180 Thus, readjusting the scope 
of the treaty categories to that concerned with individual fundamental rights is highly 
relevant here since the change can make the court a more appropriate body to address the 
issues of individual fundamental interests rather than to evaluate governmental acts 
concerning the conduct of our foreign relations.181 There are strong implications of 
individual rights within the system of the separation of powers under which individuals 
harmed by government acts must be protected. Even in the area of foreign affairs where 
judicial deference has normally played its role in the U.S. jurisdiction, “the Court has, at 
least in one line of cases, enforced the standards of the Bill of Rights without any 
deference to the international responsibilities of the government”.182 Nevertheless, even 
when the courts actually do reach the merits of such a case, it does not mean that it 
cannot accord the political branches a significant amount of policy discretion. Thus, 
foreign policy that may implicate fundamental individual rights may not justify judicial 
abstention, but may validate judicial deference which has a certain degree of judicial 
involvement for a guarantee of the people’s important constitutional rights while 
allowing certain policy decision to be deferred to, and addressed by the political 
branches.183 It is thus the function of the court to weigh individual rights claims against 
other national interest, including the effectiveness of foreign administration to determine 
the level of deference it should accord to the political branches. Through this approach, 
the courts would then promote the political branches' (including itself) institutional 
                                                 
180 Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 980. 
181 Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, 
supra note 139, at102 (“The Constitution establishes an independent judiciary primarily to protect 
aggrieved individuals harmed by the violations of the law… Their function is essential to the maintenance 
of the separation of powers among the branches and the protection of individual rights.”).  
182 Scharpf, supra note 155, at 584. Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 1002 (“Although forays by the courts into 
foreign affairs are infrequent, the courts have not hesitated to adjudicate on the merits of claims with 
foreign affairs implications when individual rights or domestic property interests are at stake”). 
183 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the government has argued that the courts should abstain from hearing these 
cases because they involve sensitive matters of national security and foreign policy. The courts that have 
considered this argument have rejected it, but have nonetheless concluded that considerable deference to 
the political branches' judgment was appropriate. Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 1006. 
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competence over foreign affairs issues. “In such a framework, judicial abstention and 
deference do not entail mutually exclusive categories, but rather reflect a continuum of 
judicial involvement in foreign affairs”.184 
The consideration of the factors mentioned may require that our treaty-making 
practice under the Constitution be re-evaluated. Thus, a form of limited judicial review in 
foreign affairs can be (i) the readjustment of the judicial intervention manner that should 
take place early in the treaty process, and in collaboration with the other two branches to 
determine if the treaty must undergo the special treaty process (to be elaborated in 
Chapter V, Section II, D (i)-(ii)) as well as (ii) the limitation on the judiciary’s ability to 
impose a public hearing standard (to be elaborated in Chapter V, Section II, D (iii)). 
These proposals relate to the concepts of judicial abstention and deference in the sense 
that (i) the prior-determination mechanism will provide a stronger basis for judicial 
abstention in the constitutional challenge of a procedural violation once the executive’s 
treaty authority has formally been established, and (ii) that political branches’ 
discretionary approach concerning the public hearing standard will require the application 
of judicial deference in order to maintain an effective function of the public 
administration. These notions of limited judicial review are necessary to broaden the 
executive’s power in the area of its competency.  
Preah Viherah Temple has become a bitter lesson for Thailand-Cambodia foreign 
relations which can hardly be patched due to the decision of the Constitutional Court to 
invalidate a friendly act of the Thai government toward Cambodia. What type of interests 
is being protected here by the judicial process is unclear.185 However, it is quite clear 
what we are losing in this battle. The ideas of limited judicial review in foreign relations 
                                                 
184 Id. at 1009.  
185 The decision of the Constitutional Court could not prevent the Cambodia government from proceeding 
with the enlistment of the Temple (even in the absence of the Joint Communiqué). The revocation of the 
Thai government act requested by the Court only sent Cambodia a hostile message that Thailand is no 
longer in support of the enlistment.  
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certainly has nothing to do with the concerns of judiciary insecurity and confidence (as 
some critics claimed),186 but rather has much to do with ensuring a proper method of 
securing our national interests and protecting citizens’ welfares in our system, even if it 
may sometimes require that the central role of the executive in the making of foreign 
policy decisions be preserved.187 
VI. Conclusion 
The principle of separation of powers, although aims at preserving the 
accountability and transparency of a governing system, also reminds us of what it means 
for each institutional branch to be “separate”. Institutional competencies may not be part 
of the bargain (objective) of this principle, but are arguably byproducts that can help each 
department perform its function effectively. The effectiveness of the executive 
administration is far from what people understand as mere “convenience”. It, in fact, has 
significant contributions to the assurance of our national interest that can be attained 
through the maintenance of external relations. In terms of domestic challenge, this 
effectiveness quality is also required for an administration to be responsive to the 
people’s needs and concerns. It is, therefore, important that the executive be accorded 
sufficient autonomy in the exercise of its foreign powers as constitutionally intended. The 
possession of the adequate autonomy does not mean a grant of the executive’s absolute 
power that should receive no scrutiny, but rather calls for an appropriate level of 
                                                 
186 Although, to some critics, the argument concerning the lack of judiciary’s competency may be overrated 
while making judges feel faithless in the judicial process in guarding our national interest, it should be 
acknowledged that having the judiciary decide on every issue concerning foreign relations can be 
politically damaging since the courts sometimes find it difficult to maintain its impartial judgment against 
foreign governments. HENKIN, supra note 1, at 69-91 (for criticism of political question doctrine). 
187 The ability of the executive to decide its own competence in the realm of foreign affairs is also crucial to 
the maintenance of an effective administration. The proposal of an “oversight committee” which should be 
composed of the executive, legislative and judicial officials to determine the types of treaty that are subject 
to the constitutional process prior to undertaking any treaty negotiation will be incorporated into the treaty-
making model presented in chapter V.  The idea is also influenced by the concept of judicial deference in 
the sense that the determination of the foreign affairs conduct is executive-based.  
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legislative and judicial interventions, which is still required to secure the legitimacy of 
our political process pursuant to the principle of separation of powers.  
Foreign affairs are considered sensitive areas of politics that may demand for 
coordination and mutual respect among the institutional branches in the upholding of our 
national interest and the maintenance of institutional competencies. This rationale affirms 
the significance of executive autonomy and limited involvements of the legislature and 
judiciary through the justifications of strong domestic impacts and individual rights 
implications. Specifically, the Thai Constitution, unlike the U.S. Constitution, does not 
vest the entire treaty-making powers in the legislature. Its required approval merely 
concerns specific types of treaties, and what is left is within the plenary powers of the 
executive. The treaty-making power is generally preserved, although not exclusively, for 
the executive for various legitimate reasons such as a tradition, institutional advantages 
and the concerns of foreign relations. Thus, the excessive roles of other branches in the 
treaty process can create shifts in their functions while undermining the competence of 
the branch that has the primary responsibility.  
The notions of judicial limits in foreign affairs may be unfamiliar in the Thai legal 
context, especially when the power to police constitutional boundaries is clearly granted 
to the branch under the Constitution. But the consideration of the concepts can be 
practical, given the conditions and dynamics of today’s international politics188 in which 
flexibility and policy space must be sufficiently accorded to the executive in order to 
address the exigencies of the country in the international realm. The manner of judicial 
intervention is therefore important to maintain this balance. The current approach may 
entail the Court to cross into the area of foreign policy decision which falls outside the 
judicial function and contributes to the shift in the balance of powers. This dislocation of 
                                                 
188 Nzelibe, supra note 134, at 977-80. 
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powers can threaten the foundation of constitutionalism and the integrity of our 
Constitution. Judicial limits should thus also be understood as a support system for the 
separation of powers principle in the sense that “[w]here the Constitution assigns a 
particular function wholly and indivisibly to another department, the federal judiciary 
does not intervene”.189 
The intervention of the Constitutional Court in the Pra Vihear Temple case which 
involved the Court’s review in the government’s foreign policy decision is an example of 
a devastating result that shattered diplomatic relations between Thailand and Cambodia 
when it rendered the decision that the friendly posture of Thailand is unconstitutional, 
and that such a position must be withdrawn. The embarrassment, the severance of 
diplomatic relations, hatred among the people of the two nations and the loss of many 
more economic opportunities, in my view, are sufficiently justifiable for the 
consideration of judicial limits (both in terms of the level and manner of intervention). In 
the support of this argument, the rationale in Dames & Moore v. Reagan reflected the 
court’s willingness to go along with the government policy instead of judging it for the 
reason that “[i]f the Court had rule against the Iranian pact. Chaos and confusion would 
have resulted and a carefully crafted diplomatic package would have been unraveled”.190  
By conclusion, the way in which the current Thai Constitution was drafted may be 
complicated for the application of judicial limits in foreign affairs since the Constitution 
clearly designates the role of the Constitutional Court to resolve issues concerning the 
extent of the executive and legislative roles in the treaty-making process. Under such a 
construction, the judiciary’s obligation to police the constitutional boundaries may be 
hard to be relieved, but can be re-adjusted. My argument comes nothing close to 
suggesting a complete abandonment of this judicial role in the foreign affairs area or 
                                                 
189 Scharpf, supra note 155, at 538 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 246 (1962)).  
190 Adler, Court, Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 158, at 46. 
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encouraging the usurpation of power by the executive because such an approach will only 
undermine the system of checks and balances as well as the function of the court, as the 
guardian of the people’s constitutional rights.191 My proposal only asks to re-create a 
balanced role for each branch in order to meet the internal and external challenges 
described in Chapter I. How the role of each institutional branch should be readjusted and 
coordinated in the realm of foreign affairs, particularly in the treaty-making process to 
maintain balance in the executive’s autonomy will be further discussed in the following 
chapter (Chapter V). 
                                                 
191 Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 
supra note 139, at 100.  
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Chapter V: Democracy and the Treaty Practice Reform through a Comparative 
Perspective (The Public and State Roles) 
 
I. Introduction 
 The derivation of a treaty-making model requires this chapter to answer three 
primary questions; (i) what the proper scope of public participation should be in terms of 
the  type of participation involved, and the kind of treaty to be subject to the 
constitutional process under Section 190 (which has also partially been analyzed in 
Chapter III), (ii) what the proper role of the legislature should be in the treaty process in 
terms of the type of legislative check, and the kind of treaty to be subject to its scrutiny, 
and (iii) what the proper roles of the courts are in terms of the level of deferential review 
they should accord to other branches (which has also been considered in Chapter IV). 
These questions will be addressed through examining treaty-making practices among the 
various civil and common law countries. The surveyed countries include France, 
Germany, the United Kingdom (UK), India, Switzerland, New Zealand and South Africa.  
The analysis will be made in the following order. Section I provides the meaning 
of a “treaty” according to each country’s terms and definitions, followed by the study of 
how the surveyed countries approach these three primary questions. Although the search 
for the meaning of a treaty is not the primary focus of this analysis, it is deemed crucial to 
the determination of the executive’s treaty power in certain jurisdictions as the definition 
can affect the ability of the executive to conclude a treaty. Under Section II, this survey 
study will be incorporated into the analysis concerning the three particular areas of 
proposed reforms through readjusting the roles of the public, legislature and judiciary in 
the treaty-making process. Each question will be consisted of two sub parts, namely (i) 
assessing the surveyed countries’ treaty practices, and (ii) asserting the standard (adopting 
the approach) through my analysis. Section III will provide a complete derivative model 
by taking into consideration the assessments of the surveyed countries’ treaty-making 
169 
 
experiences, cultural arguments in Chapter III (the adoption of liberalism), and structural 
arguments in Chapter IV (the maintenance of institutional competence) to achieve fuller 
democracy in the treaty-making process. Therefore, the primary objective of the analysis 
is to argue neither for the facilitation of the executive administration nor its 
monopolization of foreign affairs power, but rather to generate a practical approach in 
order to secure effectiveness and responsiveness in the machinery of our public 
administration in the realm of foreign affairs.  
II. Comparative Perspective 
 
 It is unquestionable that participatory rights of citizens can serve as a “mechanism 
for enhancing the democratic tenor of public decision-making”.1 The method of 
participation can come either though representation (legislature) or direct means 
(referendum). In a large society where direct participation by citizens is deemed less 
practical, the role of legislature may increase to better serve this democratic goal. The 
judiciary, at the same time, has the power to enforce to ensure that this right is being 
observed. These mechanisms are meant to improve the quality of political decisions by 
guarding against the corruptive practices of a government and by securing intellectual and 
constructive inputs of participants. Opportunities to directly or indirectly participate in 
policy decision-making process are, therefore, crucial to the abilities of individual or 
groups to defend and improve their interests.  
Despite all the wonderful aspects, this self-governing principle can sometimes 
collide with citizens’ own interest in having a responsive and effective government, 
especially in the area of external affairs where national interests are also contingent upon 
the country’s well-established foreign relations. The strenuous checks from the public and 
institutional branches upon the executive (as described in Chapter I), although in theory 
                                                 
1 Martha Jackman, The Cabinet and the Constitution: Participatory Rights and Charter interests: Manicom 
v. County of Oxford, 35 MCGILL L.J. 943, 944 (1989-1990) (Criticizing the unconstitutional outcome of the 
case). 
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can strengthen the people’s interests, do not always guarantee such a result when the 
checks can have substantial impacts upon domestic as well as external relations 
administrations. Aside from the need to secure the accountability and transparency of the 
government, an effective function of the executive in handling treaties with foreign 
governments must also be taken into consideration. Thus, the first question to be 
addressed in this section as to what should be the scope of the public participation in the 
treaty context will be drawn from the surveyed countries’ experiences combined with the 
analysis provided in Chapter III.  
Many jurisdictions generally have broad categories of treaties that are subject to 
close supervision. However, their scrutinizing mechanisms in the treaty process are based 
on final rather than prior legislative approvals and mandatory public consultations in 
addition to this legislative check. The complicated process established in Section 190 
certainly requires us to narrow down the scope of the treaty categories and to determine a 
proper participation mechanism in order to ensure that those in need of special attention 
properly receive one. The comparative perspectives will help us understand how the value 
of public participation is carried out in practice in the context of a treaty-making process. 
And this understanding will also help us shape its scope and define its limits to enable the 
effective function of this participatory mechanism.  
A. The Constitution of a “Treaty” 
The Thai Constitution does not provide a legal definition of a “treaty”.2 Section 
190 primarily provides a treaty-making procedure for special classifications of treaties, 
and it is rather the judiciary function to determine whether the treaty in question is within 
                                                 
2 It must also be noted that, under the Thai treaty-making practice, unlike the U.S. system, the term 
“international agreements” and “treaties” are interchangeable. 
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the meaning of those specified in Section 190.3 Thus, the power to interpret and define 
treaties is entirely vested in the Constitutional Court.  
According to the Thai jurisprudence, a treaty means any type of international 
agreement in written concluded between states or international organizations intended for 
legal effects among the parties in accordance with international law.4 The court, in fact, 
treated mutual obligations borne by the parties (if breached would entitle the other to 
certain judicial remedy) as a core element of a treaty. In the case of the International 
Monetary Fund (hereinafter “IMF”) under which the Thai government tried to seek a 
financial assistance from the IMF through the submission of the letter of intent, the court 
rejected the plaintiff’s argument stating that the document, if anything, constituted no 
more than “an explanation of policies and the operation of the government” bearing 
simply “the characteristics of being a unilateral act by the Thai government in request of 
the exercise of its rights in its capacity as a member State to utilize the general resources 
of the IMF”.5 The court distinguished treaties from unilateral acts, which in its view lacks 
the binding legal effects of both sides. The letter of intent, according to the court’s 
analysis, is a non-binding instrument in which no sanctions would have been imposed had 
the Thai government failed to deliver its promises stipulated in the letter of intent. It can 
be understood that any binding agreement certainly accompanies significant legal 
implications which can potentially have adverse impacts upon the people, and thus 
requires greater scrutiny before it can take effects. Contractual obligations created by a 
                                                 
3 CONST. (2007), Ch. 9, §190 ¶ 3 (Thail.). 
4 Saan Rattatumnoon [The Constitutional Court], Jul. 8, 2008, Ruling No. 6-7/2551 (Thail), available at 
http://61.19.241.65/DATA/PDF/2551/A/108/1.PDF.  See also the Summary of the Constitutional Court, 
Ruling No. 33/2543 (Thail.) (ruling on the constitutionality of the Bio-diversity Convention).  
5 Summary of the Constitutional Court’s decision, May 25, 1999, Ruling No. 11/2542 (Thail.), available at 
http://www.constitutionalcourt.or.th/download/Summary_desic/42/Summary_desic_eng/e11_2542.pdf  
(requested the Constitutional Court to rule on whether or not a letter of intent to seek technical and financial 
assistance sent by the government to the International Monetary Fund was a treaty that had to be approved 
by the National Assembly under section 224 paragraph two of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, 
B.E. 2540 (1997). 
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written agreement between the parties, therefore, have become the primary factor that the 
court considered in the construction of a treaty. 
In addition, the courts have increasingly relied on the elements of the treaty 
definition provided under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) 
(hereinafter “VCLT”). Despite being a non party to the VCLT, its customary status has 
long been recognized by the Thai judiciary.6 The courts, in fact, have adopted and 
incorporated into their interpretation the treaty definition provided by Article 2(1) of the 
VCLT which defined a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in 
a written form and governed by international law, whether embodied in a single 
instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular 
designation”.7 It should be noted that the intent for the legal binding effects of the parties 
is missing from the VCLT definition. And, thus the contractual obligations created 
between the parties is an additional element that is being recognized by the Thai 
judiciary. In conclusion, there are four primary elements that the Thai courts have 
elaborated in the constitution of a treaty. These are (i) legal consequences of the 
obligations (ii) in a written form (iii) concluded between states or international 
organizations and (iv) under the governance of international law. 
The majority of states have virtually adopted these similar elements pursuant to 
the VCLT treaty definitions.8  Canada, for instance, recognized treaties as a source of the 
international legal obligations binding upon the state, and treated the VCLT as a basis of 
the Constitution.9 Switzerland, in the same manner, recognizes any form of agreements 
                                                 
6 Id. See also ANTHONY AUST, MODERN TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 14 (2d ed. 1985) (suggesting that the 
criteria set in the VCLT have become customary international law).  
7 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1) (a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S 331; 8 I.L.M. 
679 (1969); 63 A.J.I.L. 875. 
8 Australia, Canada, China, Germany, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, for instance, have domestic 
definitions that are compatible with the VCLT definition. Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 10 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).  
9 Maurice Copithorne, National Treaty Law and Practice: Canada, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 91-92 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).  
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intended by the parties for binding legal effects to be governed by international law as a 
treaty.10 The creation or change of legal obligations pursuant to public international law is 
primarily required in order for a treaty to form under the Netherland constitutional 
approach. This position has, in effect, generally excluded policy or cooperative 
agreements from constituting a treaty to be submitted for parliamentary approval.11  
In summary, although Thailand provides no distinction between “treaties” and 
“international agreements”, its definitional approach is still considered conventional by 
incorporating the international law definition (VCLT). The title of the instrument is also 
proven to be less important than the intent of the parties when considering whether the 
instrument in question has legal binding effects. The constitution of a treaty is therefore 
relevant since it is one of the factors that can determine or even delimit the scope of the 
executive authority in the treaty process. The next section provides the discussion of 
another treaty component that must be taken into consideration in the allocation of the 
treaty-making power. 
B. Special Categories of Treaties 
Despite the prerogative of the executive in the treaty-making realm, one cannot 
deny that the executive cannot exercise such an authority without limitation. In many 
states, the system of checks and balances enables state legislature (or in rare cases, public 
consultation) to approve certain types of treaties prior to its implementation or its entry 
into force. These categories ranged from as broad as those with political and economic 
implications (i.e. territory cessation, having significant financial obligation) to the ones 
that may have personal impacts (i.e. affecting individual rights).12 The surveyed countries 
                                                 
10 Luzius Wildhaber, Adrin Scheidegger & Marc D. Schinzel, National Treaty Law and Practice: 
Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 627, 642 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).  
11 J.G. Brouwer, National Treaty Law and Practice: the Netherlands in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 483, 485 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005). 
12 Hollis, A Comparative Approach, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 35. See 
also Pierre Michel Eisemann & Catherine Kessedjian, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in 
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in this section, namely France, Germany, India, the UK, Switzerland and South Africa all 
place an emphasis on the treaties that have substantial implications on individual rights.  
The issue can get more complicated when the constitutional process, such as that 
of Thailand entails checks from the public and the legislature prior to the initiation of an 
important treaty negotiation,13 which is to be distinguishable from the practices of many 
jurisdictions. Thus, securing the effectiveness of this process may require us to narrow 
down the treaty type since, given these additional requirements, a broad common treaty 
category as reflected in many jurisdictions will certainly cast all kinds of treaties into this 
demanding process, which will prolong the process of treaty negotiation while potentially 
leaving the important ones unattended.14  To redefine the treaty scope, the surveyed 
countries have at least suggested that those that potentially threaten individuals’ rights to 
life, liberty and security - the utmost interests guaranteed under the Thai Constitution - 
should primarily be warranted in the treaty context. This is also a liberal approach that I 
argued for in Chapter III. 
Arguably, public participation can become more significant as the government 
conduct increasingly affects individual fundamental rights to life, liberty and security. In 
the U.S. treaty-making context, sole executive agreements without proper checks is seen 
as a threat to the principle of democracy and constitutionalism, “especially when an 
agreement entails lawmaking and affects individual rights”.15 The impacts on an 
individual fundamental justice, which bears the basic characteristic of human rights, can 
provide a strong basis for the participatory right of an individual in a policy decision. As 
argued by Jonathan Charney, there are strong implications of individual rights within the 
                                                                                                                                                  
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED 
KINGDOM 1, 6 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995). 
13 CONST. (2007), Ch. 9, §190, (Thail.) (amended 2011). 
14 In the Switzerland model, LUZIUS WILDHABER, TREATY-MAKING POWER AND CONSTITUTION: AN 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE STUDY (1971) (emphasis added). 
15 LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 65 (1990). 
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system of the separation of powers under which individuals harmed by government acts 
must be protected.16 Even in the area of foreign affairs where judicial review has 
limitedly played its role in the U.S. jurisdiction,17 “the Court has, at least in one line of 
cases, enforced the standards of the Bill of Rights without any deference to the 
international responsibilities of the government” 18 where important individual rights are 
at stake. These are the cases that individuals’ political participation is undeniable, and 
should be given priority. 
i. Assessing Treaty-Making Practices 
 
France (Civil law) 
 
Under the French Constitution of 1958, Article 53, Section VI specifically 
provides that special types of treaties require parliamentary approval before these treaties 
can take effect (prior to ratification or approval by the executive).19 Such a process (the 
intervention of the Parliament) can also be replaced by direct consultation of the citizens 
in accordance with Article 11.20 According to Article 53, peace treaties, trade agreements, 
treaties or agreements relating to international organization, those committing the 
finances of the State, those modifying provisions which are the preserve of statute law, 
those relating to the status of persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or 
                                                 
16 Charney pointed out the crucial function of the court in upholding the constitutional rights. And matters 
such as foreign affairs when implicating individual rights and fundamental justice should be subject to 
closer scrutiny. Jonathan Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE 
U.S. CONSTITUTION 98, 102 (Louis Henkin et al. eds., 1990) (“The Constitution establishes an independent 
judiciary primarily to protect aggrieved individuals harmed by the violations of the law… Their function is 
essential to the maintenance of the separation of powers among the branches and the protection of 
individual rights.”).  
17 HENKIN, supra note 15, at 69. DAVID GRAY ADLER & LARRY N. GEORGE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 38 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George eds.,1996). 
18 Fritz Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L. JOURNAL 
517, 584 (1966). 
19 1958 CONST. art. 53 (Fr.). 
20 Id. art. 11 (“The President of the Republic may, on a recommendation from the Government when 
Parliament is in session, or on a joint motion of the two Houses… submit to a referendum… which provides 
for authorization to ratify a treaty…). Pierre Michel Eisemann & Raphaёle Rivier, National Treaty Law and 
Practice: France, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 253 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005).  
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acquiring of territory, may be ratified or approved only by an Act of Parliament.21 The 
operation of this clause prevents these treaties from taking effect until such ratification or 
approval has been secured. In addition, the consent of the population affected by the 
ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory must be obtained. 
Despite the broad scope of the legislative approval required by the Constitution, 
special attention has been paid to the case in which individual rights have been deprived. 
Although the cession and acquisition of territory, in many jurisdictions, is a common type 
of treaty that simply requires legislative approval after the treaty has been concluded, the 
direct impact upon an individual’s livelihood and his community resulted from the 
transaction are the type of interest that the Constitution protects. Therefore, additional 
process for the concerned individuals must be accorded. Thus, the issue requires us to 
look beyond territory ceding and acquisition, and to take into consideration citizens’ 
fundamental interests that are substantially at stake in any type of treaty negotiation. This 
protective approach has also been adopted more or less in the treaty practice of Germany. 
Germany (Civil law) 
 Germany, following the lines of the parliamentary system, also has particular 
types of treaties that require the participation of Parliament in their conclusions. 
According to the German Constitution (The Basic Law), these are the treaties affecting 
the existing legislations or requiring a new law, affecting the existence of the state and its 
territorial integrity, independence, status and sovereignty.22 Although the Federal 
                                                 
21 1958 CONST. 53 (Fr.). Eisemann & Rivier, National Treaty Law and Practice: France in NATIONAL 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 259.  
22 GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 59(2) (F.R.G.) (“Treaties that regulate the political relations of 
the Federation or relate to subjects of federal legislation shall require the consent or participation, in the 
form of a federal law, of the bodies responsible in such a case for the enactment of federal law. In the case 
of executive agreements the provisions concerning the federal administration shall apply mutatis 
mutandis”). Parliament’s consent to a treaty is given in a form of an accessory law enacted by both 
chambers of Parliament. The procedure of approval is varied depending on the type of treaty. The 
conclusion and modification of treaties on the European Union, for instance, may require only an enactment 
of an ordinary federal law. For others that require the law of  approval, additional process may be needed. 
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Constitution provides no mandate for the federal government concerning direct 
participation of the people in treaty-making process, public consultations may be required 
where the interested groups so requested that their special interests be taken into 
consideration in the conclusion of the agreement.23 However, for the facilitation of the 
administration, this process rather takes place through representative civic bodies such as 
chambers of commerce, associations and other public interest groups. 
India (Common law) 
For India, the treaty-making power is exercised and regulated by the executive.24 
The Indian Constitution, in contrary to France and Germany, does not require 
parliamentary approval (Union Parliament) before agreements are concluded or enter into 
force. 
Despite this plenary power, the concern of individual rights is affirmed and 
expressed in conjunction with the exercise of the executive’s treaty-making power. Thus, 
implementing legislations are necessary to give effect to certain categories of treaties 
relating to cession of Indian territory, affecting the existing laws or restricting or 
infringing upon individual rights.25 Treaties such as the Geneva Conventions for the 
                                                                                                                                                  
For further discussion, see Hans D. Treviranus & Hubert Beemelmans, National Treaty Law and Practice: 
Federal Republic of Germany, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, 
SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM 43, 49-50 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995). 
23 Treviranus & Beemelmans, National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED 
KINGDOM, supra note 22, at 52. 
24 The President is the chief executive of the Union of India, and the executive power is vested in him. 
INDIA CONST. art. 52 § 5. K. Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW 
AND PRACTICE 349 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005). 
25 Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, A.I.R. 1969 S.C. at 784 (“If, in consequence of the 
exercise of executive power, rights of citizens or others are restricted or infringed, or laws are modified, the 
exercise of (executive) power must be supported by legislation”). INDIA CONST. art. 253, § 6 (“Parliament 
has power to make any law for the whole or any part of the territory of India for implementing any treaty, 
agreement or convention with any other country or countries or any decision made at any international 
conference, association or other body”). Article 253 is to be read in conjunction with “the Union List” (the 
Seventh Schedule), clause 14 concerning the power to make and implement treaties of the legislature that 
covers “treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing of treaties, agreements and 
conventions with foreign countries”. Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM 79, 
81 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995).  
178 
 
Protection of War Victims 1949, the Tokyo Convention on Offences and Certain Other 
Acts Committed on Board Aircraft 1963, the International Convention on the Suppression 
and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid 1973, the Convention for the Suppression of 
Unlawful Acts Against Safety of Civil Aviation 1971 are subject to this requirement due 
to their natures that have significant implications for fundamental individual rights. 26  
In addition, treaties or agreements that are matters of public importance may be 
considered in Parliament on a motion moved by the concerned minister. This process can 
take place after the treaty has been signed or ratified.27 The Indian Constitution, although 
does not generally require parliamentary approval for treaties prior to their conclusions, 
still ensures that treaties affecting individual rights must be brought to the Parliament 
attention who acts as a screening body before they can take effect in the domestic realm. 
Switzerland (Civil law) 
Despite the unique treaty referendum process (to be further discussed in the 
section on the public hearing standard), the emphasis on individual rights in the Swiss 
treaty context may not be as strong in the sense that they were not explicitly expressed 
under the treaty categories required for further action of the Parliament. Individual rights 
were rather assumed as matters of major importance that generally fall within the ambit of 
the Federal Assembly’s (Parliament) authorization prior to their entry into force.28 
Aside from enacting legislation and rendering budget decisions in connection with 
international agreements, the primary role of the Federal Assembly in influencing foreign 
                                                 
26 Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, 
GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 25, at 92. 
27 Id. at 97.  
28 The Federal Assembly is the Swiss Parliament which consists of two Chambers: the National Council and 
the Council of States. The two Councils are on an equal level. See, 
http://www.parlament.ch/e/wissen/parlamentswissen/Pages/parl.aspx. Switzerland adopted the negative list 
approach for the Federal Assembly foreign relations power under which all treaties are subject to 
parliamentary approval, except those of a technical, administrative or executive nature, and of minor 
importance. Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution fédérale de la 
Confédération Suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 166, ¶ 2 (Switz.) (“[the 
Federal Assembly] shall approve international treaties, except where by statute or international treaty the 
Federal Council alone is competent.”). 
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policy is also to approve these international agreements of which the Federal Council’s 
power (the executive) alone is not sufficiently competent. The agreements that the 
executive alone can conclude are (i) agreements the Federal Assembly had authorized in 
advance whether explicitly or implicitly, (ii) purely administrative or routine agreements 
of minor importance (i.e. no individual rights affected), and (iii) urgent agreements that 
must require a provisional entry into force, yet to be subject to subsequent parliamentary 
approval - mostly treaties of commerce.29  
The international agreements of minor importance or “petty agreements” are 
described as those of a purely administrative or technical in nature, and do not primarily 
aimed at individuals.30 The observation of individual rights in the Swiss treaty-making 
process is thus emphasized through the implication of treaties of major significance of 
which the executive cannot solely execute without the necessary parliamentary approval.  
United Kingdom (Common Law) 
The United Kingdom (UK) embarked on a dualist system under which no treaty 
can give effects without receiving the cooperation of Parliament, notably in the form of 
legislation enactment.31 Under the UK system, a treaty that has impact upon private rights 
cannot escape the external check since it is explicitly expressed as the category that 
requires Parliamentary approval. The consideration of individual rights in the treaty 
process is therefore within the Parliament’s supervision. And thus, treaties that affected 
                                                 
29 Luzius Wildhaber, Adrin Scheidegger & Marc D. Schinzel, National Treaty Law and Practice: 
Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, 
THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM 140 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995). The categories of the agreements that 
the Federal Council had power to act alone were revised by the International Law Division of the Federal 
External Affairs Department and the Federal Office of Justice in 1987. 51 VPB No. 58, 369-85, at 381 
(1987), See also Federal Statute Concerning External Trade Measure, June 25, 1982 SR 946.201 
(empowering the Federal Council to conclude international agreements concerning external commerce, 
services and payment transactions).  
30 Wildhaber, et al., National Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 650. 
31 Ian Sinclair & Susan J. Dickson, National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom, in NATIONAL 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM  223, 
229 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995).  
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individual rights cannot take effect until a formal legislative action has completed. 
Treaties requiring legislative action are those; (i) modifying or adding to the existing law 
or statute, (ii) endowing additional power to the Crown, not previously existed, (iii) 
affecting private rights, (iv) creating a direct or contingent financial obligation upon the 
UK, and (v) providing for an increase in the powers of the European Parliament.32 The 
safeguard of individual rights is reinforced by an additional consultation process with the 
legislature prior to ratification as well as the enactment of legislation. Such mechanism, 
also known as “the Ponsonby Rule”, provides the Parliament an opportunity to consider 
and evaluate the desirability of the treaty content.33 Thus, a formal legislative action may 
only bring the treaty into force, but it is the particular consultative process that pays due 
consideration to the concerned citizens.  
South Africa (Common law) 
It can be said that South Africa has similar approach to the Swiss treaty practice in 
terms of limited open list for treaties that can be solely performed by the executive 
branch. The positive list entails all treaties to be subject to parliamentary approval, except 
those listed under section 231(3) of the South African Constitution.34 These international 
agreements that are not subject to parliamentary approval are those of a technical, 
administrative or executive nature or agreements that do not require ratification or 
accession.35 The role of legislature in the treaty-making process, nevertheless, does not 
come up until after the decision to conclude an agreement has been reached.  
                                                 
32 Ian Sinclair, Susan J. Dickson and Graham Maciver, National Treaty Law and Practice: United 
Kingdom, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 727, 734 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005). 
33 Id. at 738. Ponsonby Rule, A. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATY 68 (1961) (requiring any required 
ratification treaty to be laid before the Parliament for a period of twenty-one sitting day before the 
instrument of ratification is submitted to the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs).  
34 Section 231(3) provided exceptions to the approval of the National Assembly given that an international 
agreement is “of a technical, administrative, or executive in nature, or an agreement [that] does not require 
either ratification or accession…” S.AFR. CONST. 1996. 
35 Id. N.J. Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE 581, 587 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005). The Manual on Executive Acts of the President of 
the Republic of South Africa has played a major role in guiding state departments to draft and submit 
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Despite the absence of the expressed language in the treaty approval requirement 
concerning individual rights, it is to be assumed that the term “technical, administrative or 
executive” agreements enabling the executive to execute the agreement alone practically 
excludes any agreements with major political, economic and social significances as well 
as those affecting individual rights.36 Therefore, under the South African approach, the 
concern of individual rights’ impact was simply addressed in the treaty category that has 
significant social implication, without further specification.  
ii. Asserting a Law-Making Standard 
The conventional treaty-making process, which normally has neither mandate for 
public consultation nor legislative approval prior to a treaty negotiation, may provide an 
explanation why many jurisdictions are able to cast broad categories of treaties to be 
subject to the final legislative approval. For Thailand, which has a more demanding treaty 
process, following this conventional practice may not be practical, if not unfeasible. 
However, it is noteworthy that the treaty practices of these surveyed countries recognize 
individual rights as a matter of high importance that deserve special attention and close 
supervision. Narrower treaty categories are deemed necessary under the current treaty 
approach. And by shifting the focus of Section 190 treaty provision to the issue that 
concerns individual rights, we may achieve more than a practical function of the 
mechanisms established in this Section, but also the assurance of a responsive 
governmental administration.  
As I explained the significance of adopting the liberal approach in Chapter III, my 
additional justification for borrowing an element of a legislative process to provide a 
minimum ground for Section 190 treaty category was also due to the fact that the demand 
                                                                                                                                                  
documents to the President properly and in accordance with the constitutional process. Manual on 
Executive Acts of the President of the Republic of South Africa, Office of the President, Ch. 5 § 5.5, at 24 
(March 1999). 
36 Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 35, at 588. 
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on the level of accountability in the making of a treaty that Section 190 has set may be 
close to that of the law making procedure.37 Thus, any activity or commitment the 
executive branch made externally that may personally subject individuals to must be first 
addressed and properly heard. Treaty consultation with the public under Section 190 
certainly is a unique process that heightens public scrutiny on the executive’s exercise of 
its foreign power. Although an argument had been made concerning the opposite nature 
(difference) of the treaty and that of domestic legislation that the latter was rather 
“introverted”, 38 what should not be distinguished between the treaty-making and the law-
making processes is the impact of individual fundamental justice that must be addressed 
regardless of the context in which it was involved. 
In the context of Canadian governmental regulations, the areas in which a 
maximum level of individual and public participation has been arguably required are 
those concerned with the right to life, liberty and security of individuals.39 According to 
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, the notion of fundamental justice 
particularly refers to the most basic human rights to life, liberty and security of the person 
dealt within section 7.40 Manicom v. County of Oxford provides an example of which 
fundamental justice of individuals or groups is being affected by the cabinet decision-
making process in the location of the waste disposal site.41 The constitutional challenge in 
                                                 
37 By the same token, Chapter 7 of the Thai Constitution entails direct political participation by the people 
in the legislative process. CONST. (2007), Ch. 7, §163, (Thail.). MANIT JUMPA, “Kwamroo beungton 
kiewkab rathatumnoon hang ratcha anachak thai,” translated in BASIC KNOWLEDGE OF THE 2007 
CONSTITUTION OF THE KINGDOM OF THAILAND 251 (2008). 
38The distinction was made based upon the nature of treaty referendum that may involve the predilections of 
two or more states, and may not be afforded the same level of internal pressure. WILDHABER, supra note 14, 
at103. 
39 Supra note 1. See also CONST. § 7 (1982) (Can.) (Oceanalaw). 
40 Supra note 1, at 945. 
41Manicom v. County of Oxford concerns a dispute between a Township of South-West Oxford and the 
County of Oxford over the latter's decision to locate a waste disposal site within the Township despite 
considerable local opposition. The proposed site was located on a height of land, and was in close proximity 
to the centre of the community. The County applied to a Joint Board appointed under the Ontario 
Consolidated Hearings Act to consider the environmental and planning impacts of the application. After a 
lengthy public hearing which resulted in a concern of public health and environmental issue, the Joint 
Board rejected the application. The County then appealed to the Ontario Cabinet. The cabinet appealing 
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this case was thus based on the denial of participatory rights for the most affected local 
individuals. The fundamental principle and the goal of democracy were thus being 
undermined by excluding participatory rights of citizens in the case which the life, liberty 
and security interests of the people were clearly at stake. And why this is important and 
more effective to engage people, especially in such a situation has already been 
elaborated through my lengthy arguments in Chapter III. The approach will provide us 
with a more specific standard that would help balance the government workloads while 
better responding to the internal (citizens’ demands and social harmony) and external 
challenges (the country’s credibility, diplomacy and national interest).  
This approach narrows down the principle of public participation to the area 
where persons’ welfare, health and safety have been directly deprived. It is also specific 
enough to ascertain a standard that will allow the holding of a public forum to attend to 
individuals’ injuries without causing undue delay of necessary government actions. This 
conclusion does not, however, suggest that public participation should be excluded at a 
higher level such as foreign affairs, the area in which the threats toward citizens’ life, 
liberty and security is less imminent. Rather, it should serve as guidance when 
determining the participatory rights of citizens in any international commitment. The 
countries such as France, India and the UK have specifically spelled out individual rights 
as one of the treaty categories that cannot take effect unless implemented through an 
internal process, whereas Germany has a special channel to address the issues for those 
who believed their interests were adversely affected. Fundamental individual rights 
should at least be a minimum mandatory standard for public participation to create trust 
and to provide the people with a sense of security within the governing system, and to 
                                                                                                                                                  
process that gave rise to the issue of constitutionality brought the plaintiffs to file a complaint with the 
Ontario High Court.  Id. at 946 (emphasis added). 
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avoid overstretching the participatory right to the extent that it would hamper the quality 
of the public administration which also means the interest of the people.    
The assertion of a law-making standard by requiring a public hearing in a case of 
individual fundamental rights’ infringement goes along the line with the adoption of the 
liberal approach here. The goal is not only to legitimize government policy decision in 
foreign affairs, but also to increase the effectiveness of the public participation 
mechanism itself by making sure that individual energies will be positively unleashed into 
the system in which responsive and effective administration can be warranted. The 
potential direct impact that the treaty’s obligations may have upon individuals’ 
fundamental rights should trigger the same mechanism as the law-making process since 
the law-making power (which amounts to altering individuals’ rights and duties, even if 
done to further foreign policy objectives) is certainly beyond the executive constitutional 
boundary.42 Individuals’ right to life, liberty and interest should stand as one of the core 
elements in the requirement of the direct public participation in the treaty realm.  
This liberal approach, thus, is not only restricted to treaties that are commercial in 
nature (as those introduced in Section 190), but will cover any type of international 
agreement that threatens the well-being of individuals and their local communities. Public 
participation is particularly important to this new treaty category (concerning fundamental 
individual rights) which must be created in addition to other important treaties. The 
approach will be further summarized in Section III (the Derivation of a Treaty Model). 
I believe this specific requirement will bring out the best of the people’s intellects, 
understandings and empathy toward the community they live in rendering public 
participation serve its fuller function. And to make public participation in the treaty-
making process works, we must ask if our constitutional mechanism operates in a way 
                                                 
42 MICHAEL RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 106-107 (2007). See, Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 635 (1952). 
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that would allow our political ideology – democracy- to flourish. As a matter of a 
democratic principle, citizens’ participatory rights should not be denied even in the area 
that is far-fetched from individual’s fundamental interests, but can be weighed against the 
government’s interest in having an effective administration which is also in the best 
interest of the people. 
C. Seeking Appropriate Legislative Role 
The roles of public participation in the legislative process suggested the minimum 
standard that individuals’ participatory rights must be warranted. The role of direct public 
participation in the treaty-making context, which may not be as widely recognized, can 
also be strengthened by the participation of legislature.43 By increasing the accountability 
and openness of the executive in the early process, this approach may help cut back the 
extensive judiciary role in the treaty process that had sometimes caused policy disruption 
and frustration to the executive.  
Many of the civil law countries such as France, Germany, India and Switzerland 
share the common treaty practice in terms of the executive responsibilities in negotiating, 
signing, ratifying and terminating a treaty. The only substantive distinction among them is 
the extent to which the executive may commit the nation internationally without 
parliamentary approval.44 Treaty-making practice may range from a highly secured mode 
requiring extensive legislature roles to a minimally involved form. Switzerland’s treaty-
making procedure, for instance, requires widespread consultation of political parties and 
interested groups prior to the initiation of new legislation of international treaties. India’s 
                                                 
43 For instance, under New Zealand’s common practice, the executive remains the supreme authority of the 
treaty-making process. With this respect, “the Executive does not require the Parliamentary approval to 
negotiate, conclude or ratify treaties. The current political structure and institutional arrangement thus allow 
Parliament to take a role only when the Executive provides its opportunity to do so. The Parliament 
practically has limited role in the making of treaties, which is to implementing them by incorporating 
treaties into New Zealand’s domestic law. Mark W. Gobbi, Enhancing public participation in the treaty-
making process: an assessment of New Zealand's constitutional response, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 83, 88 
(1998). 
44 Leigh Monroe, Introduction to NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE : FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, 
SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM at ix, x (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1995). 
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parliament, on the contrary, almost plays no role in approving agreements, despite the 
power granted under its Constitution.45  
Despite the variation of models concerning the extent of the countries’ legislative 
roles in the treaty-making process, legislature participation, in a number of states, is based 
on strong political, economic and social implications that a treaty may have.46 It is, 
however, uncommon for the legislature to take part or consult with the executive during 
the on-going treaty negotiation.47 Thus, the legislative role is somehow limited within the 
constitutional framework to facilitate effective and feasible governmental functions.48 In 
Germany, although legislature is allowed to attend a treaty negotiation at the invitation of 
the Federal Government,49 this participatory role clearly serves no more than an 
observatory one, and does not entitle the legislature as a co-decision maker in the treaty 
negotiation. The particular negotiation process, therefore, is simply meant to keep the 
legislature informed and to secure coordination between political branches while entailing 
no parliamentary control the way the implementation process does.  
Thus, generally speaking, the roles of the legislatures in the countries of my study, 
namely France, Germany, India, Switzerland, the UK, Japan, South Africa and New 
Zealand have been cut short to facilitate the treaty negotiation process while enabling 
effective check mechanism before the international agreements can take effect 
domestically. In spite of the unique treaty referendum process, Switzerland yet adopts a 
                                                 
45 Id. at xii. 
46 Duncan B. Hollis, A Comparative Approach, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 
34-35. 
47 Id. at 30. 
48  See U.S. “fast-track” legislation, Robert E. Dalton, National Treaty Law and Practice: United States, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 765, 773 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005). Trade Act of 2002, 
19 U.S.C. §§ 3803-3805 (2002) (containing special provisions relating to Congressional approval of trade 
agreements negotiated by the President). J.G. Brouwer, National Treaty Law and Practice: the Natherlands 
, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 11, at 483, 492 (describing the Dutch process that 
allows treaties to receive either express or tacit parliamentary approval). 
49 Monroe, Introduction to NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE : FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, 
SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 44, at xiii. Hubert Beemelmans & Hans D. 
Treviranus, National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW 
AND PRACTICE, 317, 323 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005). 
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more flexible approach by requiring that legislative approval be secure only after the 
conclusion of the negotiation has been reached.50  
i. Assessing Legislative Roles 
The following section divided the participation of the countries’ legislatures into 
three different stages; namely prior to a treaty negotiation, during the negotiation and 
prior to its entry into force. The presence of the legislatures’ actions in different stages 
can help us rationalize their roles and significance in each stage, and enable us to generate 
an applicable approach.  
(a) Prior to Treaty Negotiation 
In most countries, the requirement of legislative action at the initiation of a treaty 
negotiation is uncommon or even absent. For the countries such as France, Germany, UK, 
South Africa or New Zealand, the executives are vested with full powers to initiate and 
negotiate without having the official involvement of the legislature at the beginning.51 
These models demonstrate the predominant executive’s role in the early stage of a treaty-
making process by entailing the executive to determine its own responsibility concerning 
the initiative of a treaty negotiation. Especially in Germany where treaty-making power 
as part of the foreign relations power is in the sole hand of the executive,52 the ability of 
the cabinet to make up their own decisions concerning a treaty framework at the 
                                                 
50 Monroe, Introduction to NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE : FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, 
SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM supra note 44, at xi. 
51 1958 CONST. 52 (Fr.) (“The President of the Republic shall negotiate and ratify treaties. He shall be 
informed of. Any negotiations for the conclusion of an international agreement not subject to ratification”). 
GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [Constitution] art. 59(2) (F.R.G.) (“Treaties which…relate to matters of federal 
legislation shall require the approval or participation, in the form of a federal statute…”). See also 
Regulations and Orders Relating to Treaties, reprinted in Treviranus & Beemelmans, National Treaty Law 
and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 49, at 
335. Sinclair, Dickson & Maciver, National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom, in NATIONAL 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 32, at 727 (“[T]he treaty making power is vested in the Crown as 
part of the Royal prerogative.”) See also MCNAIR A., supra note 33, at 68. Under the 1996 Constitution, the 
negotiation and signature of all international agreement is the responsibility of the national executive which 
consists of the President and the Cabinet. S.AFR. CONST. §231(1) 1996. Supra note 43 (NZ).  
52Treviranus & Beemelmans, National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED 
KINGDOM, supra note 22, at 43. 
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beginning of the treaty process is deemed crucial to its capacity to determine foreign 
policy guidelines. By the same token, under the UK system, the exercise of treaty-making 
power is the responsibility of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth 
Affairs.53 This includes foreign policy formulation and treaty-making procedure. The 
Foreign and Commonwealth office operates as a central coordination with other 
governmental departments that has primary responsibility to initiate certain treaties 
negotiation.54  
India, on the other hand, suggests that the freedom of the executive in the exercise 
of its treaty-making power is conditional upon an absence of any legislation concerning 
the entry of the negotiation. This is because Parliament has exclusive power to legislate 
on foreign affairs.55 Nevertheless the treaty procedure is to be regulated by the 
executive.56 And, in practice, it is uncommon for parliamentary approval to be required 
prior to a negotiation, a treaty conclusion or even its entry into force.57  
For Switzerland, the Federal Constitution assigned no strict boundary between the 
Federal Assembly and the Federal Council in the realm of external affairs. By virtue of 
Article 166, the Federal Assembly must participate in the shaping of foreign policy and 
must supervise foreign relations.58 Although this loose constitutional framework renders 
                                                 
53 Sinclair & Dickson, National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 31, at 224. 
54 Id. at 228. 
55 INDIA CONST. art. 246 §11 (…[P]arliament has exclusive power to make laws with respect to any of the 
matters enumerated in List I in the Seventh Schedule.”).  
56 Id. art. 53. U.N. Doc. ST/LEG/SER.B/3, at 63-64 (Dec. 1952) (Memorandum of Apr. 19, 1951). The 
power is exercised by the Executive in pursuant to Article 53 of the Indian Constitution.  
57 K. Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: 
FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM 81(Leigh Monroe et al., 
eds.1995). 
58 Swiss Constitution has laid down an unclear standard on the distribution of foreign relations powers 
between the Federal Council (executive) and the Federal Assembly (legislature). Due to a loose 
constitutional framework (overlapping powers and responsibilities), the executive and the legislature have 
shared the treaty-making powers and mutually shape external relations.  While the Constitution stated that 
“[t]he Federal Council shall conduct foreign relations…”, “[t]he Federal Assembly shall participate in 
shaping foreign policy, and shall supervise foreign relations.” Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen 
Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution fédérale de la Confédération Suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 
1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 166, ¶ 1 (Switz.). 
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the legislature’s and executive’s powers and responsibilities overlap (while failing to 
specify at what stage the Federal Assembly must approve treaties), there is no definite 
answer to the extent of the legislature’s participation, and one of the five possibilities, 
theoretically, is the authorization in advance of negotiations since treaty-making is not an 
exclusive authority of one or another branch.59 Nevertheless, the Federal Council is the 
sole organ that represents the state, negotiates, signs and ratifies a treaty. The Federal 
Statute on the Federal Assembly may have been amended to increase the parliamentary 
participation in the treaty process at an early stage.60 But the legislative involvement is 
after the negotiation has been initiated and only to keep Parliament informed of any 
important developments in the negotiation process rather than to authorize the treaty 
content. 
All in all, from these countries’ experiences, treaty-making powers whether solely 
vested in the executive or shared between the political branches have left the executives 
with a considerable amount of discretion at the initiation of the treaty process to provide 
flexibility in the shaping and guidance of foreign policy, which mainly are the primary 
responsibilities of the branch.  
(b) During the Negotiation Stage 
In these surveyed countries, it is quite uncommon for legislature to take part in the 
negotiation process, let alone the informal approval of the negotiated items. This is 
especially true in the countries that keep the treaty-making power quite centralized, 
typically in the hand of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.61 In France, legislature does not 
                                                 
59 Other possibilities are (a) advance authorization, subsequent specific approval after ratification, (b) tacit 
approval in case the legislature does not expressly object in between signature and ratification, (c) approval 
between signature and ratification and (d) subsequent approval after ratification. Wildhaber et al., National 
Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, 
INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 29, at 135. 
60 Federal Statute on the Federal Assembly, BBI I 195 (1994). Wildhaber, Scheidegger & Schinzel, 
National Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, 
at 640. 
61 Hollis, A Comparative Approach, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 21. 
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receive official notification of proposed international agreements since negotiating the 
agreements is not within its authority.62 The ability of the legislature to participate in the 
on-going negotiation is limited through the submission of written or oral questions to the 
government concerning the particular agreement,63 whereas, in India, substantial 
legislature actions can take place even after treaty signing or ratifying through a motion 
moved by the concerned ministry in Parliament.64 In the South African model, 
parliamentary committees, strictly speaking, are not authorized to negotiate or renegotiate 
the terms of treaties, except inserting a reservation which marginalizes the legislature’s 
role during the negotiation process.65 In the same manner, Parliamentary approval for 
treaty negotiation is not required in the treaty practice of New Zealand. Under the current 
political structure and institutional arrangement, Parliament may partake only when the 
executive provides such an opportunity to do so.66 All in all, limitations on the 
executive’s exercise of its treaty power are rather imposed toward the conclusion of the 
negotiation by restricting the executive ability to consent to that particular treaty. The 
screening mechanisms may involve national legislative approval and public consent.  
Nevertheless this common practice does not necessarily suggest that the 
involvement of the legislature during the treaty negotiation is insignificant because for 
some countries such as Germany and Switzerland keeping the legislature informed 
throughout the negotiation process may work to the advantage of the principle of 
separation of powers. In Germany, parliament members may attend important treaty 
negotiations at the invitation of the Federal government to improve its supervising 
                                                 
62 Eisemann & Kessedjian, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 12, at 7. 
63 Id.  
64 Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, 
GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 57, at 96-97. 
65 Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 35, at 591. 
66 Id. at 587. 
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function under the Constitution while this procedure can lessen the tension between the 
branches.67 This type of legislature’s participation is also undertaken in the Swiss model. 
Whereas the Federal Council (the executive branch) still posses the power to negotiate 
treaties under its Federal Constitution, 68 the Committees on Foreign Policy of both 
chambers are allowed to send their own observers to attend international negotiations.69 
The Federal Council also has a duty to inform the president of each chamber of the 
Federal Assembly regularly and thoroughly concerning the development of the on-going 
negotiation. Recommendations from the legislature may take place through this 
consultative process, but do not necessarily bind upon the Federal Council’s final 
decision. 70 The Federal Council still retains its independent negotiation authority.  
Despite the possible advantage of the approach in terms of increasing the 
transparency and accountability of the executive branch, the approach may work against 
the nature of treaty negotiation which requires a certain extent of confidentiality to 
preserve the country’s interest. Debates and discussions concerning the country’s position 
and concessions can compromise the country’s interests while putting the country at a 
disadvantage.71 Preservation of information during the negotiation stage may sound 
dubious, but it is also wise to keep in mind that even if this information was fully 
disclosed and openly discussed with the legislature, the process may not allow the 
legislature to directly control the executive’s decision since the legislature’s role is still 
limited to a consultative one. Despite a certain possible influence the legislature may have 
                                                 
67 Treviranus & Beemelmans, National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 49, at 323. 
68 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution fédérale de la 
Confédération Suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 184, ¶ 1-2 (Switz.). 
69 Art. 47 bis a(1) The Federal Statute Governing the Activities of the Federal Assembly as well as the Form, the 
Publication, and the Entry into Force of its Act, March 23, 1962, Amendment of October 4. 1991, BBI 1991 III 812-
827, at 818-820. 
70 Wildhaber et al., National Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 10, at 130. 
71 WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 103-104. 
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upon the executive’s decision, this benefit must still be weighed against the fact that the 
country’s position may have already been compromised by the process. 
(c) Prior to the Treaty’s Entry into Force 
Every model of the surveyed countries establishes the mechanism to secure 
legislative approval after the treaty has been concluded, which is deemed the most crucial 
stage prior to its ability to take effect internally. The meaning of legislative actions in this 
section will include the power to form treaties both by its consent and the power to 
implement them (legislation enactment). Variations among these countries, however, 
concern the types of treaties that must be subject to the process of this final legislative 
action.  
The majority of states have shown that not every type of treaties requires the 
legislature’s involvement in the final stage.72 And those that fall outside the requirement 
are also known as executive agreements of which the executive branch can solely rely on 
its authority to execute them. Executive agreements, for instance, have been categorized 
by treaties not requiring legislative implementation in India, treaties falling outside of 
categories that require legislative approval in France and Germany or treaties within the 
executive’s sole authority for Switzerland and the UK.73 On the other hand, the common 
types of treaties that require legislature’s involvement, as I observed, are those affecting 
the existing laws and those that are of major significance, and more than simply 
administrative, technical or routine agreements. The variation, once more, depends upon 
                                                 
72 There are, however, a few states that require legislative action to give effect to every treaty or 
international agreements. Columbia, for instance, required that all treaties entered into by the President 
must be submitted to Congress prior to ratification/enforcement. This powerful posture of Congress entitles 
it to approve or disapprove of treaties as well as postpone the enforceability of a treaty by questioning the 
treaty text. German Cavelier, National Treaty Law and Practice: Colombia, in, NATIONAL TREATY LAW 
AND PRACTICE : AUSTRIA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, UNITED STATES 69 (Leigh 
Monroe et al., eds.1999). 
73 See Table 2, Hollis, A Comparative Approach, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, 
at 24. 
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how each nation goes about the definition of “major significance” which can be as narrow 
as those having an impact upon individual rights. 
In a simple analysis, two distinctive approaches concerning the requirement of the 
joint actions between the two political branches are applied among the countries. In one 
case, the ability of the executive to execute treaties independently is applied by a negative 
list approach meaning the plenary treaty executing power lie within the executive body, 
except those expressly listed that requires a joint action from both branches. This 
approach is undertaken by France, Germany, India and the UK which provides a broad 
range of the executive’s treaty-making power. And another case is in which the 
opportunity for the executive’s sole power to give effect to the treaties is given only when 
it is in accordance with the circumstances listed under the Constitution (positive list 
approach). These are the Swiss, the South African and the New Zealand models. 
Unlike Switzerland, although, for South Africa, the role of the legislature in the 
treaty-making process does not come up until after the decision to conclude an agreement 
has been reached, 74 both countries vest considerable amount of treaty approval authority 
in the legislature by enumerating the executive treaty-making powers. The ability of the 
executive to implement the treaty’s obligations is, therefore, limited through the 
enumerated list provided under both countries’ Constitutions and legislation. According 
to Article 231(3) of the South African Constitution, only “[a] n international agreement of 
a technical, administrative or executive nature or an agreement that does not require either 
ratification or accession, entered into by the national executive…” does not require an 
approval of the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces to bind the 
                                                 
74 In South Africa, the legislature may not approve a treaty until after the conclusion of an agreement has 
been reached, and the Section 231(2) obligations have been confirmed by the Departments of Justice and 
Foreign Affairs. Section 231(2), (3) requires approval by resolution in both the National Assembly and the 
National Council Province for the conclusion of international agreements. Botha, National Treaty Law and 
Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 35, at 586. 
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republic.75 Along this line, the Swiss Constitution grants the Federal Assembly a plenary 
power in treaty approval by stating that the Federal Assembly “shall approve international 
treaties, except where by statute or international treaty the Federal Council alone is 
competent”.76 Despite the absence of the specification concerning the types of treaties 
that the Federal Council can solely execute in the Swiss Federal Constitution, this task is 
rather carried out by a federal statute as stipulated in Section 166(2) of its Constitution. 
Accordingly, Article 7(a) of the Federal Statute on the Organization of the Government 
and the Administration provided a list of treaty categories of “minor importance” to be 
concluded by the Federal Council.77 Others are the agreements that the Federal Assembly 
had authorized in advance or urgent agreements requiring provisional entry into force (yet 
to be subject to subsequent approval).78 These provisions provide limited circumstances 
in which the executive may exercise its independent treaty power. The same principle is 
also applied to the country, with no formal written constitution, like New Zealand whose 
exceptions to the general requirement of legislation to make a treaty part of domestic law 
are those that do not affect domestic laws or the rights and duties of individuals.79 
                                                 
75 S.AFR. CONST. §231(3) 1996. 
76 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution fédérale de la 
Confédération Suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 166, ¶ 2 (Switz.). 
77 The Federal Statute on the Organization of the Government and the Administration, SR 172.010. See also 
BBI 1999, at 4827-29 (The Federal Council “has power to conclude international treaties of minor 
importance, namely: (a) agreements which neither impose new obligations upon Switzerland nor abandon 
existing rights, (b) agreements executing international treaties approved by the Federal Assembly, (c) 
agreements concerning matters which the Federal Council has power to regulate under domestic law…and 
(d) agreements which are primarily aimed at the authorities, settle questions of an administrative-technical 
character or do not imply significant financial consequences.”).  
78 Wildhaber, Scheidegger & Schinzel, National Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland, in NATIONAL 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 645. See 51 VPB No. 58, 377-78 (1987). 51 VPB No. 58, 
369-85, at 381 (1987), see also Federal Statute concerning external Trade Measure, June 25, 1982 SR 
946.201. 
79 Gobbi, supra note 43, at 84-85 (Under certain circumstances, the executive organ can solely execute 
international treaties through the ratification process, mostly involving bilateral treaties that do not affect 
individual rights and duties). W.K. Hasting, New Zealand Treaty Practice with Particular Reference to the 
Treaty of Waitangi, 38 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 668, 669-670 (1989) (In principle, legislation is almost always 
required to make a treaty part of domestic law. Nevertheless, “Parliament will quite often delegate its 
legislative authority to the executive, which is then empowered by statute to implement international 
obligations by way of regulation or Order in Council”).  
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Clearly, the powers of the executive to negotiate, sign and ratify treaties are not 
necessarily amount to the implementation of the treaty obligations in every case. The 
scope of this executive power, however, has been broadened in the countries that adopt 
the opposite approach. 
Under the negative list approach, a clear majority of states grants the executive a 
prerogative power to conduct and conclude treaty negotiations. These countries, France, 
Germany, India and the UK, allow the executive to solely execute treaties, except those 
enumerated in their Constitutions, statutes or reflected in the common law tradition. 
Article 53 of the French Constitution of 1958, for instance, itemized treaty categories, 
namely peace treaties, trade agreements, treaties or agreements relating to international 
organization, committing the finances of the State, modifying provisions which are the 
preserve of statute and law, relating to the status of persons, and involving the ceding, 
exchanging or acquiring of territory that may be ratified or implemented by a joint action 
between the executive and the Parliament.80 Germany has both constitutional provisions 
and a statute that require participatory function of its Parliament in the final stage.81 In the 
same manner, Article 245 and 246 of the Indian Constitution provides specific 
circumstances in which the legislature’s role is deemed necessary in the treaty execution 
by conferring the exclusive power to the Union parliament to make any law affecting the 
territory, and implementing treaty and agreement with other nations.82 In the UK, in the 
                                                 
80 1958 CONST. 53 (Fr.). 
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absence a written constitution, the common law tradition has provided a few exceptions to 
the executive’s prerogative treaty-making power.83 
From the treaty practices of these surveyed countries, it can be concluded that not 
every model requires legislature’s participation in the initial and intermediate stages of 
the negotiation. This does not mean that the principle of separation of powers is 
weakened, but rather strengthened through the respect of each branch’s political function 
and a proper check mechanism. Every state does have a mechanism to secure certain 
legislative action in the final stage of the negotiation, which has come to support my 
understanding of how the legislature’s involvement in the last phase is the most critical 
process. A number of states even showed the practices of having the legislature active 
after the treaty’s entry into force, which is to ensure that the legislature is consistently 
informed of the treaty’s effects.84  
The approach of procuring the legislative check in the final stage as consistently 
found in the majority of states helps keeping the legislative involvement in the treaty 
process in balance, while reducing the disruption of the negotiation process. The 
distinction made among the treaties to be subject to the legislative action was also a 
procedure to facilitate the effectiveness of the administration.85 Legislative authorization 
at the very end as part of an implementation process may also serve as a pre-condition to 
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UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 57, at 96-97. In South Africa, international agreements that are considered as 
“technical or executive” in nature will come into force without parliamentary approval. Nevertheless, they 
must still be tabled in Parliament within a reasonable time (as mere notification, and no possible rejection 
can be made). Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 35, at 586. 
85 It has been agreed that to subject “mundane treaties” to time-consuming process would clog up the 
already overburdened parliamentary system. Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 35, at 587. See also M. Olivier, The Status of 
International Law in South African Municipal Law: Section 231 of the 1993 Constitution, 19 SAYIL 1, 7-8 
(1993-1994). 
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ensure that a treaty is in a clean state before it can take effect. This mechanism can induce 
the executive to generate a constructive approach in order to secure the legislature’s 
approvals as demonstrated in the New Zealand’s treaty reform proposal.  
ii. Seeking Balance in the Legislature Role: New Zealand Treaty Reform 
Experience 
 
Under the New Zealand treaty-making model, although treaties that are deemed 
important and require a change in domestic law are subject to legislative control before 
they can take effect, efforts have still been made to counterweigh the executive’s treaty 
power. Public participation was seen as another means to induce greater accountability in 
the treaty-making process, in addition to the legislative safeguard.86 Nevertheless, the 
emphasis on the ability of the legislature to supervise the executive’s treaty power prior to 
the treaty’s entry into force is still prevalent as it does not only serve as the ultimate 
safety net, but also a mechanism conducive to generating a forum of public discussion in 
a treaty realm. Citizens’ participatory rights are, therefore, rather encouraged and 
expected to naturally be created from the process in which a government attempts to 
secure parliamentary approvals of the treaty by using the previous public support. This 
approach, in fact, implies the crucial function of the legislature in the approval of a treaty 
in the absence of any explicit requirements of public participation in the treaty-making 
process. And according to this model, the legitimacy of the making of a treaty lies in the 
final stage of the legislative role by creating a condition for the government to seek 
greater consultations from the people. 
                                                 
86 New Zealand has a mechanism to ensure the openness of its treaty-making process. Many of its treaty 
negotiation forums are open to public, particularly multilateral treaties. Only some that do not affect rights 
of individuals are subject to confidentiality. Those that are open to public encourage public involvement 
through invitations as observers and through media commentary on the progress of a negotiation. Gobbi, 
supra note 43, at 85. Hasting, supra note 79, at 672-673 (arguing for the increased role of the legislature in 
the final stage of the treaty-making process, which should also apply to treaties within the executive’s 
prerogative).   
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Under the New Zealand treaty practice, the legislative function assumes a greater 
role in legitimizing the treaty making conduct. New Zealand’s attempt to make changes to 
enhance greater participation in the treaty negotiation process went to address the 
relationship between the parliament and the executive rather than that between the 
government and the civil society.87 Even treaties that are deemed insignificant and do not 
require a modification of law were recommended to receive certain legislative action 
whether in a form of tabling or notification after its ratification.88 The additional 
requirement of parliamentary approval is presumed to generate sufficient incentives for 
the executive to ensure public involvement. Whereas a formal requirement of a public 
hearing conduct is absent, the public participation will be indirectly improved through the 
pressure that parliament can impose upon the executive. The readjustment of the 
executive-parliament relationship, which requires the executive to seek greater 
consultations with the legislature, was assumed to accord the public better opportunity to 
participate in the treaty-making process. The executive is also expected to extend its 
consultative practice with the public at the early stage because this public support could 
help secure parliamentary endorsement. Thus, the legislature can itself be the guarantor of 
the government’s obligation to include public participation. According to the proposed 
changes of a treaty-making process, the executive will be held directly accountable to the 
parliament, and indirectly to the people. 89  
The point being made here is not that the Thais should adhere to this standard by 
adopting this traditional practice, and eliminating the explicit requirement of public 
                                                 
87 The opportunity for greater parliament’s role in the current treaty-making process can be increased if the 
Executive were to execute a treaty containing a provision that the treaty shall only take effect upon 
Parliament’s approval; or the Governments decides to seek Parliament’s approval prior to ratifying a 
treaty. Gobbi, supra note 43, at 85 (emphasis added). 
88 Hasting, supra note 79, at 672, A. MCNAIR , supra note 33, at  98. Kenneth Keith, New Zealand Treaty 
Practice: The Executive and the Legislature, 1 N.Z.U.L.R. 272, 293-294 (1964). 
89 The readjustment of the balance of powers between the Parliament and the Executive reflected in the 
following manners; the ability of the House of Representatives to debate the Government’s annual budget 
(implications for a control over a foreign policy), offering all elected representatives an opportunity to form 
a negotiating position and the parliamentary approval of treaties. Gobbi, supra note 43, at 101. 
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participation in the treaty-making process. My intention is rather to point out that securing 
parliamentary approvals on both stages (prior to negotiation and prior to be bound) may 
be unnecessary and prolong the negotiation process since the current Constitution already 
secures direct civic participation within the procedure.90 Legislature may ensure direct 
accountability to the people given that it is the representative body of the people. But 
when the people can act to ensure that account themselves, it is even better while making 
the role of the legislature diminished. The crucial point to keep in mind is how to make 
the executive’s tasks as well as those of the legislature manageable to maintain well-
balanced functions of the political branches.91 Thus, for Thailand in which a negative list 
approach (independent executive treaty authority, except those listed under the 
Constitution – explained in Chapter IV) has already been established, requiring a final 
legislative approval can be deemed sufficient to secure transparency and accountability in 
the treaty process. This later legislative control would mean securing a simple majority 
vote of the National Assembly on the enumerated treaties any time after the conclusion of 
the negotiation, but prior to the treaty’s entry into force (whether through ratification or 
legislation implementation). A time limit within which both Houses must make a decision 
must be imposed (i.e. 15 sitting days). This final legislative control mechanism will of 
course be applied to both special category (individual rights) that I proposed in Section B, 
and the traditional kinds (affecting territory and sovereign rights, and domestic laws of 
the country). The application of this approach can even be extended to those that generate 
material commitments in trade, investment or budgets of the country as seen under the 
                                                 
90 Legislature can have vital functional roles as a foreign policy co decision-maker for it is the focal point 
for the expression and organization of public opinion, and thus can reflect the collective judgment of a 
diverse people. The involvement of a legislature is arguably required in the treaty-making process where 
direct public participation is absent.  MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 30-31 (1990). 
91 Through this concern, the New Zealand treaty-making reform, in accordance with a National Interest 
Analysis, even proposed an expedient route that, under special circumstances, the government may accede, 
approve or accept a treaty prior to tabling it to the House if it acts “in the national interests”. Gobbi, supra 
note 43, at 105-107. 
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current treaty provision. The proposal of the model is therefore to take the quality of the 
administration into consideration which is also to act in the interest of the country, and in 
accordance with the principles of democracy and good governance. 
D. Seeking Proper Judicial Role in the Treaty Process 
Generally speaking, the role of the judiciary in the treaty process tends to be 
limited and is usually involved after the treaty has come into force. This is especially true 
when Article 7 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (of which many states 
have adopted as a customary practice) provides the primary authority of the executive i.e. 
the Heads of State, Heads of Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs to conclude 
treaties.92 The language of this international instrument purports to states’ distribution of 
their treaty making powers at the national level.93 As discussed in the earlier section, this 
tension is, however, relieved through states’ remarkable uniformity in vesting their treaty-
making power in the executive. Nevertheless, the scope of the executive’s treaty-making 
power is varied from country to country depending on the conditions applied to limit the 
executive’s ability to consent to the treaty. Beside implementation measures which 
require the participation of legislature, judicial intervention in the legality of the treaty 
can be another common restriction upon the executive’s exercise of its foreign affairs 
powers.  
The common role of the judiciary in a treaty process oftentimes involves judicial 
scrutiny on the constitutionality of the international agreement. In other words, judges 
must observe and enforces procedural limitations prescribed by the Constitution.94 The 
approach and the scope of the review are, however, varied among the countries. One 
                                                 
92The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 7(a), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. (“Heads of State, Heads of 
Government and Ministers for Foreign Affairs, for the purpose of performing all acts relating to the 
conclusion of a treaty”). 
93 Hollis, A Comparative Approach, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 8, at 19. 
94 WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 349. 
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primary distinction is the ability of the court to decide on the question of the 
constitutionality of the international agreement. Countries with limited judicial mandates 
are such as the Netherlands, Belgium and Switzerland.95 The Constitutions of these 
countries, in fact, ruled out the possibility of the Courts’ inquiry into the constitutionality 
of treaties or international agreements whether they were properly concluded without 
legislative approval. On the other hand, this opportunity has been accorded to the French 
and the Indian judiciary branches to determine the constitutionality of the executive’s act 
in the conclusion of a treaty. 
i. Assessing the Scope of Judicial Review: Judging the Constitutionality of a 
Treaty 
 
Both France and India provide a judicial procedure to ensure that treaties and 
international agreements are made in conformity with the Constitution. For France, the 
“Conseil Constitutionnel” 96 has a similar function as a constitutional court. It may 
exercise its power to ensure the conformity of the treaty and international agreement, and 
the statute authorizing the ratification or approval of such agreements to the 
                                                 
95 The scope of review of the Dutch, the Belgian and the Swiss Courts are limited to observing whether an 
agreement is properly published, and only extends to the publication of the agreement. Id. at 350-352. 
According to the Dutch Constitution, the Courts are incompetent to judge the constitutionality of the 
agreement. Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden [Gw.][Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Netherlands] February 17, 1983, art. 120 (Neth.) (“The constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties 
shall not be reviewed by the courts”). In Switzerland, the Swiss Federal constitution ruled out the 
opportunity of the Court to determine on the constitutionality of the treaty due to the legal effects of the 
statutes and general resolutions enacted by the Federal Assembly after the agreement that bind upon the 
Federal Tribunal. Thus, the sole judicial authority is rather to reject the application of unpublished 
agreements. Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution fédérale de la 
Confédération Suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 189 (Switz.) (The 
jurisdiction of the Federal Courts are limited to (a) complaints about violations of constitutional rights, (b) 
complaints about violations of the autonomy of the municipalities…, (c) complaints about violations of 
international or intercantonal treaties, and (d) pubic law disputes between the Confederation of Cantons, or 
amongst Cantons.). 
96 The Constitutional Council (Conseil Constitutionnel) is the highest constitutional authority in France. It 
was established by the Constitution of the Fifth Republic on 4 October 1958, and its duty is to ensure that 
the principles and rules of the constitution are upheld. Its main activity is to rule on whether proposed 
statutes conform to the Constitution, after they have been voted by Parliament and before they are signed 
into law by the President of the Republic. http://www.conseil-constitutionnel.fr/conseil 
constitutionnel/english/homepage.14.html. 
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Constitution.97 According to Article 54 of the French Constitution, the Conseil 
Constitutionnel has the power to declare that “an international commitment contains a 
clause contrary to the Constitution” rendering any authorization to ratify or approve such 
commitment ineffective. This hybrid judicial body, thus, has the primary function to 
observe that Article 53 treaties’ process is properly followed. Its authority is also 
extended to approving the statute that authorizes the international agreement pursuant to 
Article 61.98 In addition, “Conseil d’Etat” (the Supreme Administrative Court) whose 
primary duty is to observe the misuse of administrative power, the conduct of the 
bureaucracy or the executive action also has jurisdiction over the question of the treaty’s 
constitutionality through the examination based on the lack of proper procedure in the 
treaty ratification for treaties within the meaning of Article 53.99 India, in the same 
manner, assigned the role of the Supreme Court to decide on the type of treaty that needs 
an implementing legislation before giving its effects.100 Thus, the question of the validity 
of the treaty that was concluded without the legislative authorization can be raised in 
court. 
It must be noted that, in the French context, the power of the Conseil 
Constitionnnel to rule against the treaty in question is limited to the period prior to the 
enactment of the statute or the ratification of the treaty pursuant to Article 61 which 
                                                 
971958 CONST. 54 (Fr.) (“if the Constitutional Council…has declared that an international commitment 
contains a clause contrary to the Constitution, authorization to ratify or approve the international 
commitment in question may be given only after amendment of the Constitution”). For the Conseil’s 
decision on the interpretation of Article 53 concerning the agreements modifying provisions within the 
ambit of legislative power, see F.C.P. 1970 I, 2354, R.D,P. 1971, at 1972, R.G.D.I.P. 1971, at 239. Pierre 
Michel Eisemann & Catherine Kessedjian, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in NATIONAL 
TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM , 
supra note 12, at 9.  
98 1958 CONST. 61 (Fr.) (“In cases described in the two foregoing paragraphs, the constitutional council 
must hand down a ruling on the law within one month…). 
99 Eisemann & Rivier, National Treaty Law and Practice: France, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 20, at 262. For treaties requiring legislature approval, see 1958 CONST. 53 (Fr.) 
(Peace treaties, trade agreements, treaties or agreements relating to international organization, those 
committing the finances of the State, those modifying provisions which are the preserve of statute law, 
those relating to the status of persons, and those involving the ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory).  
100 Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, 
GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 57, at 92. 
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established this rule.101 Thus, after the treaty ratification, the question of the 
constitutionality of the particular treaty application is rather referred to and decided by the 
French courts such as the Counceill d’Etat.  
Their being restrictive in the judiciary role likely comes from the court’s 
consideration of the nation’s delicate treaty relations.102 It has been said that since “there 
is no basis in French law for challenging the constitutionality of the agreement after its 
approval or ratification”, the French courts have hesitated to take an action that could 
annul the treaty or question the validity of the treaty.103 In its view, the subject of 
international relations is outside the scope of its review. The same is also true for the 
Indian Courts which often times either deferred its decision to the executive authority or 
validated the executive acts as within its treaty-making competence under the 
Constitution.104 In Germany and the U.S, where the question of the executive competence 
in the treaty-making process is allowed to be raised in court, the Courts have maneuvered 
                                                 
101 1958 CONST. 61 (Fr.) (“Organic laws, prior to their promulgation, and the regulations of the Chambers 
of Parliament, prior to their application, must be submitted to the Constitutional Council, which decides on 
the conformity of same with the Constitution.”) (emphasis added). 
102 In the case concerning the land boundary agreement signed in 1974 between the Governments of India 
and Bangladesh in which India agreed to lease to the Government of Bangladesh a piece of land in the 
district of Cooch-Behar in West Bengal, the Indian expressed its concern to the well-being of the country’s 
international relations by ruling in favor of the government that its act was valid in the absence of a 
legislation when there is no cession of territory involved. Union of India and others v. Sukumar Sengupta 
and others, A.L.R. 1990 S.C., at 1708 (“…without the change in the law or change in the Constitution, the 
agreement should have been implemented fully and we hope that will be done for the restoration of the 
friendly relations between India and Bangladesh.”). In re German-Dutch additional financial agreement, 
BVerfGE 16, 220 (226-29) (1963) (rejecting the petition stating that “the seriousness of delaying the 
comprehensive and delicate treaty settlement and the danger of upsetting the friendly relations with the 
Netherlands far outweighed the possible disadvantages resulting for petitioners from ratification) . 
103 WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 353. Georger v. Teivassigamany, C.E., 6-27-1958, 86 JDI 1959 426 
(ruling on the validity of cessation of its former possessions to India in the absence of public consultation 
and legislative approval). 
104 Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, 
GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 57, at 88-90. Union of India v. 
Manmull Jain, A.L.R 1954 Calcutta 615, 616-617 (rejecting the argument on the invalidity of the treaty by 
which the former French possession of Chandernagore was transferred by France to India in the absence of 
parliamentary legislation by ruling that the making of treaty is an executive act, and not a legislative 
act…The makers of the Constitution did not intend that no treaty cannot be entered into without the support 
of the parliamentary legislation. The President makes a treaty pursuant to his executive power, and no Court 
of law in India can question its validity.), Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel v. Union of India, A.L.R. 1969 S.C., 
at 783 (ruling on the constitutionality of the ceding of territorial areas in Rann of Kutch to Pakistan without 
the approval of the Parliament stating that such undertaking was within the constitutional competence of the 
Union Executive).  
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to interpret the conflict in such a way that it was out of existence for a similar 
consideration.105  
Clearly challenges can present in both cases either the court attempts to nullify the 
treaty for its lack of constitutionality or validates it to affirm the executive’s competence. 
There will always be negative consequences. There are of course several reasons why 
judicial review on the constitutionality of international agreements should be restrained. 
For the most part, as previously discussed in Chapter IV (the separation of powers), such 
a review is a delicate task and may create diplomatic controversies and embarrassment on 
the international plane. 106 And the courts must take into consideration the repercussion of 
the strenuous review.107 But judicial abstention will also mean a potential circumvention 
of citizens’ participatory right to a treaty-making process (whether directly or through the 
representative body). The decision will inevitably affect the judicial capacity to enforce 
constitutional obligations.  
The drawback to this approach clearly has something to do with the timeline of 
the judicial intervention, which can either cause the disruption in the state’s foreign policy 
upsetting foreign relations and yielding potential liabilities, or result in the disregard of 
the affected citizens’ participatory rights in the treaty process. The attempt of the court to 
police the political branch’s constitutional obligation in the treaty realm by invalidating 
                                                 
105 WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 371. See also the Political Question Doctrine, David Gray Adler, Court, 
Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN 
POLICY, supra note 17, at 35-38 (During the war period, the political question doctrine has routinely been 
invoked by the U.S. Courts in response to the challenges to the constitutionality of the war- the Vietnam, 
Korean, Grenada and Panama wars- which were initiated without congressional authorization).  
106 WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 356-357. E.g., Petition for an injunction, In re German-Dutch additional 
financial agreement, BVerfGE 16, 220 (226-29) (1963) (The 1960 German-Dutch Financial Treaty was 
alleged a violation of the petitioner’s constitutional right. The Court, however, rejected the petition stating 
that “the seriousness of delaying the comprehensive and delicate treaty settlement and the danger of 
upsetting the friendly relations with the Netherlands far outweighed the possible disadvantages resulting for 
petitioners from ratification”.). Cf., Adler, Court, Constitution and Foreign Affairs, in THE CONSTITUTION 
AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 17, at 44 (Effectiveness and efficiency of the 
administration remained a key role that encouraged the court to view its function as a proponent for 
governmental policy that has already been established). 
107 WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 373. See factors that have driven courts to abstain from ruling on the 
validity of the treaty. Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION supra note 16, at 101-109. 
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their act can be destructive as the fully enforced treaty already involved the consumption 
of time, resources and energy. The post determination approach is also less effective in 
the sense that the court’s judgment against the legality of the treaty unfortunately cannot 
restore the individual rights that had already been overlooked. And surely, there is not 
much to gain when the issue of political departments’ competence in the treaty-making 
realm is raised after the facts only to repudiate the treaty since the country cannot escape 
its obligations.108 Thus, these negative consequences may not be easily rectified by 
judicial redress, but could have been prevented by providing all the branches an 
opportunity to co-determine this question to ensure that the treaty-making process is 
properly followed prior to the treaty’s entry into force. Such power is best exercised in the 
early stage.  
The issue of each political branch’s competence (role and authority) in the treaty-
making process should, therefore, be prior determined to reduce these internal and 
external tensions. To what extent the executive treaty-making power is subject to 
constitutional limitations is a very important question that must be addressed in the early 
phase. As mentioned, when such a question failed to be responded early in the process, 
there will certainly be a dilemma attached, either the treaty invalidation ruled by the 
Court can make the state liable internationally and harm external relations or the treaty 
validation attempt by the Court (to save the country’s reputation and resources) could 
mean a loss of the people’s certain important constitutional rights that could have been 
observed earlier.109 Through this conventional approach, the objective of judicial policing 
power may not be achieved at best as it does not guarantee a constant enforcement of 
                                                 
108 The Vienna Convention made clear that a material breach of a treaty includes “a repudiation of a treaty” 
by the party which does not prevent the other party from seeking a remedy when the treaty has been 
concluded. See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 7, art. 61(3)(a), available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
109 In Ex parte Georger et Teivassigamany, the French Supreme Administrative Court was asked to void the 
treaty of territory cessation. The French government was, however, still liable under the obligation as well 
as lost its reputation and credibility internationally. WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 373. 
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citizens’ participatory right in the treaty-making process. At the same time, the ability of 
the executive to partially decide its own competence in the realm of foreign affairs is also 
crucial to the maintenance of an effective administration. From the evaluation, it may 
seem that the most effective approach is to establish the procedure that guarantees the 
constitutional compliance prior to the enforceability of the treaty. The creation of a legal 
body which should be composed of the executive, legislative and judicial officials to 
determine the treaty to be subject to the constitutional process prior to the undertaking of 
any treaty negotiation may be necessary for the maintenance of our democracy and 
international relations. 
ii. Asserting a Preemptive Approach 
In response to these challenges, some states have adopted a mechanism to verify 
the constitutionality of the international agreement in advance either prior to the 
negotiation or the agreement’s entry into force to avoid future complications such as 
international liability resulting from a breach of the treaty due to its unconstitutionality. 
The countries that have established this approach are such as Canada, Germany, the UK, 
Japan and South Africa110 ranged from a simple internal consultation to a (less popular) 
broader one which involves the legislature in the determination of a treaty process. 
The multi-branch prior-consultation to ensure the executive competence in the 
treaty-making process is uncommon in most surveyed countries. For Canada, the process 
takes place through the procurement of legislation. The decision to seek legislative 
approval on important treaties may be deferred to the legislature in a later process through 
                                                 
110 Although, in the case of Germany, the Constitution does not explicitly state that whether international 
agreements are subject to judicial review concerning their constitutionality, the German Federal 
Constitutional Court have ruled on this question. WILDHABER,, supra note 14, at 354. However, Germany, 
at the same time, has provided a necessary mechanism to ensure the constitutionality of the agreement 
before hand, which I feel will set another excellent example in the formulation of the treaty model. 
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the coordination among the Standing Committees on their concerned issues.111 To avoid 
future complication concerning its treaty-making authority, the government will ratify a 
treaty only after any necessary enabling act has been passed.112 And this process itself 
serves as a prior legislative consultation to ascertain the treaty’s constitutionality. 
On the other hand, the basic model, which allows the executive body to prior-
determine its competence in the treaty realm, is more popular in several states. This 
approach is reflected in the UK, Japan, South Africa and Germany. Although an approval 
for certain important treaties must be sought from the legislature, the legislature is not 
necessarily consulted on the question of the type of treaty that requires its authorization. 
According to the UK practice, the Legal Advisers to the government acting in cooperation 
with the Legal Advisors to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Law Offices of 
the Crown and Parliamentary Counsel make the determination on the question of whether 
legislation (legislative approval) is required to ensure the validity of a particular treaty.113 
Similarly, in Japan, the Cabinet Legislation Bureau has a duty to decide before hand 
whether the international agreement in question falls within the category of executive 
agreement, and therefore requires no Diet (legislature) approval.114 This process is 
customarily undertaken prior to the signature. The power of treaty interpretation also falls 
within the executive branch, namely the Treaties Bureau under the Ministry of Foreign 
                                                 
111 E.g., Third Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade (SCFAIT), 
March 3, 2008. http://www.tbs-sct.gc.ca/dpr-rmr/2007-2008/inst/ext/st-ts09-eng.asp. 
112 Copithorne, National Treaty Law and Practice: Canada, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 9, at 96. 
113 Sinclair & Dickson, National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW 
AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 31, at 
232-233. But cf., A. MCNAIR, supra note 33, at 99 (irrespective of whether formal legislative action is 
required, it is a common rule that before the executive can express the consent of the U.K. to be bound by a 
treaty, the executive must provide Parliament an opportunity to consider the desirability of any proposed 
agreement for a period of twenty-one sitting days before it can ratify the treaty). 
114Takao Kawakami, National Treaty Law and Practice: Japan, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 
415, 419 (Duncan B. Hollis et al., eds. 2005). 
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Affairs.115 Thus, any dispute or ambiguity concerning the classification of an international 
agreement, it is the Treaties Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in consultation 
with the Cabinet Legislation Bureau that has a final word.116  
The responsibility to address the ambiguity as to how international agreements 
should be classified also belongs to the South African executive bureau. Since there is no 
clear distinction made between the types of agreements that require only the executive 
and those required both the executive and the Parliament approvals, the Manual on 
Executive Acts of the President of the Republic of South Africa has played a major role in 
guiding the distinction allowing the executive to partially determine its own competence, 
especially when the exception provision (Section 231(3)) has never been defined or 
determined by the courts.117 In addition, the determination of whether a treaty falls under 
Section 231(3) vests in the minister who is responsible for the particular treaty. 
Nevertheless, such decision must be taken in conjunction with the law advisors of the 
Departments of Justice and Foreign Affairs.118 This is a required procedure prior to the 
submission of a treaty to the Cabinet and the Parliament to ensure the constitutional 
compliance of the treaty.  
In Germany, this process is required under §72(4) of the Common Rules of 
Internal Procedure of the Federal Ministries (Gemeinsame Geschäftsordnung der 
Bundesministerien - GGO) by demanding that the Federal Ministries of Interior and 
                                                 
115 According to Article 13 of the Cabinet order for the Organization of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Treaties Bureau shall take charge of (1) matters relating to conclusion of treaties and other international 
agreements, and (2) matters of international law and legal matters concerning foreign relations. Takao 
Kawakami, National Treaty Law and Practice: Japan, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE : AUSTRIA, 
CHILE, COLOMBIA, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, UNITED STATES 107, 110 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.1999). 
116 Id. at 108. 
117 Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 35, at 587. The exception provision is referred to Section 231(3) which provided exceptions to 
the approval of the National Assembly given that an international agreement is “of a technical, 
administrative, or executive in nature, or an agreement [that] does not require either ratification or 
accession…” S.AFR. CONST. 1996. 
118 Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, 
supra note 35, at 589.  Office of the President, Manual on Executive Acts of the President of the Republic 
of South Africa, Office of the President, Ch. 5 § 5.5, at 24 (March 1999). 
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Justice be consulted during the preliminary drafting of international agreements to verify 
the constitutionality of the agreement and its national implementing directive.119 In 
addition to the text verification, the competent department together with the Federal 
Foreign Office, the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Federal Ministry of the interior, 
collectively decide whether a given treaty should be submitted to Parliament in 
accordance with the rule of the Constitution (the Basic Law).120 This method again 
enables the executive to independently determine its own authority prior to giving the 
state consent to be bound.  
A prior co-determination among the institutional branches in the treaty process is 
clearly an unusual practice. Among these countries, the judiciary’s role, let alone the 
legislature’s involvement, in helping ascertain the constitutional process of a treaty in the 
early stage is absent. Thus, the proposal of a multi-branch treaty determination can be 
conventional and innovative; conventional in the sense that the executive still takes up its 
role in determining its treaty power, and innovative in a way that the process will 
encompass the roles of other departments to establish the executive’s competence.   
This multi-branch prior determination approach can take care of two important 
issues, (i) procedural violation – improper constitutional procedure of a treaty and (ii) 
substantive violation – infringement of an individual’s constitutional rights, especially 
participatory right, by ensuring that important treaties follow a proper process, and that 
treaties that threaten individual fundamental rights are properly heard through a public 
forum.  
These issues of procedural and substantive violations also correlate to the level of 
court involvement, namely abstaining, deferential and vigorous in the treaty process. 
                                                 
119 §72(4) of the Regulations and Orders Relating to Treaties reprinted in Treviranus & Beemelmans, 
National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 49, at 335, available at 
http://vwvbund.juris.de/bsvwvbund_21072009_O113120018.htm#ivz91. 
120 Id. at 326. 
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Under this proposal, while judicial abstention can arguably be of less concern due to the 
assurance of procedural compliance, the degrees of judicial deference and engagement are 
still highly relevant when it comes to determining the sufficiency of a public hearing or 
addressing individual rights infringement in the treaty context (substantive violations). In 
some countries such as Germany, despite having the procedure of prior determination in 
place, the issue concerning the constitutionality of the treaty is still allowed to be raised in 
courts.121 Nevertheless, the Court has elected to exercise judicial self-restrained 
(abstention) when it comes to political matters such as the competence of the executive in 
the making of treaties that had previously been determined.122 Judicial abstention is thus 
legitimate here when a proper treaty process has been followed through the assurance of 
the executive treaty authority. However, it may be misleading to conclude that by 
establishing this prior-determining mechanism for treaties will automatically foreclose the 
possibility of a judicial challenge on the constitutionality of the treaty at a substantive 
level in the aftermath. The substantive constitutionality of the treaty must still constantly 
and strictly be observed by the judiciary in order to enforce the principle of 
constitutionalism. This substantive compliance which concerns a guarantee of an 
individual’s constitutional rights requires us to examine the extent to which the judiciary 
should defer or engage in rendering its decision. For instance, treaties that violate 
                                                 
121 In the absence of any explicit requirement of judicial control over international agreements under the 
German Constitution, treaty application and interpretation nevertheless lie within the jurisdiction of the 
Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) who decides on the questions of constitutional law 
and its conformity. WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 366.  
122 Id. (“The Federal Constitutional Court has been confronted with claims alleging constitutionality of 
international agreements, but the courts has until now never upheld any such claim). However, the issue 
that the Court oftentimes examines is on the constitutionality of a law enacting a treaty rather than the 
validity of the treaty itself. This approach has allowed the Court to avoid conflicts with the Federal 
Government and the disruption of the nation’s international relations. Treviranus & Beemelmans, National 
Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 49, at 328 (“…so that its comment on the validity of treaties have not reasonably restricted the 
Federal Government’s freedom of action in international relations”) (emphasis added). See also supra note 
102 (Petition for an injunction in re German-Dutch additional financial agreement). K. Loewenstein, The 
Bonn Constitution and the EDC treaties, 64 YALE L.J. 805 (1955). Cf., Japan v. Shigeru Sakata, 32 ILR 43, 
4 JAPANESE ANN. INT’L. L. 97, 103 (1960) (upholding the constitutionality of the security treaty as it 
possessed a highly political character). 
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fundamental constitutional rights will demand a rigorous participation of the judiciary to 
ensure that these important rights are closely observed. But the standard of a public 
hearing, although involving an individual participatory right, should deserve a certain 
degree of deference. This particular type of deference is to be discussed in the next 
section.  
Despite the possibility of a constitutional challenge on the substantive basis, we 
cannot deny that what this mechanism helps is enhancing the odds of the treaty survival 
by securing procedural compliance. This discussed mechanism can at least foreclose the 
chance of a treaty being overturned by the court on a procedural, if not on a substantive 
ground.123 Thus, for Thailand where a specific procedure is established for important 
treaties, the creation of an oversight committee who will make prior determination on the 
application of the constitutional process to a particular treaty is a necessary step to avoid 
irreversible damages both domestically and internationally. This approach does not only 
allow the executive to partially determine its competence in the area it originally has a 
prerogative, but will also enhance the effectiveness of the court’s role in the treaty-
making process by reducing the impact of its decision on the country’s international 
relations (through ensuring procedural compliance), and by guaranteeing that the people’s 
rights are properly observed and respected early in the process (through ensuring 
substantive compliance).  
iii. Assessing the Public Hearing Standard 
Since the incorporation of a public hearing pursuant to Section 190 of the Thai 
Constitution, the scope of judicial review has undoubtedly been extended in the treaty-
making process.124 This is another important area of the judicial function that concerns a 
                                                 
123 Treviranus & Beemelmans, National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 49, at 327. 
124 Saan Pokklong [The Administrative Court], Mar. 30, 2007, Ruling No. 178/2550 (Thail.), available at 
http://www.admincourt.go.th/50/s50-0178-o01.pdf  (Affirming the decision of the Administrative Court of 
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substantive guarantee of the Constitution (upholding an individual’s participatory right). 
Despite the justifiable role of the courts in addressing this substantive violation, there are 
times that judicial deference must be applied as a matter of public policy to maintain 
administration effectiveness. The level of judicial control over a public hearing standard 
(the substantive requirement of the participatory process) will therefore be addressed in 
this section.  
The Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement (JTEPA) became the first 
case since the enforcement of the 2007 Constitution that concerned the unconstitutionality 
of the treaty on the public hearing basis (inadequacy). Although the case was dismissed 
by the Supreme Administrative Court for its lack of jurisdiction (on the constitutional 
issue) which deprives the Court’s ability to determine whether the three day public 
hearing held by the assigned research center provided people with adequate opportunity 
to participate,125 the moral of the story is that a public hearing standard can constitute as 
an element of the treaty constitutionality, and that the substantive requirement of this 
public consultation is within the judiciary discretion. Such a power, if exercised without 
limit, can jeopardize government functions that must try to constantly manage what the 
judiciary demands.   
The limit of judicial review concerning the standard of public participation is 
especially crucial for Thailand in which the public consultation requirement must take 
                                                                                                                                                  
First Instance ruling that it had no jurisdiction judging the constitutionality of the treaty pursuant to Article 
9 of the Act on Establishment of Administrative Court and Administrative Court Procedure B.E. 2542 
(1999) . The Administrative Court, therefore, did not get to determine whether the public hearing claimed 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be meaningfully held meets the “standard” of public participation). 
125 Despite the defendant (Ministry of Foreign Affairs)’s contention that it had assigned the Chulalongkorn 
University research centre to conduct public hearings 3 days following the cabinet decisions, the plaintiffs 
claimed that people were not given adequate opportunities to participate because the hearing was not widely 
announced and took place for a short period of time. Such conduct shows bad motives of the government 
when it tried to exclude people from meaningful participation and discussions which, in effect, prevent 
people from effectively checking the government’s exercise of power. Id.  
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place as early as prior to the entry of a negotiation.126 The need for judicial deference in a 
public hearing standard becomes less relevant in most surveyed countries in which the 
hearing process is not required. In certain states such as France, the process rather takes 
place on an optional basis which is substantially within the discretion of the executive.127 
Thus, under this executive discretionary approach, the judicial review scope or its control 
over public hearing activities is naturally limited through the decision of the government 
whether and how to undertake it. This method of limited judicial involvement becomes a 
necessary tool in many treaty provisions that can carve out the burdens on the executive 
which paralyze the function of the administration.128   
In this section, I will primarily focus on the issue of a public hearing standard 
which requires a consideration of the judicial deference concept.129 Because the 
requirement of public consultation in a treaty process is an uncommon practice in many 
surveyed countries, examples given here only demonstrate how the countries approach 
this requirement, and may not provide us any specific practice. Switzerland turned out to 
be one of a few countries that have incorporated this tradition into its Federal Constitution 
in a form of a treaty referendum. The suggested treaty-making model will take into 
                                                 
126 CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190 ¶ 3 (Thail.) (“Prior to undertaking a treaty negotiation of any treaty 
specified under paragraph two; The Council of Ministers shall provide information and cause to be 
conducted public hearings, and shall give the National Assembly explanations on such treaty.”) 
(emphasis added). 
127 See, 1958 CONST.  art. 11, 53 (Fr.) (“Where the referendum is favorable to the adoption of the project, 
the President of the Republic promulgates [the] same within the time period specified in the previous 
Article). Article 53 also requires that “no ceding, exchanging or acquiring of territory shall be valid without 
the consent of the population concerned”. WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 94 (suggesting that the President 
of France is empowered to hold a referendum on treaties which have repercussion on the functioning of 
public institutions).  
128 A major problem that worried the Swiss officials was the fact that “the treaty referendum handicaps 
Switzerland in its international dealings”. A state, instead of being able to act freely and responsively on the 
international plane, must be subject to this restriction and must take into consideration wide-range of 
interests. France, for instance, vigorously protested and refused to enter into an arbitration with Switzerland 
as a result of the Swiss referendum rejection to the 1923 Convention that abolished Free Zones. 
WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 102  
129 Since I justified the need for a public participation in both Chapter III and the Section II, B of Chapter V, 
its requirement is thus out of the question.  
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considerations these variations and may also require us to borrow the public consultation 
standard from a law-making process.  
(a) Assessing the Models: Comparative Perspectives 
At one end, Germany and India, for instance, provides no room for direct public 
participation in the treaty-making process.130 The public is either consulted through 
representative bodies such as chambers of commerce, trade unions and other 
organizations that represent public interests or the Parliament which may inquire into the 
government’s position, intention and over all policy in a form of parliamentary debate. 
Along this line, in the absence of statutory or constitutional requirements 
concerning public consultation in the treaty-making process, many surveyed countries 
such as the UK, Japan and South Africa have one thing in common; the freedom of the 
executive to seek the consultation when it feels appropriate.131 The responsible 
department may elect to consult with professional or interest groups either before or 
during the negotiation process. This decisions as to which group should be consulted and 
how it should be consulted are entirely within the executive’s sole discretion. Since there 
is no constitutional or statutory requirement for a wide-range public participation, its 
format is usually on an ad hoc basis, including general participation by way of an 
invitation to comment on the treaty, rather than pursuant to any compulsory procedure.132   
                                                 
130 Treviranus & Beemelmans, National Treaty Law and Practice: Federal Republic of Germany, in 
NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED 
KINGDOM, supra note 22, at 52. Thakore, National Treaty Law and Practice: India, in NATIONAL TREATY 
LAW AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 
57, at 98. 
131 Sinclair & Dickson, National Treaty Law and Practice: United Kingdom, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW 
AND PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 31, at 
236. Kawakami, National Treaty Law and Practice: Japan, in, NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE : 
AUSTRIA, CHILE, COLOMBIA, JAPAN, THE NETHERLANDS, UNITED STATES, supra note 115, at 115. Botha, 
National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 35, 
at 593. 
132 N. J. Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 
: CANADA, EGYPT, ISRAEL, MEXICO, RUSSIA, SOUTH AFRICA 131 (Leigh Monroe et al., eds.2003). 
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On another end, public participation has been embedded in the constitutional 
history of very few jurisdictions such as Switzerland. Public consultation mandate dates 
back to the Federal Constitution of 1921, in which Article 89(4) required treaties 
concluded for an indefinite period or for a duration more than fifteen years, must be 
submitted to the people for adoption or rejection if 30,000 active citizens so demanded.133 
The duration of the treaty, thus became the sole criterion for requesting the referendum, 
whereas the treaty content is irrelevant.134 And thus, the weakness of this approach is the 
possible exclusion of important treaties such as those affecting fundamental rights of the 
citizens when their binding period fails to meet the criterion.135 The concern led to treaty 
referendum reforms.136 The new regime, thus, provided only the mandatory optional 
referendum when 50,000 citizens or 8 cantons so requests for treaties which contains 
important provisions establishing rules of law or requiring the enactment of federal 
statutes for their implementation.137 
Despite the requirement, public consultation remains significantly a matter of the 
executive for the fact that the public hearing is regulated by the Federal Council’s 
Ordinance, also known as “Consultation Procedure” (Vernehmlassungsverfahren) of 
August 2005 which specifies a hearing format, procedure and scope to be applied to all 
                                                 
133 WILDHABER, supra note 14, at 95. 
134 Id. at 97. 
135 As a result of the restrictive criteria, treaty referendum did not get to play its major role, and only 3.5 
percent of the international agreements were subject to the clause between 1952 and 1963. Id. at 99. 
136 Swiss had threefold treaty referendum from 1977-2003. These are (1) a mandatory referendum for 
treaties providing for the adherence to an international organization, (2) a mandatory optional referendum: 
50,000 citizens or 8 cantons request it for treaties with indefinite duration, providing for the adherence to an 
international organization or involving a multilateral unification of law and (3) an “optional referendum”: 
50,000 citizens or 8 cantons request it for treaties that legislature decides appropriate, Wildhaber, 
Scheidegger & Schinzel, National Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 654. 
137 Id. at 655. Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft [BV], Constitution fédérale de la 
Confédération Suisse [Cst] [Constitution] April 18, 1999, SR 101, RO 101, art. 141 ¶1 (d) (Switz.) (“At the 
request of 50,000 citizens who are entitled to vote or of eight Cantons, the following are submitted to vote 
by the People,… International treaties which are of unlimited duration and may not be terminated, the entry 
into an international organization, [and] involve a multilateral unification of law.”).  
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consultations held by the Federal Council.138 In practice, not only may the Federal Council 
arrange public consultations after the signature (but prior to legislative approval) in a 
written format, but also through a means of oral communications and conference 
discussion.139 Through the application of the consultation ordinance, the judiciary has 
almost no role in the decision outcome concerning the adequacy of the public 
consultation.140 Judicial limit in this context thus takes place through the consideration of 
rules and policy laid down by the executive and legislature without imposing the 
judiciary’s own standard. 
(b) Asserting a Public Hearing Standard: Revisiting the Legislative Process 
 
In the treaty-making context, in the absence of the public consultation requirement 
in the majority of states, searching for and assessing the public hearing standard can be 
difficult. Most treaty practices either provide no room for direct public participation or 
make the process optional. The executive discretionary approach in the consultation 
process means the branch’s own determination in terms of the manner, the period of the 
hearing, and the participants. In either case, judicial review in this realm (ability to 
impose its own hearing standard) is foreclosed.  
The executive discretionary approach offers an idea of judicial deference when it 
comes to determining the substantive requirement of the participation process for 
Thailand that has adopted a unique method of securing additional legitimacy in the 
making of important treaties. And due to the distinctive feature (the requirement of prior 
public consultation for certain treaties), the judicial role in deciding on the 
                                                 
138 Ordinance on the Consultation Procedure, SR 172.061.1, available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/gg/pc/index.html. 
139 Wildhaber et al., National Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND 
PRACTICE: FRANCE, GERMANY, INDIA, SWITZERLAND, THAILAND, UNITED KINGDOM, supra note 29, at 136. 
140 The sole judicial check is the possibility of rejecting the application of unpublished agreements. Cf., 
WILDHABER, supra note 14 at 351. In addition, under the circumstance in which the referendum is held at 
the discretion of the Federal Council, the citizens’ venue for challenging the constitutionality of the hearing 
might have been closed since the Federal Tribunal lacks the power of judicial review in such case. 
Wildhaber, Scheidegger & Schinzel, National Treaty Law and Practice: Switzerland, in NATIONAL TREATY 
LAW AND PRACTICE, supra note 10, at 656-657.  
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appropriateness of this procedure must be addressed to establish a balanced relationship 
among the three institutional branches in the treaty context. This following South African 
approach, although speaking from a law-making perspective, also offers a scope and limit 
of public participation mechanism through the notion of judicial deterrence on the public 
hearing standard. Such an approach by allowing a policy decision (the manner of public 
consultation) to be determined by the executive and the legislature in the form of rules, 
regulations or laws rather than judicial decisions can facilitate public administration, 
which is crucial to the assurance of a meaningful public involvement.   
Although public consultation is generally required in the domestic legislative 
process, in particular where fundamental individual rights are involved,141 there is yet a 
limit on the exercise of this political right. The decision in Doctors for Life Int’l v. the 
Speaker of the Nat’l Assembly & others (Doctors for Life), which affirmed the need for 
the involvement of citizens in the law-making process, addressed one of the crucial issues 
concerning the scope of the constitutional obligation of a state's legislative organ to facilitate 
public participation (substantive matter) and the issue of timing (procedural matter). 142 
The South African Court has played a crucial role in enforcing, expanding and 
delimiting individuals’ participatory rights in the law-making context. Under the South 
African Constitution, the scope of the Parliament’s constitutional duties to provide public 
participation has been set by various sections to support democratic values in the 
guarantee of individuals’ “social justice and fundamental human rights”.143 This 
obligation has been broadened by the application of Section 19 (political rights clause) 
                                                 
141 Public consultation, although required only in the domestic law-making process, is a growing trend, 
particularly in the case of human rights treaties or those in which individual rights may be gravely affected. 
Botha, National Treaty Law and Practice: South Africa, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE, supra 
note 35, at 593. 
142 Karen Syma Czapanskiy & Rashida Manjoo, The Right of Public Participation in the Law-Making 
Process and the Role of Legislature in the Promotion of this Right, 19 DUKE J.COMP. & INT’L L.1-2 (2008). 
143 The constitutional duty to facilitate public involvement in the legislative and other processes is found in 
section 59(1)(a) for the National Assembly (NA), section 72(1)(a) for the National Council of Provinces 
(NCOP), and section 118(1)(a) for provincial legislatures. Id. at  5.  
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and Section 16 (freedom of expression) of the South African Constitution by the Court.144 
The Court’s interpretation on a parliamentary obligation in facilitating public involvement 
in the conduct of public affairs also took into account Articles 19 and 25 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) concerning the freedom of 
expression and the political rights of the people.145  
Despite the Court’s broad interpretation concerning the Parliament’s constitutional 
obligation to facilitate public participation, the Court did address the scope of the 
mandatory public consultation by deferring the manner in which the Parliament may 
fulfill such an obligation.146 The Court by suggesting the possible (not determinative) 
methods of public involvement that the Parliament may include, decided that the standard 
of the public hearing arrangement is to be left within the discretion of the Parliament.147 
The limitation on the Parliament’s obligation to facilitate public participation was driven 
by public policy concerns (practicality and efficiency of government administration). 
According to the Court’s ruling, requiring the judiciary to address a specific standard of 
public involvement may cause “the business of the Parliament” to be “stalled” and the 
“parliamentary process would be paralyzed if Parliament were to spend its time defending 
its legislative process in the courts”.148 And, therefore, it is not the duty of the judiciary to 
judge how well the government spends their resources and provides the consultative 
means. This is a matter of policy rather than a legal question. 
                                                 
144 Id. at 6.  
145 Id.  
146 The specific procedure of public participation that was argued by the plaintiff in Doctors for Life was “a 
failure to invite written submissions and conduct public hearings” on the enactment of the health statutes 
(the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Amendment Act and the Traditional Health Practitioners Act) as 
opposed to a mere opportunity provided by the legislature to make either written or oral submissions at 
some point in the national legislative process. Id. at 8. 
147 “The public may become 'involved' in the business of the National Assembly as much by understanding 
and being informed of what it is doing as by participating directly in those processes. It is plain that by 
imposing on Parliament the obligation to facilitate public involvement in its processes, the Constitution sets 
a base standard, but then leaves Parliament significant leeway in fulfilling it”. Id. at 13 (citing King & 
Others v Attorneys Fidelity Fund Bd. of Control & Another 2006 (4) BCLR 462 (SCA) at 23-24 (S. Afr.). 
148 Id. at 23-24.  
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Drawing from this experience, the substantive requirement of public participation 
should primarily be the discretion of the branch that possesses the capacity and resources 
to facilitate a public forum. This does not mean that the conduct of a public hearing can 
be made arbitrarily by the branch. Rules and regulations concerning public consultation 
must be made to set a legitimate standard, and to allow the concerned branch to manage 
its own resources, time and energy. The case of Doctor for Life represents the middle 
ground approach by opening up the opportunity for the judicial enforcement of the 
constitutional rights while allowing the legislature to determine how to address them.149 
Such limits provide a practical approach which can help secure proper balance in the 
enforcement of the participatory right without overstretching to the point that it interferes 
with the responsiveness of the administration, and becomes an obstacle to the democratic 
goals.  
In conclusion, aside from the need to narrow down the scope of the public 
consultation in the treaty process for the maintenance of the effective administration, the 
judiciary may have to play a limited role in deciding on the question of the sufficiency of 
the consultation by deferring its decision to the political branches. It can be understood 
how several surveyed countries have come to allow their executive branches to determine 
the manner of a public hearing or even let the branches undertake the initiative where 
they sees appropriate to preserve the quality and integrity of the administration. Thus, the 
primary arguments for the limitation of judicial review in this realm are ones of policy 
concern; firstly, how the government should manage its resources is not the question for 
the judiciary,150 and secondly how much information should be discussed is the country’s 
                                                 
149 Czapanskiy & Manjoo, supra note 142, at 25. 
150 Although freedom of speech (under civil and political rights) is traditionally regarded as a negative right 
in nature, for these rights to be fully respected, “one must entrench rights to resources that help the exercise 
of those rights…” Thus, this type of negative rights which arguably does not enjoy unlimited exercises 
because it could have both budgetary and certain political consequences. CECILE FABRE, SOCIAL RIGHTS 
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 40, 42 (2000).   
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privilege that is outside the judiciary’s discretion.151 The ability of the executive to 
control the subject of discussion is crucial to the preservation of the country’s position. 
The length and the contents are a matter of policy decision. And it is not the duty of the 
Court to create its own rule to define the adequacy of the required public consultation, 
especially when such a right has budgetary and political implications. On the other hand, 
this approach does not suggest that the government should be at liberty to hold anything 
less than a meaningful consultation. My suggestion is only to remind us that the 
determination of the public hearing standard is the function of the political branches (the 
executive and legislature) and should come from their coordination in the form of 
legislation, and certainly not from the judiciary’s words. 
III. Breaking the Barriers: Derivation of a Treaty Model 
It is undeniable that the increased involvements of the public, legislature and 
judiciary enhance transparency, openness and accountability in government decision-
making which are also the democratic goals that Section 190 intends to promote in the 
realm of foreign affairs. However, it is clear that securing these objectives without 
balancing against other democratic values (administration effectiveness and 
responsiveness) is not sufficient to fulfill the definition of democracy and good 
governance. The quality of public administration is crucial to the function of democratic 
mechanisms and the achievement of other political, economic and social goals. The 
existing mechanism of Section 190 which provides a method of direct public 
consultation, parliamentary approvals and judiciary intervention in the treaty-making 
process has put the executive in a straitjacket leaving it with little room to make the 
decision in terms of the country’s foreign policy. The progressive approach inevitably 
                                                 
151 Debates and discussions oftentimes concern the country’s position, compromises and concessions, and 
can put the country’s interests at stake. Having all the information fully disclosed in public makes the 
country bear the risk of the exploitation by its partner. The executive should not be compelled to tender 
more than “dark hints and appeals to the confidence of the voters”. Wildhaber, supra note 14, at 103-104. 
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causes damages to domestic and international relations (i.e. the unresponsive public 
administration, public unrest, and the frustration of foreign nations). Section 190 
mechanisms therefore do not only involve the regulation of external, but most importantly 
internal affairs. What Section 190 may lack is certainly not these ambitious goals, but 
rather the proper means to fulfill them. 
What I am proposing in this section is a reform of the three areas under Section 
190, namely (i) the types of treaties to follow this special treaty process, (ii) the procedure 
of the treaty-making and (iii) the manner of the judicial involvement. These are the three 
primary areas that have obstructed an effective function of the government, and need to 
be re-assessed. The existing categories of treaty, especially those concerned with the 
extensive impacts on national economic or social security or generate material 
commitments in trade, investment or budgets of the country, are vague and incredibly 
broad to be subject to public participation, and for the executive to undertake without 
having a possible backlash. Furthermore, having the Constitutional Court determine on 
the constitutionality of the treaties (which is likely to be after the treaty has been 
undertaken) and assert its own public hearing standard would present both major 
impediments to the treaty-making process and expose the country to international 
liability. And finally, the treaty-making process itself should not require two stages of 
legislative checks.152 The parliamentary approval should only be required before the 
country is bound by the treaty, which serves as a more effective check on the executive 
treaty power when detailed substances are available for a review as opposed to a vague 
framework that might never take shape when tabling it early in the beginning.  
                                                 
152 The U.S. treaty-making process is not as democratic as it might be. But to propose constitutional 
amendment that requires the roles of both Houses in the making of treaties would certainly make the 
process more cumbersome. And “[d]o the claims of democracy demand that greater inefficiency?” HENKIN, 
supra note 15, at 61.  
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These issues are not addressed solely to impose limits on citizens’ participatory 
rights in the treaty-making process. They are rather addressed to guarantee the effective 
implementation of public participation, and to ensure that Section 190 serves the ultimate 
democratic goals. And how these goals will be best served will be briefly explained 
through my treaty-making model. 
As mentioned, the types of treaties that are subject to Section 190 process is the 
first area of my concern. Many surveyed countries have included the category of 
individual rights in their treaty practices. The explicit requirements of the Constitutions 
such as those of France, India or the UK set good examples of paying close attention to 
the very fundamental issue that a constitution must primarily guarantee. From the 
Canadian regulatory model, public participation is operated upon the principle of 
individual fundamental justice - life, liberty and security interests. This fundamental 
principle should be incorporated into Section 190 treaties by being an additional category 
to be specifically subject to public consultation.153 Thus, in terms of the public 
participation scope, the primary approach here is to shift the focus from a broad and 
ambitious language to the very fundamental issue of constitutionalism. This new category 
will come to replace the vague ones (having extensive impacts on national economic or 
social security). This new addition will also be the sole category that requires public 
consultation, while participations for other three classifications are optional, and within 
the executive’s discretion. 
The liberal approach will guide us on the questions of the public participation 
mechanism as to who should be the primary participants and when they should 
participate. With this respect, a public participation mechanism must be narrowed down 
in its scope by primarily focusing on the treaty that may substantially have an adverse 
                                                 
153 In the U.S. treaty-making context, principle of democracy and constitutionalism suggested a limited role 
for sole executive agreements, without proper checks, especially when an agreement entails lawmaking and 
affects individual rights. Id. at 65. 
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impact upon a person’s life, liberty and security. Those who perceived themselves to be 
potentially affected may file a request for participation along with their reasons. The 
extent of the impact on each person is to be considered when judging against others or a 
government’s own goal in the delivery of the final decisions. Secondly, the institution to 
guarantee such a forum must be available both at local and national levels. And finally, 
the means through which participants will address their concerns are public hearings to be 
subject to appeals within a specific timeframe to allow government to move forward. The 
appellate process will at least serve as a safeguard for the administration’s responsiveness 
to individuals’ issues by making the government aware of the people’s opportunity to 
respond. The incorporation of liberalism in the area of treaty making which calls for 
individual rights to life, liberty and security as the third category of “important treaties” 
will create a key element of self-government that is public trust - a believe in change the 
people could make in the system they can call their own.  
 The second area is the scope of judiciary function. The judicial role in enforcing 
this constitutional right can be strengthened and made less intrusive through firstly the 
creation of a committee that oversees the treaties that should go through Section 190 
process prior to being undertaken by the government, secondly the avoidance of imposing 
its own public hearing standard on the review, and thirdly the jurisdictional grant to the 
Constitutional Court on the substantive violation of international treaties.  
The primary purpose of an oversight committee is to eliminate the uncertainty of 
the executive’s treaty authority when a fully enforced treaty can later be turned down by 
the Constitutional Court due to a procedural violation. This method affirms the concept of 
judicial abstention by discouraging the judiciary to step in once the executive competence 
has been determined by the committee. This body will be consisted of representatives 
from the executive, judiciary and legislature whose members possess legal skills and 
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expertise. The involvement of the legislature in this process is necessary since this is the 
body of the people that should have a say in determining the matter that may threaten 
individuals’ fundamental interests. The early determination mechanism will also help 
ensuring that the basic rights of the people will be properly upheld before they are lost in 
the treaty process. At the same time, when the frustration of the government from seeking 
third and fourth opinions is reduced, the government can focus on holding a meaningful 
public hearing for the treaty that truly needs attention, allowing the participation 
mechanism to better fulfill its function. Thus, the country’s as well as citizens’ interests 
can be better served when the process of this particular constitutional requirement is 
ascertained at the early stage.  
This pre-determination method goes along the line with the legislative procedure 
in which the Constitutional Court must determine the constitutionality of the statute and 
organic law bills prior to their enactments. In the legislative context, the Court is obliged 
to rule on the constitutionality of the bill (in consistent with the Constitution) that has 
already been approved by the National Assembly, but prior to the presentment to the King 
for his assent.154 In other words, the bill is assured of its constitutionality before its 
enactment to bind upon the Thai people. In the same manner, a treaty draft should be 
prior determined to follow an appropriate constitutional process before it can become a 
treaty. The making of a treaty may require this similar approach to prevent the 
infringement of the people’s rights and liberties when once lost in the treaty process can 
be difficult to redress. 
The operation of the committee does not completely wipe out the function of the 
Constitutional Court. The judicial body still plays an important part in the process of a 
                                                 
154 CONST. (2007), Ch. 6 §141, (Thail.) (“Upon its approval by the National Assembly, an organic law bill 
shall be, prior to its presentation to the King for signature, referred to the Constitutional Court for 
determining its constitutionality…”). Amara Raksasataya & James R. Klein, THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
OF THAILAND: THE PROVISIONS AND THE WORKING OF THE COURT 7 (Amara Raksasataya & James R. Klein  
eds., 2003). 
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treaty determination concerning substantive violations of individual rights.155 While 
judicial involvement in this particular area is undeniable, the degree of its participation 
(deference) can be varied depending on the type of rights being violated, the level of 
infringement and the kind of important government policy decisions being involved (e.g. 
national security, allocation of resources). These are the factors that the court must take 
into consideration when determining the degree of its deference. Thus, for instance, its 
deferential role will be demanded when the sufficiency of a public hearing is called into 
question. The limitation of judicial review on the determination on a public hearing 
standard is through acknowledging the policy decision made between the legislative and 
executive branches (a rule or regulation). This recommendation, while emphasizing the 
facilitation of government administration in the treaty process, will ensure a proper and 
effective judiciary’s role.  
The last area of my proposal is re-adjusting the treaty-making process by reducing 
two-step parliamentary approval to the “prior to be bound” stage. This is the approach 
that all the surveyed countries have undertaken to ensure that the executive branch has 
sufficient autonomy and discretion in conducting a negotiation. This approach goes back 
to the analysis on institutional competence argued in Chapter IV in which the primary 
authority of the executive in the treaty-making conduct must be preserved in order to 
secure national interests. Many surveyed countries have shown that legislature’s 
involvement is either absent or disallowed until the treaty has been concluded to preserve 
the executive’s function and secrecy of the country’s position. Under limited 
circumstances such as that of Germany, the legislature is allowed to partake in an on-
going treaty negotiation. Nonetheless, its role is restricted by having no authority to 
                                                 
155 The Constitution establishes an independent judiciary primarily to protect aggrieved individuals harmed 
by the violations of the law. And the role of the judiciary in policing constitutional boundaries should 
continue to serve this objective.  Charney, Judicial Deference in Foreign Relations, in FOREIGN AFFAIRS 
AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, supra note 16, at 102.  
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approve or disapprove the content. The New Zealand treaty reform suggested that the 
parliamentary role in the final stage can induce more effective public participation 
through the executive’s incentive to gain better support in getting the treaty approved. 
This method can become crucial when public consultation for the other three categories, 
as I suggested, are made optional. One could argue that the requirement of the 
parliamentary approval does not only serve that purpose (encouraging public 
participation), but also provides additional protective mechanisms against any non-
transparent treaty-making conduct. But my question is how well this mechanism will 
serve such a goal since there are still chances of future textual alterations and the 
government’s incentives to provide all the wonderful information to get the legislature to 
endorse the framework. Thus, the crucial stage for a legislative check is rather in the final 
stage (where government will have a high interest in behaving knowing that the treaty can 
get turned down if the treaty fails to carry out the people’s interests) before “important 
treaties” can take effect. The treaties to be subject to final legislative approval will be 
summarized in Chapter VI.   
This method of final legislative control means the approval of both Houses 
(National Assembly) through a simple majority vote prior to the treaty’s entry into force 
(ratification, accession, acceptance or approval). The draft treaty when tabling to the 
parliament is subject to a time limit (i.e. 15 sitting days) which requires the draft to be 
returned to the negotiating authority. A legislative approval guideline for the 
consideration of approval may take the following factors (but not limited to) into account: 
 Reasons for Thailand to become a Party 
 Advantages or disadvantages of the treaty to be entered by Thailand 
 Any out of ordinary obligations that Thailand must undertake 
 The costs of compliance and breach 
 Economic, social, cultural, environmental impacts 
 Or flexibility of the treaty obligations 
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While the legislative approval guideline will help the executive predict the 
outcome of this control mechanism process (how a treaty gets approved), the elimination 
of this additional stage can improve the quality of the administration as well as the 
legislative function.156 Thus, the effectual operation of a constitutional method such as 
Section 190 depends significantly on re-designing its mechanism to secure the political 
environment that facilitates the process toward fulfilling its fuller objectives.      
IV. Conclusion  
Giovanni Satori suggested that “once a democratic system has been 
established…the democratic ideal must be minimized”157 to ensure the survival of its 
function. Mechanisms established under Section 190 may be the key elements to 
improving democratic conditions in a remote area of politics like foreign affairs. But 
within this process, it is still necessary that the roles of the public, legislature and 
judiciary in keeping an eye on the executive’s treaty-making conduct are subject to 
certain limits and properly determined to maintain other democratic goals, namely 
effective and responsive governmental functions. The treaty practices of my surveyed 
countries have demonstrated crucial elements that we should take into our consideration 
in the readjustment of Section 190. These are individual rights concern for direct public 
consultation, the executive treaty-making autonomy, and the limited legislative control 
and judicial involvement in the treaty realm. There are good reasons why these 
conventional practices have widely been adopted and maintained, which are not 
necessarily in the promotion of the executive monopolization of a treaty power. My 
proposals of narrowing down the treaty categories to be subject to public participation 
(the mandatory type and other optional kinds), creating an oversight committee, limiting a 
                                                 
156 The inefficiency of legislature’s review of treaties was reflected in a notorious example when the 
Genocide Convention was on the U.S. Senate shelf for thirty-seven years before finally ratified forty years 
after. The U.S. Senate was once described as the “grave-yard of treaties”. HENKIN, supra note 15, at 50-51.  
157 CAROLE PATEMAN, PARTICIPATION AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 10 (1970). 
. 
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judicial review of the public hearing conduct (but enabling its safeguard when the 
individual interests at stake are high), and eliminating excessive parliamentary roles in the 
treaty-making process aim at seeking better balance between ensuring the observation of 
the executive’s constitutional obligations and securing the quality of the public 
administrations. This is especially the current challenge faced under the implementation 
of Section 190, which requires extensive accountability of the executive toward the 
people and legislature, whereas the aggressive role of the judiciary has become a major 
impediment to the discharge of the government’s duty in international affairs.158 Lessons 
learned from other countries’ treaty-making experiences are not the sole justification for 
proposing the new treaty model. There are cultural and political structural factors 
discussed in Chapter III and Chapter IV that have come into play in the shaping of the 
proposed model. Thus, its formulation takes into consideration the analyses on the notion 
of public participation, the principle of separation of powers and the comparative study of 
the treaty-making practices which I shall demonstrate how this proposed treaty model can 
provide an effective response to internal and external challenges (discussed in Chapter I) 
in the next chapter. There will certainly be counter-arguments to my approach to be 
addressed in Chapter VI. 
 
 
 
                                                 
158 The case of the Joint Communiqué between Thailand and Cambodia has set a perfect example that has 
terribly shaken the relations between the two nations after the Thai government was ordered to withdraw its 
acknowledgement. A New Way to Annoy Neighbor, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 12, 2009, available at 
http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=14857229. Judicial review can be 
intrusive if enforcing people’s participatory rights involves imposing a standard of practice such as public 
hearings. At the very least, “[c]ourt must be conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority and the 
Constitution's design to leave certain matters to other branches of government” Czapanskiy & Manjoo,  
supra note 142 , at 13 n.43 (citing Doctors for Life, 2006 (12) BCLR 1399 (CC) at 59-60 (S. Afr.). 
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Chapter VI: Toward the Next Chapter 
I. Introduction 
There is no doubt that political structural change is one of the preconditions for 
establishing democracy. However, whether this component can solely sustain the principles 
of democracy and good governance in the long run remains an important question. Political 
forms such as political parties, electoral process, a constitution, public participation and 
checks mechanisms are all part of the democratic components. These are structural and legal 
means of limiting and controlling governmental power to ensure its accountability to the 
people. From the birth of the People Constitution (Constitution 1997) to the implementation 
of the 2007 Constitution, Thailand never seemed to fall short of these formal elements. To 
the Thais, the adoption of a democratic form is relatively an easy task. But what it may lack 
seems to be the meaning of a democratic nation, the absence of the “demos’ power” and the 
people’s right mindset (political will). Thailand may fall within the category referred by 
Giovanni Satori as the “latecomers” that must catch up the trend at an excessively rapid pace. 
And what these latecomers likely to experience are the sufferings from “overload, [an] 
unmanageable situation arising from too many simultaneous crises or burdens”.1 Amid the 
political and social chaos, Thailand thus has a major task to tame politics and to foster a real 
democratic political culture within the people by setting up a political environment that will 
increase greater trust among the people and toward the institutions through which they 
exercise their sovereign powers. This is a path toward good governance which can only be 
realized when both political and social dimensions of democracy are at play. 
                                                          
1 Giovanni Sartori, How Far Can Free Gov. Travel? in Democracy: A Reader 51(Larry Diamond and Marc F. 
Plattner eds., 2009). 
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The treaty provision (Section 190) of the 2007 Constitution is part of the progressive 
plan. This approach requires an active, impartial, intellectual and selfless mind of citizens, an 
extensive legislature’s role, and a strong judicial intervention in the treaty-making process. 
Whatever democratic mechanisms that got incorporated into were expected to be 
automatically and wisely applied by the people, and to be successfully followed through by 
the government. Pressured conditions of the government, as a result of this reform, become 
their responsibility to deal with in order to be accountable to the public. The bottom line of 
this strategy is that the government’s problem is not really the people’s problem. 
Unfortunately, the consequences of this idea brought about factors that affected the pace of 
our democracy. Ineffective administration that led to unresponsive administration, public 
participation that seemed more problematic and less promising, and inefficient treaty 
negotiation that resulted in a loss of national interests at the borders’ fronts, altogether, make 
up the interests of the “demos”. It is thus difficult to see how over-emphasizing transparency 
and accountability can lead us far, but in fact slows us down from achieving fuller democracy.  
As we are moving toward the country’s new political phase, it is quite clear that 
public affairs are no longer the matters of government and representatives, but also of 
citizens. These two sectors must work together. Section 190 may reflect the appreciation of 
the dynamic of public participation and the meaning of limiting government mechanisms, but 
fails to perceive the significance of a balanced interaction between the limiters and the 
limited in fulfilling the objectives of democracy. The introduction of liberalism into the 
participation of a treaty process and the readjustment of each institutional branch’s role in the 
making of treaties are meant to restore this balance, and to address the political and social 
dimensions of Thai democracy in the treaty context through recovering currently missing 
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components, namely effective and responsive administration. The aspect of liberalism, which 
has also been adopted in the treaty practices of many surveyed countries, to my belief, can 
enhance the meaning of public participation by creating public trust in their government 
which is vital to nurturing a positive political culture. At the same time, an understanding of 
the system of checks and balances which takes into consideration the political branch’s 
autonomy and independence other than transparency is deemed crucial to the practical 
function of the executive, which is the source of securing national interests and the public 
trust. There are thus good reasons why many surveyed countries have maintained the system 
of the centralized executive foreign policy making (CEFP) without deferring too much power 
to other bodies. My proposal, however, does not suggest that CEFP must be fully embraced, 
but rather asks that this method be factored in when seeking accountability, transparency, 
responsiveness and effectiveness in administrating foreign affairs. The readjustment of each 
political branch’s treaty-making role to increase the executive competence in the treaty-
making process may not be the ultimate answer in the future, but certainly is necessary for 
now. The current treaty provision (Section 190) is an ambitious project, but not impossible to 
achieve, given the maturity of certain social and political conditions, which will take some 
time before it can be fully materialized. This is what I hope that the proposed treaty reform 
will help prepare for such conditions. Professor David Williams in his book, Designing 
Federalism in Burma, gave us a lesson that you need the right tool to fix the right problem.2 
For Thailand, we might only have a good tool that has not yet fitted the problems. 
 
                                                          
2 DAVID C. WILLIAMS, DESIGNING FEDERALISM IN BURMA 130 (David C. Williams & Lian H. Sakhong, eds., 
2005) (“the right Constitution can help lead a country away from internal division and toward the rule of law”). 
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II. Summary of the Problems: The Dilemma of Section 190 
 As introduced in Chapter I, mechanisms established under Section 190 to secure a 
more open and accountable administration in the area of foreign affairs have presented both 
internal and external challenges, which also undermine the principles of good governance 
and democracy. These mechanisms include the extensive executive’s obligations in the treaty 
process which involves a public hearing, legislative approvals (prior and after a treaty 
negotiation) and the policing power of the judiciary after the enforcement of a treaty. Not 
only does Section 190 expand the list of important treaties whose meanings have not yet been 
determined, but also requires the executive to provide information and cause to be conducted 
for public hearings, and to secure the approval of the National Assembly prior to undertaking 
a treaty negotiation. The second approval prior to the country’s ratification to the treaty is 
also necessary whereas the power to determine whether the executive is competent to act 
alone on the treaty in question is solely vested within the Constitutional Court, which can be 
challenged after the treaty has been in full force.  
Although the recent Section 190 amendment aims at solving these problems by trying 
to create greater certainty in the executive’s treaty-making authority, a legislation to be 
enacted that lists important treaties within the meaning of Section 190 will only serve as a 
temporary relief for the types of treaties that are currently foreseeable. And because the list 
will never be comprehensive, despite the enumerated treaties, they are still subject to the 
Constitutional Court’s decision whether a treaty in question fits the “important treaty” 
characteristics. Public participation is still required vastly and mainly on national issues. As 
long as foreign affairs are not tied to personal interests, the gap between remote politics and 
individuals will be hard to bridge. Thus, without looking beyond a simple text alteration, and 
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into a cultural change and balance of institutional arrangements within a treaty framework, 
these democratic aspects will continue to hamper with the effectiveness of the administration 
by undercutting meaningful public participation, restraining the executive’s autonomy in 
foreign affairs, damaging the country’s foreign diplomacy, and subjecting the country to 
potential international liabilities. 
A. Hampering with the Administration’s Effectiveness and Responsiveness  
The idea of democracy which is centered on a governing process has much to do with 
the quality of governance itself by seeking a way in which the demos’ power can be 
exercised effectively. Thus, democratic mechanisms should not only warrant accountability 
and transparency, but also the effectiveness and responsiveness of the administration since 
these are important elements that facilitate the exercise of the people’s sovereign power 
through the bodies that can accurately represent their interests, and quickly respond to their 
needs. Unfortunately, these elements have been weakened under the implementation of 
Section 190.  
 The vague and broad language of the two additional types of treaties which have 
recently been added (referring to those having economic and social impacts, or generating 
material commitments in trade, investment or budget of the country) have presented 
challenges to the executive.3 At the same time, the amendment of Section 190 does not 
guarantee that the branch will not run into the same old problem by having to present all 
kinds of treaty proposals to the public and parliament before it can proceed to commence a 
                                                          
3 H.R. REP. No. (omitted) , at 32 (2011) (Report of the Committee on the Draft Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Thailand Amendment (No. 2) B.E. 2554 (Section 190)), available at 
http://web.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa_db/adhoc-upload/5-20110128105022_190.pdf (describing the concern 
of the vagueness of Section 190 treaty categories which has presented a major difficulty in carrying out national 
foreign policy). H.R. REP. No. 2, at 4-5 (2010) (Conf. Rep.), available at 
http://web.parliament.go.th/parcy/sapa_db/adhoc-upload/5-20101222105129_2.pdf. 
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negotiation. Accountability and openness of the system may be created, albeit at the expense 
of government time, resources and efficiency. The check mechanisms introduced under 
Section 190 which involved the role of the public, legislature and judiciary in the treaty-
making process has substantially slowed down the negotiation process. Since the Court’s 
decision in 2008, the Foreign Ministry and Ministers have refused to sign “mildly-worded 
agreements” lest it will later be interpreted as a violation of Section 190.4 This outcome is not 
just a concern of government works with foreign nations, but most importantly a matter of 
domestic relations – a positive interaction between the people and their government which is 
founded upon trust and good political attitude. While government responsiveness is 
essentially lost in the current public participation mechanism within the treaty context, the 
legislature and judiciary’s powerful roles in determining the survival of a treaty that caused 
major disruption in foreign affairs administration provided even less guarantee for 
government responsiveness5 when satisfying these constitutional obligations serve no more 
than a shield for the executive. The scope of public participation, the level of legislature’s 
involvement, and the timeline and manner of judicial intervention are all the factors that 
contribute to the effectiveness of government function upon which responsive administration 
depends.6  
                                                          
4 Bangkok Pundit, Yellow Shirt Turns on Abhisit, Asian Correspondent, Nov.24, 2010, 
http://asiancorrespondent.com/42930/yellow-shirts-turn-on-abhisit/ 
5 The World Bank, in fact, emphasized the significance of administration effectiveness as a way of exercising 
political authority in using and maximizing institutional resources to manage public affairs and respond to 
social needs. Farouk Lawan, Chairman, Educ. Comm., Democracy & Good Governance, Lecture at the 
University of Nigeria (Feb. 28, 2008), in DEMOCRACY AND THE ISSUE OF GOOD GOVERNANCE: CHALLENGES 
AND PROSPECTS, 2008, at 6-7. 
6 The reduction of the effectiveness of the Thai government administration is posing two phases of challenges; 
the current situation in which the government’s resources, time and energy have been heavily invested into the 
constitutional requirements of the treaty-making process in order to avoid any sort of political backlash, and the 
future challenge in which the government will become further unresponsive by being tempted to fast-forward 
their obligations only to satisfy the rules while ignoring the true meaning of the procedure. While government 
resources will be drained down into the demanded treaty process due to the vague terms of the required treaties, 
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B. Reducing the Executive Autonomy in the Exercise of Foreign Powers 
 The principle of separation of powers in which government should be composed of 
independent branches with distinct constituencies is the heart of democracy.7 As argued in 
Chapter IV, the core idea of the principle does not only focus on breaking down 
governmental powers to prevent a tyrannical act of the governing authority, but also concerns 
the functionality of the institutional branches to ensure the effectiveness of the checks and 
balances mechanisms.8 The principle’s underlying purpose is also to assign powers and 
responsibilities to each political branch in order to prevent interference and to guarantee 
independence among the legislature, executive and judiciary.  
 For a long period of time, Thailand had maintained the tradition of “diplomatic 
kingship” in which the Kings took the leads in the country’s conduct of foreign relations.9 
Even after being under the system of constitutional monarchy, a series of Constitutions, in 
fact, explicitly vested plenary foreign power in the executive with a few exceptions, and for 
practical reasons which are functionality and expediency in foreign diplomacy.10 This 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
public comments and concerns from the hearing which are formed as part of people’s wills and intellects will 
run the risk of failing to take part in the final decision.  
7 The concept of separation of powers was by many famous political theorists between the seventeenth and 
eighteenth century. These include Montesquieu, John Locke and William Blackstone. Although uniquely 
developed by each theorist, the concept “remained a cornerstone in their constitutional thought”.  MICHAEL 
RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 59 (2007). 
8 What became the forefront idea of separation of powers was the autonomy of each branch by assigning those 
particular functions and powers to particular entities. And for effectiveness and transparency, powers should be 
separated by who exercise them, and the types of activities they involved. Id.  
9 See Chapter IV, Section III, A 
10 Treaties that provides “for changes in the Thai territories or requiring the enactment of an Act for its 
implementation must be approved by the National Assembly”. For numerous examples, see Chapter II, Section 
III, B (ii). Kanitta Topothai, The Jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court on the Matter of Being the 
International Agreement under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550 Section 190 with 
Regard to the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 26 (Dec. 12, 2008) (an academic document submitted in partial 
fulfillment of the requirements for the program of senior executives on criminal justice administration, National 
Academy of Criminal Justice)(on file with the Library of Courts of Justice), 
http://elib.coj.go.th/managecourt/data/c12_4.pdf (“Because the King as the head of state who exercises his 
executive power through the Council of Ministers has the prerogative to conclude a peace treaty, armistice or 
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constitutional framework technically limited the scope of the parliament authority in the 
treaty-making process, whereas the public role was never required. This practice, however, 
has been reversed as the exceptions got expanded under the implementation of the 2007 
Constitution.11  
 Despite the presumption of the executive’s inherent foreign affair power under this 
new Constitution,12 its new treaty provision has effectively stripped away the executive’s 
treaty-making power by re-distributing it to the public and other political organs. The 
executive’s treaty authority has been counter-balanced through three channels, namely the 
public, legislature, and judiciary. These first two channels basically require that the 
undertaking of important treaties be disclosed and discussed directly with the public and 
legislature. This process, including a formal approval of the legislature on the treaty 
framework, is acting as an authorization before the executive can proceed to a treaty 
negotiation. In the absence of these steps, the executive is deemed powerless to conclude an 
important treaty, and the treaty itself is considered unconstitutional.  
 In the judiciary channel, the executive treaty power can be closely observed. The 
broadness and vagueness of the exceptions (in the form of treaty categories) render the 
executive’s treaty-making authority inflexible and uncertain.13 Because the treaty categories 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
other treaties with other countries or international organizations, the authority in the making of treaties pursuant 
to Section 190 thus belongs to the executive branch…”). 
11 The expanding exceptions refer to (i) the textual adjustment of the first treaty category to include those 
affecting “extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance therewith 
or in accordance with international law”, and (ii) the addition of two treaty categories that have extensive 
impacts on national economic or social security, or generates material commitments in trade, investment or 
budget of the country. See Chapter I, Section III, B (iii). 
12 Rujikej Chumkasorakit, Praden wikrao rang rathatumnoon hang ratcha anachak thai: bot bunyad kiewkub 
sonthisanya nai rathatumnoon [Analysis on a referendum: Treaty Clause in the Constitution], 24 (Working 
Paper, 2007). See also Jaturon Therawat, Roles of the Parliament in Treaty Making Process under the Thai 
Constitution 2 (Nov. 21, 2008) (Working Paper, on file with the King Prajadhipok’s Institute).  
13 A change that has been made to the first treaty category by replacing a treaty which provides for a change “ in 
jurisdiction” with “extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has sovereign rights or has jurisdiction in 
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(especially those with “extensive impacts on national economic or social security or 
generates material commitments in trade, investment or budgets of the country”) fail to 
provide a clear meaning, the interpretative power then belongs to the Constitutional Court 
who can solely make a final decision concerning the executive’s authority.14 It has been 
widely acknowledged that the source of the problem is the court decision in 2008 concerning 
Thai-Cambodia Joint Communiqué which applied such a broad interpretation of Section 190. 
Whether the branch is capable of acting alone in negotiating and concluding a particular 
treaty can be subject to a challenge in court later. This constitutional obligation makes it 
harder for the executive to predict and comprehend its competence in the making of treaties 
since the power to interpret what these important treaties are is rested within the 
Constitutional Court, which also means the power of this judiciary body to determine the 
territory of the executive authority in foreign affairs.  
 Since the implementation of Section 190, the treaty-making power of the executive 
has thus been affected and curtailed in several ways primarily to secure openness and 
accountability in the area where the public had traditionally been excluded. The question that 
we may have is why should we care or so what if the executive must take substantial efforts 
to complete the task. This perception obviously does not take the relationship between 
government practical function and a successful operation of democracy into account. The 
ability of the executive to retain sufficient autonomy in this particular area is crucial to the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
accordance therewith or in accordance with international law”, although meant to clarify the old definition, has 
still been a subject of dispute since such terms provide broad definitions concerning the extent to which the 
country can actually exercise its sovereign rights which can go beyond territorial seas such as exclusive 
economic zone or continental shelf. These broad terms has made the executive branch feel uneasy to rely on its 
own authority in negotiating a wide variety of treaties. While the executive prefers a narrow interpretation to 
limit to “territorial jurisdiction”, the judiciary is more willing to apply a broad interpretation to cover possible 
sovereign rights. Topothai, supra note 10, at 28. 
14 Id.  
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effectiveness in its administration in order to guarantee healthy domestic relations for one 
reason, and a good foreign diplomacy for another.   
C. Damaging Foreign Relations and Hampering Economic Gains 
 The issue of administration effectiveness is not only a domestic concern, but also a 
matter of external relations. It can impact, establish and destabilize the country’s credibility 
and international relations. This matter of securing an effective government requires the 
executive branch to at least maintain sufficient discretionary power and to have certain 
flexibility in the implementation of foreign policy.   
 In the case of Thailand, the independence of the executive branch which has been 
undercut by the application of Section 190 has substantially affected the negotiation process 
of several routine beneficial international agreements, which could have fallen within the 
category of “important treaties”,15 and for the worst part, its treaty partners that may 
eventually lose its faith in the country’s commitment under a weak leadership of the Thai 
executive who seems to have less authority than the parliament and the court in the making 
of a treaty. Hesitant gesture of the Foreign Ministry in pursuing international negotiation also 
sends out a negative sign of Thailand’s foreign policy (e.g. its willingness to establish 
international diplomacy). The maintenance of the country’s foreign relations oftentimes 
relies on the conclusion of a friendly or cooperative treaty, which unfortunately is without 
exception. Its process has also been disrupted and delayed under the implementation of 
Section 190. The country thus faces a big time of losing its economic and political 
opportunities that are contingent upon the enforceability of those treaties.  
                                                          
15 Charter Change Goes Before Parliament, BANGKOK POST, Nov. 22, 2010, 
http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/local/207499/charter-change-goes-before-parliament (“The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs will benefit most from the attempt to amend Section 190 of the constitution as the present 
situation is causing delays in negotiations with other countries”).  
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There is no question that there is still the need to protect real important treaties 
originally intended to secure by Section 190. However, the safeguard must not be at the 
expense of other minor treaties which are tantamount to the people’s interests and the 
country’s economic and political gains. The reaction of the Constitutional Court which 
resulted in the withdrawal of Thailand-Cambodia Joint Communiqué has rolled the foreign 
relations between Thailand and Cambodia downhill, despite the fact that it served no more 
than a friendly diplomatic gesture according to the former Foreign Minister Pattama’s view.16 
Since the decision in 2008, the government hardly desired to push forward the three 
memorandums of understanding on border demarcation between Thailand and Cambodia 
signed by their Joint Boundary Commission, which “are still awaiting parliamentary approval 
despite being forwarded to the lawmakers three times since November 2008”.17 Although 
these memorandums can help patch up the tie, and improve border trade relations between 
the two countries, the action to undertake it is still up in the air. The disruption of the cross-
border trade and tourism definitely harmed both countries' revenues which generate billions 
of baht.18 The border trade was even known to benefit Thailand more than Cambodia.19 
Thailand-Cambodia Joint Communiqué is not the only case that has a negative implication 
on Thailand’s foreign relations. Its precedence has discouraged the executive from relying on 
its own power to conduct the negotiations of other international treaties. The hesitation of the 
                                                          
16 Thailand, Cambodia Signed Document on Preah Viherah Temple, MCOT News, June 18, 2008, 
http://enews.mcot.net/view.php?id=4812 (quoting the former Thai Foreign Minister Noppadon Pattama at a 
press conference that “the declaration would not affect each country's rights on surveying and demarcating the 
common border” ). 
17 Supra note 15. 
18 Kavi Chongkittavorn, Abhisit and Hun Sen, A Clash of Leadership, THE NATION, Nov. 12, 2009, 
http://www.nationmultimedia.com/2009/11/12/opinion/opinion_30116375.php 
19 Id. 
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Thai government in pursuing even a mild commitment cast doubt in the mind of its partners 
who essentially questioned about Thailand’s hospitality and sincerity. 
Sure enough, Section 190 amendment has been speculated to help ascertain the 
boundary of the executive’s treaty-making authority by saving time on the making of routine 
and technical agreements, which have been known to benefit the country’s economy and 
foreign relations. However, it is unclear if other cooperative agreements, which may not have 
been listed in the legislation, but share certain characteristics with those important treaties 
will not be the subject of a challenge. The risk that the executive will run into in determining 
its own competence in the treaty process may be reduced, but will not entirely be eradicated.  
We cannot deny that creating a transparent treaty-making process may be necessary, 
but it is not the sole democratic element that should drive the machinery of our public 
administration. The fact that the country’s economic well-being still highly depends upon 
external relations reminds us that we may not afford to have a claim of transparency take 
over the country’s interest in the pursuit of foreign diplomacy. There are political and 
economic interests to gain from the effective conduct of foreign relations that we must take 
into account. Maintaining good foreign relations does not simply concern “theirs”, but the 
economic and social well-beings of “ours” through exchange of trade, resources and 
information. As a treaty process, Section 190 should not weaken its primary function which 
provides the means to secure these particular interests. However, I did not suggest that the 
transparency mechanism should be undercut. Far from this perception, the mechanism should 
rather be operated in a fashion that minimizes its impact on other important components. 
These economic and political interests to be borne out of having effective administration in 
241 
 
the conduct of foreign relations must therefore be balanced against the transparency and 
openness of the system since they also constitute as one of the democratic goals.  
D. Bearing International Liability:  
 In the modern time, a country can no longer stand in isolation, especially when it has 
continued to benefit economically and politically from the power of globalization. Thailand 
has been part of the global force since it first made contact to the outside world in the 
thirteenth hundred.20 As the world gets smaller, the interconnection among nation states may 
make our self-governance “less than a self” in the sense that the country can no longer be 
solely accountable to its citizens, but also to the outsiders under the role of international rules 
and obligations. The country’s commitments that once made with other nations cannot 
simply be repudiated without legal consequences regardless of how serious or legitimate 
reasons are being made.  
 This understanding raises another important issue within the implementation of 
Section 190 which allows the Constitutional Court to nullify a treaty that may have already 
been in force. And what is left with the country are international breach, possible liability, 
reparation, and a violation of citizens’ participatory rights that cannot be refurnished once 
treaty compliance is sought by the other party.21 Serving as customary international law, the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (the Vienna Convention) made clear that a 
                                                          
20 See Chapter I, Section III, B (i) 
21 In addition, although the 2007 Constitution provides an escape clause for treaties which have been complete 
prior to the date of its promulgation, this does not mean that there will not be further complication concerning 
the future treaties or existing treaties whose terms are subject to automatic renewal at the end of their periods. 
These treaties whose terms enable automatic renewal may encounter the conditions required by Section 190 
which could result in the modification of the treaty instead of a continuation of the existing terms. This is 
another potential breach that Thailand must face. CONST. (2007), Ch. 15 §305(5), (Thail.) (“any act, in 
connection with the conclusion or the implementation of a treaty, which has been done prior to the date of the 
promulgation of this Constitution shall be valid and the provisions of section 190 paragraph three shall not 
apply but the provisions of section 190 paragraph three shall apply to acts which remain incomplete and require 
further action”). 
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material breach of a treaty includes “a repudiation of a treaty” by the party which does not 
prevent the other party from seeking a remedy when the treaty has been concluded.22 An act 
of refusal to honor the treaty that has been made therefore does not release the country’s 
international obligations. The country still either has to comply with those commitments or 
pay the price for breaching them. Article 61 and 62 of the Convention also refer to situations 
of “impossibility of performance” and “fundamental change of circumstances” which cannot 
provide grounds for treaty termination, except under limited circumstances.23 Both Articles, 
however, explicitly disallow a breach of treaty as a ground for termination, which prevent a 
party from making repudiation of a treaty as an excuse to escape its obligation without legal 
consequences.  
 Thus, Section 190 may be able to give the court all the power to nullify an 
international treaty.  The country is nonetheless responsible for its compliance or otherwise 
for its breach which can incur costs in the form of financial obligation or diplomatic relations. 
The decision of Cambodia-Thailand Joint Communiqué is a clear example of the weakness 
of section 190. The withdrawal of the pact ordered by the court did not affect anything, but 
the diplomatic relations between the two countries. The strong application of a “check 
system” in which the judiciary is prescribed with the power to invalidate the executive treaty 
authority became sharp teeth that rather damage than protect its own skin. Judiciary 
                                                          
22 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 61(3)(a), May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331; 8 I.L.M. 679 
(1969); 63 A.J.I.L. 875, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf. 
23 For instance, Article 61(1) provides that “[a] party may invoke the impossibility of performing a treaty as a 
ground for terminating or withdrawing from it if the impossibility results from the permanent disappearance or 
destruction of an object indispensable for the execution of the treaty.” Article 62(1)(a), (b) states that “[a] 
fundamental change of circumstances which was not foreseen by the parties, may not be invoked as a ground 
for terminating or withdrawing from the treaty unless [they] constituted an essential basis of the consent of the 
parties to be bound by the treaty and the effect of the change is…still to be performed under the treaty”. The 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Id. art. 61(1), 62(1)(a), 62(1)(b).  
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intervention may be the right approach to balance out the executive power, but the timeline is 
clearly wrong to achieve the intended outcome.   
E. Weakening the Principles of Democracy and Good Governance 
 The dilemma of Section 190 does not only pose numerous problems in practice, but 
also in principle. These issues may be found to work against the principle of democracy and 
good governance which share a common ground in terms of the quality of a governing 
process. Although transparency and accountability are well-known elements of democracy 
and good governance, these characteristics cannot be solely sustained, and must be 
accompanied by other governing qualities. Thus, the improvement of any democratic 
elements must seek balance to avoid jeopardizing other important components.  
The issues of the government’s ineffective response to the political participation and 
social needs of the public, and the delayed administration in international affairs as a result of 
the Section 190 implementation are all relevant to the quality of our governing system in 
which I believe are not part of the democratic goals. First of all, the public participation 
mechanism and legislative prior approval process, which are intended to induce both 
transparency and responsiveness of the public administration in the area of foreign affairs, 
provide no guarantee that the decision outcome will well reflect public opinions when it is 
doubtful whether a busy and ineffective government will carefully listen to the people and 
keep up with its promises. Secondly, the fact that the direction of the country’s foreign 
diplomacy (the decision to undertake a negotiation and conclude a treaty) can be thwarted by 
the judiciary body can put the country’s economic and political gains on hold. These gains 
are also deemed the interest of the people. Thus, both internal (toward the people) and 
international (toward international community) accountability are equally important as they 
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seek social, economic and political dependence upon each other. And to hamper this process, 
Section 190 which conveys a means of treaty negotiation, is to undercut its own objective. In 
addition, the issue of international liability due to this external accountability, which is 
sometimes inescapable without legal consequences, also has negative impacts on internal 
affairs both in terms of benefit and the public participatory rights losses. While the country 
will be sought either for compliance or compensation, the decision of the court to invalidate a 
treaty will not restore the people’s participatory rights that had already been disregarded in 
the treaty process. And it seems that judicial intervention at this stage does not serve much 
purpose, but only causes internal and external damages.  
 It is true that democracy is an “exercise of power” that belongs to the people, and not 
to a particular branch.24 The power therefore may either be directly exercised by the people 
or through their representatives that must be held accountable to the people, the original 
owners. But in the assurance of this process, is it necessary to substantially intervene with the 
authority of the executive in such a way that might eventually undermine effective 
democracy, the system in which the people’s wishes and interests being effectively 
represented and accorded a guarantee of  popular control over final policy decision.25 This 
would be a democratic irony. Seeking to secure the accountability and openness of the 
system should not weaken the effectiveness and responsiveness of the public administration. 
Thus, the primary objective of the proposal to a treaty process reform is to address this 
                                                          
24 GIOVANNI SARTORI, DEMOCRATIC THEORY 3 (1962). Democracy is generally understood as “a political 
system in which the citizens themselves have an equal effective input into the making of binding collective 
decisions. [W]hereas a non-democratic system gives power to the hands of certain individuals to make binding 
decisions without any accountability to citizens.” MICHAEL SAWARD, THE TERMS OF DEMOCRACY 15 (1998). 
25 ROSS HARRISON, DEMOCRACY 8 (1995) (defining effective democracy as the process in which people’s 
wishes are being effectively represented by way of getting what they want or responsive administration 
regardless of whether it is direct or indirect participation).  
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dilemma by showing the possible co-existence of these important democratic elements 
through cultural and structural changes to be concluded in the following section. 
III. Adopting a New Approach: Proposal of a Treaty-Making Process Reform 
 
A. A Model Summary: Areas of Reforms 
 In Chapter V, I have developed the derivation of a treaty-making model through the 
comparative analysis of the treaty practices in various countries by factoring in the liberal 
and structural approaches addressed in Chapter III and IV respectively in response to the 
three primary areas of concerns under the current treaty-making provision (Section 190) 
which are the re-adjustment of (i) the treaty categories for public participation and legislative 
approval, (ii) the level of the public and legislative involvements, and (iii) the manner and 
scope of the judiciary intervention in the treaty process.  
While narrowing down the treaty category to be subject to a mechanism of public 
participation is a means to attain cultural change through the use of better public involvement 
in order to foster the people’s positive attitude in politics, adjusting the categories of 
important treaties required for final legislature’s approval is to ensure transparency and 
accountability of the treaties that may not receive public hearings, through indirect public 
involvement. The single participatory approach (the requirement for the sole category) is 
meant to induce more active political participation of the people while increasing effective 
government function by narrowing down its obligations to focus on truly fundamental issues. 
The re-adjustment of the treaty categories for a final legislative approval process is crucial to 
the effectiveness and transparency of the public administration. Although demanding broader 
categories to include the traditional kinds (affecting territory and sovereign rights, and 
domestic laws of the country) and the special kinds (affecting individual rights, and 
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generating material commitments in trade, investment or budgets of the country), this 
adaptation has eliminated the most vague category, and replaced it with a more definitive one. 
The proposal of treaty category adjustment still maintains the traditional negative list 
approach in which the plenary treaty power is vested within the executive, except those listed 
under Section 190 of the Constitution. And those are important treaties that must receive 
proper authorization from the body that represents the interests of the people. 
The structural changes by re-specifying the timelines and scopes of the legislative and 
judicial involvements in the treaty process are required to improve administration efficiency 
without giving up transparency and accountability as governing qualities in the treaty 
negotiation process. While legislative function can best safeguard the people’s interest in the 
final stage of the treaty process, moving up the judiciary body to determine the executive 
competence in the making of a treaty at an early stage can help timely secure the people’s 
participatory rights and preserve the country’s stakes (potential international liability and 
embarrassment). An appropriate role of judicial intervention is suggested through 
empowering the Constitutional Court (jurisdiction grant) to address questions concerning the 
individual’s rights violation of a treaty, and the determination of its deferential power. These 
are the underlying arguments which led to the reformulation of a treaty process.   
i. Readjusting Treaty Classifications  
 The liberal approach and the treaty practices of my surveyed countries had shown the 
significance of incorporating individual’s fundamental interests into the treaty process by 
adopting it as one of the treaty categories. Thus, pursuant to this understanding, Section 190 
should appear as follows; 
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A treaty which: 
(1) Provides for change in the Thai territories or 
extraterritorial areas over which Thailand has 
sovereign rights or jurisdiction in accordance 
therewith or in accordance with international law 
(2) Requires the enactment of an Act for the 
implementation thereof, or 
(3) Has substantial adverse impacts upon 
individuals’ life, liberty and security interests 
or the livelihoods of local communities 
(4) Generate material commitments in trade, 
investment or budgets of the country 
   
 The proposed new category which focuses on the people’s fundamental interests also 
narrows down legal interpretation by replacing the vague category of having extensive 
impacts on national economic or social security, and by ensuring that only treaties that 
actually have adverse impacts upon individuals (in the exclusion of potentiality) will receive 
a proper hearing in accordance with the constitutional requirements. Treaties that concern 
individuals’ fundamental rights will be the sole category which demands a public hearing 
process, primarily due to the cultural argument I made in Chapter III. This proposal of course 
does not bar other important treaties which may also carry individuals’ fundamental rights 
implication from guaranteeing a public forum (e.g. treaties affecting the country’s territories 
oftentimes bring along the issue of personal livelihood). In any case, all four classifications 
are considered “important treaties” that require approval from both Houses prior to their 
entries into forces.  
ii. Adapting Treaty Process (Legislature and Public Involvements) 
 The second area of reform is to re-affirm the principle of separation of powers which 
aims at preserving both checks and independence of each institutional branch. The 
elimination of the legislative approval in the early stage may also mean increasing the role of 
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the public (which are optional for the three treaty categories) whose views and concerns will 
hold the executive most accountable at the final legislative approval upon the conclusion of a 
treaty. The treaty content that does not reflect people’s interests and concerns will run the 
risk of falling through at this last screening stage, which is more critical than an early 
approval of a treaty framework which is still subject to changes, and renders the executive’s 
position inflexible. The language should appear as follows; 
Prior to taking steps to concluding any treaty specified 
under paragraph two,  
(1) The Council of Ministers shall provide information and 
cause to be conducted public hearings for the treaty that 
bears the characteristic of the third category 
(2) A public consultation may be conducted in the case 
where the Council of Ministers is of the opinion that a 
treaty may affect national or public interests specified 
in the first, second and forth categories 
(3) Prior to expressing its consent to be bound, the 
Council of Minister shall, thereby, submit to the 
National Assembly a final treaty text for approval, 
and make its details publicly accessible… 
 
Under this proposal, public consultation is divided into two levels, namely (i) 
mandatory for treaties affecting fundamental individual rights, and (ii) optional for the rest of 
important treaties (the first, second and forth categories). Because the mandatory public 
consultation has been cut down to one important category, the government will be expected 
to address the issue promptly and effectively. At the same time, the optional approach (as 
opposed to complete absence) can provide additional incentive for the government to seek 
public consultation for other important treaties in order to secure their final legislative 
approvals without being interfered by the substantial demands of the constitutional process. 
The re-wording of the treaty process is also in accordance with the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969) which allows different means for a country to be 
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bound, and not necessarily limited to consent expressed by ratification, acceptance or 
approval.26 This is also the problem of the Section 190’s current text which only takes into 
account the consent to be bound by a treaty by ratification. Its failure to include other means 
of consent makes the requirement of parliamentary approval and public accessibility “after 
the treaty has been signed” meaningless, and yield potential liability had the parliament 
disapproved it. Because many international treaties take effects upon signing, the disapproval 
of the legislature afterward will not excuse the country from compliance. And at worst, this 
final screening process will not serve as any safety valve for the people’s interest. Thus, the 
suggested wording by not specifying a particular means to declare an intention to be bound 
will also force the executive branch to secure legislative approval prior to its undertaking any 
legal action whether signing or ratifying a treaty.  
iii. Creating an Oversight Committee 
 In considering the doctrine of separation of powers to ensure that the interaction 
among the institutional branches works toward the effectiveness of the checks system,27 the 
creation of an oversight committee is to replace an ineffectual function of the judicial body 
whose intervention, after the treaty takes effects, does not serve as effective check upon the 
executive, and only incurs legal burdens to the country. Although the judicial role in the 
treaty-making process is limited in many surveyed countries, its role and opinion are still 
necessary to form a final decision in regarding to the types of “important treaties”. However, 
this decision must take place at an early stage. With this respect, the following clause 
                                                          
26 Means of expressing consent include consent to be bound by signature, by an exchange of instruments 
constituting a treaty, by ratification, and by accession. See The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, supra note 21. 
27 See Chapter IV, Section II. 
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requiring the executive, the legislature and the Constitutional Court to co-determine the 
nature of the treaty in question prior to an undertaking of a treaty negotiation must be added.  
A treaty proposal shall be submitted to an oversight 
committee to prior determine the nature thereof that 
may fall within the parameter of any treaty specified 
under paragraph two. In the case of dispute concerning 
legal interpretation, the power to make the final 
determination thereon shall be vested in the 
Constitutional Court. 
 
This clause, although giving the power to the oversight committee to decide on the 
question of “important treaties”, also addresses a potential conflict among the branches 
concerning the legal meaning of the treaty proposal (in which an executive may have a high 
interest in asserting its own interpretation) by giving the constitutional court the power of 
final determination.  
iv. Empowering the Constitutional Court in the Treaty Context 
As argued in Chapter V, Section II. D (ii), the operation of the oversight committee 
which helps addressing the issue of procedural violation in the treaty-making process does 
not necessarily eliminate the role of the constitutional court or render a constitutional 
challenge on a substantive ground impossible. The court must still adjudicate on a claim 
where individual rights guaranteed under the Constitution are involved, regardless of the 
context in which such a violation took place. Thus, even in the area of foreign affairs where 
limited judicial involvement is suggested, the court should address the question whether a 
treaty infringes upon an individual’s constitutional rights. Nevertheless, the degree of 
involvement (standard of review) will be varied depending on the type of right being violated 
(negative vs. positive rights), the degree of infringement, the level of public impact and the 
kind of government policy decision being involved. This determination will be made through 
251 
 
the court’s own analysis. Another paragraph concerning the Constitutional Court’s role and 
limit should be added as follows; 
The Constitutional Court shall decide on an issue where 
the implementation of such a treaty has violated the 
rights and liberties of an individual guaranteed under 
this Constitution. In the case where the violation 
occurred in relation to national security interest or other 
important government policy decisions, the court may 
defer its decision to the concerned authorities where 
these national interests have been determined to 
substantially exceed a private right.  
 
This clause, while mandating the constitutional court to address the question that 
concerns its primary function (adjudication on the merit of an individual’s constitutional 
rights infringement case) in the treaty context, will allow the court to employ its judgment in 
deferring important issues to other competent authorities by balancing these interests against 
the individual right at stake. The flexibility accorded by this clause is crucial to an effective 
function of government, and most importantly the procurement of important national 
interests. Because the clause does not require the court to make a deferral, but only to use its 
best judgment in addressing an individual’s rights violation while taking into consideration 
other public interests, the protection of individual rights is not being compromised. Thus, 
even after the treaty has been fully in force, an individual can still challenge in court through 
this clause, for instance, if he felt that his participatory right (which is within the 
constitutional guarantee) has been violated. But it is up to the court to decide how much right 
a person can be accorded pursuant to the balancing test suggested in the clause.  
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This is an important power that is currently missing from the Constitutional Court’s 
jurisdiction.28 Thus, in connection with Section 190, Section 212 (Chapter 10) must also be 
adjusted to grant the court additional power as follows; 
A person whose rights or liberties recognized by 
this Constitution are violated has the right to file a 
motion to the Court for a decision that a provision 
of law or a treaty is contrary to or inconsistent with 
the Constitution. 
 
The proposal purports to improve competency of the institutional branches by 
allowing each branch to perform its primary function effectively. While the court would still 
play an important role in adjudicating on the matter that touches upon foreign policy 
(individuals’ rights violation by a treaty), its scope of interference would still be limited 
through balancing the national security interest or other important government policy against 
the individual rights at stake in addressing the substantive violation. Thus, the level of 
deference would directly depend upon the kind of individual rights being implicated. 
Through this application, the courts could then accommodate the political branches' 
institutional competence over foreign affairs issues by according the political branches with 
the appropriate amount of deference. 
B. Counter-Arguments  
 The proposed treaty model can be subject to criticism primarily in terms of a good 
governing and democratic principles that the approach may undercut several democratic 
mechanisms currently guaranteed under Section 190. Because this version of a treaty 
provision is regarded as highly protective against corruptive practices, any readjustment or 
modification can be perceived as weakening democratic values like transparency and 
                                                          
28 CONST. (2007), Ch. 10 §212-215 (Thail.). See Chapter II, Section III, D (ii).  
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accountability.29 The proposed areas to reform will inevitably encounter such a claim that 
they are a limitation of the people’s participatory rights in the treaty process, a reduction of 
accountability and openness of the system, and an empowerment of the executive branch, 
which is not a representative body that is directly accountable to the people.30 To summarize 
these potential arguments, first of all, the reduction of treaty categories to one mandatory and 
three optional cases, while lessening the safety valve of the people in scrutinizing 
government external activity, will deny public involvement in a broader treaty context. 
People’s opportunities to hear and voice their opinions in the making of important treaties 
will be limited to certain circumstances. Secondly, the elimination of legislative approval at 
the early stage is the removal of a mechanism that ensures transparency and accountability of 
the executive act. Treaty framework approval is an important step to lock the executive’s 
negotiation position in order to prevent self-seeking individuals from pursuing their personal 
agenda. And thirdly, narrowing down the scope of important treaties, reducing legislature’s 
involvement and allowing the executive to decide on its competence in the making of 
particular treaties will enable the executive to freely exercise, and potentially abuse its 
foreign affairs power. 
 The concern of limited public participation is a valid claim that people should not be 
deprived of their rights to take part in government policy decisions. Instead of weakening the 
participation mechanism, the readjustment of the treaty categories to primarily focus on 
individual fundamental interests, in fact, increases the safety valve by closely guarding the 
                                                          
29 See Chapter I, Section III, A (i), (ii) and (iii) (defining democracy, good governance and their relationship). 
30 See Chapter II, Section III, C (Pursuant to Chapter 9 of the 2007 Constitution, the prime minister is elected 
from among the members of the House of Representatives following national elections for House of 
Representatives. The leader of the party positioned to organize a majority coalition generally becomes the prime 
minister by appointment by the King, who also appoints no more than thirty-five other ministers to constitute 
the Council of Ministers.). 
254 
 
interests that personally and directly concern the people and local communities. The 
modification does not decrease the people’s rights to participation, but only shifts the 
attention to the very fundamental issues to help improve the effectiveness and accountability 
in the treaty participation process. This proposed category also goes along the line with the 
existing conventional ones which arguably address certain fundamental concerns of the 
people by having direct impact upon their lives.31 Broad public participation issues such as 
those relating to national interests may increase people’s opportunities to partake, but neither 
necessarily invites public involvement nor induces an active government response to the 
addressed concerns. Nevertheless, the fact that the government may also seek public 
consultation on other important treaties could provide a broader ground for public 
involvement, which could slowly mature into a routine practice for the government to secure 
public approval. Thus, under the new proposal, people’s participatory rights will rather be 
strengthened, and better guarded.  
 The second area of criticism concerning the elimination of legislative approval which 
is amount to abandoning an additional screening process may be a removal of a mechanism 
that helps secure the openness and accountability of the system, but not necessarily the 
openness and accountability themselves. These democratic elements, as argued in the 
previous section, are best protected at the final stage of a treaty-making process. The 
weakness of the current language that allows the executive to bind the country to 
                                                          
31 The conventional categories which are those that provide for change in the Thai territories or require the 
enactment of an Act for the implementation also concern people personally. While the Constitutional Court has 
interpreted that treaties affecting territories of the country could create social impacts by affecting social and 
economic rights of citizens living in the disputed area in Thailand-Cambodia Joint Communiqué case, the treaty 
which requires an enactment of an Act, in the same manner, have strong implication upon people’s lives by 
committing the people to a new law. See Saan Rattatumnoon [The Constitutional Court], Jul. 8, 2008, Ruling 
No. 6-7/2551 (Thail), available at http://61.19.241.65/DATA/PDF/2551/A/108/1.PDF.   
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international obligations through signature prior to securing a formal authorization from the 
legislature, although requiring a two-step legislative approval, does not truly protect against 
unwanted or bad commitments. At the same time, a treaty framework is a broad document of 
which contents are still subject to future alterations. This aspect does not necessarily provide 
an effective measure to prevent the self-dealing claim. The elimination of the early stage 
legislative approval may, in fact, strengthen the role of the public by lessening the amount of 
time that government has to spend with the parliament and inducing the government to pay 
better attention to the public views and concerns in order to secure legislative approval in the 
final stage. It is then not necessary that the extensive involvement of the legislature will serve 
our best interest, but rather be an impediment to a smooth operation of the executive in the 
pursuit of national interest through our foreign diplomacy. 
 The proposed model may still open up another area of criticism that it would give too 
much power to the executive by cutting down the screening process (legislative approval) 
and endowing the branch the power to take part in the determination of the special treaties. 
The approach will allow the executive to interpret the meaning of these treaties narrowly to 
circumvent Section 190 treaty procedure. While this concern is true that the executive has a 
high incentive to avoid the extra burden, the approach, however, does not make the branch 
the sole decision-maker on the question of the treaties’ definitions which are to be co-
determined with the legislature and the Constitutional Court. The executive’s legal opinion is 
still subject to the Constitutional Court’s final decision in the case of conflict in terms of 
legal interpretation. The legislature, which is the representative body of the people, will have 
a strong interest in ensuring that treaty frameworks affecting individual rights or fundamental 
interests must be made in accordance with Section 190. Thus, the participation of the 
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legislature and judiciary is still acting as a balancing tool against any possible abuse of the 
executive’s discretionary power. The approach that enables the executive to partially 
determine its competence in the making of treaties is to facilitate routine, technical 
administrative or cooperative agreements if the branch could demonstrate their characters 
that are outside of Section 190 concerns, and establish a pattern of these agreements in order 
to expedite the treaty negotiation process.  
In addition, the risk of the abuse of power will be minimized by a scrutinizing 
mechanism at the conclusion of a treaty rendering the treaty to have no legal effects unless 
formally approved by the legislature, and made available to the public. The Constitutional 
Court will also serve as an enforcement body that addresses individuals’ rights violation by a 
treaty made under the capacity of the executive. This additional jurisdictional grant to the 
Constitutional Court can provide another effective means that undercuts the executive treaty 
authority in a way that supports the institutional competency of each branch. Although 
arguably the court’s involvement in the treaty context can be limited, the restrictions either in 
determining the executive’s treaty power or in addressing an individual rights’ violation are 
to increase the executive’s competence in the area which highly demands expertise and 
expediency, and involves important government policy decisions. In fact, this type of 
empowerment is not necessarily a bad thing if it means flexibility in guiding the direction of 
our national foreign policy. This is empowerment in the sense that scrutiny still applies, but 
does not interfere with the discretionary power so seriously that it impairs the primary 
function of the executive in the realm of foreign affairs.  
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C. Toward Embracing the Model in Comparison to Section 190 Amendment 
The potential criticisms of the proposed modal previously addressed have much to do 
with the concerns of the principles of democracy and good governance which have been 
weakened throughout Thailand’s political history. This is what Chapter II sought to explain 
to us to realize and understand the dynamic of political struggles among various factions and 
the intensity of political exploitation of which the concern makes it harder for the 2007 
Constitution to compromise.32 These concerns became the forefront of limited amendment 
made to Section 190, which only sought to resolve the problem by spelling out significant 
treaties without attending to the issues of public mindset and institutional competence in the 
political process.  
Unlike the simple solution in the amendment,33 the study of the past democratic 
failures requires this proposed model to maintain accountability and transparency as top 
priority in the readjustment of Section 190 while strengthening other democratic elements. 
This model must at least be taken into consideration for its several positive aspects that aim 
at correcting the weaknesses of Section 190. These are (i) enhancing the principles of 
democracy and good governance, (ii) preserving the executive foreign affairs power, and (iii) 
maintaining the country’s international relations. The model can serve as an improved 
version of Section 190. By focusing on the people’s fundamental rights, securing 
administration responsiveness and efficiency, and preserving the country’s international 
                                                          
32 Supra note 4 (“the PAD gathered in front of parliament to protest against the government-supported plans to 
amend two parts of the constitution”).  
33 “There shall be the law on the determination of the treaty types, negotiation framework, procedures and 
methods for the conclusion of treaties having extensive impacts on national economic or social security or 
generating material commitments in trade or investment…” CONST. (2007), Ch. 9 §190, ¶ 5 (Thail.) (amended 
2011) (emphasis added). 
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credibility and reputation, the proposed changes are ways of cultivating trusts in both 
domestic and international relations. 
 i. Enhancing Democracy and Good Governance 
 The proposed model, which has been formulated from the analyses of Chapter III to 
V, can directly address weak elements of democracy and the principle of good governance 
through improving the effectiveness and responsiveness of the public administration, while 
maintaining transparency and accountability as priority components. In comparison to the 
amendment which only requires a treaty legislation, the model, although seeking to delineate 
the scope of public participation, eliminate legislative involvement and increase the executive 
competence in the treaty process, neither undermines the safety valve of the people nor 
renders the executive the monopolist of foreign affairs power. The suggested changes rather 
aim at protecting important functions and fostering the characters that each body should have 
- which are active and discerning citizens, a responsive executive, an attentive legislature, 
and an effectively- policing judiciary – desirable levels of which may not be achievable 
under the amendment. These are the primary outcomes that the model is expected to generate 
in the improvement of our democracy. 
 The three areas of reforms, which are the scope of public consultation, the level of 
legislature involvement, and the manner of the judiciary intervention, are all relevant to the 
satisfaction of the four prime democratic and good-governing characters. As argued in the 
previous section, openness and accountability in the treaty-making process will remain 
secured in these readjustments through the increasing consultation of the public in a 
personally affected area, a legislative authorization of only treaties that truly reflect people’s 
interest, and effective judiciary intervention that can timely protect people’s constitutional 
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rights. The manners in which the legislature and judiciary are involved pursuant to this model 
will not leave the exercise of the executive foreign power go unchecked, and becomes the 
subject of public criticism as the treaty provision of the 1997 Constitution faced.34  
 By contrast, the Section 190 amendment which may preserve all the original 
democratic mechanisms, such as a wide range of public consultation, two-step legislative 
controls and the strict observation of the Constitutional Court in policing the constitutional 
boundary among the branches, is expected that a minor change made to require a treaty 
legislation will restore the executive and legislature’s effective functions. These mechanisms 
without careful adjustments will continue to pose the problems I presented in Chapter I. 
Creating the law to specify important treaties may not be sufficient to induce public 
participation, to improve the quality of the administration, and to strengthen the power of the 
Constitutional Court as the primary guardian of the individuals’ rights for the facts that the 
amendment did not take cultural and political (institutional arrangements) factors into 
consideration. The legislation will undoubtedly provide a short-term solution as a temporary 
guidance for the executive’s treaty authority, but may never address the long-term issues 
such as the public mindset, social reconciliation, balances among the institutional branches, 
and propriety of the judicial intervention.  
 Thus, the proposed model will involve substantial changes in order to undertake a 
more comprehensive approach to achieve these results. Whereas accountability and 
transparency of the system would not be compromised, the model can quickly restore the 
effectiveness and responsiveness of the public administration. By boiling down the issues for 
public consultation to those concerning individuals’ fundamental rights, the proposed clause 
                                                          
34 Martinez Kuhonta, The Paradox of Thailand’s 1997 People’s Constitution, XLVIII ASIAN SURVEY 373, 374-
375 (2008).  
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will help excluding a number of routine or cooperative agreements which can make the 
arrangement of a public hearing unnecessary and cumbersome, and possibly causing many 
treaties to go unattended.35 In addition, this readjustment of treaty categories, while requiring 
the government to pay close attention on and distribute resources to those important issues, 
will allow the government to exercise its discretion in seeking public consultation on other 
subjects of national concern when time and budget permit. The process will eventually 
warrant a better response of the government toward the people’s concerns by making the 
people’s interest the center of the public discourse, while giving the government enough 
resources to incorporate public comments in other areas of national interests.  
The second adjustment which only requires final legislative approval (for all four 
important treaty categories) also serves similar purposes, administrative efficiency 36 while 
acting as a safety net to ensure that the concluding treaty will truly reflects people’s interest 
before giving its permission for the country to be bound. The elimination of the legislature 
involvement prior to a treaty negotiation is to increase the autonomy and flexibility of the 
executive in taking the lead in the shaping of the country’s foreign policy, and to reduce the 
workloads of the legislature that would have resulted in its frivolous supervision when it 
                                                          
35 Cf. John C. Stennis & J. William Fulbright, Senators, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research: The Role of Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN 
POLICY, 1971, at 5 (suggesting the negative outcome of having every international agreements to go through the 
Senate that it would be literally impossible for them  to pay close attention, and give thoughtful consideration), 
LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 50-51 (1990). At the same time, 
Tocqueville advanced why high-profile or broad issues will not produce effective public participation since it 
has a tendency to intensify social conflicts driven by participants’ biases, political alliance and emotion which 
tend to make individuals lose touch with reality. Stephan Holmes, Tocqueville and Democracy, in THE IDEA OF 
DEMOCRACY 28 (David Copp, John Hampton & John E. Roemer eds., 1993) (“In the heat of the struggle each 
partisan is driven beyond the natural limits of his own views by the views and excesses of his adversaries, loses 
sight of the very aim he was pursuing …”) 
36 See Stennis & Fulbright, Lecture at American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research: The Role of 
Congress in Foreign Policy (July, 1971), in THE ROLE OF CONGRESS IN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 35. 
HENKIN, supra note 35 (describing the Senate as the Senate as “the grave-yard of treaties”). 
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comes to scrutinizing important treaties.37 The efficiency argument is thus also connected 
with a guarantee of administration responsiveness by allowing these two political branches to 
channel their energies into important matters. It is then more important to ensure that the 
legislature serves a serious function at the critical stage than playing several light roles when 
committing the country to significant treaty obligations. The procurement of legislative 
approval will work as a formal guarantee for an effective response of the public institutions.  
Similarly, the timeline and scope of the judicial interventions will serve as a 
safeguard for the people’s constitutional rights, in the making of Section 190 treaties. While 
the judicial involvement in the treaty determination which has been moved up to the stage 
prior to a negotiation will provide a certainty in the government’s public hearing obligation, 
the Constitutional Court’s additional jurisdiction in hearing a case concerning individuals 
rights’ violations by a treaty will be another important safety net that protects the people 
against the government’s potential abuse of treaty power. In terms of administrative 
effectiveness, this “pre-determination” approach will enable the executive to decide on its 
competence, especially in the making of routine, technical, or cooperative treaties to advance 
diplomatic relations with other nations. At the same time, the concept of judicial deference 
that has been applied to the Constitutional Court’s standard of review concerning the 
infringement of individuals’ rights either by the making of a treaty or by the treaty itself will 
better accommodate the government with policy space, the area which falls outside the 
judicial primary function. The proposed method of the judicial interventions, by making the 
executive’s treaty activity less disruptive, may be understood as a readjustment of judiciary-
executive relations through transforming from adversary to a more cooperative one. 
                                                          
37 HENKIN, supra note 35. 
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Nevertheless, the policing power of the judiciary remains unaltered, and will still serve as a 
check mechanism on the executive’s exercise of power in the realm of foreign affairs. 
 ii. Preserving Executive Competence in the Realm of Foreign Affairs 
 From the analysis of Chapter V, it is quite clear that the interest in preserving the 
executive autonomy in the exercise of its foreign affairs power should not be compromised. 
While the democratic values can be strengthened as previously argued, national interests 
such as economic and political benefits or diplomatic relations will be best served when the 
executive, legislative and judiciary operate as “partners” (respect each other’s authority and 
responsibility) within the framework of the constitution. The proposed model therefore 
addresses this institutional interaction which aims at creating legislature consultation and 
judicial review (the ability of the Constitutional Court to review the government’s treaty 
conduct) in a proper balance, and maintaining mutual respects among the branches in the 
area that demands expertise, speed, and effective communication for national interest to be 
well secured. Thus, the proposed model goes beyond a simple claim about conserving a 
conventional treaty-making practice by raising economic, social and political justifications to 
prove why the tradition of ensuring the executive’s sufficient autonomy in foreign affairs is 
crucial in our time.  
 Although the Section 190 amendment can arguably help preserve the executive’s 
treaty authority by providing a legislation to determine important treaties, the solution may 
still invite controversies on the treaties that might not have been contemplated on at the time 
of the enactment, but share the important aspects with those special treaties, which in effect 
will still create an uncertainty in the boundary of the executive’s treaty power. And if the 
treaty’s nature has not been ascertained, this can again raise the issue of an improper process, 
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which will affect its constitutionality. The amendment will thus only serve as a temporary 
relief to facilitate the executive’s foreign affairs administration on the foreseeable or common 
types such as routine, technical agreements, which provides no guarantee that other 
cooperative ones such as the joint communiqué (understood by the executive at the time that 
it carried no legal obligations) will be safely executed without political backlash. Above all, 
the amendment only addresses one angle of the problem. 
On the contrary, the important changes proposed by this model which especially 
concerns the reduction of the legislative approval, the creation of an oversight committee to 
(prior) ensure the constitutionality of important treaties (as a guarantee of the executive 
competence), and the application of judicial deference concept in the Constitutional Court’s 
review of the individuals’ rights infringement can tremendously help restore the executive 
branch’s autonomy, and facilitate an efficient exercise of its treaty negotiation authority in 
the long run. First of all, the absence of the legislative approval requirement on a treaty 
framework prior to a negotiation will enable the executive to act on its own discretion based 
on the information, experience and time it has while maintaining a certain level of secrecy 
concerning the country’s position in the negotiation process. This again by no means 
suggests that its broad discretion will not be counter-balanced, given the mandatory public 
participation on the fundamental issue, and the final legislative approval for all important 
treaties. An early authorization, if resulted in a deadlock of a negotiating position, will create 
further complication as whenever the country’s position has been counteracted, the executive 
will be subject to a series of legislative approvals for each adjustment. On the other hand, if 
the early authorization serves merely as a broad permission for the treaty framework, it 
would not serve any democratic purpose since the legislature would not have foreseen future 
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changes in the treaty content in order to act as a real screening agency. Secondly, the 
establishment of an oversight committee to pre-determine the nature of a treaty proposal to 
ensure each treaty’s compliance with Section 190 requirements will allow the executive to 
fully exercise its negotiation authority without disruption later on (at least on a procedural 
level). This method will reduce a number of “bad treaties” that render the executive less 
competent and less credible in the making of treaties. The issues of competency and 
credibility can also affect the flexibility and autonomy of the branch directly by weakening 
its capacity to negotiate, and indirectly by raising doubts in the mind of its treaty partners 
whether to make any concession to the agency of the country whose negotiating power is 
unsettled. As a result, it would not give the executive much room to bargain. In addition, 
enabling the executive to decide on the nature of a treaty proposal with other branches is a 
restoration of its competence, especially in the making of routine, administrative or technical 
agreements by giving the branch an opportunity to assert its position that it believes within its 
treaty authority, and by taking into account an opinion of the branch that is primarily in 
charge of a treaty process. And finally, limiting the power of the Constitutional Court’s 
review on the issues affecting important national policy in the treaty context by asking the 
court to simply apply a balancing test where a strong legitimate national interest is present is 
to provide the executive flexibility in redressing individuals whose constitutional rights may 
have been infringed as a result of the treaty implementation without completely withholding 
the Court’s ability to render a judgment.  
 Therefore, the elimination of an early legislative approval, the creation of an 
oversight committee and the application of judicial deference in the treaty context, while 
coinciding with the conventional treaty practice by preserving a certain degree of the 
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executive foreign affairs power, are deemed crucial to the assurance of an effective and 
competent exercise of the executive’s treaty authority that the amendment may fall short. 
After all, this is the area where the branch is warranted within the framework of the Thai 
Constitution. The adjustments are arguably compatible with the constitutional structure in 
which the plenary foreign affairs power (while subject to certain limits) is vested in the 
executive body. And this is so due to the fact that the undermining of this executive’s 
character is bound to create complication in the matter of the country’s international relations.  
 iii. Maintaining Foreign Relations and Avoiding of International Breach 
 The analysis of Chapter IV on the preservation of the executive’s autonomy in the 
realm of foreign affairs in relations to the principle of separation of powers suggested the 
significance of this political characteristic to the maintenance of the country’s image, 
reputation, credibility and good foreign diplomacy in the world stage. Thus, another goal of 
the proposed model is to improve the means to secure this outcome, which in a way, is for 
the people to fully exploit the benefits of the global networks. Although there are both gives 
and takes in the process of making international commitments, and it is important that the 
process should not allow the preservation of good foreign relations to take priority over the 
people’s interest, these two interests should still be equally weighed for the fact that the state 
of domestic well-being is also contingent upon the condition of external relations.38 Not only 
                                                          
38 See ROBERT GILPIN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (1987) (focusing on the 
interplay of international market forces and the increasing economic interdependence among national 
governments while recognizing that poor countries will suffer as opportunities shrink). In the case of Thailand, 
unstable diplomatic relations between Thailand and Cambodia have undermined both countries’ economies. 
Closure of their border crossings due to the political tension had been reportedly affected the trade volume and 
local lives of the two countries. See http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-10/26/content_10255381.htm. See 
also http://www.tannetwork.tv/tan/ViewData.aspx?DataID=1039922. In an extreme case, economic sanction 
which is a severe form of a diplomatic protest involves the systematic deprivation of a nation of economic 
resources through the prevention of sales or purchase of goods as well as the denial of investment, foreign 
exchange or credit to the target country. In an increasingly integrated global economy, the impacts of economic 
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does an inadvertent termination of a treaty could create “bad relations” between the countries, 
it may also incur the country in breach liability (possibly in a form of financial obligation) 
when the demanded compliance could not be made. Thus, it cannot be simply said that 
maintaining good foreign relations is less relevant to the people’s interest. By understanding 
the difference that an efficient, yet accountable treaty-making process could make, the model 
has therefore been formulated in the realization of these interests.  
 While the amendment is still lacking a mechanism to ensure that a treaty has received 
a proper process, and will not be subject to later challenge for a procedural violation, the 
proposals of the treaty category adjustment and the creation of an oversight committee are 
the guarantee for the maintenance of the country’s foreign relations. Both methods are ways 
of assuring the country’s treaty partners the success of the treaty conclusion that it will less 
likely be subject to a constitutional challenge for circumventing an important process. While 
the contraction of important treaties to only require that those affecting fundamental interests 
of the people be subject to public participation can help guarantee a survival of “less 
significant treaties”, the operation of the oversight committee will ensure that each treaty will 
receive a proper process in accordance with the constitutional requirement to prevent the 
country’s future repudiation to its international obligations, which will inevitably affect its 
credibility and create embarrassment. The fact that setting up this determination body to 
ensure the constitutionality of a treaty can save time, energy and resources on both sides is a 
contributing factor to fostering a positive and friendly environment in the treaty process. The 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
sanction upon, not just the targeted country’s economy, but also the imposer are tremendous by resulting in the 
reduction of trade flows and job loss. Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., U.S. Economic Sanctions; Their Impact on 
Trades, Jobs, and Wages (Peterson Institute for International Economics, Working Paper, 1997), available at 
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/wp.cfm?ResearchID=149. 
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model can thus help promoting greater certainty in the treaty procedure which can, in turn, 
preserve the country’s international relations.39  
 In terms of international breach avoidance, while the creation of this committee is 
especially important to reduce the possibility of a later judicial challenge on the procedural 
ground, 40 the re-wording of the final legislative process is also required to prevent the 
executive from binding the country through signature prior to obtaining formal legislative 
approval. The current constitutional text which only provides a final legislative approval after 
the treaty had been signed can open up a huge liability as there is a possibility of the 
legislature’s disapproval which could have resulted in the country’s repudiation of the 
binding treaty. With regard to the issue that results from a judicial challenge, the termination 
of a fully enforced treaty on the basis of a procedural violation does not simply release the 
country’s obligations. Even in the case of a cooperative treaty such as the Joint Communiqué 
between Thailand-Cambodia that simply contains a statement acknowledging Cambodia’s 
Pra Vihear World Heritage enlistment of which withdrawal does not create any financial 
liability for Thailand, it nevertheless costs the country in terms of diplomatic relations. A 
worse scenario certainly is when the country is involved with concessions and trade 
commitments that could have resulted in enormous political and financial consequences. 
                                                          
39 Securing certainty in the treaty process is directly relevant to a country’s credibility and stability of its foreign 
relations, In the case of the U.S., a sharp bifurcation of the treaty process between the presidential stage and the 
Senate stage has been criticized by foreign governments as making it impossible to do diplomatic business, and 
that it gave no chance of any predictability on the treaty approval, As a result, such a reaction caused annoyance 
to foreign governments and troubled United States foreign relations. HENKIN, supra note 35, at 50. See also, 
Harold Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking after I.N.S v. Chadha, 18 
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 1191, 1217 (1986). 
40 The operation of an oversight committee does not entirely foreclose a judicial challenge on the basis of the 
treaty’s unconstitutionality since the Constitutional Court can still decides on the questions of the individuals’ 
rights infringement by a treaty or the sufficiency of a public hearing held by the government. Judicial review 
must nonetheless be limited in addressing the infringed rights based on the balancing test, and in deciding on a 
public hearing standard made in accordance with legislation. See Chapter IV, Section V, C and Chapter V, 
Section II, D (ii)-(iii). 
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Thus, to ensure that the role of the Constitutional Court is involved early through the creation 
of this special committee to establish a proper process for important international agreements, 
and the participation of the legislature is effectively executed through requiring it before 
being bound by any legal instrument are to relieve the burden not of the executive, but most 
importantly, of the country. Thus, in comparison to the Section 190 amendment which still 
opens the door for the treaty’s procedural challenge due to the lack of an adequate 
determining process, the proposed model seeks to undertake a preventive approach by 
creating a mechanism that can reduce the possibility of inadvertent treaty termination in the 
realization that, when it comes to matters of international relations, the cost of providing a 
remedy can far exceed that of prevention.  
 The three areas of reforms proposed under this treaty model, which involve 
readjusting the scope of public participation and the roles of the executive, legislature and 
judiciary as equal partners can have positive effects upon the implementation of democracy 
and the principle of separation of powers within the treaty context. While empowering the 
function of public participation, and guaranteeing administrative accountability, transparency, 
effectiveness and responsiveness are ways of strengthening the country’s democratic 
characters, preserving each branch’s autonomy and its primary function is an effective 
implementation of the system of checks and balances. Despite the suggested elimination of 
Section 190’s certain mechanisms, this model still serves as an active constitutional 
safeguard for the people’s fundamental and political rights in the treaty process. The 
eradication of broad treaty categories and excessive legislative involvement are to enhance 
the realization of these important constitutional rights.  Shifting the scope of public 
participation to center on individuals’ fundamental interests, inducing effective and 
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responsive characters of the public administration upon which the protection of the people’s 
rights depend, securing the people’s participatory rights in a timely fashion, and empowering 
the Constitutional Court to address individual rights’ violations in the treaty context are the 
primary methods of constitutional guarantee under this model. These are not just good 
principles that the model can induce. In terms of practicality, the proposed reform introduces 
a more realistic approach for applying the mechanism of public participation, by creating 
efficient roles for the public institutions, and by limiting damages to the country’s 
international relations. Through this vision, the proposed model makes the principles and 
practice complementary. While the existing treaty provision may build upon a strong 
principle, its impracticality, unfortunately, turns into a major impediment to furthering its 
primary objectives.  
IV. Unresolved Questions 
 The research conduct of this dissertation primarily deals with a broad framework of a 
treaty process which has been taken out of and adjusted in accordance with the current 
Constitution. The proposed treaty model therefore provides only a general treaty-making 
procedure, which does not go into details concerning specific mechanisms such as a public 
hearing process or the determination process of the proposed oversight committee. These are 
the questions that will require further research, and must be answered had this model been 
accepted. 
 Legislation enactment may be necessary in order to establish the committee and to 
determine its member composition and the manner of conduct that has been proven to be 
most efficient. The participation of the legal offices of the executive and legislature in this 
committee is also a possibility, given the office of the Juridical Council already acted as the 
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executive’s primary legal counsel. The manner of the conduct will determine whether legal 
opinions from different branches should be deliberated at the same venue within the same 
time frame or in circulation by having the executive be the first to take up on the issue, and 
forward its opinions to the other two branches. The composition and determination process of 
the oversight committee must be dealt separately outside the constitutional context which 
should only provide a broad framework of a treaty process.  
 Similarly, legislation enactments concerning a hearing standard and a specific 
procedure are required to establish a public hearing process. In the absence of the law, 
Section 190 will open up an opportunity for the Constitutional Court to assert its own hearing 
standard causing greater chance for the country to face international breach. Nevertheless, the 
legislation enactment may not entirely foreclose the issue of international liability. The 
ability of the Constitutional Court to determine on the question of the individuals’ rights 
violation by a treaty and the public hearing sufficiency in accordance with the legislation 
means that the government is technically still subject to the judicial challenge even after the 
treaty has been in force. However, in terms of the public hearing issue, the law will reduce 
the arbitrariness of judgment, and instead help ascertain a public hearing standard by giving 
guidance to the executive on what it should expect and respect. Thus, what this model may 
fail to solve are the possibility that the judiciary body will still be able to turn down the treaty 
that either infringes upon an individual’s rights or does not meet the required hearing 
standard provided in the legislation, and the kind of remedy to be furnished to the people 
whose constitutional rights were violated as a result of the treaty implementation or the 
inadequacy (in the case of participatory rights in the treaty process). These questions present 
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a difficult challenge to perfect a treaty model, and are outside the research parameter of this 
dissertation.  
V. Conclusion 
 The current democratic dilemma under the implementation of Section 190 Treaty 
provision involves the improvement of administrative transparency and accountability that 
led to the undermining of other important democratic characters. The irony of the approach 
reveals that the principles of good governance and democracy have inadvertently been 
weakened as a result of the efforts to upholding them. While facing internal challenges such 
as lagging democratic culture, people’s weak faith in the effectiveness and responsiveness of 
government administration, the country also encounters external barriers in terms of foreign 
relations stability and international responsibility as a result of Section 190 innovation whose 
amendment has not provided a better response (Chapter I). A strong motivation of this 
reform should then be understood through the political character of Thailand and its 
evolution that revealed the struggles in its democratic path. And the reason why the 2007 
Constitution is playing hardball with the executive should explain the entire history. As part 
of the democratic reform effort, under the new understanding, the recent constitutional 
structure has set the new roles and boundaries among the public, legislature, executive and 
judiciary in the realm of foreign affairs. The increased participation of the public and 
legislature, and the ability of the judiciary to intervene in the treaty-making process were the 
new powers prescribed in the Constitution (Chapter II). But because of the issues of internal 
and external accountabilities brought by Section 190, each of its mechanism, namely the 
requirements of public consultation, multiple legislative approvals and judicial intervention 
was required to be examined and reconsidered.   
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 Pursuant to the new constitutional framework, the role of the public in the treaty 
process was translated into a mechanism of public participation to which important treaties 
must be subject. In the advancement of the functionality of this mechanism, the theories and 
weaknesses of political participation were elaborated and addressed in order to entail public 
participation which is one of the Section 190’s latest innovations to foster the right political 
culture and enhance the democratic characters of the public administration. The study then 
suggested that an incorporation of the liberal approach which places an emphasis on 
individuals’ fundamental rights is recommended to advance the objectives and improve the 
effectiveness of the mechanism (Chapter III). In terms of the role of the State, Section 190 
mechanisms have readjusted the relationship among the public institutions by increasing 
legislative and judicial abilities to check upon the executive’s treaty activity. This 
readjustment, however, has a strong implication on the operation of the principle of 
separation of powers which comes into play in preserving not only the accountability of the 
government, but also each branch’s autonomy. Thus, to secure the practicality and efficiency 
of these checks mechanisms provided under Section 190, the examination on the principle of 
separations of powers provided an answer to a very important question concerning the extent 
of the executive’s central authority and judicial deference in the realm of foreign affairs. An 
aspect of the separation of powers principle which underlines the independence of each 
political branch thus unfolded the significance of the centralized executive foreign policy 
making (CEFP) concept. This is the notion that the proposed reforms of Section 190 take into 
consideration in order to relieve both internal and external pressures in the execution of our 
foreign policy (Chapter IV).  
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 The analysis of each component of Section 190 mechanisms is a necessary step to 
reformulating a treaty model that has been coupled with the examination of the treaty 
practices in various jurisdictions. From the treaty experiences of the surveyed countries, the 
study on the roles of the public, executive, legislature and judiciary in their treaty processes 
showed that these countries reflected the CEFP tradition while a public participation is 
commonly absent, except in Switzerland which limits the function of public participation to a 
form of a treaty referendum to facilitate efficient execution of its foreign policy. The 
derivation of the proposed treaty-making process therefore factors in these variations in terms 
of the level of legislature’s involvement, and the degree and manner of judicial intervention 
in pursuant to the analysis of the separation of powers doctrine while recognizing liberalism 
as a practical approach for public participation. In sum, the proposed treaty model consisting 
of the three areas of reforms is fundamentally based on the analyzed components of Chapter 
III (the scope of public participation) and IV (the manner of the legislature and judiciary 
participation) to secure the rights mechanisms in the treaty process that can further our 
democracy (Chapter V). 
 In the conclusion of this dissertation, the proposed model of a treaty-making process 
provides ample justifications for its adoption ranged from the enhancement of the democratic 
principle to the practical aspect such as the maintenance of good foreign diplomacy. The 
proposal tries to fix the flaws of Section 190 which resulted from the inadequacy in its 
response to the internal and external challenges, while still preserving constitutional 
safeguards within the treaty-making process. The proposal provides a way of securing 
transparency and responsiveness in the internal process, and ensuring efficiency and 
accountability in the external course where individual rights and public interests lie. The 
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model does not only serve as a minor structural reform that primarily focuses on rearranging 
the roles of the public institutions, but also the cultivation of a new political cultural 
discipline which can only build upon strong positive relations between the people and the 
public institutions. These are the major arguments that, I believe, justify the adoption of this 
model. Although Section 190 is considered a revolutionary treaty-making process which 
places an emphasis on improving transparency and accountability through heavily restraining 
the executive’s treaty power, and increasing public and other institutions’ controls over such 
an exercise of power, the costs it brings can undermine the function of democracy and 
jeopardize public interest in the long run. The provision accompanies many problems that 
may have been overlooked by the writers whose determinations were to protect the 
generation against Thailand’s past democratic failure. But these attempts may not lead us far 
enough down the road if they constantly present impediments in the executive’s function 
without proper balance. Thus, to me, it is very clear why this proposed model should at least 
be considered. And why this model should be fully embraced is a question for the Thai 
people who are the original owner of the Constitution.  
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Appendix 
Country Prior to Treaty 
Negotiation 
During Negotiation Prior to entry into 
Force 
France 
(civil law) 
LR: No official role  
 
EC: Central power of 
Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs (MFA) 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: President has 
power to negotiate and 
ratify treaties 
 
JC: The Conseil 
Constitutionnel has the 
power to ensure the 
conformity of the 
statute authorizing the 
ratification or approval 
of  an international 
agreement to the 
Constitution (art. 61) 
 
PP: President or 
members of 
Parliament may 
submit a bill relating 
to the economic, social 
or environmental 
policy of the Nation 
for a referendum (art. 
11) 
EC: President/MFA 
conclude and ratifies 
treaties (art.52) 
 
LR: Treaties to be 
approved by Parliament 
prior to taking effects - 
Peace Treaties, Trade 
agreements, treaties or 
agreements relating to 
international 
organization, those 
committing the finances 
of the State, those 
modifying provisions 
which are the preserve of 
statute law, those relating 
to the status of persons, 
and those involving the 
ceding, exchanging or 
acquiring of territory 
(art.53) 
Germany 
(civil law) 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: controls initiation, 
conclusion and 
termination of treaty 
negotiation 
LR: Observation of 
Parliament members at 
the invitation of EC 
 
EC: President is 
vested with full power 
to negotiate 
 
PP: Consulted through 
representative bodies 
such as chambers of 
commerce, trade 
unions and other 
organizations 
EC: Treaties are 
concluded by the 
President and the Federal 
government 
 
LR: Treaties to be 
required for legislature’s 
participation at their 
conclusions - Treaties 
affecting the existing 
legislations or requiring a 
new law, affecting the 
existence of the state and 
its territorial integrity, 
independence, status and 
sovereignty (art. 59(2)) 
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India 
(common law) 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: In the absence of 
any legislation, a 
power to enter into a 
treaty negotiation is 
exercised by the 
Cabinet 
(art. 52) 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: Sole power to 
conduct a treaty 
negotiation 
 
PP: No statutory or 
constitutional 
requirements for direct 
public consultation. 
EC: The cabinet exercises 
a power to sign or ratify a 
treaty 
 
LR: Treaties to be 
required for legislation 
implementation - treaties 
relating to cession of 
Indian territory, affecting 
the existing laws or 
restricting or infringing 
upon individual rights 
(art. 253) 
 
Japan 
(civil law) 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: The cabinet has 
the power to initiate 
and undertake treaty 
negotiation (art. 73(2)) 
LR: No official role. 
The government either 
chooses to report on 
the negotiation to the 
parliament or can be 
questioned by the 
parliament 
 
EC: Maintain the 
primary responsibility 
to negotiate a treaty 
(art. 73(2)) 
 
PP: No statutory or 
constitutional 
requirements. EC may 
choose to consult with 
public 
EC: Concludes and 
effects only executive 
agreements (routine, 
technical, administrative 
agreements) 
 
LR: Treaties to be subject 
to formal approval of the 
Legislature - Agreements 
relating to the 
Parliament’s legislative 
power (new leg., 
modified law), involving 
expenditure unless 
previously authorized by 
the Parliament, and those 
that are politically 
important in nature (art. 
73(3)) 
 
New Zealand 
(common law) 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: The executive is 
vested with full power 
to initiate a treaty 
negotiation, and to 
approve its negotiating 
position without 
having the official 
involvement of the 
legislature.  
LR: No official role. 
But may only partake 
at the invitation of the 
EC 
 
EC: Primary body that 
undertakes a treaty 
negotiation. EC 
generally secures the 
passage of the 
necessary legislation 
EC: May only effect 
technical or routine 
agreements or treaties 
that only aim at creating 
rights and obligations 
between states, and do 
not affect individual 
rights and the existing 
laws. In case of technical 
agreements, parliament 
delegates authority to 
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prior to ratifying the 
treaty 
 
PP: No statutory 
requirement for public 
consultation. But 
public (generally 
NGOs) may attend 
important treaty 
negotiation as 
observers. 
implement a treaty to EC 
(in a form of rules and 
regulations)  
 
LR: Once ratified by EC, 
a treaty is generally 
required to be 
implemented by 
Parliament through 
incorporating it into its 
domestic law 
South Africa 
(common law) 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: The President and 
cabinet maintain the 
primary function in 
treaty negotiation 
(Section 231(1)) 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: Sole negotiator. 
parliamentary 
committees are not 
authorized to negotiate 
or renegotiate the 
terms of treaties, 
except inserting a 
reservation 
 
PP: No statutory or 
constitutional 
requirements.  
EC: Concludes and 
effects only executive 
agreements (routine, 
technical, administrative 
agreements)  
 
LR: Treaties are 
generally required to be 
approved by resolution in 
both the National 
Assembly and the 
National Council 
Province (Section 231(2), 
(3)) 
Switzerland 
(civil law) 
LR: Share the treaty-
making power through 
shaping external 
relations and 
influencing foreign 
policy (art. 54) 
 
EC: Share the treaty-
making power through 
initiating a treaty 
negotiation 
LR: The Committees 
on Foreign Policy of 
both chambers are 
allowed to send their 
own observers to 
attend international 
negotiations. Federal 
Council must inform 
the committees 
through the process 
 
EC: Federal Council 
negotiates treaties 
 
PP: Mandatory 
optional referendum 
when 50,000 citizens 
or 8 cantons so 
requests for treaties 
containing important 
EC: The Federal Council 
may conclude the 
following treaties alone – 
(i) agreements the 
Federal Assembly had 
authorized in advance 
whether explicitly or 
implicitly, (ii) purely 
administrative or routine 
agreements of minor 
importance (i.e. no 
individual rights 
affected), and (iii) urgent 
agreements that must 
require a provisional 
entry into force 
 
LR: The Federal 
Assembly must approve 
all other treaties that EC 
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provisions, 
establishing rules of 
law or requiring the 
enactment of federal 
statutes for their 
implementation. (art. 
141(d)) 
is not competent to act 
alone (art. 85(5)) 
United 
Kingdom  
(common law) 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: The exercise of 
treaty-making power 
is the responsibility of 
the Secretary of State 
for Foreign and 
Commonwealth 
Affairs, which 
operates as a central 
coordination with 
other governmental 
departments that has 
primary responsibility 
to initiate a treaty 
negotiation. 
LR: No official role 
 
EC: Main negotiating 
body 
 
PP: EC may choose to 
consult with public to 
ensure legislature’s 
approval 
EC: The Royal 
prerogative issue Full 
Powers for the executive 
to conclude and sign 
treaties. 
 
LR: No treaty can give 
effects without receiving 
the cooperation of 
Parliament (in the form 
of legislation enactment) 
Treaties requiring 
legislative action are 
those; 
(i) Modifying/adding to 
the existing law or statute 
(ii) Endowing additional 
power to the Crown, not 
previously existed 
(iii) Affecting private 
rights 
(iv) Creating a direct or 
contingent financial 
obligation upon UK 
(v) Providing for an 
increase in the powers of 
the European Parliament  
LR – Legislature 
EC – Executive 
JC – Judiciary  
PP - Public 
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